The Worrying Rise of Jihadism in Africa: A Look at Nigeria

Known for its cruel abductions, school attacks and village-burnings, this particular Islamist insurgency group is responsible for the murder of tens of thousands, as well as the forceful displacement of millions. With their focus primarily on northeast Nigeria but sometimes spilling into the Lake Chad Basin, these ruthless terrorists might be responding to their country’s widening economic disparity, political corruption and longstanding religious tensions, fueled by the Nigerian government’s counterterrorism efforts and strong-handed police. Created by a prominent Borno State Islamist cleric named Mohammed Yusuf, this group’s aim is to establish a fundamental Islamic state with sharia criminal courts. Estimated by U.S. intelligence officials to number around four and six thousand hardcore militants, and by others three times that, the group is known around the world. Once its name is said, it alludes to trauma, violence and overwhelming fear throughout West Africa … Boko Haram. 

Founded in 2002 in Maiduguru, Nigeria, this Salafi insurgency movement has conducted countless terrorist attacks on political and religious groups, police and military, as well asarbitrary civilian attacks in villages and busy markets. Considered to be one of the largest insurgency groups in Africa, Boko Haram seems to be particularly effective at displaying the weaknesses of the Nigerian government in its inability to effectively contain the group. Prior to the 2009 Maiduguri crackdown, the jihadists only operated in northern Sahel. They did not target Christian minorities and expatriates, only focusing on Nigerian state representatives, government institutions and those they determined to be “bad” Muslims. However, the crackdown set off an armed revolt in the Bauchi state, which spread to the northeast. In this uprising, police and government forces were responsible for the murder of over eight hundred people, including many suspected Boko Haram members, including their leader, Yusuf. As a result, the conflict spread beyond the Borno states and since then the attacks have had national and international repercussions. Although the attacks lack coordination and an apparent cycle, they have now multiplied to target prisons, military barracks, banks, police stations, churches and mosques, especially on Christian and Muslim holidays.

Political scientist and research director Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos states, “It is important to emphasize how the execution of Mohammed Yusuf was a serious strategic error. By creating a martyr, it has indeed generated a current of sympathy in favor of the victims of repression, at least in the Northeast.” Since Yusuf’s death, Boko Haram has splintered into two factions, with Abubakar Shekau at the head of one and Yusuf’s son Abu Musab al-Barnawi at the other, which has the same final goal as that of Shekau but a less uncompromising view as to what apostasy constitutes. Arguably, the increasingly atrocious nature of Boko Haram has also led to rifts within the group, which then decided to rebrand itself as the Islamic State’s West Africa Province after it declared allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in 2015. However this might not be as significant as it first appears, since many jihadists often swear allegiance to another terrorist group for a semblance of power and unity, yet still work mostly independently. However, it can still be argued that this rebranding symbolized Islamist unity, connecting Middle Eastern and Northern African terrorism with that of the Eastern African domain. In May 2021, Islamic State’s West Africa Province killed its Boko Haram leader, Shekau, resulting in the surrender of thousands of people, including civilians, former Boko Haram fighters and their families, to Cameroonian and Nigerian authorities. However, another consequence was that many Boko Haram commanders joined the Islamic State’s West Africa Province, leaving Boko Haram in disarray. Yet, the end of violence in northeast Nigeria seems unlikely, especially since the new jihadist group might be more resilient — estimated by United Nations analysts to already have four to five thousand fighters — and continues the ransomed kidnappings, lootings, military facility attacks and the taxing of local populations and commerce, mostly in northern Nigeria.

The political and socio-economic conditions of Nigeria have only intensified Boko Haram’s violence.With a record of inequality, political corruption and instability due to over half a dozen coups, the 1967-1970 civil war, and decades of ironfisted military rule, Nigeria proves to be fertile ground for radicalization. Although the country is Africa’s biggest economy and contains abundant natural resources, it is also statistically one of Africa’s poorest populations, with about half of its two hundred million citizens surviving on less than roughly $1.90 per day. This can arguably be attributed to the unequal distribution of oil revenues, which mostly go to a small percentage of elites, as well as through the embezzlement of highly corrupted government ministers. Analyst Chris Ngwodo states,“The emergence of Boko Haram signifies the maturation of long-festering extremist impulses that run deep in the social reality of northern Nigeria. The group itself is an effect and not a cause; it is a symptom of decades of failed government and elite delinquency finally ripening into social chaos.”

Although we can see a decline in Boko Haram’s brutality in northeastern Nigeria since 2015, jihadist-linked violence in Africa has increased 17-fold since 2009. In 2021, United Nations statistics revealed that in the first six months of that year, “the most striking development” was the shift in the African continent. Instead of the perhaps expected Middle East or South Asia, as the world region most impacted by jihadi violence and suffering the worst number of casualties due to such U.N.-designated jihadists. Now called the “African turn,” since early 2022, ISIS has conducted about half of its operations in Africa, and in the first four months of 2022, there have been more attacks organized by the Islamic State in Nigeria than in Iran. Arguably, it is Africa’s emergence as the mentioned jihadist’s center of gravity which has caused the continent to serve as the new international epictenter of jihadi terrorism. Even the U.S. Committee on Homeland Security in 2017 claimed, “The threats posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria  and al-Qaeda are dynamic and are expected to increase as the Islamic Stateloses ground in Iraq and Syria, and as al-Qaeda seeks to reclaim its status as the leader of the global jihadi movement. In this context, North Africa, which sits on the edge of Europe, has emerged as an important theater in the war on terror.”

Arguably, the reason for this geographical shift in the focus of terrorism from the Middle East to Africa, is the lack of counterterrorism efforts in the latter. While 2015, Chad, Niger and Cameroon have deployed several thousand troops as a part of an African Union authorized multinational force, which has helped the Nigerian military reclaim many of its territories, foreign direct investment inflows to Nigeria have plunged, from nine billion dollars in 2011 to $3.5 billion in 2017. This symbolizes the decline in international foreign aid, which, in turn, leaves the future of jihadism in the African continent unsure.

The current strategy of the Islamic State’s West Africa Province is focused on addressing past mistakes and causes of tension by ensuring that group members are fairly treated by their field leaders and incentivizing fighters through the division of war spoils. This has been a strong driver of success, as can be observed on the eastern front, especially in poor communities which lack resources. The jihadist group’s work to ensure the support of the population through  the promotion of mutual investment between itself and communities and stable access to services in isolated areas, allows for tax collection as well as the legitimation of the group. 

To achieve the goals the jihadists have set for themselves, they continue their attacks on humanitarian initiatives, international relief activities, and murder and abduct humanitarian workers, as well as loot and burn their offices. As a result, the displacement rate has increased by almost 50 percent. Most victims in northeastern Nigeria are women and children  — a region which has suffered under the struggle for dominance between the Islamic State’s West Africa Province and Boko Haram. According to Al-Ahram, a recent international report covering Borno, which was Boko Haram’s first stable stronghold, has shed light on the dire humanitarian situation — the insecurity in the area has led to about 25 percent of the land being cut off from Lagos, the capital. Borno, once described as the region affected most negatively by this conflict, is now at a complete risk of secession.

Borno is but one of the several cities in the Islamic State’s expansive strategy to implement a so-called “scorched-earth” policy, which they may use to their advantage both inside the area and abroad, as a potential signal to the rest of the world that Africa is now the focus of jihadists.