In the face of Brazil’s largest corruption scandal to date, Brazilians directed their rage at the once beloved former president, Lula, whose entanglement in the scheme paved an easy path to victory for the fringe right-wing candidate, Jair Bolsonaro. < Back Has Brazil’s Largest Corruption Scandal Irreparably Damaged Democracy? By Lara-Nour Walton April 29, 2022 Something sinister was afoot in 2012 Brasilia. Money was moving unnaturally — streaming in and out of a local gas station in abnormally large quantities. Officials believed that they had flagged a routine case of laundering in the nation’s capital and zeroed in on the usual suspect: small-time doleiros (black market dealers). What their investigation uncovered was even bigger and far more unsettling. What they found imprisoned presidents, bankrupted billionaires, and paved the way for Jair Bolsonaro’s election. In 2014, Operation Lava Jato (Car Wash) was formally launched when police discovered a suspicious email correspondence in doleiro Alberto Youssef’s inbox. Youssef had been involved and apprehended on laundering counts in the past, but had proven to be quite the recidivist. The email in question discussed a Range Rover that the doleiro had recently bought. But, this was no above-board car purchase. Youssef had bought a Range Rover for none other than the high profile Petrobras petroleum company executive, Paulo Roberto Costa. Under questioning, a somber Youssef informed police, “If I speak, the Republic is going to fall.” And fall it did. Operation Car Wash is Brazil’s largest corruption scandal to date. The operation earned its name from being hatched at the Brasilia gas station and car wash. The scheme began as a way for the construction conglomerate, Odebrecht, to secure constant and overly-lucrative business at the national petroleum company, Petrobras. To accomplish this, Odebrecht, the ringleader of the scandal, developed a cartel of engineering companies which set inflated contract prices for petrochemical complex building projects. In custody, Costa revealed how this intricate scheme functioned: first, Petrobras directors intentionally overpaid cartel contractors for construction, drilling, exploration vessels, and refinery. Then, 1% to 5% of the profit from those shady contracts was funneled into clandestine slush funds. Elected politicians (who incidentally appointed Petrobras officials) were the beneficiaries of the funds and used them to finance personal agendas and election campaigns. Bribes were the currency of Brazil’s elite. Everyone involved in the scandal was paid off in cash, luxury automobiles, art, Rolex watches, yachts… Money cascaded into Swiss accounts, a bevy of oversea properties were purchased, elderly mules, strapped with bricks of cash, flew from city to city, inconspicuously distributing bank notes. By the time Operation Car Wash was on law enforcement’s radar, Petrobras and Odebrecht had paid off over 16 companies, 1,000 politicians, 50 congressmen, and four former presidents (including Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, better known as Lula) with a whopping sum of $5.3 billion. The victims of this kafkaesque scheme? Average Brazilians. Not only was the potency of their vote diluted by this operation, but their own tax dollars were funding it. No strangers to institutional corruption, Brazilians directed the entirety of their rage at the once beloved former president, Lula, his successor, president Dilma Roussef, and other members of the Workers’ Party. The party was not the only culpable entity implicated in the scandal, but received the most popular backlash — and perhaps justifiably. The political group ascended to power to fight Brazil’s seemingly untreatable case of corruption. Yet, the disease only seemed to have metastasized in the Lula administration. Elected in 2002, Lula suffered from having a minority Workers’ Party in congress. Although he denies any knowledge of involvement in the scheme, Operation Car Wash would have allowed for the president to buy the support of small parties, thus permitting him to pass legislation through congress. The Lula administration improved the condition of working class Brazilians through policies that reduced poverty and increased social safety nets and environmental controls. He left office with an unprecedented approval rating of 80%. Lula attributes his success to securing a symbolic majority in congress through political allegiances. Instead, the immense progress he made was found to have a morally and legally unsound infrastructure. These findings eventually culminated in his 2018 arrest. Brazilians have a complex relationship with Lula — they continue to reap the benefits of his presidency while lamenting his hypocrisy. The true test of national sentiment will be reflected in the result of the upcoming October presidential elections, which the now-released Lula has announced his candidacy for. The imprisonment of Lula created an easy path to victory for the fringe right-wing candidate, Jair Bolsonaro. Due to the elimination of his main opponent and his anti-establishment, anti-corruption platform, Bolsonaro, sometimes referred to as the “Trump of the Tropics,” waltzed into office in spite of his notoriously racist, homophobic, and misogynistic public persona. However, the comparison to Trump is misleading. Despite sharing some qualities with the former United States president, Bolsonaro is more akin to the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte. And this makes him all the more dangerous. Unlike Trump, Bolsonaro and Duterte actually followed through with their alarming campaign trail claims. Similarly to Duterte, Bolsonaro has an affinity for militarizing state police, cracking down on crime, and green-lighting extrajudicial killings. He waxes nostalgic for Brazil’s military dictatorship and has been openly threatening Brazil’s increasingly tenuous checks and balances. According to United Nations human rights activist, Clément Nyaletsossi Voule, the Bolsonaro administration encourages violence towards women, favela community leaders, journalists, quilombolas (Afro-Brazilians), and indigenous peoples. Bolsonaro shamelessly intimidates the Supreme Court, which has active investigations into his conduct, threatens his critics' freedom of speech, and makes baseless claims about fraud in the Brazilian electoral system. To Voule, it is clear: the world’s fourth largest democracy hangs by a thread. On September 7, 2021, Brazilian Independence Day, Bolsonaro proclaimed, before tens of thousands of supporters, “Only God will remove me from power.” This ominous statement follows months of disinformation, propagated by Bolsonaro himself, about Brazil’s supposedly “fraudulent” electronic voting system. It has been speculated that such allegations intend to lay the groundwork for canceling the upcoming October 2022 elections or to contest a potential presidential loss. With the president trailing behind his perennial foe Lula in the polls, fears that Bolsonaro will refuse to accept defeat have increased. As such, Brazil’s top election authority, Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE), has invited the European Union and other international bodies to monitor the validity of the October elections. The EU plans to send a mission to Brazil this May to assess whether it can fulfill the duties of official observer. From the outside, Operation Car Wash is a juicy scandal indeed. But at its core, it is a tragic case of government inefficiency. Lula was charged with serious crimes, to be sure, but the consequences of his alleged actions should not spell another Bolsonaro victory. Brazil might not survive it. Democracy becomes more fragile every day that Bolsonaro presides. His record-level deforestation is leaving the Amazon more vulnerable than ever. Climate expert, Marcio Astrini, has determined that the forest will not be able to withstand another four years of a Bolsonaro presidency. Brazilians are at a critical crossroads. On October 2, 2022 they may sow the seeds of their own destruction or secure their survival. But if Brazil has learned anything from its past, it is that the power should and must, lie in the rightful hands. The people must be the final deciders — not between Lula or Bolsonaro — but rather life or death.

The scale of flooding Pakistan is enduring is greater than anything it has witnessed before. An estimated third of the country is now underwater; over 1,300 people have died, while 33 million people have been directly affected. < Back Climate Change, Pakistan, and the Case for Reparations By Noor Ahmad September 27, 2022 Pakistan has witnessed months of heavy monsoon rains and severe flooding. An estimated third of the country is now underwater; over 1,300 people have died, while 33 million people have been directly affected. The last time Pakistan experienced similar flooding was in 2010, when millions of acres of cropland were destroyed alongside the lives and livelihoods of over 20 million people. Back then, the Secretary General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon, said that the scale of flooding Pakistan had endured was greater than anything he had witnessed before, with 400,000 cusecs of water making their way down the Indus. This time, however, 700,000 cusecs of water are expected, highlighting the extent of the emergency. In their 2021 report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change said that the environmental crisis intensifies the water cycle, resulting in more extreme rainfall and flooding. This explains the unprecedented downpour that enveloped Pakistan from mid-June to late August, with parts of the country receiving 500%-700% of their usual August monsoon rain. Although climate change is the likely cause of heavy rainfall, it is notable that Pakistan produces less than 1% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Despite that, due to its geography, Pakistan is particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change; the Global Climate Risk Index ranks Pakistan as the eighth most affected country by climate change-related extreme weather events. In contrast, more developed countries in the northern hemisphere – who were the first to industrialize and therefore have produced the greater share of greenhouse gas emissions – have only been mildly affected by such extreme weather events. The global south has faced the more severe impacts of climate change, although it bears less responsibility. There is a case to be made that Pakistan and other developing countries facing climate change should receive reparations from abroad. Pakistan has to rehabilitate around 15% of its population and requires funds it does not have. And although countries such as Canada and the US have provided donations – $5 million and $30 million, respectively – this is not enough, especially because the total damage exceeds $10 billion, and because Pakistan is facing its most severe cost-of-living crisis. After he visited Pakistan on Saturday, Sept. 10, Antonio Guterres, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, urged members of the international community to provide massive financial support to Pakistan. Guterres suggested a debt restructuring, which would involve writing off a portion of Pakistan’s debt owed or lengthening its repayment period. This would allow Pakistan to have breathing room to rebuild its economy. However, the traditional “lender of last resort,” the International Monetary Fund, does not follow this logic. The fund released $1.1 billion as a part of a larger assistance package to Pakistan as of Aug. 29, 2022, but with the proviso that it undertakes a reduction in its budgetary outlays. Now is hardly the time to cut social assistance expenditure, just when it is needed the most. Beyond climate change, many internal failures within Pakistan have contributed to this catastrophe. Overpopulation and poor building regulations have led to riverside housing developments that lack adequate safeguards against flooding. Moreover, unsatisfactory disaster management and surveillance mechanisms are likely to have worsened this outcome. Pakistan’s government must now focus on preventative strategies such as building resilient infrastructure since these disasters are now reoccurring. Only $50 million of Pakistan’s budget this year has been allocated to its Climate Change Ministry, which is insufficient. This results from a significant portion of its budgetary expenditure being diverted to defense, given the country’s hybrid civil-military dyarchical system. Interestingly, Pakistan is one of the most water-stressed countries in the world, yet it cannot adequately harvest rainwater because of a lack of dams. Undoubtedly, better governance and allocation of funds could have mitigated the tragedy to some extent. Climate change is upon us: extreme heat, floods and melting glaciers, all seen in the space of this summer in Pakistan. Developed western nations are responsible for countering the consequences of global warming caused by their industrialization and ongoing polluting activities. There is a need to enact the climate change agenda, as espoused by the United Nations Climate Change Conferences, and accelerate the move to net zero emissions. At the same time, assistance must be given to southern countries facing the effects for which they bear less responsibility. Debt forgiveness, financial aid and expertise are now required. But of course, this does not absolve developing countries of their responsibility. There is a need for better governance and redirection of finances on social development and infrastructure rather than militarization.

