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Beijing: Unanticipated Beneficiary of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine?

By Magdalena Offenbeck

April 30, 2022

The sanctions imposed by the West following the invasion of Ukraine in February have significantly damaged the Russian economy. Nevertheless, the idea of a stronger Sino-Russian alliance to evade sanctions and counter their effects hangs over the head of the West like the Sword of Damocles. How realistic is this? Will Western states’ intervention tip the scale in favor of Ukraine or does China offer a viable economic alternative?


Now, two months into the invasion, the United States, the European Union, and their allies seem to have reached their sanction-imposing limit. Yet, the battles have not halted. In light of recent human rights violations in Bucha and beyond, we ask ourselves why, despite all the actions taken to counteract the Russian invasion, so little progress has been made.


Now, after the recent meeting in Beijing between Russian and Chinese foreign ministers, a new fear has emerged: the alarming possibility that Russia could evade sanctions by strengthening economic and political ties with the People’s Republic of China. In the meeting, the two powers discussed closer economic ties and joint strategic security interests.


China was Russia’s top trading partner in 2011, with a trading volume that is approximately 2.5 times that with Germany, Russia’s second most important trading partner. Of the five largest trading partners with Russia, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States are imposing sanctions; China and Belarus are not.


It is no secret that these sanctions have had a grave impact on Russia’s economy. However, with the West’s dependence on Russian oil and gas exports, the trade volume will likely not shrink close to zero in the near future. This is not to say that Russia does not need the West for its relative economic prosperity, but if Russian history has shown one common trait, it is that its leaders, from the Tzars and the Bolsheviks to current President Vladimir Putin, do not tend to prioritize the interest of the people. Putin’s war will hurt the Russian citizens, who are now facing inflation, shortages and the effects of a sudden isolation after 30 years of relative openness. They will not hurt the president and the surrounding elite who control the wealth in the country, unless one considers the loss of a chalet in Switzerland to be equally grave as a lack of basic necessities. In consequence, Putin and his political elite will not only be much less affected but they can also use repression and misinformation to silence dissatisfied citizens. Russian propaganda may present an alliance between Russia and China as an economically equally viable alternative to trade with the West, but its success is doubtful, especially considering the financial instability Western sanctions have caused.


China has been playing a careful balancing act. Abstaining from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) vote on a resolution regarding Ukraine (unsurprisingly vetoed by Russia), it has since been avoiding any strong positioning. However, abstention is a position in itself. By continuing trade relations with Russia and further following objectives to increase trade in the course of the decade, China has de facto sided with Russia. In a recent speech before the UNSC, the Chinese delegate Dai Bing mastered the art of diplomatic vagueness. He encouraged negotiation and urged for equal protection of refugees, general statements that do not assign blame. He did “deplore” the Russian attack on a Ukrainian train station (denied by Russia), however, Dai Bing only called for an investigation of the cause rather than condemning the apparent perpetrator. Arguably the most enlightening part of Dai Bing’s speech was his declaration that sanctioning and providing weapons “will not bring about peace.” Rather, they have brought about “a food crisis for which the whole world pays the price.”


It is true that Western intervention has triggered a food crisis and put the global economy to the test. However, China is well aware that, to the participating nations, this is about more than the global economy. It is about Russia’s bid to challenge the world order and a post-war status quo that has benefited Europe and the United States more than anyone else. They are willing to go to great lengths to protect their positions. Yet, China has also seen its rise in that order. The West has both been an important trading partner and a strategic rival, a dynamic that has allowed the People’s Republic to experience unprecedentedly rapid growth, development, and increased geopolitical power. China and Russia are often treated as one entity because both are arguably the most important “non-Western” political actors and maintain similar political stances. But, Russia is also both a trading partner and a strategic rival to China, even if both share a common resentment towards the West. China has increased trade with Russia and benefited from Moscow’s isolation by gaining strategic importance. However, both Russia succeeding in its annexation and becoming too powerful or the West gaining from increased unity and self-sufficiency are not ideal for Beijing. China has no interest in seeing the political framework that it has been navigating successfully uprooted as it proceeds to silently expand its sphere of influence globally. The status quo of the past years has allowed Beijing to become a key actor in Africa, Central Asia, and beyond. If any side emerges stronger from the conflict, their next focus could be countering Chinese geopolitical influence in their backyard, an undesired outcome for the rising power.


This leaves us with the typical “only time can tell” conclusion. Beijing will likely navigate the conflict opportunely, gaining from an increased trade with Russia. However, it will avoid becoming the target of equally harsh economic sanctions or getting involved directly in the conflict. In other words, China is happy to remain more of a side actor. The political landscape will be transformed through this invasion, but it is unclear how exactly, and China might not be quite certain how to feel about it. Ultimately, the People’s Republic has been defending its own interests in the geopolitical game for a while and there is reason to believe that it will manage to use the current status quo to continue its endeavors.


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