Azerbaijan Corridor Dispute Leads to Fears of Invasion

Although Azerbaijan has achieved everything it could have hoped for in the long-disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, there are concerns that it may consider expanding westward into Armenian territory. With the international community in turmoil, Azerbaijan's rhetoric is becoming increasingly extreme. Key figures have warned of a possible ground invasion that could benefit Azerbaijan and its allies, especially Russia, and isolate Armenia from its only friendly neighbor.  

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict dates back to 1923, when the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region (oblast) was separated from socialist Azerbaijan. Despite the fact that the region has always had a majority Armenian population, attempts at reunification with Soviet Armenia during the long collapse of the USSR were met with indifference by Azerbaijani and the Soviet central institutions led to widespread violence against Armenians, as illustrated by the pogroms that took place in Azerbaijani cities such as Baku and Sumqayit. In 1991, following Azerbaijan's declaration of sovereignty and efforts to strip Nagorno-Karabakh of its autonomy, an independence referendum was held in which 99 percent of the Armenian population voted to become an independent entity, the Republic of Artsakh. The referendum was boycotted by the region's Azerbaijanis, who made up 20 percent of the total population. The declaration of independence of the Republic of Artsakh led to the two-year-long First Nagorno-Karabakh War, which resulted in the Republic of Artsakh gaining de facto independence and control of the seven surrounding "buffer" districts in Azerbaijan. 

A diplomatic deadlock persisted for a quarter-century until 2020, when Azerbaijan, aided by Turkey and armed with Israeli drones, seized control, upsetting the geopolitical equilibrium and causing human tragedy on a massive scale. This new status-quo upset the delicate geopolitical balance in the Caucasus, providing an opportunity for Russia to further integrate itself with the fate of the region. The general perception among observers was that the war was happening solely on Russian terms. An uncharacteristic reticence to intervene diplomatically or otherwise on behalf of Armenia was seen as a reprimand to a nation which had seen increasing rapprochement with the West under the leadership of democratically elected Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Azerbaijan was permitted to take advantage of the situation, but only up to a certain point. Indeed, it was Russia that brokered both the ceasefire and preliminary peace deal, sidelining the OSCE Minsk Group's remaining members, the United States and France, initially tasked with finding a negotiated resolution to the conflict. Sources close to the situation reported that Azerbaijan had been presented with an ultimatum by Putin after having captured key strategic positions. Left with a choice between partial victory and Russian intervention, President Ilham Aliyev chose to stand down. Tensions persisted, however: Azerbaijan was not pleased with Artsakh Armenians retaining control over some key areas. The presence of Russian peacekeepers caused further tension, serving as a Russian foothold in the region.

The following years saw escalating rhetoric and ceasefire violations, primarily by Azerbaijan. This fueled a two-day war in September which saw Azerbaijani forces gain control of strategic locations deep within Armenia, leading to the displacement of over 7,000 civilians. On the heels of this offensive, Azerbaijan orchestrated a shutdown of the Lachin corridor, the only link connecting mainland Armenia to Artsakh and thus playing the role of a lifeline for the population of Artsakh. The corridor was blocked first by state-backed environmentalist groups under the guise of protesting against potential ecocide. Later, members of state-supported Non-governmental Organizations, disguised servicemen, and civil servants would also join the blockade. The Azerbaijani authorities also tampered with civilian infrastructure in order to restrict the access of civilians in Artsakh to water and electricity. The blockade quickly precipitated a humanitarian disaster, being referred to as a ‘siege’ by media sources. All traffic was restricted, including the normal flow of products, aid convoys and vehicles of international organizations such as the Red Cross.

September 2023, the ninth month of the blockade, saw Azerbaijan launch an offensive framed as an anti-terror operation, seizing additional territory. A swift ceasefire mediated by Russian peacekeeping forces was followed by a negotiated peace deal, which saw the capitulation of the vanquished Artsakh armed forces and the dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh, to be effective on Jan. 1, 2024. This new status-quo led to the flight of the region’s 120,000 Armenian civilians, thus succeeding in a total ethnic cleansing of the enclave.

