New Milestone, the Ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel: Why It Happened and What It Changed

On November 27, U.S. President Joe Biden announced a ceasefire to end 14 months of intense fighting between Israel and Hezbollah. The agreement, brokered by the U.S. and France, marks the conclusion of a conflict that caused extensive losses and suffering on both sides, “designed to be a permanent cessation of hostilities,” U.S President Biden told reporters.

The Israeli offensive significantly weakened the Iran-backed Hezbollah, leaving its leadership decapitated and its resources severely depleted, though not entirely eradicated. This came at the cost of widespread destruction across Lebanon, killing more than 3900 people indiscriminately, particularly in the Southern Litani area, where infrastructure was devastated, and civilians faced brutal violence. Meanwhile, Hezbollah, through its cross-border missile attacks, managed to paralyze Northern and Central Israel for months, displacing over 1 million residents in regions such as the High Galilee. It also inflicted substantial damage on Israeli troops attempting to penetrate Lebanese territory in the last months of operations.

The ceasefire is already reshaping domestic and regional dynamics, with inextricable implications for ongoing conflicts and political landscapes in neighboring states. This development is closely linked to the ongoing Israeli operations in Gaza, with direct repercussions for Lebanese and Israeli internal affairs, as well as the revival of the once-stagnant Syrian civil war.

While Hezbollah had refrained from directly supporting Hamas by opening a “supporting front” since October 8, 2023, Hamas now appears more likely to accept a truce with less restrictive conditions. After the killing of its former leader, Yahya Al-Sinwar, on October 16, the group initially maintained a stance of stubborn resistance, a hallmark of its approach since the onset of the conflict. However, the ongoing isolation of Hamas, compounded by daily massacres and the starvation of  about two million people in the enclave, has intensified pressure on the group. In Cairo, President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi hosted a dual meeting between Hamas and Fath for the first time since October 7, aiming to discuss Gaza’s future leadership post-ceasefire. This aligns with Israel’s primary condition besides freeing the hostages to end the conflict: the removal of Hamas from power in Gaza. 

Hezbollah has maintained pressure on Israel until the final days of the conflict, forcing millions of Israelis to take shelter from near-daily missile sirens. The group also launched successful resisting attacks on Israeli forces in Southern Lebanon. However, Israel’s targeted assassinations of Hezbollah leaders, culminating in the killing of Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on September 27, left the group weakened. The new Hezbollah leadership under new Secretary-General Naeem Qassem accepted a ceasefire that required the withdrawal of its forces to the Northern Litani River, roughly 35 kilometers from the Lebanese-Israeli border. For Hezbollah, continuing hostilities would have been unsustainable after a widely popular view among the Lebanese people that Lebanon has nothing to do with the Israeli war on Gaza and needs to be more focused on the shattering domestic economic crisis, given the need to rebuild its internal hierarchy more than involving in another regional destructive war.

On the Israeli side, Netanyahu also recognized the limitations of extending a prolonged guerrilla war in Lebanon. With his focus shifting to the southern front in Gaza, Netanyahu sought to avoid the high costs of fighting on two fronts. A deeper incursion into Lebanon would not have decisively undermined Hezbollah’s military capabilities but would have placed immense financial and human strain on Israeli forces. The strain on Netanyahu’s coalition government—composed of far-right and ultra-Orthodox parties such as the United Torah Judaism party—further complicated the situation. Many ultra-Orthodox citizens, exempt from mandatory military service, opposed conscription efforts to address manpower shortages, threatening the coalition’s stability. Last October, UTJ party head and Housing Minister Yitzhak Goldknopf addressed the issue by saying, “Without a doubt, the conscription law will be passed before the government approves the budget… [but] if it doesn’t happen, we won’t be in the government.” Additionally, with the Knesset’s constitutional requirement to approve the government’s budget for 2025 before the deadline on March 31, the economic toll of simultaneous wars made a single-front conflict a more pragmatic choice. 

The future in Lebanon remains uncertain. The ceasefire agreement stipulates that over 10,000 Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) troops will be deployed in the Southern Litani region, reinforcing the Lebanese state’s official authority. However, the broader effort to centralize state power faces significant challenges with the two polarized camps—one supporting Hezbollah and the other calling for disarmament. Past ceasefires, such as the 2006 UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the relatively short war between Hezbollah and Israel, have demonstrated the Lebanese state’s inability to assert control over Hezbollah’s strongholds for the following two decades. Now, with Syrian rebel groups making significant advances in Syria, Hezbollah risks losing its critical supply routes from Iran through Syrian regime-controlled territories. This creates an opportunity for the Lebanese state to reclaim authority, provided it can overcome internal divisions and fill the state vacuum that has been functioning without a president since Michel Aoun’s term ended two years ago.

Culminating the consequences with the main event, the civil war in Syria officially ended with the toppling of the long-lasting Assad regime and Ba’ath ruling, which had been standing since November 1970. Just one day after the ceasefire was announced, Syrian rebel groups based in Idlib launched a surprise offensive, breaking the Syrian regime’s siege and capturing Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city, in less than two days. This rapid advance, led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has revived the Syrian civil war, but this time it was faster than anyone can imagine. The rebels capitalized on the distractions facing the Syrian regime’s allies: Russia’s involvement in Ukraine, Iran’s international approach uncertainty and Hezbollah’s weakened state. Over less than two weeks, HTS forces reached the Syrian capital, Damascus, after the Syrian overthrown president fled the country for an unknown destination. After the regime’s allies have shown little willingness to re-engage militarily in Syria’s internal conflict, Bashar Al Assad regime’s total collapse was inevitable.

With the pace of the rebels and the unprecedented retreat of the Syrian Arab Army, the rebels penetrated Damascus in the early morning of the 8th of December, putting an end to 54 years–lasting dictatorship of Al-Assad family in Syria.