What Can We Expect From Al-Qaeda Now?

Since Joe Biden, President of the United States, authorized the deployment of two Hellfire missiles by an unmanned drone on July 31, 2022 in Kabul, killing al-Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, the terrorist group’s future seems uncertain. While jihadist movements are known for easily replacing their emirs, bin Laden’s death in 2011 had already caused the organization to suffer structural fragmentation and it could now completely deteriorate if al-Zawahiri is not replaced with an equally charismatic and respected jihadist. Furthermore, the event resulted in tension between Afghanistan and the United States, with both sides claiming that the other violated the Doha Agreement – terms which stipulated that American military presence would gradually come to an end in Afghanistan if the Taliban follows its commitments, such as not harboring terrorist figures – and caused further insecurity for the locals in the surrounding area.

Al-Zawahiri became the emir of al-Qaeda after bin Laden was killed in a U.S. raid, however, by that point, the group was fractured and his followers were not as loyal to him as they had been to bin Laden. In the following years, al-Zawahiri attempted to lead far-reaching terrorist groups that often showed disloyalty and insubordination. The success of the Islamic State in its violent and cruel dominion over Iraq and Syria, especially in 2014 and 2015, overshadowed al-Zawahiri’s reputation. However, he had been bin Laden’s physician and right-hand man for years before 2011; thus he still commanded a certain degree of authority and respect from his followers, reminding them of when al-Qaeda was at its peak strength. His videotaped tirades against the U.S. had helped him assume a significant role in molding al-Qaeda to become as ambitious and deadly as it had been during the 9/11 attacks. When joining the terrorist group, he merged it with the extreme Egyptian-centric operation called Egyptian Islamic Jihad he had led, making al-Qaeda even more globally powerful.

However, even his admirers conceded that he lacked the charisma for which bin Laden had been known. During al-Zawahiri’s leadership, no terrorist attack took place comparable to the scale of bin Laden’s time. As a result, al-Qaeda began to lose its control over some of its territories, most notably in greater Syria. The jihadist group fragmented into different strands, creating ISIS, which later became its greatest rival in the Islamist movement. For al-Qaeda to survive and return to its original reputation of strength and terror, the next emir must already be known among the followers and jihadists and show great magnetism and ability to unify the fragmented group.

The often unspoken consequences of firing the two Hellfire missiles concern the inhabitants of Shirpur, the neighborhood in central Kabul where al-Zawahiri was residing. Syed Agha, an unemployed schoolteacher who sells vegetables from a cart, stated, “We have had so many years of war, and things were just beginning to settle down. The conflict is past, and no one should have the right to violate our sovereignty. An attack like this could badly affect our future.”

A year after the Taliban seized power of Afghanistan, the country is on the threshold of economic collapse, as Kabul’s alarmed civilians responded to the killing helplessly and bitterly. 29-year-old Ezatullah explained, “I wish we had this power to defend our country. The people can’t show any reaction or anger because they cannot say what they want to and they have economic problems.” This sense of vulnerability seems common among the inhabitants of Shirpur. According to the Washington Post, a man named Abdul Wali “changing money on a sidewalk” told the paper, “I heard Joe Biden did it. This means Afghanistan still belongs to America. They can do whatever they want. If they can do a drone strike in the city, it means they are still in charge.”

Indeed, the relationship between the Taliban and the United States has become even more complicated since July 31, 2022, as both claim that the other violated the terms of the Doha Agreement, which was signed in February of 2020 as the U.S. left Afghanistan. American officials claim that senior members of the Haqqani Taliban knew about al-Zawahiri’s presence in Shirpur and attempted to conceal his whereabouts, a direct violation of the Doha Agreement. Al-Qaeda’s utilization of Afghanistan as a safe haven broke the terms of the peace deal, to the detriment of the Afghan people, who are often the victims of these domestic and foreign policies. Antony Blinken, the U.S. Secretary of State, stated that “By hosting and sheltering the leader of al-Qaeda in Kabul, the Taliban grossly violated the Doha Agreement and repeated assurances to the world that they would not allow Afghan territory to be used by terrorists to threaten the security of other countries.” UN intelligence recently published a report revealing that al-Qaeda not only saw Afghanistan as a safe haven but even enjoyed freedom under the rule of the Taliban, as al-Zawahiri was found to be freely communicating with others. Now that the emir was proven to be in Kabul, the Taliban’s commitment to upholding their end of the Doha Agreement is further called into question by American and international authorities.

However, the Taliban also vehemently opposed the drone attacks, as Zabihullah Muhajid, the Taliban spokesman, stated that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan “strongly condemns this attack on any pretext and calls it a clear violation of international principles and the Doha Agreement.”

This highly controversial missile strike has even been theorized by some, such as the highly influential Jordanian Arabic daily newspaper Ad-Dustour, to have been organized by al-Qaeda itself and that perhaps its own members were responsible for leaking information concerning the whereabouts of al-Zawahiri. Ad-Dustour even claimed that “the terrorist organization’s title is division and the intrigues within it contributed to the killing of its terrorist leaders.” Arguably, the breaches within the dead emir’s protection network allowed for the circumstances in which the jihadist leader could be executed. It is difficult to substantiate these claims as interpretations differ based on the geographical location of the source. While the West prefers to consider the U.S. as solely responsible for what they perceive to be an almost heroic act of perseverance and revenge against its enemies, Middle Eastern perspectives often question if American intelligence agents were really capable of attaining information about al-Zuwahiri’s whereabouts without help from within the jihadist group. Either way, the long-term consequences of this event are severe and will be far-reaching.

