How Students Are Keeping Up With Ukraine

A Student Perspective on the Russo-Ukrainian War

Estonian second year student, Markus Vaher, created a group chat following the Ukrainian invasion, in which students share information and updates. In five responses, he sums up his experience.

1. Why did you create the Ukraine group chat? What is the purpose?

The day that the war broke out was very cloudy and depressing here in Menton. I remember waking up in the early morning, way before my alarm. The war had started a mere two hours earlier, but my parents and close friends had already texted me. Just a few minutes later, I found myself plunging into the news, making coffee and breakfast on the side.

What I was seeing really struck me differently. I felt that I wanted to discuss the situation with others from our campus, and perhaps inform those who were less up to date with the events that have taken place in Ukraine in the last decade. Half an hour after I waken up, the group chat was born.

2. How have you been following the invasion so closely? Are there any apps or sources you would recommend?

Following a live war from a distance is always quite exhausting, it is very emotionally draining. It takes up a lot of your time, and distracts you from whatever else you might be doing. But if it matters to you, then you will keep following the events.

My sources vary quite a bit. In a large part, especially for information about battles and bombings, I follow Ukrainian Telegram channels like the Kyiv Independent, Политика страны, Украина сейчас, and Киев сейчас. For information about Russian and Belarussian internal opposition, NEXTA Live and Осторожно новости are quite good. A lot of information also comes through Estonian media and the Estonian Council of Foreign Relations, of which I am a member. And Twitter, of course, but as a source it is not very reliable.

3. As an Estonian, how do you feel about the safety and security of your country and family? How does being Estonian impact your perception of the invasion?

24 February, the day that the war started, was also Estonia’s 104th independence day. The speeches and celebrations that day took on a very different, darker tone. Our people remember history. We remember the battles, the killings, the deportations and carpet-bombings of World War II. We remember - my parents from first-hand experience - the silent terror of the [Russian] occupation [of Estonia]. So, of course, the symbolic meaning of this conflict is very deep for us. We remember how our people, language, and culture were being erased, and we are now seeing a revived attempt at that. I have never stepped foot in Ukraine, but we have a lot of common historical experiences with the Ukrainian people.

Today, I do not see a direct threat to the safety of my friends and family. Our country is a highly committed member of NATO and the EU, our society is heavily opposed to any form of Russian domination and influence. Compared to an attack on Ukraine, an attack on Estonia would be even more costly for Putin’s regime. We have already proved this with the level of military support we are offering to Ukraine: proportionally to population size, Estonia has provided the largest amount of military aid of any country, and in absolute terms, we are in third place after the United States and the United Kingdom.

4. What do you think has motivated Putin? Do you think he has an upper hand?

For a long time I was skeptical about the narrative that Putin just wants to rebuild a Russian empire in the former territory of the Soviet Union, perhaps because I expected him to be more rational. Since the war started, however, I have begun to give more credit to this view of him as an imperialist. After all - attacking Ukraine was a very high risk, but low reward endeavour. And he still went for it.

I do not think he has an upper hand, however. As of my writing this article [March 28, 2022], the war on the ground has come to a stalemate, whilst Putin is losing on the information and economic fronts. He has won very little so far, and even if he can drag the conflict out, there is little for him to gain. On a more personal level, he seems to have lost a large part of the legacy he sought to make for himself. Even the judo belt was taken away.

There is an important historical comparison. When Poland was attacked by Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939, it took the invading forces 36 days to occupy the country. It seems highly likely that Ukraine will pass that mark, albeit at a great cost to human lives. Yet it is nowhere close to losing the war. The question is whether Ukrainians can win back their land.

5. What have been the biggest outcomes and challenges of the war thus far? Do you see these persisting? How do you feel about the international response?

The biggest positive outcome is that Ukrainian society has been reoriented toward the West. If Ukrainians and Russians might have gotten along well a decade ago, the animosity between them, between normal, everyday people, has grown very large. And so Ukrainian unity and commitment to Western values have never been as large as today. After all, Ukrainians are the only people who have died fighting under the European flag.

The biggest negative outcome is, obviously, the cost in human lives and livelihoods. This war has already resulted in more than a thousand civilian deaths, including the confirmed bombings of three hospitals and nine schools. There are up to four million people that have left the country, just as many have been displaced within. It is very hard to tell today how the health and well-being of these people can be ensured, or how they could safely return to their homes in a relatively short time-frame.

A lot has been done, but nonetheless the international response should be stronger, especially regarding a lot of low-risk measures, such as humanitarian aid, military intelligence sharing, limiting Russian disinformation, and working on ending the European dependence on Russian fossil fuels. The slow response in many of these areas is perhaps behind technical challenges that the public is not aware of. But in other cases it might be a lack of political will or real commitment.

The proposal of a NATO-backed no-fly zone, however, is a technical question. Too often, it is seen as a symbolic or diplomatic question rather than a purely military one, but at the end of the day, it is the military calculus that matters. As of now, it is unlikely it will ever be established.