Les algorithmes amplifient les contenus qui suscitent le choc et l'émotion, même si ceux-ci ne reflètent qu'une partie de la réalité. Ainsi, les zones de conflits moins spectaculaires ou celles qui ne répondent pas aux critères de viralité demeurent dans l’ombre. < Back Vivre la Guerre à Travers un Écran: la Bataille des Récits Christy Ghosn April 30, 2025 Aujourd’hui, la guerre ne se vit plus uniquement sur le terrain : elle se vit aussi, intensément, sur nos écrans. Hashtags, stories Instagram, vidéos TikTok : la bataille ne concerne plus seulement les armes, mais aussi les récits. Une photo d’enfant sous les décombres, un cri de mère en larmes, un drapeau brûlé: en temps de guerre, certaines images deviennent virales, iconiques. Qui choisit ce qu’on voit? Et à quelles émotions ces images nous condamnent-elles? En temps de guerre, les images fusent; les récits s'entrechoquent; l’émotion guide les opinions. Les projecteurs médiatiques sont puissants, mais leur lumière est loin d’être équitable. Derrière chaque récit médiatique se trouve un choix: montrer ou taire, choquer ou ignorer, mobiliser ou détourner. L'Image au Service de l'Émotion À l'ère du tout visuel, une guerre non filmée est une guerre presque inexistante. Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts ( RULAC ) identifie actuellement plus de 110 conflits armés impliquant au moins 55 États et plus de 70 acteurs armés non étatiques. Combien apparaissent dans notre fil d’actualité? Les réseaux sociaux ont transformé la manière dont nous percevons les conflits. Une image vaut mille mots, et dans le contexte de la guerre, elle vaut mille émotions. La puissance de l'émotion est un outil redoutable pour capter l'attention mondiale. Les images et les vidéos qui suscitent des émotions fortes sont plus susceptibles de devenir virales. Ce mécanisme entraîne une « guerre des récits » où l'image devient le support privilégié d'une instrumentalisation émotionnelle. Les algorithmes amplifient les contenus qui suscitent le choc et l'émotion, même si ceux-ci ne reflètent qu'une partie de la réalité. Ainsi, les zones de conflits moins spectaculaires ou celles qui ne répondent pas aux critères de viralité demeurent dans l’ombre. Construire son Récit : Qui Parle et Qui Est Entendu? La construction du récit est une arme aussi puissante que les armes conventionnelles. Chaque camp s'efforce de façonner une narration où il apparaît comme la victime ou le héros, tandis que l'adversaire est dépeint sous un jour sombre. Cette bataille des idées commence souvent par le choix des mots, car comme le dit Terry Jones , « la première victime de la guerre, c'est la grammaire. » Ainsi, les termes utilisés deviennent des outils de propagande. Les « dommages collatéraux » remplacent les pertes civiles, et la « libération de l'Irak » se substitue à l'invasion. Dans ce contexte, les médias occidentaux, notamment américains et britanniques, ont souvent adopté ce langage, tandis que des chaînes régionales comme Al Jazeera parlent plutôt de « guerre contre l’Irak » menée par des « forces d’invasion. »Cette guerre des mots a également engendré une dichotomie journalistique entre « nous » et « eux. » Aux États-Unis, cette vision manichéenne a imprégné les déclarations officielles et une partie de la presse. En temps de paix, la liberté de la presse est un ‘pilier des démocraties.’ Mais en temps de guerre, cette liberté est souvent restreinte. Le contrôle de l'information, par la censure ou la propagande, devient une priorité. Aujourd'hui, le contrôle de l'information est entre les mains de quelques géants de la tech. Lors de l'invasion russe en Ukraine par exemple, des plateformes comme Meta, Google, Twitter et TikTok ont bloqué les contenus de propagande russe, entraînant des représailles du Kremlin. Les internautes russes se retrouvent par conséquent piégés dans une bulle de désinformation. Les médias traditionnels ne sont pas en reste. Le 17 octobre, l'explosion de l'hôpital Ahli Arab de Gaza a été interprétée de manière radicalement différente selon les sources. Al Jazeera titrait « un raid israélien sur un hôpital fait 500 morts, » tandis que le Times of Israel parlait d'une « explosion due à une roquette mal tirée. » Aux États-Unis, les titres variaient également en fonction de l'orientation politique des journaux. Le Washington Post mettait en avant la version palestinienne, le New York Times restait neutre, et le Wall Street Journal introduisait la position israélienne. Fox News, quant à elle, ne mentionnait même pas la version palestinienne. Le Rôle du Spectateur Moderne Le spectateur moderne est bombardé d'images de conflits et de souffrances, partagées instantanément sur les réseaux sociaux. Ces images, souvent choquantes, sont consommées, partagées, puis rapidement oubliées. La surabondance d'informations visuelles crée une fatigue émotionnelle, une sorte de lassitude face à l'actualité. Selon un baromètre récent, 68 % des jeunes âgés de 15 à 30 ans et 70 % des personnes âgées de 31 ans et plus éprouvent cette lassitude. Ce sentiment est d'autant plus prégnant que la fréquence de consultation de l'actualité augmente avec l'âge, jusqu'à 30 ans. La répétition incessante d'images violentes conduit à une désensibilisation progressive. Les guerres sont « consommées » comme des produits médiatiques, puis reléguées aux oubliettes de notre mémoire collective. Cette surcharge informationnelle engendre un sentiment d'angoisse et d'impuissance, particulièrement chez les plus de 31 ans, dont près d'un tiers (30 %) mentionnent ce motif. Les jeunes, quant à eux, sont plus enclins à lier leur lassitude à une surabondance d'informations, 21 % des 15-30 ans se sentant dépassés par la quantité d'informations disponibles. Les réseaux sociaux ont instauré un nouveau paradigme où la notion de communauté est à la fois gratuite, collaborative et désorganisée. Dans cet espace dématérialisé, le temps et l'espace sont abolis: tout y est immédiat et à portée de clic. L'image, le visuel, dominent, et l'opinion publique est désintermédiée, chacun pouvant devenir un producteur de contenu. Retrouver une Parole Juste Il est dans ce contexte, temps de repenser non seulement la manière dont les conflits sont représentés, mais aussi notre réponse en tant que société, en faisant preuve d'une conscience renouvelée et d'un engagement critique. Les réseaux sociaux, ont transformé la manière dont nous consommons l'information. Ils nous offrent une fenêtre sur le monde, mais cette fenêtre est souvent teintée par des algorithmes qui privilégient le sensationnel au détriment du factuel. Retrouver une parole juste, signifie aussi écouter les voix marginalisées, celles qui ne correspondent pas forcément aux récits dominants. Loin du bruit et de la fureur des réseaux sociaux, nous devons créer des espaces de dialogue où la nuance et la complexité peuvent être explorées. C'est seulement en adoptant cette approche critique et engagée que nous pourrons véritablement comprendre les conflits qui façonnent notre monde et y répondre de manière éclairée et empathique. Photo source: Unsplash - Dole

Growing up, I constantly pondered over what a hero meant to me. I would have varying heroes ranging from fictional characters to influential figures. I always thought that they were out of reach, yet today, I can look back and realize that I was surrounded by them. < Back Women of Iran Named Time Magazine’s “Heroes of the Year.” By Anonymous December 31, 2022 Who and what makes a hero? Could it be a superpower that allows you to jump over buildings as if they're pebbles or shoot webs from your hands? Is it a quality that distinguishes you from the average person and makes you the "chosen" one, bringing peace to the whole population? Or is it an achievement, saving a life, helping those in need, and standing up against injustice? At some point in our lives, each of us has appointed someone as a hero, whether a parental figure, someone influential, or maybe a fictional character that embodies characteristics we admire. These different "heroes" change over time and embody varying features that we look up to, making the unifying factor of what constitutes a hero contestable. However, I define a hero as a community, or someone, who brings positive change to our society and personifies inspiring bravery. On Dec. 7, 2022, Time Magazine named Iranian women "Heroes of the Year." This accolade represents a significant step forward in how Western media and society depict Iranian women, and it has increasingly positive influences than one may imagine. To understand this choice, one must first recall the current women-led movement in Iran. Upon the brutal murder of Zhina Mahsa Amini by Iran's morality police, protests broke out around the country, demanding the abolishment of the mandatory hijab and corrupt morality police. As time passed, the repression of the protests increased. Anger built up amongst Iranians — recalling the injustice they have faced for the past 43 years under the Islamic Republic, the continuous human rights violations, the oppression of women and the lack of freedom –– the movement progressed into what some may call an "uprising" and others a "revolution." The underlying sentiment, however, is clear: the people want a change in the regime. Their wants? Women, Life, Freedom. Iranian