Although the status of Nagorno-Karabakh appeared to have been resolved on Azerbaijan’s terms, one territorial issue lingered, and it had the potential to be the most crucial of all. Aliyev had, since the 2020 war, proposed a transport corridor that would cut through a strip of Armenian land, known as the province of Syunik, which separated Azerbaijan from its autonomous republic, Nakhchivan, which shares a border with Turkey. The proposal theoretically aimed to provide unimpeded transportation from Azerbaijan to Turkey, with the added benefit of pan-Turkic innuendo, suggesting that a land connection between the two Turkic countries would be established. The corridor would end a mutual blockade imposed by Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1989. While the opening of all Soviet-era transport links, including a railway that took the same path as the proposed corridor, was indeed a part of the peace agreement, Aliyev’s corridor was deemed by Armenia to be something completely different, and not within the scope of the agreement which foresaw no transfer of land whatsoever.

However, President Aliyev's continued insistence on implementing the Zangezur Corridor, coupled with an escalating rhetoric of irredentist claims on the Republic of Armenia through the notion of “Western Azerbaijan,” which referred to all of Armenia proper, amplified concerns. Ongoing construction in newly occupied areas linked to the corridor, along with a new cycle of joint exercises with the Turkish military in commemoration of the hundredth year of the Turkish Republic, added another layer of complexity to the already tense geopolitical situation. 

In the aftermath of the Azerbaijani offensive, Armenia had responded by ratifying the Rome Treaty and joining the International Criminal Court, where Putin is wanted for war crimes. Although Armenia officially stated that these measures were undertaken for additional guarantees in response to the recent bout of aggression, they were popularly interpreted as a reaction to Russia's sluggish response to the offensive. The lack of a robust reaction by Russian peacekeeping forces and a noticeable strain in relations with Russia further pushed Armenia into strategic realignment. Armenia has exhibited signs of drifting further Westwards, marked by a reconfiguration of relations with Russia and Iran and a more significant military alignment with the EU (evidenced by a new weapons deal with France).

Russia, seeking to maintain regional influence, would support the Zangezur Corridor it could potentially control. The corridor would hold strategic importance as Russia would most probably play the role of a guarantor, a situation allowing the deployment of Russian troops in a crucial location close to Iran. This move would further solidify Russia's influence in non-NATO territory, permanently cementing its geopolitical footprint in the Caucasus. Meanwhile, Tehran has vehemently opposed the Zangezur Corridor concept, warning against any alterations to regional borders or the establishment of what it perceives as a "pan-Turkic" or "NATO" corridor along its northern frontier. 

The U.S. position, however, is more ambiguous. Politico reported that Secretary of State Antony Blinken had privately warned policymakers of an impending invasion of Armenia, though these claims were quickly denied in a statement by the Department of State, which also affirmed U.S. support for Armenia’s territorial integrity. Was this delicate maneuver an attempt to conceal a sincere estimation of a potential threat with a denial, aiming for a more subdued policy? Or was it rather a reflection of the ambiguous policy relating to the Caucasus at a time when the international community was preoccupied with other crises?

As tensions persist with no established plan forward, the prospects of the Zangezur corridor remain uncertain. While the intricate power struggles that dominate the Caucasus could see Aliyev swing either way as he balances the costs and benefits of an invasion, there is no doubt that this corridor amounts to more than just a physical route. As Azerbaijan persistently pushes its irredentist agenda and constructs a narrative around the corridor, it has become a flashpoint that could radically alter the regional balance of power and cause violent geopolitical alterations in the region. The Zangezur Corridor and the inevitable invasion required to establish it remain as important factors shaping the immediate future of the South Caucasus and the powers that are intertwined within it.