February Issue
Lydia Ntourountou
February
The need for humans to communicate and exchange goods and ideas can be traced back to thousands of years ago. Despite the virtual impossibility of bridging societies across the globe, efforts were constantly being made to ensure the continuation and development of trade and commerce, inevitably followed by cultural exchanges. One of the most impressive developments was the Silk Road, established in 130 B.C.E., during the period when China officially opened trade with the West. This pioneering network of routes managed to connect different civilizations, allowing the exchange of products and ideas from East Asian societies to East African and Southern European ones. Chinese silk, tea, perfumes and other products were sought-after in Egypt, Rome and Greece and not only did this allow for the exportation of such products, but most importantly, it marked the beginning of trade on an international scale.
The gradual collapse of the network around 1450 A.D. marked a new beginning: international maritime trade. And though it would, indeed, take some centuries before it truly became global, this “sea-based globalization” has become the most prevalent form of trade, with over 80% of the volume of international commerce goods traveling by sea. China’s role in it is undoubtedly worth examining, considering that it remains the country with the largest amount of cargo ship exports annually. This exceptional economic activity is closely linked to what has been characterized as the New Silk Road, officially titled China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an incredibly ambitious infrastructure project adopted by Xi Jinping’s government in 2013. This time, however, it is not limited to maritime trade but focuses on the overall development of a vast network of railways, ports, energy pipelines and highways that aim to facilitate a wide range of economic activities between Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Already, over two-thirds of European Union member states have joined the BRI, leading to a rise in Chinese investments in these countries to fund industrial projects. The vision promoted by Xi Jinping, though quite compelling, has attracted a lot of doubt and criticism; one of the main BRI projects sparking concern is the Budapest-Belgrade railway, aiming to create a fast train line connecting Hungary and Serbia. However, Hungary’s ability to repay the loan, as well as the actual profitability of the railway, has caused a lot of uncertainty.
However, Xi Jinping’s project does not end here but takes on a rather drastic form regarding Greece’s involvement in the One Belt One Road Initiative. Indeed, Greece could be considered a unique case, since it hosts the most successful BRI project as of 2024: the port of Piraeus. Although a significant peak in bilateral economic and political relations between Greece and China dates back to the Greek debt crisis of 2008, during which Beijing offered to buy Greek government bonds, it is in the past couple of years that we notice the prevalence of Chinese influence in Greece. In 2016, Athens signed a contract with the company COSCO (China Ocean Shipping Company), giving it access to 51% ownership of the port, before finally gaining another 16% shares in 2021, allowing it to possess a total of 67% and therefore owning the majority of the port.
If Piraeus is classified as the fifth largest port in Europe, with around 5 million twenty-foot equivalent units passing annually, it is important to examine this success with caution. It must be highlight that this project benefited Athens in maintaining its position as an important hub in maritime trade while securing its place as an essential geopolitical actor facilitating the connection between the EU and Asian markets. But does Xi Jinping’s policy serve the sole purpose of fully establishing the Belt and Road Initiative? If so, what does this mean for Greece? According to an article published by Plamen Tonchev, China’s objectives in Piraeus could be briefly summed up in three points: 1) utilize Greece’s position in the framework of the BRI, 2) win over the country’s political, business and academic leaders and ensure its backing of China, 3) influence the EU through “friendly” member states, one of which would be Greece. We notice that Beijing’s policies in this case are not extremely direct or “disruptive” and mostly take the form of a strong economic presence in this region. However, this active and powerful presence inevitably leads to political and economic dependence.
Greece, because of its small size and low level of population (around 10 million), could be considered a country that requires external “backup,” notably because of the regional tensions surrounding and directly influencing it. We could not talk about its foreign policy without mentioning the United States, characterized as Greece’s closest historical “ally” and whose relations with the country were recently referred to as “excellent” by Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. Having secured a five-year defense cooperation with the US and working together in matters of energy finance and military, their bilateral relations do indeed seem quite secure. But, amidst a period of uncertainty concerning the policies to be implemented after the US presidential elections, will Greece be capable of balancing two powerful “enemy nations,” both having interests in the Mediterranean region?
This question seems even more pertinent after the U.S. Defense Department blacklisted COSCO by listing it as a company working with the Chinese military, which COSCO denied. This decision cannot be followed by legal sanctions for the commercial sector and so far does not seem to have any direct impact on the shipping company. However, it raised alarms in Piraeus, considering that the blacklisting could act as a “deterrence” for some importers. It also reminds us of the tensions between these geopolitical actors and the fact that countries with smaller economic and political power, such as Greece, are caught in the middle.
Although we cannot predict the outcomes of the significant Chinese ownership of Piraeus, the fact that Greece’s biggest port is owned by a foreign power will have an important impact on its future policies, as well as its relations with other countries. What is interesting, however, is that China’s project affects the game of power and slowly shifts the economic narrative from the West to the East. Whether Greece will be able to successfully balance in between, without completely becoming dependent on either power, is to be determined.
Photo credits: Rory Boon on Flickr