women have been the face of bravery since the dawn of time. When one lives in a country that suppresses one's fundamental rights, tries to diminish one's happiness and extinguish one's light, that person quickly learns how to rebel and live the way one wishes, even if it does not adhere to the regime's rules. For instance, in the context of the intense dress code imposed by the Islamic Republic, Iranian women rebelled by wearing more make-up, changing fashion trends that "softened" the dress code and even protesting. From the first time Vida Movahed took off her hijab, placed it on the stick and expressed her disapproval of this misogynistic law to the movement of the "Girls of the Revolution Street" and to it taking a larger form in today's protests, allowing girls to start taking off their hijab in daily life while being fully aware of the risks and dangers, Iranian women showed they were never people to conform to injustice. In everyday life, they rebel by asserting themselves in society and proving their capability, intelligence, talents, and strength. They start controversial debates about the patriarchy, the effects and wrongdoings of traditions enforced by older generations towards women and the unfair marriage laws. Through their persistence, Iranian women changed modern Iranian society and its mindset. They allowed their male counterparts to understand their struggles, stand by them and even fight with them, as seen in this movement. Their efforts are inspirational, and they do not go unnoticed. It is not an easy job to change the mindset of a population, and Iranian women's work every single day for the past years has been crucial to allow this movement to take off and have the impact and momentum it has today. It is precisely their refusal to fit into a mold of what society told them they should be, whether it is the Islamic Republic dismissing them or the West orientalizing them, which is incredibly inspiring, notably for other young Iranian girls who face the same challenges. During these protests, we have witnessed incredible bravery — Iranian women sacrificing their lives and safety to fight for what they believe in and for freedom — not only for themselves but also for other Iranian women and the next generation. They refuse to admit regret even when the regime abuses them, and they refuse to stay silent despite repression. I believe that the bravery, inspiration and change-making latent in the current Iranian movement render the country's women deserving of the title "Heroes of The Year." Time Magazine's decision is highly significant. With propaganda determining the media image of Iranian women in the past, it is an astonishing relief that they are finally being seen as their true selves. It humanizes Iranian women in the eyes of those who were fed lies, giving them credibility and allowing a larger sympathy to the cause. International support is crucial to keep this movement alive, and this amazing act of Time Magazine sends a political message highlighting that they are on the side of the people and Iranian women. It terrifies the regime and empowers Iranians, making it all the more noteworthy. To support this movement, the international media must change the hegemonic narratives and align themselves with reality, as did Time Magazine. The international community must keep listening and spreading the words of the Iranian people and, most importantly, Iranian women. Growing up, I constantly pondered over what a hero meant to me. I would have varying heroes ranging from fictional characters to influential figures. I always thought that they were out of reach, yet today, I can look back and realize that I was surrounded by them. I feel immense pride for Iranian women, their efforts and how far they have come, and I believe they are such inspirational figures. Iranian women are more than deserving of this title.

Pendant qu’on s’attache à montrer qu’on suit les pas de la Raison, on oublie l’essentiel dans la politique au point que l’on puisse trouver cela trivial et naïf; on oublie la nécessité d’un débouché concret et utile à la méthode rationnelle, c’est-à-dire la recherche de la justice. < Back Déni de politique: les ‘experts’ au pouvoir Lubin Parisien January 31, 2025 Qui gouverne la France? Emmanuel Macron ou McKinsey? En 2022, un rapport sénatorial dressait le constat d’un État faisant appel de plus en plus aux cabinets de conseil pour l’aider à la mise en œuvre des politiques publiques. Le rapport dénonce des prestations à la qualité variable et teintées de partialité, le tout sur fond de perte de compétence des institutions de l’Etat, avec une aspiration des haut-fonctionnaires par le privé avec le pantouflage. Le chiffre choc, c’est celui d’un milliard, un milliard d’euros dépensé en conseil en 2021. La campagne de réélection d’Emmanuel Macron en 2022 fut empoisonnée par la mise en avant de ses liens avec le cabinet McKinsey. Ainsi, durant les campagnes présidentielles de 2017 et 2022, des prestations qui auraient vraisemblablement dû être déclarées furent escamotées, d’où une enquête du Parquet national financier (PNF). L' appétence du président pour des profils au « cerveau ultra-rapide » venant de grandes écoles comme Polytechnique et devenus consultants dans le privé, c’est-à-dire des profils en-dehors de la politique, est un fait bien connu et critiqué. Ces cabinets de conseil à l'efficacité contestable apportent une expertise, leurs recommandations modèlent concrètement les politiques publiques, notamment pour les aides personnalisées au logement ( APL) et leurs paramètres. Leurs consultants, engagés pour leurs compétences techniques supposées, ne sont élus par personne et ont pourtant un rôle non négligeable dans la politique. L’utilisation massive des cabinets de conseil est largement reprochée à Emmanuel Macron et à ses gouvernements, mais l’idée de donner le pouvoir à ceux qui seraient techniquement plus compétents pour l’exercer est un lieu commun qui remonte à plus longtemps que la ‘macronie’ ou l’externalisation induite par des politiques néolibérales: c’est la justification du pouvoir de toute élite. Les meilleurs pour nous guider Le biais élitiste de la pensée politique occidentale est structurant du temps de Platon déjà. Son grand traité de politique est La République , dont l’ambition était une recherche de la justice dans la cité et en fin de compte dans l’âme. Platon distinguait trois ‘classes’ dans la cité: celle des producteurs et des travailleurs, celle des auxiliaires qui seconde la troisième, c’est-à-dire la classe des gardiens de la cité. C’est eux qui disposent de l’autorité politique pour mettre en place les réformes nécessaires au retour de la justice—notamment la censure des poètes clamant des idées injustes et propres à confondre les esprits. C’est aux gardiens aussi de protéger la cité durant la guerre. Pour les sélectionner et faire naître de grands crûs, Platon a proposé dans le Livre V de La République un dispositif eugéniste ingénieux pour que seuls les plus droits et les plus forts dans cette élite puissent se reproduire. L’éducation des enfants est absolument collective et très stricte. Tout cela n’a pas manqué de nourrir des critiques sans doute justifiées contre Platon et contre son eugénisme fondamental, mais infondé. Le modèle que Platon a appelé de ses vœux pour la restauration de la justice dans la cité est l’aristocratie au sens premier du terme, c’est-à-dire le gouvernement des meilleurs, des philosophes-rois. La conception du mouvement politique vers le Bien que Platon a développée est celle d’un mouvement dirigé par le haut: des livres entiers de La République sont exclusivement consacrés à l’éducation des gardiens de la cité, les bas-fonds de la cité ne sont que de vaines diversions régies pour en confiner les fièvres. Platon, qui fut le conseiller du tyran de Syracuse Denys, avait une approche clairement élitiste où l’autorité politique revient aux meilleurs soigneusement choisis; la classe des producteurs n’est qu’un figurant dans le chemin que dessine le philosophe du IVème siècle avant notre ère. Mais vouloir qu’une minorité soit motrice dans la logique et la dialectique de la politique n’a pas forcément vocation à accaparer le pouvoir, mais parfois à émanciper l’ensemble de la société et des opprimés. C’est bien là tout le rôle du parti selon Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels dans Le Manifeste du Parti communiste de 1848. Le prolétariat doit s’affirmer dans la dialectique irréconciliable qui le lie à la bourgeoisie. Le projet est révolutionnaire, mais il semble bien lointain tant les prolétaires ne sont pas conscients de leur condition: c’est là que le parti peut renverser la situation. Marx et Engels écrivent ainsi que « pratiquement, les communistes sont donc la fraction la plus résolue des partis ouvriers de tous les pays, la fraction qui stimule toutes les autres; théoriquement, ils ont sur le reste du prolétariat l'avantage d'une intelligence claire des conditions, de la marche et des fins générales du mouvement prolétarien. » Le parti doit exposer les crimes du capitalisme et ses iniquités, il doit être l’organisation où le prolétariat puisera les armes et les ‘compétences’ nécessaires pour opérer le changement révolutionnaire souhaité. Le