Change in the Republic of Moldova

Stuck between the West and the East, neglected by both, and frozen in checkmate with Russia for the last seven decades, the Republic of Moldova endured more hardships than any other European country. Having been stripped from Romania and incorporated into the USSR at the beginning of WW2, gaining formal independence only after 1989, the Republic of Moldova is yet to establish itself as a purely autonomous power outside of the influence of its greater Eastern neighbour.

After the 1989 revolution and independence, Moldova’s leadership flirted with Russia and shunned EU interventions for the next thirty years. This toxic tradition ended with the 2020 presidential elections, when Maia Sandu, a pro-European candidate with a staunch anti-corruption attitude, won. A year later, she called for a new parliament and, surprisingly, her party, PAS, won by a landslide, with a shocking 58 per cent. She and her party won on a wave of dissatisfaction with the already existing parties and the desire for reforms. So, how has the new guard managed all of these discontents?

Notwithstanding Sandu’s promises, Moldova has faced serious geopolitical issues in the past years, which have hindered the country greatly. Firstly, as a form of retaliation for the ever-growing Western stance of the new government, Russia slashed gas supplies to the country by a third and demanded double the previously set price to maintain the flow. Secondly, being located only a few hours away from Odesa, Moldova received the highest number of Ukrainian refugees per capita, thus placing immense pressure on the already dysfunctional healthcare system, public services and infrastructure. On top of this, trade with both Moscow and Kyiv, two of Moldova’s greatest economic partners, had greatly suffered, with inflation surging by as much as 40 per cent. 

Additionally, Russia also controls the separatist region of Transnistria, which broke away from the grip of Moldova’s government during a brief war in the 90s. This region has been practically maintained by Russia, with Moscow funding Transnistria’s gas supply up until the 1st of January this year. This ‘free’ assistance of Russia was not so free; Transnistria’s debt was continuously recorded, and, at the beginning of this year, it was asked to be repaid 11.1 billion dollars. It was clear that this decision was politically motivated, Transnistria being used as a tool to destabilise Moldova in the wake of the parliamentary elections this fall, to eliminate the pro-Europeans led by Maia Sandu from power. 

Alternatively, another threat surfaced from abroad: Ilan Shor, a pro-Russian businessman who actively fought against the EU integration of Moldova. Condemned in absentia for 15 years for smuggling 1 billion Euros out of Moldova’s banking system, he fled to Moscow where he established a political movement with the sole purpose of destabilizing Moldova’s EU progress. Shor and his acolytes set up a voter-bribing scheme that concerned 130,000 Moldovans who voted against the referendum for the integration of Moldova into the EU from 2024 and for Russia-friendly candidates. Through his Telegram platform, he has offered to pay up to 29 Dollars for those who registered for his campaign against the referendum, while spending millions on social media and news outlets campaigns against it. Regardless of the foreign implications of the referendum, it passed by a comically small margin: 50.35% in favour of adding EU integration as a goal in the constitution.

Nonetheless, Sandu and her party succeeded in delivering what they promised, at least partly. In 2022, Moldova obtained candidate status for accession to the European Union, and in 2024, the official negotiations regarding admission started. In the same year, Moldova greatly developed the country's wind and solar power to reduce dependency on Russian energy and the aforementioned referendum was called for. In 2023, Moldova created its first anti-corruption agency, a major step in combating this phenomenon, which has plagued the country for decades. Most notable, however, was the increase in Moldova’sCorruption Perception Index by 7 points, indicating significant improvements in the country's functioning.

 However, the polls for this year’s parliamentary elections show a diminished popularity of PAS compared to the 2021 elections, the party being situated at around 35%. This backlash could be explained by the shortcomings of their governance and slowness in delivering what was promised. Whether the new governance delivered all they had promised is of secondary importance; what matters most is that in the last four years, the country has been more open to the West than ever before.; Let us hope it will continue like this and one day, they will be a part of the greater European family.

Photo source: Sasha Pleshco - UNSPLASH