Jenna Ahmed for Students for Justice in Palestine, Menton
September
Nearly a year into Israel’s war on Gaza, Palestinians observe the 42nd anniversary of the 1982 massacres of Sabra and Shatila. Several regional crises led to the massacres, including the Nakba of 1948, the fifteen-year-long Lebanese Civil War beginning in 1975, and the re-establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in Beirut in 1970. A driving force of these historic events were the efforts of the Israeli government and its military to maintain a state in a region inimical to its presence.
During the Nakba, the Arabic word for “catastrophe,” 750,000 Palestinians were forced from their homes by Zionist militias and the new Israeli Army following the UN Declaration of the establishment of the Jewish Israeli state and the first Arab-Israeli war. 110,000 of these Palestinains fled to Lebanon. Sabra was originally an impoverished neighborhood in west Beirut; it came to border Shatila, a refugee camp for displaced Palestinians established in 1949. The large influx of Palestinian migrants caused significant demographic shifts in Lebanon, intensifying already precarious dynamics.
Leading up to the 1975 civil war, the Lebanese state was grappling with its French colonial legacy and a plethora of sectarian conflict among Marionites, Sunnis and Shias. While religious conflicts and disagreements regarding systems of sectarian rule were considerable factors, class struggle, unequal distributions of power, and deciding who and how different territories would be incorporated into the new state were equally relevant. Undeniably, a significant stressor in the context of the Lebanese Civil War was the question of Palestinian refugees and their independence movements.
Throughout the Civil War, as several political and military groups emerged, alliances shifted and international players became increasingly relevant. At home, the Lebanese forces i.e. far-right Christian militias, namely branches of the Phalange or Kataeb, were fighting the Lebanese Arab Army and the PLO. Within this context, several splinter groups and alliances emerged. Abroad, Israel supported militias within the Lebanese forces. Syria entered the conflict on two opposing sides throughout the course of the war. Evidently, allyship within the war surpassed issues of religion or nationality and was the result of constant new developments.
The most consequential of these alliances, in the context of the massacres, was between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and a far-right militia within the Lebanese forces. This alliance was strategic and ensured several things, among which included Israel’s access to the Palestinian forces and the establishment of a right-wing, pro-Israeli government in Lebanon.
The failure to secure these strategic initiatives instigated the attacks on Sabra and Shatila. In June of 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon for the second time, with the dual mission of protecting Israel’s northern citizens and eliminating the PLO. In accordance with international agreements, PLO forces withdrew. However, on Sept. 14, the president-elect of the Phalange or Kataeb and leader within the Lebanese forces, Bashir Gemayel, who had become increasingly less accommodating to Israel’s proposals, was assassinated. Not only did this put an end to Israel’s attempts to establish a puppet regime in Lebanon, but it provoked uproar among the Christian forces who initially blamed the Palestinian Movement.
At the time of the massacre, all multinational forces had withdrawn and an Israeli Blockade was in effect around the camps. On Sept. 16, the IDF’s allied Lebanese militia entered Sabra and Shatila. For 43 hours, the right-wing militia carried out a murderous rampage in which civilians were shot, beaten, raped and bulldozed into unmarked graves.
Witnesses reported Israeli military officials watching as the killings continued and providing the militia with food and ammunition. In an interview, Dawood Mohamed Nasser, a Palestinian survivor of the massacre, describes how immediately after news spread of Bashir Gemayel’s death, Israeli warplanes and flares filled the sky. The following day, with Israeli forces blockading the camp, the killing began. In the interview, Dawood states, “What they did to us, no human could be capable of doing so.”
In the massacre’s immediate aftermath, as foreign reporters and broadcasters shared the carnage with the world, the Israeli government strictly denied any association with the event, stating gruesome fighting had occurred between the Lebanese militia and so-called Palestinian terrorists. During the following months, audio tapes, intelligence reports and eyewitness accounts began to reveal the extent of Israel’s involvement.
Eventually, as the international community gained further insight into the crimes committed that day, attention was turned to Israel’s Defense Minister Ariel Sharon. However, the 1983 Israeli-led Kahan Commission, found that the Phalange acted entirely alone and that Israel played no direct role in the massacres.
This ruling came despite the fact that throughout the two days of bloodshed, several communications had passed between the militia and Israeli intelligence, many of which admitted to the fact that no terrorists could be found within the camp and that the majority of victims were civilians.
A transcript within the Kahan Commission report recounted the IDF divisional intelligence officer’s statements “that the Phalangists within the camp ‘are wondering what to do with the population they are finding inside. On the one hand, it seems, there are no terrorists there. . . . On the other hand, they have amassed women, children, and apparently also old people, with whom they don’t exactly know what to do.’”
The commission declared that Ariel Sharon had indirectly been involved by allowing the Phalange entrance into the camp and not putting a stop to the bloodshed. The commission subsequently asked for his resignation. Although he obliged, Sharon was elected as Prime Minister several years later in 2001.
The international community shared several similar condemnations, all of which were ultimately futile. The United Nations condemned the action as an act of genocide but did not pursue further consequence on the matter. Most notably, in 2002, 23 of the massacre survivors brought a case against Sharon in the Belgian court for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The court case was—again—to no avail. Primarily, there were issues of jurisdiction despite Belgium’s ability to prosecute foreigners accused of humanitarian crimes. More significantly, Elie Hobeika, leader within the Kataeb, and liaison to Israel during the massacre, was killed in a bombing of his home soon after agreeing to testify against Sharon. Now, over 40 years later, justice has not been served, nor is it on the horizon.
Despite going largely undiscussed in international settings, this was a mass murder of two to three thousand Palestinians and Lebanese. Remembering Sabra and Shatila is increasingly relevant as fighting expands again into Lebanon. In their stated efforts to combat terrorism, Israel is continuously targeting highly concentrated civilian residentials utilized by both Hamas and Hezbollah.
The massacres of Sabra and Shatila are a prime example of how regimes and organized political parties have and continue to answer the “Palestinian question." Unprosecuted massacres have become the record of the international community in the face of the Palestinian struggle, whether by the Israeli state or extremist militias. As negotiations for a ceasefire continue between Israeli forces and Hamas, accountability for the loss of life must be of the utmost priority.