parti incarne le prolétariat, mais il doit avant tout lui donner toute sa carnation, il doit donner au prolétariat sa conscience de classe et des armes. C’est certes une élite, mais elle n’a aucune vocation à se substituer au prolétariat pour mener la révolution et encore moins pour diriger une société qui devrait pourtant être sans classes. Une tradition marxisante ultérieure et s’éloignant en vérité de Marx parle d’une ‘avant-garde’ du prolétariat. Selon Lénine, c’est à elle de prendre le pouvoir et d’instituer une dictature du prolétariat, vue comme une étape claire et cohérente vers d’autres étapes vers enfin le communisme. Là encore, on retrouve une vision élitiste, mais à la différence de Marx et d’Engels, l’avant-garde doit avant tout incarner le prolétariat et se saisir du pouvoir qui revient de droit au prolétariat. Le glissement est subtil, mais il est fondamental: c’est sans doute là le péché originel de l’URSS et de la révolution bolchevique. Le prolétariat est réduit à une abstraction qu’une élite de fait peut utiliser comme un paravent à sa constitution comme une classe distincte et aux intérêts concurrents. Quand on parle des experts en politique, il ne faut pas penser qu’aux techniciens, il y a aussi tous ces guides, ces gardiens et autres avant-gardes qui sont des élites exclusivement définies par leur rôle politique. Pourtant, d’autres ‘experts’ s’aventurant effectivement en politique s'attachent au contraire à montrer qu’ils sont au-dessus des partis, au-dessus de la politique. Des remèdes bien acres Dans les moments de crise, les procédures et les coutumes politiques des démocraties libérales semblent dépassées. C’est le constat dressé en Italie qui a amené à la formation de ‘gouvernements techniques’. Les plus récents sont ceux formés en 2011 par Mario Monti et en 2021 par Mario Draghi. Ce sont des techniciens et des experts en économie reconnus par beaucoup de partenaires politiques à l’étranger et par les marchés; l’action de Mario Draghi à la tête de la BCE après la crise financière de 2008 est ainsi souvent saluée . Au sujet de ces gouvernements, dans une note destinée à donner des idées aux Français en pleine crise politique en 2024, l’IFRAP déclare ceci: « l’exemple italien nous montre ainsi l’intérêt de nommer comme Premier Ministre, une personnalité non politique et, dans les deux cas cités plus hauts, expérimentés dans les affaires économiques. » Qu’est-ce l’IFRAP ? Il s’agit de la « Fondation pour la recherche sur les administrations et les politiques publiques, » un think-tank néo-libérale qui se targue d’avoir promu en France « l’ouverture des postes de directeurs d’hôpitaux publics au privé » ou « l'instauration d'un jour de carence dans la fonction publique » Pourquoi une telle organisation fait les louanges d’une solution gouvernementale analogue aux expériences italiennes? La réponse est simple: les gouvernements d’experts prennent des décisions qu’aucun parti politique ne veut pleinement endosser tellement elles sont attentatoires à l’Etat-providence. Ainsi, le gouvernement Monti a lancé une ‘cure’ d’austérité: « Mario Monti réduit drastiquement les dépenses publiques, réforme le régime des retraites avec un allongement de la durée des cotisations et un recul de l’âge de départ en retraite, qui pourrait atteindre 70 ans en 2015. » Le but est de rassurer les marchés financiers, notamment sur la question de la crédibilité de la dette italienne et les perspectives de croissance. Le but n’est pas une politique juste. Le but n’est sûrement pas l’égalité. Matériellement et concrètement, le gouvernement Monti a préservé les structures en berne de l’économie capitaliste italienne, vues comme une priorité face aux préoccupations des travailleurs ayant par exemple manifesté. Les experts au pouvoir, jouant de leur image d’expertise, se cachent derrière une apparente rationalité froide et apartisane pour mieux faire passer des politiques néolibérales. Le nécessaire débat politique sur ces mesures est phagocyté par une hiérarchisation fallacieuse entre des ‘experts’ néo-libéraux et des propositions pouvant défendre l’Etat-providence. On pourrait croire que ces gouvernements techniques furent une suspension des querelles partisanes et des voix discordantes ; en réalité, l’espace politique est saturé par un néolibéralisme délétère. Nier le politique pour nier la lutte Les libéraux sont les grands ennemis de Carl Schmitt. Grand juriste allemand et philosophe du droit du XXème, son influence est indéniable dans l’histoire des idées. Néanmoins, il convient de rappeler son parcours trouble: il a eu des responsabilités dans le parti nazi, il a tenu des discours antisémites d’une grande virulence et il a justifié les politiques nazis. La possibilité de discuter de son œuvre est débattue , la mauvaise foi se faisant l’avocate de Carl Schmitt en bien des aspects. Schmitt fut toutefois discuté voire repris—avec une nécessaire distance critique—par des auteurs comme Giorgio Agamben ou Hannah Arendt. C’est pour cela que l’on se permettra de s’appuyer sur La notion du politique de Carl Schmitt rédigé en 1932, avant l’engagement de Carl Schmitt au NSDAP. L’utilisation que nous allons faire de sa pensée ne concerne qu’une partie de celle-ci et des réserves vigoureuses méritent d’être affirmées quant au débouché politique concret que prônait Carl Schmitt. La « dépolitisation » à laquelle s’acharne le libéralisme selon Carl Schmitt s’articule autour de deux pôles: une certaine éthique qui établit des normes morales arbitrant l’espace politique et une certaine vision de l’économie, émancipée des considérations partisanes et mûe par des agents rationnels. Le juriste controversé écrit: « Ainsi, dans la pensée libérale, le concept politique de lutte se mue en concurrence du côté de l’économie, en débat du côté de l’esprit. » Dans le libéralisme, la Raison est érigé en principe cardinal de l’espace public et de l’espace économique. Or, selon Carl Schmitt, le critère distinctif du politique c’est la distinction de l’ami et de l’ennemi. La Raison n’est pas caractéristique, son usage comme motif de la politique plus que comme une méthode intellectuelle invite à la prudence. Décrire la politique comme l’auberge des experts est faux. Carl Schmitt a bien compris que c’est la lutte qui est au fondement de toute démarche politique. Il ne s’agit pas de discourir et de mesurer la force de ses arguments, la politique consiste en l’établissement d’une société juste: un tel projet n’admet évidemment pas de place à l’injustice et à l’iniquité. Les arguments se nuancent, l’objectif d’une idéologie politique demeure toujours identique, ce sont seulement ses modalités d’application qui sont soumises à une discussion permanente, pas autre chose. Sinon, la cohérence interne de l’idéologie est brisée et ainsi une nouvelle idéologie apparaît—ce qui aurait été salutaire pour Schmitt vu son parcours. Le discours libéral, aujourd’hui dominant dans une démocratie libérale gouvernée par le centre et la droite comme la France de 2025, est aussi un discours de justification de l’ordre économique existant. Les discours des experts aux fragrances Mario Monti ou Mario Draghi prennent place dans une volonté de reconsolidation de systèmes économiques à bout de souffle. Ce genre d’experts n’insuffle pas un nouveau souffle dans la politique car leur action consiste en la conservation des structures économiques et financières préexistantes. Il n’y a donc pas d'intérêt à ouvrir l’espace politique et à se placer dans sa pluralité. Au contraire, le discours technocratique occupe l’espace politique par un discours de justification se réclamant de la Raison, mais ignorant la multiplicité des autres mondes possibles. Le discours libérale, plus qu’une idéologie proprement politique, est un discours qui restreint voire qui nie le politique et son vecteur actuel, l’Etat. Carl Schmitt affirme ainsi qu’ « il n’y a pas de politique libérale sui generis , il n’y a qu’une critique libérale de la politique. » Chasser la politique ainsi revient aussitôt à nier l’existence d’intérêts irréconciliables et donc la pluralité des horizons possibles. Et de fait, les hommes et femmes d’Etat revendiquant aujourd'hui leur expertise ne sont pas les héritiers d’une avant-garde marxisante. L’usage de la raison est dévoyé précisément pour nier la politique, c’est-à-dire la lutte. Pendant qu’on s’attache à montrer qu’on suit les pas de la Raison, on oublie l’essentiel dans la politique au point que l’on puisse trouver cela trivial et naïf; on oublie la nécessité d’un débouché concret et utile à la méthode rationnelle, c’est-à-dire la recherche de la justice. Photo credits: Flickr

