Turkey Inches Closer to Landmark F-16 Acquisition

The unending odyssey of the F-16s has perhaps been the most salient conflict in U.S.-Turkey relations in recent years. President Erdoğan’s 2021 request to purchase 40 of these jets along with a number of upgrade kits for its existing fleet introduced a significant point of leverage to the traditionally strained relations between the two states – one which has been maneuvered to apply to almost every aspect of foreign policy since. Recent dramatic developments in global politics have also drawn the uneasy allies closer in some arenas and further out in others.

A common interpretation of the Turkish request is that it was made as a sort of last-resort bid for U.S. loyalty – a final chance for the U.S. to step up as Turkey’s most important ally, and the endmost bulwark against the culmination of a potential Turkish pivot to Russia. The concept of a F-16 sale did after all materialize as a reaction to Turkey’s ejection from the F-35 joint fighter program, a network of U.S. NATO allies which have been funding the development of the new-generation planes with the eventual hope of integrating them into their defense apparatus, which came about as a result of the purchase of the Russian S-400 system on Turkey’s part. The justification for this purchase, which triggered a harsh round of sanctions, was U.S. reticence on the transfer of the F-35 planes, mostly in reaction to Turkey’s aggressive conduct in Cyprus and Greece.

The delay in the F-16 sale did not truly materialize in a turn eastward for Turkey, mostly due to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Erdoğan did, however, take a more subdued stance on Russian aggression than many of its NATO allies, keeping comparatively closer ties with Putin that allowed Turkey to host potential peace negotiations in 2022. Furthermore, Turkey has kept itself relatively well-integrated with Russia, as demonstrated by the significant increase in trade between the two countries post-invasion.

Given the outsized presence of Russia in the U.S.-Turkey relationship, it is fitting that Russia would be the nation to indirectly provide Turkey with its most important bargaining chip vis-a-vis the United States. The invasion of Ukraine brought the concept of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strength and unity to the forefront of the global political consciousness, which contributed in large part to Finland and Sweden applying for membership. Potential members must be approved by all existing NATO nations, as happened to Finland. Sweden, however, was a tougher sell: it had an unofficial arms embargo on Turkey and had previously provoked ire from Turkey on its allegedly permissive attitude towards the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which it sees as a separatist terrorist organisation. Using these justifications, Turkey has been able to delay the ratification of Sweden’s membership indefinitely, dealing an important blow to the conception of a strong, united NATO that the U.S. has been central in promoting.

Significant progress has recently been made. In light of security guarantees from Sweden, the Foreign Commission of the Turkish Parliament has approved the membership bid. This means the ratification is now able to be put to a vote in the assembly, in which Erdoğan and his allies hold a majority. Afterwards, Erdoğan must sign the bill into law in order to end a full 19 months of continuous delays to the process. Erdoğan has, since the beginning of the process, been very careful in emphasizing the role of the F-16s in the ratification procedure–the ratification is widely interpreted as a form of concession to the United States, one which deserves some sort of recompense. It was not, however, the end-all of this diplomatic snag until very recently.

The past few weeks have seen a revealing shift in Turkish rhetoric regarding the potential sale: officials have always been quick to point out their discontent with what they have seen as an unfair conflation between the ratification and the F-16 deal on the part of the Biden Administration, with Erdoğan himself calling the rhetoric “deeply upsetting.” The Department of Defense has been forced to clarify that no such linkage between the two topics has been officially acknowledged. The beginning of December, however, saw Erdoğan tying progress on the ratification to the F-16 sale, mentioning his expectations of further steps from the Biden Administration in exchange for his own work in the Turkish parliament. 

Biden has consistently been very supportive of the sale, having already unofficially informed Congress and expressing an intention to complete the sale repeatedly. The primary obstacle is the attitudes of key figures in Congress, who have been characteristically reticent about supplying Turkey with more weapons. Key members of the committees engaged with foreign affairs work in both the House and the Senate have cautioned that the approval for Swedish membership will not be enough for Turkey to secure the jets it has been seeking for so long, which has been a major point of concern for Ankara. Politicians on both sides of the aisle have more than sufficient basis for their worries, however, as Turkey’s recent military maneuvers have done little to endear it to the Americans.

In Azerbaijan, Turkey provided political support to the ethnic cleansing of the 120,000 ethnic-Armenian citizens of the breakaway Republic of Artsakh, which had been situated within Azerbaijani borders in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. This put it in direct opposition to the US and other Western partners, who all roundly condemned the events. In Northern Syria, Turkey has been battering civilian infrastructure such as power stations and hydraulic plants in response to a terror attack in the vicinity of the National Assembly which was claimed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Turkey has also targeted the Syrian Defense Forces, U.S. allies which are considered to be linked to terrorist organizations by Turkey. Furthermore, Turkish action close to a U.S. base in the area resulted in the unprecedented downing of a Turkish drone. Turkey has also had a historically strained relationship with Greece, having an established record of invading Greek airspace with political motivations and the eventual goal of normalizing its unique and expansionist conception of maritime borders.

As Congress seems unwilling to be persuaded on the matter, Erdoğan has pivoted to place even more importance on the ratification process as a large concession on the part of Ankara. If Washington responds favorably to these developments, the long-debated F-16 sale could finally materialize, marking a new chapter in the complex dynamic between the two nations.