Beirut Bombing: A Social Take

Photo of the bombed apartment where Saleh Al Arouri and six other members were assassinated. It was captured on Dec. 3, 2024 by Al Jazeera cameraman Jawad Shukr. 

On Dec. 2, 2024, the population of Beirut was shaken by an Israeli attack on a supposedly residential building in the Hezbollah controlled southern suburbs, killing Saleh Al Arouri, a prominent Hamas political leader, and six other members during a secret Hamas meeting. It is the first Israeli attack on Beirut since the July War of 2006.  

The Situation

Since Oct. 8, Hezbollah and Israel have been incessantly attacking each other within a ‘limited conflict’ under ‘rules of engagement.’ On the Lebanese side, this ‘conflict’ has taken the lives of more than 160 people (at the moment of writing), some of whom were innocent citizens, children and journalists like Reuter’s Issam Abdallah. It has also caused great infrastructural damages across the southern and central western regions of Lebanon, displacing approximately 80,000 people . 

On the Israeli side, the death toll is 15 with minor infrastructural damages, but with thousands evacuated under the government’s organization and request. 

A Brief Political Analysis

The attack on Beirut came as a shock to many, even to those who may have anticipated it. It marks the first potential spark of an official all out war between both parties, being that it is Israel’s biggest breach of the ‘rules of engagement.’ This latter phrase in the conflict’s context refers to an equivalent right of response by both sides, which is what all Lebanese are dreading. If Hezbollah were to respond equally to the attack, then Lebanon will be pulled into a dreadful war. 

Many concerned believe Israel is testing the waters and ploying to drag Hezbollah to war. Israel’s unofficial defence for the attack is to get rid of all those involved in the Oct. 7 operation as clearly expressed by the Israeli Mossad Chief’s vow to “settle the score” a day after the Beirut bombing. Yet, there is more to see on the wider scope: Washington has recently refused the inclusion of Lebanon in the regional conflict, which Israel appears to disagree with. As a result, Israel took this discrete, precise attack instead of its usual bombardments like in the southern regions of Lebanon. Even though Israeli government officials are claiming that the attack was on Hamas, not Hezbollah and Lebanon, the violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty is undeniable. Furthermore, on Dec. 3 Israel bombed the Lebanese village of Naqoura, killing a prominent Hezbollah leader Hussein Yazbeck. Clearly, the attacks are not limited to Hamas. Thus,we could argue that Israel was testing Hezbollah’s waters by attacking its central neighbourhood, but also verifying the US’ commitment to de-escalation in Lebanon. The latter’s officials denied any prior knowledge of the planned drone bombing. Moreover, it is also Netanyahu trying to postpone his inevitable electoral defeat by prolonging the war and expanding into Lebanon. 

In response, Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrullah warned during his speech on Dec. 3 that Arouri’s death will not go “without response and punishment,” claiming that it will be “very, very, very costly.” Consequently, observers are anticipating potential attacks; however, some interpret it as Hezbollah maintaining a ‘dormant’ right of response, so no immediate reciprocation. In fact, since Oct. 8, Hezbollah has been relatively showing a tactful response in an attempt to balance between supporting Hamas and controlling the internal Lebanese turmoil. 

Immediate Social Responses

Instances after the bombing, there was a moment of panic that  spread all over Lebanon. People in my neighbourhood, which is ten minutes away from the site of bombing, said that they had heard “three consecutive loud explosion sounds.” Two friends of mine, who live within metres from the site said that “they did not hear an explosion” – often a normal situation when the person is within  close proximity to the bombing – and that “they heard a drone movement but lower than the usual Israeli warplanes viciously hovering over Lebanon.” One of them, living on the same street, said out of fear, “whatever it was they bombed us with, I felt it pass just above my house.”

No one really knew who was assassinated, yet because of Lebanon’s consistent experiences with assassinations since 2005, it was almost immediately and  unequivocally accepted that an assassination had taken place. 

The fear spread through all telecommunication ways possible. I was driving with my friends when it all happened and, within a matter of seconds, all the phones in the car were ringing. It was the typical Lebanese response to check on everyone after an attack, especially considering almost everyone in Lebanon would know someone who lives near the site of the bombing. My brother, who was in a shopping center when the explosion happened, saw many “immediately hold their kids and rush blindly to their homes.” Indeed, soon after it was made known that Israel bombed Beirut, its streets were emptied up as everyone took shelter in their homes in fear of further bombing. Even if, by far, this surely was not the biggest, most traumatic bombing to occur nor was it the most dangerous Israeli attack within the past five years, the consistent post-Beirut 2020 explosion trauma and the current Gaza and southern Lebanon massacres were enough to trigger a wave of fear all over the country. 

Within an hour, most Beirut boulangeries had run out of Lebanese pita bread as people bought essentials preparing for a potential war. Unlike prior to the 2006 July War, consciousness and fear of the repercussions of war is strongly present among the Lebanese.  In comparison, in 2006, when Hezbollah announced the success of its kidnapping mission in the south, most Lebanese celebrated the success as many hoped to see the Lebanese hostages being exchanged for the kidnapped soldiers. Few were the ones that rushed out of fear to markets and boulangeries. However, it is evident that the trauma scarred in most Lebanese from that disastrous war created an unseen dreadfulness. As a result, most Lebanese, including to some extent Hezbollah, do not wish to go to war with Israel at the moment of writing. 

The Reproduction of Social Divisions

The Dec. 2 Israeli attack on Beirut reproduced the never-ending Lebanese social divisions, some of which were essential factors to the 1975-1990 Civil War: the Palestinian refugees and the war against Israel. For a long time, Palestinian resistance groups, like Hamas, and also Lebanese ones, like Hezbollah, have existed out of the Lebanese military control. It has sparked on multiple occasions disputes with Lebanese civilians who feel endangered by the existence of armed groups. Today, many, if not a majority, stand against these armed groups. 

Most Lebanese stand with the Palestinian cause, whether on a humanitarian or identity basis. However, the division, which nowadays is not across religious sects as during the pre-civil war, stands on thin lines: ways of resistance and national priorities. Some Lebanese do not believe it is their duty to liberate Palestine militarily, seeing that the Lebanese cause – reclaiming Lebanese Israeli-occupied territories only – is of priority and that it should take place diplomatically or via the Lebanese military. This faction of the population perceives Hezbollah as an Iranian terrorist group endangering Lebanese sovereignty as much as Israel. On the other hand, another faction of the population perceives Hezbollah as their guardian angel against Israel because of a weakened Lebanese state.

Interestingly, the latter faction is recently divided on the ‘Hezbollah’s balanced Palestinian-Lebanese strategy.’ A part of this latter faction sees the military support to Palestine from the Lebanese southern borders as morally necessary, yet should be kept limited to avoid an unwanted all-out war. Meanwhile, the opposing group, of which many are impoverished business owners and employees, still support Hezbollah yet believe that Lebanon is already in an economic crisis and that it is not the right time for liberation.  

As is the case that very few want a full war, even fewer from the anti-Hezbollah faction do not morally support the Palestinian cause and identify as Zionists. The political identification is never binary as extremists claim it to be.

The Beirut attack has reproduced immensely this social division on the political stage as Lebanese dreadfully await to see if Hezbollah’s ‘silent strategy of response’ unravels into an unwanted war.