La neutralité qui s’exprime dans le débat public a quelque chose de dangereux dans le sens où elle légitime des projets politiques souvent répressifs et conservateurs, dans le sens où ils ne portent aucune volonté de changement des structures de la société et entendent au contraire faire taire le débat sur un tel changement. < Back L’imposture de la neutralité en politique Lubin Parisien November 30, 2024 Alors que la Russie entamait son invasion de l’Ukraine, les pays européens ont décidé d’adopter des sanctions contre le régime de Vladimir Poutine. Au milieu de l’Europe, la Suisse apparaît bien seule et encerclée par une Union européenne qu’elle refuse de rejoindre. Le pays a pour mantra sa sacro-sainte neutralité; pourtant, le pays a rapidement endossé les sanctions contre la Russie tout en expliquant qu’« elle ne favorise aucun belligérant sur le plan militaire . » Mais même les défenseurs les plus acharnés de la ‘neutralité’ suisse comme l’UDC – un parti d’extrême-droite – semblent moins neutres qu’ils veulent le faire croire et cultivent une proximité discrète avec le Kremlin et ses idées. En outre, les fonds des oligarques russes en Suisse ne sont pas gelés ou sinon à la marge . Les discours sur la neutralité suisse ne sont sûrement pas neutres et défendent des visions très particulières de la place du pays dans le monde. L’irénisme suisse apparaît comme une imposture pour mieux s’afficher comme les défenseurs de la paix et surtout promouvoir des intérêts particuliers moins nobles. La neutralité cache toujours une vision politique qui n’a ontologiquement rien de différent de celles qui ne se dissimulent pas derrière la neutralité. Des neutralistes très partisans La neutralité a plusieurs avatars: on s’abstient, on ne dit rien, on ne fait rien. Quelles positions politiques peut-on exprimer quand on ne s’exprime pas? Se dire neutre permet de se placer en-dehors d’un débat, en-dehors d’une guerre. Néanmoins, un acteur politique comme un Etat ne peut s’extraire de l’espace politique, dans lequel il est par définition. En se mettant en-dehors d’un débat ou d’un conflit, un acteur politique choisit de se mettre dans une position particulière qui n’a rien d'évident. Derrière chaque discours de neutralité, on peut déduire l’expression d’une certaine vision qu’un acteur politique a de lui-même et de la relation qu’il entretient avec l’objet ou la conflictualité au sujet duquel il prétend être à l’écart. La guerre en Ukraine a suscité la désapprobation d’une grande partie de la communauté internationale et c’est pourquoi en février 2023 une résolution est présentée à l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU est adoptée par 141 pays. Cependant, des Etats prétendent être neutres, comme la Suisse, et parmi eux 32 Etats se sont abstenus et 13 étaient absents. Sont-ils vraiment neutres? Des grandes puissances comme l’Inde et la Chine n’en ont-elles rien à faire? Le Venezuela, proche de la Russie et exclu de l’ordre mondial promu par les Occidentaux et les démocraties latino-américaines, est-il le seul pays absent au vote du continent par pure indifférence? On peut en douter; de fait, les lignes de fractures relevées lors du vote ne sont pas le fruit du hasard, mais reprennent celles séparant la communauté internationale sur la conception d’un ordre mondial. Les observateurs ne s’y sont pas trompés, le journal Le Monde parlait au sujet de l’abstention de pays africains pour la résolution de 2022 d’une « abstention calculée » et motivée par diverses raisons, comme la progression de discours russophiles dans le continent ou la méfiance et la distance face à un ordre occidental décrié. Cet ordre est aussi contesté par la Chine ou par l’Inde, qui essaient de s’émanciper de façon différente de la seule tutelle occidentale sur le concert des nations. Bref, dans les relations internationales, le silence est bien révélateur, il indique ainsi la conception qu’on a de l’ordre mondial à défendre, par exemple avec la méconnaissance du primat du droit international dont font preuve les pays s'étant tus face à la guerre en Ukraine. La neutralité perd de son sens, elle n’a substantiellement rien de différent avec d’autres approches et rhétoriques défendant d’autres idées politiques par définition partisanes. C’est aussi le cas dans les universités concernant le conflit à Gaza et les mouvements contestataires qui s'ensuivent. Sciences Po Paris est un exemple parlant: le 4 octobre, le ministre de l’enseignement supérieur Patrick Hetzel a déclaré dans un communiqué citant Sciences Po Paris qu’il « condamne fermement ces actions [de contestation face aux évènements en cours à Gaza et au Liban], qui vont à l'encontre des principes de neutralité et de laïcité du service public de l’enseignement supérieur. » Cette neutralité s’oppose à des revendications politiques précises et en brident l’expression. La neutralité ainsi proclamée a en réalité de lourdes significations: premièrement, l’université est vue comme le lieu de débats aseptisés et non pas le lieu de contestations chocs que certains qualifient de violentes. C’est une vision que l’on peut tout à fait défendre, mais ce n’est pas neutre. Deuxièmement, le refus de condamner clairement la politique israélienne n’est pas une évidence ni une expression d’une vraie neutralité, mais plutôt un choix politique tranché et révélateur d'une certaine vision de cette politique, jugée suffisamment explicable et pas si clairement illégale au regard du droit international. Troisièmement, une telle neutralité révèle surtout un certain rapport entre l’université et le monde extérieur, l’institution n’étant pas censée interférer avec les enjeux extérieurs, mais simplement censée en rendre compte dans un format académique. Là encore, une telle vision politique est défendable et peut faire l’objet d’une argumentation sérieuse. Néanmoins, la neutralité est empiriquement une imposture cachant la réalité d’une posture tranchée qui s'oppose à d’autres paradigmes politiques. Là encore, la neutralité ne diffère pas en soi d’une position politique partisane. Pourtant, la neutralité a quelque chose de substantiellement différent – c’est une imposture à la coloration conservatrice. L’extrême-centre ou la défense d’un ordre établi La neutralité permet d’anesthésier le débat sur les choix pris par le pouvoir politique en place. Le même fait se vérifie avec les universités « neutres » vis-à-vis du conflit à Gaza: en refusant d’ouvrir clairement le débat sur les partenariats avec des universités israéliennes et avec le rejet de la création d’un groupe de travail spécial, Sciences Po Paris conforte une réalité dans le débat public français et notre politique étrangère. En effet, on constate une bienveillance injustifiée face à un Etat dont les politiques pourraient nous inviter à questionner la pertinence de la proximité actuelle entre nos deux pays. C’est là que réside le vice avec la neutralité en politique: il s’agit d’une rhétorique défendant l’ordre établi par le pouvoir politique sans s’afficher sincèrement. Cet ordre politique refuse qu’on le questionne et se dissimule derrière la Raison avec une majuscule et dans des retranchements qu’on ne peut pas attaquer sur le fond car la neutralité impliquerait l’absence de positions politiques à critiquer. C’est pour cela que les discours se réclamant de la neutralité et de ses avatars soi-disant apartisans doivent susciter notre méfiance: ils empêchent un débat sincère et explicite sur l’ordre établi et surtout sur les autres que nous pourrions établir. En outre, la neutralité en politique et son édification comme principe même de la politique a une histoire particulière liée à l’extrême-centre. L’historien Pierre Serna est l’initiateur de ce concept dont il fait remonter l’application à Napoléon Bonaparte et au Consulat. Il identifie trois éléments pour définir l’extrême-centre : « se placer au-dessus des clivages en adoptant une rhétorique de la modération, » « défendre un certain opportunisme en prenant les meilleures idées de chaque camp » et « la conquête et le maintien d’un pouvoir fort, » principe dont Pierre Sterna souligne la contradiction avec le supposé dépassement des idéologies. Le premier principe se vérifie avec la posture de l’Afrique du Sud qui justifie son abstention sur la résolution de 2023 condamnant l’invasion de l’Ukraine par la nécessaire contribution à une « conclusion constructive [de pourparlers] conduisant à la création d’une paix durable en Ukraine, » formule incluse dans un communiqué n'évoquant jamais la Russie et appelant à une position de surplomb de l’Assemblée générale. Le second principe est appliqué par des personnalités politiques voulant s’emparer du pouvoir avec une large assise, comme ce fut le cas d’Emmanuel Macron en 2017 lorsqu’il prônait le « en même temps. » Le caractère répressif d’une neutralité se parant des atours de la seule raison et de la seule responsabilité apparaît comme une évidence quand l’administrateur provisoire de Sciences Po Paris Jean Bassères prit la décision de faire appel aux forces de l’ordre pour déloger ceux qui occupaient le campus de Paris et quand il s’agissait de lancer des procédures disciplinaires contre des militants. La neutralité qui s’exprime dans le débat public a quelque chose de dangereux dans le sens où elle légitime des projets politiques souvent répressifs et conservateurs, dans le sens où ils ne portent aucune volonté de changement des structures de la société et entendent au contraire faire taire le débat sur un tel changement. La dangerosité réside aussi dans l’imposture déjà révélée précédemment. Le philosophe Alain Deneault relève ainsi que « l’extrémisme de l’extrême centre tient à son rejet de tout ce qui n’est pas lui » : la neutralité en politique est le paravent à une telle posture et est en tout cas une défense inavouée–peut-être inavouable–d’un certain ordre établi ou de certaines orientations programmatiques qui n’ont substantiellement rien d’apartisan.

