End of the Year Issue
Camilla Maury for CERS
April
The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 marked the end of a dictatorship, leaving Syria free from Assad family rule after 50 years. Surely that’s a cause for celebration... However, Syria finds itself at a new crossroads. It is tasked with establishing stability and security in a nation on the brink of collapse.
Today, the landscape remains bleak: 90% of Syrians in the country live below the poverty line. Bread prices have skyrocketed since the new regime lifted subsidies, electricity is available for just a few hours a day, the public sector remains largely unpaid, and banknotes are scarce, leaving the cash-reliant economy in a stranglehold.
Adding to its financial constraints, the country remains one of the most heavily sanctioned in the world, second only to Russia and Iran. While the United States has paused its proposed 41% tariffs on Syrian goods, within the general 90-day sanctions pause, the future remains uncertain. Sanctions relief has been alluded to by both the EU and Washington, however, policy ambiguity persists, trapping the country in a precarious limbo.
Where does that leave Syria in terms of safety? The country is facing both internal and external threats. Internally, local security has been jeopardized by sectarian violence in recent months, especially from March onwards. Alawites, an ethnoreligious group and Shiite sect living predominantly in Syria, have increasingly been the target of attacks by armed groups supporting the Sunni-Islamist government, who are thought to be carrying out ‘revenge killings’ against those associated with the previous regime. The reasons behind these attacks can be attributed to the Assad regime's legacy, given that Bashar al-Assad himself was an Alawite, and the sect made up a central part of the Shabbiha, an Assad-loyalist paramilitary force that carried out deadly attacks against Sunni civilians during the civil war. Aside from the historical origins of the grievances, an immediate trigger occurred on March 6 when Assad loyalists attacked a local patrol of security forces in the Latakia province, killing at least thirteen people and prompting consequent anti-Alawite attacks and revenge killings.
In early March alone, at least 1,000-2,000 civilian casualties, mostly Alawites, were reported by monitoring groups in the regions of Latakia, Tartus, Hama and Homs. More recently, in late April of this year, fourteen Alawites were reportedly abducted and killed in the Homs region. As noted by UN Envoy to Syria, Geir Pedersen, “every step towards establishing the rule of law—and moving on transitional justice—will help reassure all components of the Syrian society.” Grievances persist amidst both the Assad loyalists and those in support of the new regime.
Additionally, external threats continue to compromise security, as Syria finds itself at the heart of growing Israeli-Turkish tensions. Since December 2024, Israel has carried out repeated airstrikes on Syrian bases, incurring several casualties, while also deploying troops in a UN-patrolled buffer zone in the Golan Heights. The true target of these attacks is Turkey, with Israel’s foreign minister raising concerns of Turkey playing an increasingly “negative role” in Syria.
Turkey’s vested interests in Syria are multifaceted. For one, Turkey has been hosting the largest number of Syrian refugees since the start of the civil war. Aiding in the establishment of stability in the country would allow for the repatriation of some Syrian refugees, alleviating pressure on Turkey from hosting 3.2 million Syrian refugees.
Turkey’s primary interest, however, lies in sustaining a ‘security corridor’ in northern Syria, tackling counterterrorism linked with Kurdish insurgency on its home grounds, and expanding its soft power through a growing military presence. This comes at a time when Turkey is preparing to deploy air defense systems in Syria’s T4 air base, concurrent with negotiations with the new government for a defense pact. This would increase Turkish presence in the country and bolster Syria’s military. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s response has been clear: Turkish bases in Syria would pose a “danger to Israel.” According to Israeli Defense Minister, Israel Katz, Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s new government would “pay a very heavy price” for allowing Turkey to further establish itself in the country. Given the various conflicting external pressures, President Sharaa is called to tread carefully in navigating Syria’s next steps.
Despite the turmoil taking Syria by storm, there are some glimmers of hope on the horizon. The new Syrian leadership is taking a cautious stance diplomatically, committed to balancing ties between competing regional powers and positioning itself strategically. Experts suggest that Syria’s transitional government has a rare window of opportunity to reclaim its agency and stability. As such, the government’s next steps are of special importance, especially if sanctions relief is contingent upon counterterrorism cooperation and minority protections. If Syria can leverage its current relative freedom from Iranian dominance and can secure support from international actors and allies, the country may be en route to a sustainable transition away from its years of violence.
Syria’s road to recovery will likely be a tumultuous one—economic frailty, sectarian violence and external pressures weigh upon the government’s next steps. But for the first time in over a decade, the possibility of Syrian-led reconstruction can be seen as within reach.
Photo source: upyernoz on Flickr