Al-Zawahiri’s execution revealed the fragile structure of the group, as withdrawals from al-Qaeda followed immediately after his death. Hassan Abu Haniyeh and Muhammad Abu Rumman, two Jordanian scholars specializing in terrorism, explained that although such jihadist groups are often not majorly impacted by the assassination of their leaders due to their capability to rapidly rebuild ranks, al-Zawahiri’s death may have particularly strong repercussions. This is because other influential terrorist leaders, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Saeed al Shehri, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Nasser al-Wuhayshi and Osama bin Laden, had already been assassinated, leaving the jihadist group unable to withstand another emir assasination. Due to the general timing and overall context of this death, an already weakened al-Qaeda is now experiencing a leadership crisis, a rebellion of its branches, unprecedented levels of disengagement, a decline in geographical spread and a general discord.

The leadership crisis arguably represents a worrisome turning point in this organization which was originally founded on harmony between bin Laden and al-Zawahiri’s visions. As the central leadership of this group is in a period of decline within Afghanistan, the regional branches are experiencing severe division. In the past years, al-Qaeda has expanded its ethnic and tribal alliances with jihadists such as Nusrat al-Islam. However, without al-Zawahiri, his jihadi fame and impressive theoretical capacity, these alliances could potentially collapse.

Especially compared to ISIS, which has clear strategic and theoretical aims, al-Qaeda now faces a crisis of vision. As a result, the young Islamist extremists, looking for a straightforward intellectual, political and ideological system, would rather join ISIS than al-Qaeda. Hence, there is significant reason to assume that al-Qaeda will suffer short-term and experience waves of disintegration and fragmentation until the new emir either dooms or revives the group.

However, others argue that al-Zawahiri’s assassination has been overplayed in the media and that this will impact his group minimally. An anonymous former member of al-Qaeda, who then joined the Islamic State, said, “I’m sure Biden will try to make it sound as if it’s something big, but actually it’s not significant for us at all. Ayman al-Zawahiri became the emir after bin Laden and is now a shaheed [martyr]. And that’s it for us. The significant question will be: Who will become the new leader now?” Indeed, some point out that the leader was almost invisible in recent years, and that the act of replacing him is not as momentous as many claim.

Currently, no obvious successor who holds great respect and name recognition within the Islamist world exists. However, the core and affiliates of the jihadist group in countries in northern Africa and Yemen, who have waged war for decades, will most likely put forward a leader who has been battle-tested and who will perhaps possess even more charisma than al-Zawahiri. America’s tireless campaign against al-Qaeda through targeted assassinations has resulted in a lack of experienced leaders within the group. Some experts have claimed that a likely candidate for the role could be former Egyptian special forces lieutenant-colonel Saif al-Adel, one of the remaining members of al-Qaeda’s old guard. Arguably, his greatest rival in emir-hood could be a leader of The Guardians of Religion Organization — a Syrian hard-line Islamist group — Abu Abd al-Karim al-Masri.

Either successor will surely benefit from the current decline of ISIS, which has become weaker and less inspiring since its loss of the caliphate. However, the competition between the two will still continue as long as the Islamic State retains its remaining land and popularity.

Even in bin Laden’s days, al-Qaeda faced the problem of some of its branches swearing fealty to the emir just to pivot and pursue their own goals and ideology. Thus the new leader will need to ensure the unity of the organization. Perhaps he will be able to achieve this by attempting to organize a high-profile terrorist attack against the West to gain attention and boost his stature. However, the tough U.S. counter-terrorism network forces terrorist leaders to remain on the move to avoid discovery and execution constantly.

Indeed, the relationship between the future emir and the Taliban movement will be key, as it could allow al-Qaeda to rebuild its base in Afghanistan and recruit more members. Due to the decreasing counter-terrorism efforts in Africa, al-Qaeda’s regional strands in Mali, Somalia and North Africa will likely solidify. As a result of the closure of political tracks in the Middle East, southern Sahara, North Africa, the Sahel and Southeast Asia, all of which are suffering from economic crises, al-Qaeda could exploitatively rebuild and solidify its roots in these areas amid these fiscal calamities. Although the Islamic State remains more radical and attractive to new jihadists, new leadership in al-Qaeda arguably allows it to adapt and take advantage of cooperation opportunities due to a common enemy. While al-Zawahiri’s death was a curse for al-Qaeda, perhaps it was also a blessing, as a new emir could rebuild al-Qaeda’s reputation and end the era of division. With the emergence of an international jihadi agreement about international opportunities, rising cross-border terrorism and multipolarity, new opportunities crop up for global jihadism.

Whoever emerges, what is certain is that he will preside at a turning point in the overall jihadi movement. Will he irreparably fragment al-Qaeda, leading it to its dissolution, or will he unify and strengthen it, making the group more dangerous and threatening than ever before?