Is the Poland-EU dispute just a bump along the road, a crisis that every marriage must endure? Or is it truly the end of a great love story, one that ends with heartbreak? Only time will tell. < Back Poland and the EU: A Whirlwind Romance That May End In Divorce By Barbara Kuza December 30, 2021 Years of yearning to join the European Union seem to have been long forgotten with the recent developments in Polish-EU relations, as well as judicial reforms in the country. When the United Kingdom left the European Union (EU), setting a dangerous precedent, no one thought that any country would realistically follow suit. Brexit was supposed to be the exception, an anomaly, not the beginning of some new rule. But recently the question of a “Polexit” has surfaced. While Poland has played the role of the EU’s black sheep for a few years now, most dismissed it simply as bickering — like every married couple does. However, Polexit entered Polish and European public discourse over the summer, when the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that Poland’s Disciplinary Chamber (transl. Izba Dyscyplinarna) — a judicial organ that reprimands judges when they break the rule of professional ethics — should be liquidated. While the idea behind the disciplinary chamber is not necessarily a bad one in theory, it has been abused by the ruling party to open investigations into, and eventually suspend, judges who are vocal critics of the government. The promising meet-cute Like every tale of romance, this one starts years back. Poland entered the EU on May 1, 2004, after 77.45% of those voting in the referendum answered yes to the question “Do you allow the accession of the Republic of Poland to the European Union?” Television reports from the day of the referendum shows Poles cheering, whooping, jumping up and down with smiles on their faces. Joining the EU was a dream come true for the Polish nation after living under communist rule and Soviet influence for 44 years. A united Europe symbolized to many Poles a guarantee of no more wars — the Second World War and the Cold War still haunted collective memory. Opening up the market and having access to goods which used to be rarities brought by lucky cousins from abroad was another dream come true. Furthermore, free movement between countries meant some could see places that they had only heard about in stories or saw in newspapers and movies. Puppy love, the honeymoon phase, call it what you will — it seemed like life as a European nation could not get any better than becoming a part of the Union. However, things started rapidly changing when the Law and Justice party (PiS) came to power in 2015. The outgoing Sejm (lower chamber of the legislative body), led by the Civic Platform, appointed three judges for the Constitutional Tribunal before the end of its term. It was up to newly elected President Andrzej Duda to swear them in, which he ultimately decided against. When the new PiS government was formed, they unlawfully appointed three new judges who conveniently corresponded to PiS’ placement on the political spectrum. This provided the groundwork for the Sejm to pass several unconstitutional laws and, with a complicit President and Constitutional Tribunal, it was more than easy. In 2017, the Disciplinary Chamber was created and in April of 2020, the so-called “muzzle” act was passed, which envisioned disciplining judges for applying EU law in court cases, and sending inquiries to the EU Court of Justice. The issue of restricted abortion, which was precisely made possible by the judiciary reforms, further developed in March of this year. The Constitutional Tribunal ruled then, that abortion in case of fetal defects was unconstitutional after an inquiry to the Tribunal was made by far-right parliament members. A love turned sour? This summer, when the ECJ ruled that the Chamber must be liquidated, Law and Justice politicians rushed to send an inquiry to the Constitutional Tribunal about whether or not Poland should comply with the ruling. And unsurprisingly, the Tribunal ruled that Polish law is superior to EU law. At this point Poland asked itself whether it was in a toxic relationship with the EU. Am I losing my independence and sense of self? But it really was not. It was just realizing that it was not in love with its partner as it used to be. The ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal sparked a series of protests in support of the EU. Nevertheless, the state-controlled media, TVP Info, made a special effort to further polarize the conflict, headlining the dissent as “protests against the Polish constitution,” indirectly suggesting that those who do support the EU are not in fact patriots. On the 19 of October, a hearing was held in the European Parliament on the topic of violations of rule of law in Poland. Patryk Jaki, a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) from the Law and Justice party, pompously quoted Jean Jacques Rousseau and whined about how the EU was against the Polish government. The Prime Minister Morawiecki, on the other hand, could not resist mentioning the name that always stirs up a myriad of controversies: Donald Tusk. Donald Tusk, in the case of the Polish-European marriage, is like that shared friend whose expected position after the divorce is unclear. Or at least that is how the government views it. He served as the Polish Prime Minister in the years 2007 to 2014 from the Civic Platform (the largest opposition party), after which he became the President of the European Council. PiS partly built its election campaigns on demonizing him — at one point the national news portrayed him having a reddish tint. So is Donald a friend? A foe? Depends who you ask. Therefore, instead of addressing the issue at hand, the rule of law (or in Poland’s case, a lack thereof), Morawiecki decided to redirect the attention onto Tusk. He pushed back against the accusations of judicial ruling being politically motivated by saying “Please show me one ruling like that. One.” Indeed, ladies and gentlemen, Poland was officially gaslighting the EU. Moreover, he pointed out that during Tusk’s rule — contrary to now — politically motivated court rulings were made. But the only reaction he was met with for this statement was scarce applause and a Polish MEP shouting “don’t lie” in the background. “But will they really get divorced?” As in most dysfunctional marriages, when things go south, one of the partners has to say “I can’t live without you, please stay” to put past quarrels aside and make amends. In this case, it seems it is the EU that wants to hold onto Poland, whereas the Polish government unfortunately does not reciprocate the feeling. But interestingly enough, the dynamic is reversed — it is more so Poland that needs the EU than the other way around. The country is heavily dependent on EU funds and is now also dealing with the Belarusian migrant crisis on the border, which it cannot face alone. “On the eastern border we are dealing not only with violence, but with a staged spectacle aimed at violating borders, bringing chaos to the European Union” Prime Minister Morawiecki said on the situation at the border in November. Maybe Poland still loves the EU after all? Or perhaps it is just scared of getting lonely… Another worrying indication is how reckless the Law and Justice politicians have become when talking about a potential Polexit. A member of parliament, Janusz Kowalski, even mentioned 2027 as the year for a Polexit referendum. Nevertheless, as of October, 88% of an Ipsos poll’s respondents (made for Gazeta Wyborcza and OKO. Press) supported Poland’s continued membership in the EU.On the other hand, the Polish nation is becoming increasingly polarized, and the government-controlled media outlets are becoming progressively more ruthless by the day. As if that was not enough, on the 18 of December 2021, the Sejm passed a law commonly dubbed Lex TVN. The law is targeted against Poland’s largest independent news broadcaster, TVN, which is owned by American company Discovery. The new bill prohibits companies from outside the European Economic Zone to have complete ownership of a Polish radio or TV station. Is the Poland-EU dispute just a bump along the road, a crisis that every marriage must endure? Or is it truly the end of a great love story, one that ends with heartbreak? Only time will tell.

About two weeks ago, blissful and ignorant, I decided to research the upcoming Lemon Festival. Immediately, I found a stream of articles announcing the revolutionary involvement of non-fungible tokens (NFT) in this Mentonese tradition. After a couple more searches, I found myself on the official page for the sale of John Lemon NFTs; it was horrifying. < Back The NFT-fication of La Fête du Citron Spells Environmental Disaster By Saoirse Aherne February 28, 2023 As February approaches, those familiar with Menton wait in anticipation for the event of the year, a UNESCO recognized expression of Intangible Cultural Heritage, a citrus celebration like no other: La Fête du Citron. Since 1934, the Lemon Festival has drawn in visitors from far and wide. In typical fashion, this absurd carnival began as a cash grab. Back when Menton was a popular winter getaway for the European bourgeois, a group of local hotel owners decided to host a Menton carnival to entertain their wealthy clients. This first Menton parade in 1875 was a great success, but it was not until 1929 that the humble lemon got involved. That year, an exhibition of citrus fruits and flowers was showcased as part of the festivities. By 1928 the Menton area was the biggest lemon producer on the European continent, even acquiring the nickname “Rocher du citron.” Quickly, the lemon became the star of Menton’s annual parade and in 1934 the city officially named the event “La Fête du Citron.” Today, the Menton lemon proudly claims protection of geographical indication (PGI) — official recognition at the European level of its unique properties. Menton’s micro-climate makes it the perfect place to grow this golden fruit, which is said to be larger and less bitter than the standard. Currently, there are 15,000 trees which produce lemons that meet the PGI requirements, though this number is swelling with the help of the Association for the Promotion of Menton’s Lemons (self-explanatory organization, very specific mission). Presently, the lemon festival hosts 240,000 spectators each year, with 100 percent of tickets selling out in 2021. The event uses 140 tons of citrus fruit to adorn floats, decorations and gardens. Best of all, a charming character by the name of John Lemon has become emblematic of the event. But this year, for Menton’s 89th Fête du Citron, our favorite yellow mascot has had quite the digital facelift. Menton 3.0 - NFTs, Holograms, and Crypto: Oh my! About two weeks ago, blissful and ignorant, I decided to research the upcoming Lemon Festival. Immediately, I found a stream of articles announcing the revolutionary involvement of non-fungible tokens (NFT) in this Mentonese tradition. After a couple more searches, I found myself on the official page for the sale of John Lemon NFTs; it was horrifying. Unsure whether to laugh or cry, I scrolled through page after page of John Lemon NFTs; chunky yellow ovoids wearing stupid little top hats, ugly goatees pasted on their non-existent chins, strumming poorly rendered electric guitars. It was sick. The entire collection includes 5,000 designs — so far 18 have been purchased. The standard John Lemon NFTs are priced at 0.02 Ethereum coin, the equivalent of 30 euros. If you have even less self-respect and taste, however, you can purchase rare animated (moving) versions for 60 euros. Rock-Opera John Lemon will also perform every evening on the facade of the Palais de l’Europe in the form of a hologram. According to Nice Matin, this will mark the first NFT concert in the world. It will also apparently “enrich the intangible heritage of the city of Menton.” I'll just leave that there. Why? How? Why? This scheme is the brainchild of Mayor Yves Juhel and Stephanie Jacquot, second assistant to the mayor and deputy of events. Ms. Jacquot seems to be especially invested in the project, and reasonably so; on the Menton municipal council website, the description of her projects reads “city of tomorrow” and “digital.” According to Jacquot, incorporating modern technologies into the Fête du Citron will demonstrate that Menton is dynamic and innovative. A bold rejection of the image Menton has long cultivated as a quaint Riviera town frozen in history, Jacquot wants to revolutionize this “sleeping beauty,” as she puts it. The enthusiasm for NFTs is perhaps inspired by a project recently carried out by another Riviera town, the city of Cannes. In June of 2022, Cannes sold at auction 10 “digitized versions” of real locations within its jurisdiction. The event brought in 330,000 euros and marked the first sale of real estate through NFTs. According to Arnaud Oliveux, the auctioneer of the digital property, this opens the door to a future where buyers and investors can truly “live in the metaverse.” Whatever Jacquot and Juhel’s motivations, the duo were not alone in the mission to digitize Menton. The 5,000 rock-opera John Lemons were designed by a street artist from Nice who goes by the name Faben. The artist, whose real name is Benjamin Fabris, has recently engaged in a number of NFT-related projects and believes his work will “take the mascot of the Lemon Festival into the metaverse.” The other actor responsible for this dystopian saga is MyHologram, a company founded by Vanessa Rigaud. MyHologram has worked on a number of collaborations with museums, and has notably already collaborated with Faben to release a line of NFTs in September of 2022. For the Lemon Festival, MyHologram has worked closely with Faben, creating digital sculptures of his designs. MyHologram is also responsible for marketing the NFTs, however, they remain the city's property until sold. According to Yves Juhel, this is just the beginning. When speaking to Nice Matin, the Mayor promised many more NFT-related projects to come, declaring, "We already have ideas for next year... We will reveal the theme of the next edition at the end of it." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hiZEfnCVzr0 “We must not be afraid of NFT’s” announced Stephanie Jacquot to the Nice Times. Controversy! Beyond aesthetic sin, this project is also an “ecological disaster,” according to a representative from the Menton-based group Stand up for the Planet. In a rant posted to Facebook, this association proclaimed that “A single NFT represents a journey of about 800 km by car,” which is equivalent to 200 kilograms of carbon dioxide. The environmental impact of NFTs is mainly due to the large amounts of electricity required to facilitate Blockchain, the technology through which NFT transaction and ownership is recorded. However, identifying the exact carbon footprint of an NFT is quite difficult as each time an NFT is produced or sold, another carbon cost is endured. Digiconomist estimates that one Ethereum transaction demands 33.4 kilograms of CO2, though an NFT can undergo infinite transactions over its lifetime. Artist and programmer Memo Akten calculates that an NFT transaction produces 14 times more emissions than mailing a piece of artwork. With regards to the John Lemon collection, I have high doubts that all 5,000 will sell. Nonetheless, the carbon footprint of their creation — or “minting” as it's called — was significant in and of itself. If adding one NFT to the blockchain uses about 83 kilograms of CO2, as many cryptoblogs have informed me is the case, then this collection is already responsible for 415,000 kilograms of carbon emissions. That is the equivalent of flying from London to New York about 421 times . The looming threat of climate change has been more evident than ever over the past year, especially in the Cote d’Azur. Droughts across the region during the summer stunted the local lemon crop, and many citrus farmers will thus not be able to claim official Menton lemon status for their fruit. In the coming years, rising sea levels will pose significant challenges to this coastal town as increasingly heavy storms will bring about landslides. The city itself recognizes the need for environmental action, having recently pledged to transition Menton into a “Green city.” In light of this, the creation of John Lemon NFTs is not only unnecessary and laughable, but it is also a sign of the city’s hollow commitment to environmental action. La Fete du Citron is already wasteful by many metrics. The festival consumes a sizable chunk of the city budget on displays and decorations, purchasing thousands of fruits which are often destined to rot rather than be eaten. At a time when such events should be reimagined in a more sustainable fashion to preserve both tradition and the environment, it is disappointing to see the city of Menton do quite the opposite.

Situated in a quaint bay amongst sun-kissed houses, Sciences Po Menton is truly a peculiar place to spend two of the most impactful years of our lives. Many of us come here, leaving behind the safety of a familiar environment, to confront both the pleasure and pain of newfound liberty. < Back Reflections on Mentonese Life With Former Student, Professor Ismail Hamoumi By Emilia Kohlmeyer April 29, 2022 Another year at Sciences Po Menton is ending. 2As are passing onto their next journey and 1As are taking on the responsibility of preserving the Mentonese student culture. The legacy of Soundproof, the campus party house, is being transferred to a new enthusiastic quadruplet, and many events, such as the collective chant-writing session, represent a modicum of traditions which are transmitted over generations of Sciences Pistes. Reflecting upon the months since I moved to Menton, I grasped the profound impact our small French Riviera town had on me. I would have never pictured the extent to which this student community would be able to shape us when I first arrived. Situated in a quaint bay amongst sun-kissed houses, Sciences Po Menton is truly a peculiar place to spend two of the most impactful years of our lives. Many of us come here, leaving behind the safety of a familiar environment, to confront both the pleasure and pain of newfound liberty. I was fortunate enough to discuss this strange Mentonese journey into adulthood with one of our very own alumni. Former-student-turned-1A-sociology-professor, Ismail Hamoumi has completed the full circle of the Menton experience and was kind enough to sit down with me to offer his reflections on the student life of his day. The Menton experience could be described as both incredibly intense and influential — a microcosm of around 300 students from all over the world, sharing the same buildings, streets, and social spaces. This has an enormous impact on social relations. Privacy is much more limited, as perfectly exemplified by a 2A warning me not to gossip on Rue Longue in my first week here. Indeed, not much of anything remains private in Menton, as it is routine to run into a minimum of three other students each time you leave your home. Hamoumi emphasized the profound effect this leaves on our process of identity construction. Leaving home as inquisitive and malleable adolescents provides us with the liberty to experiment with new identities – ones that could potentially deviate from our familiar culture. Everything new we experience challenges our perception of self. This is compounded by our numerous daily social interactions with a highly international community. Students leave Menton with a more stable sense of self, remarked Hamoumi. Our identities are only reinforced by the diversity of people and thoughts that can be found on our Menton campus. But not everything has remained consistent. Menton has also witnessed some changes in the six years since Professor Hamoumi graduated. The student body has increased by a third. Many more associations now contribute to the blooming social scene and, to my suprise , even the vivacious nightlife, a pillar of the Menton culture, is a fairly new phenomenon previously limited to Le Retro. In Professor Hamoumi’s era, social life was mostly confined to the outdoors, a few larger apartments, or nights in Monaco on which a memorable part of the night invariably included 3 a.m. bus rides along serpentine roads, causing some alcohol and dizziness induced “incidents.” Conversely, many of the festivities of the last year took place in apartments. An iconic party spot in contemporary Menton is Soundproof — the student residence where wild nights sometimes start, but always end. Professor Hamoumi cited a similar apartment from his time in Menton. But it is yet to be confirmed whether it was in the same building as Soundproof, or if they were just on the same street. However, there remain a few notable constants besides the integral role of the ummah and a lingering separation between the English and French track. It seems that the Mercedes Benz of the owner of the New Asian Store is a product of the sponsorship of generations of Sciences Pistes’ late-night alcohol purchases. The culinary scene of Menton has also not been subject to much change, including the traditional takeout pizza from Volcano or dinners at Marrakech and Al Vecchio Forno. An honorable mention should also be awarded to our very own Michael Jackson, whose effervescent presence is an integral part of Mentonese life and spirit. It is clear that much in Menton seems to remain and accompany hundreds of Sciences Pistes well after their departure. As a rising 2A, it is clearer to me now how much responsibility weighs on us to preserve the community we have created and the traditions that mark our student life. Every generation of students has contributed a little piece of the ummah and once we leave a piece of our life will remain, kept alive by new eager students experiencing their own growth into adulthood and profoundly shaping their own identity.

Sur l’air solennel de la Marseillaise et le dépôt traditionnel de gerbes sur la Place de France à la Case Rocher, le 27 février 2024 marque l'installation d’un nouveau préfet à Mayotte, François-Xavier Bieuville. < Back Le droit du sol sur une île en crise: Retours sur l'actualité de Mayotte By Salomé Greffier March 30, 2024 Sur l’air solennel de la Marseillaise et le dépôt traditionnel de gerbes sur la Place de France à la Case Rocher, le 27 février 2024 marque l'installation d’un nouveau préfet à Mayotte, François-Xavier Bieuville. Pour la ministre déléguée chargée des Outre-mer, Marie Guévenoux, cette nomination vise à renouer le dialogue, rompu avec le précédent préfet, entre les autorités publiques et le collectif citoyen “Forces vives”, afin de “garantir l’ordre public et rétablir durablement la paix civile dans le département” . Trouver des solutions durables pour ce territoire traversé par des crises à répétition en termes de sécurité, d’immigration clandestine, d’accès aux biens de premières nécessités, de pauvreté,... devrait être au cœur du programme de l’ancien juriste ayant exercé dans des territoires ultramarins. En effet, alors que le 101 ème département français fait face à des barrages routiers depuis un mois de la part des “Forces vives”, l’enjeu du pouvoir central semble devoir se concentrer sur le rétablissement du dialogue et la prise en considération des revendications mahoriennes. La société civile qui proteste aujourd’hui, accuse l’Etat français d’abandon et condamne le climat d’insécurité palpable sur l’île, ainsi que l’immigration illégale. Concernant l’insécurité, l’INSEE relate en novembre 2021 que 48% des habitants de Mayotte se sentent en insécurité, principalement dans leurs quartiers, soit cinq à six fois plus que les habitants de l’Hexagone. Un sentiment confirmé par une délinquance d’appropriation élevée dans la région, puisqu’environ un ménage sur cinq a été victime d’au moins un cambriolage ou d’un vol sans effraction. Les logements et biens matériels motorisés (voitures, bus) s’avèrent être les principales cibles des délinquants. Des épisodes plus violents entraînant l’usage d’armes blanches (couteaux, machettes) ont également été répertoriés dans les écoles et les transports publics notamment. Ces agressions sont, le plus souvent, l’oeuvre de jeunes mahoriens organisés en bandes rivales mais demeurent associées au problème de l’immigration illégale. En effet, l’île de Mayotte, située au cœur de l’archipel des Comores, compte 55% d’étrangers dans sa population. Cette proportion s’explique par l’arrivée massive de comoriens (95% des étrangers) dans le département. La principale motivation de cette migration reste avant tout économique dans la mesure où Mayotte constitue le territoire le plus riche et doté d’infrastructures de services publics plus accessibles que dans le reste de l’archipel. Ces déplacements de population marquent également le 101 ème département français d’un taux de natalité s’élevant à 4,7 enfants par femme en 2022, soit 10 730 bébés de mères domiciliées sur l’île la même année. Surnommée ‘la maternité’ de la France, Mayotte et ses services publics, avec en première ligne la maternité de Mamoudzou, peinent à faire face à cette explosion démographique. La majorité des nouveau-nés sont issus de parents comoriens souhaitant obtenir pour leurs enfants la nationalité française en invoquant le droit du sol. Une pratique dénoncée par le gouvernement actuel ayant déjà initié l’opération Wuambushu en avril dernier afin d’expulser les migrants illégaux amassés dans des bidonvilles dans l’objectif de faire barrage à la crise migratoire. L’exécutif a choisi de répondre par la force et la destruction à une situation migratoire jugée intolérable et incompatible avec le développement de Mayotte. Or, l’ethnologue Sophie Blanchy rappelle d’une part que les liens entre comoriens et mahorais demeurent étroits en termes de culture, de langue, de religion; la seule distinction les caractérisant se trouvant dans la possession de la nationalité française ou non. D’autre part, la chercheuse avance que, dans cet espace insulaire doté de peu de ressources, la migration a toujours été une nécessité. D'autant plus que le transfert d’argent acquis par le déplacement des individus permet d’alimenter l’économie du département. Ainsi, l’argument nourrit par les discours de la métropole quant au fait que la migration à Mayotte ne serait motivée que par l’obtention de papiers administratifs reste à nuancer. L’article reviendra prochainement sur ce point. Dans l’immédiat, il semble nécessaire de se tourner vers la récente proposition du ministre de l’Intérieur et des Outre-Mer, Gérald Darmanin, pour couper “ littéralement l’attractivité qu’il peut y avoir dans l’archipel mahorais ”. Soutenu par Emmanuel Macron, le ministre souhaite assurément endiguer le phénomène migratoire en annonçant le 11 février dernier vouloir réformer les articles relatifs au droit du sol de la Constitution. Ce droit inscrit dans l’article 21-7 du code civil stipule que les personnes nées en France de deux parents étrangers peuvent obtenir la nationalité à l’âge de 18 ans si elles résident en France depuis une période continue ou discontinue d’au moins cinq ans depuis l’âge de 11 ans. De plus, l’enfant peut dans ce cadre obtenir la nationalité avant sa majorité sur demande de ses parents entre 13 et 16 ans ou sur demande personnelle entre 16 et 18 ans, sous conditions de durée de résidence en France. Ce droit du sol dit “simple” se complète d’un double droit du sol avançant que toute personne née en France ayant au moins un parent français peut obtenir la nationalité dès sa naissance. Dans le cas de Mayotte, c’est le droit du sol simple qui semble être visé par les mesures proposées par Gérald Darmanin. Dès lors, invoquer une mesure d’exception pour Mayotte contournerait le principe d’indivisibilité inscrit dans l’article premier de la norme suprême. En 2018 déjà, Emmanuel Macron s’était trouvé à l’initiative de la Loi Collomb réduisant les possibilités d’obtention de la nationalité française par le droit du sol. En effet, ce texte impose qu’à la date de la naissance d’un enfant né à Mayotte, l’un de ses parents au moins réside en France de manière régulière, sous couvert d’un titre de séjour, et de manière ininterrompue depuis plus de trois mois. Or, les observations montrent qu’en 2022, si seulement 800 mineurs ont obtenu la nationalité contre 2800 en 2018, les problèmes migratoires et tensions internes n’ont pas décru. Par conséquent, la proposition du ministre de l’Intérieur et des Outre-mer apparaît inutile voire dangereuse selon les partis de l’opposition. A droite, alors que le Rassemblement National se réjouit de cette mesure, Marion Maréchal Le Pen craint un “appel d’air” migratoire qui pourrait atteindre l’Hexagone. La chef de fil du parti d’extrême droite Reconquête, critique en outre la fin du visa territorialisé qui permettait de limiter la circulation des personnes étrangères en situation irrégulière au seul département de Mayotte. Sur les bancs de la gauche, Manuel Valls, anciennement affilié au Parti socialiste, défend que “ cette réforme repose sur le fantasme que le droit du sol est responsable du chaos à Mayotte [... ]on ouvre un boîte de Pandore qui me paraît extrêmement dangereuse dans notre débat national ”. En effet, toucher au droit du sol remet en cause des piliers fondamentaux de la République française tels que son caractère indivisible et social. Cette mesure marque davantage encore l’inefficacité de l’Etat français à mettre en œuvre des actions concrètes pour pallier la pauvreté qui divise les îles de la Lune. Alors que l’eau est coupée presque trois jours par semaine, que son prix est assez exorbitant pour que les mahorais en consomment via des systèmes d’approvisionnement vétustes et porteurs de bactéries telles que l’E.coli, le gouvernement s’attache à poser la responsabilité de cette situation sur les étrangers. Certes, la pression démographique implique une prise en charge complexe des services publics sur l’île, mais elle n’est pas la seule coupable d’une crise structurelle plongeant 77% des habitants sous le seuil de pauvreté. Emmanuel Macron se veut rassurant en affirmant que la réforme constitutionnelle annoncée ne fera pas le jeu de l’extrême droite tout en soutenant qu’il reste “ très profondément attaché à ce droit pour la France ”. Par ces paroles, le gouvernement évite finalement une fois encore de résoudre les problèmes par des solutions et place Mayotte en périphérie de ses préoccupations nationales.

Je ne vous apprendrai donc rien en vous disant que notre université, et le campus de Menton en particulier, souffre d’une image pour le moins ternie par des accusations d’antisemitisme et autres propos diffamatoires circulant dans les médias. Mais les questions qui demeurent sont : pourquoi en sommes nous arrivés là, et comment est-ce que cela nous impacte concrètement ? < Back La perception médiatique de Sciences Po Menton By Anonymous April 30, 2024 Si vous lisez ceci, vous êtes probablement élèves de Sciences Po. Je ne vous apprendrai donc rien en vous disant que notre université, et le campus de Menton en particulier, souffre d’une image pour le moins ternie par des accusations d’antisemitisme et autres propos diffamatoires circulant dans les médias. Mais les questions qui demeurent sont : pourquoi en sommes nous arrivés là, et comment est-ce que cela nous impacte concrètement ? Depuis le 7 octobre, Sciences Po a été au centre de l’attention pour les positions prises par ses élèves en relation au conflit en cours. Mais le campus de Menton en a souffert doublement. En tant que campus ‘Méditerranée Moyen Orient’ il est le plus directement affecté car ce conflit touche à notre zone géographique de prédilection, mais aussi car il touche certains de nos camarades de près. Pourtant, la discussion a été difficile et la gestion compliquée. En effet, notre campus a souffert d'attaques par des élus locaux d’extrême droite visant directement certains étudiants en postant des vidéos de leurs visages dans un but de diffamation du campus. Ils les ont ainsi mis au centre d’une attention qui n'était pas voulue et haineuse. De plus, les médias ont abondamment répété que notre campus était “antisemite”, associant tout une communauté étudiante aux actes certes répréhensibles mais non représentatifs d’une petite minorité, et vidant de son sens cette notion si grave et complexe. Il est donc impossible de ne pas être choqué de la durée durant laquelle ces propos ont pu circuler en ligne, endommageant gravement l’image de notre campus. On pourrait peut être penser que la réputation du campus, et de Sciences Po plus largement, s’en remettra probablement; après tout, les classements QS ne semblent pas en tenir compte, Sciences Po arrive 2 ème en politique, et c’est peut être tout ce qui compte… Néanmoins, cette attention médiatique est grave, car elle attise les divisions et fragilise notre confiance dans la capacité de notre institution à nous protéger. Souffrant d’une gouvernance instable, nous nous sommes donc retrouvés démunis. Qui plus est, les propos ont été plus d’une fois démentis par des élèves de manière très ouverte, mais étrangement cela ne semble pas autant attirer les médias. En ce qui concerne les impacts directs de ces accusations, notre campus en souffre déjà. En effet, le président de MEDMUN, l’une des cinq associations permanentes du campus, a évoqué la difficulté à inviter certains diplomates ou à nouer des partenariats avec certaines marques qui ne voudraient pas que cette image leur soit associée. Pour lui, il est d’autant plus difficile de se défendre contre de telles positions tant que Sciences Po ne fait pas de “contre attaque”, car sans un démenti officiel nous n'avons que peu d’arguments. Néanmoins, il est important de reconnaître l'existence dans notre campus de postures antisémites. Comme la conférence du 24 avril nous l’a rappelé, les élèves juifs de notre campus en ont souffert. Les témoignages l’ont montré, nous ne sommes pas toujours très à l’aise. Il est aussi important de se rendre compte que l’antisemitisme est souvent mal compris. En effet, ce que certains voient comme anodin ne l’est pas toujours pour ceux à qui ça s'adresse systématiquement. Et oui les ‘blagues’ stéréotypes toujours justifiées a ce titre sont dures à vivre, et oui être convoqué sur la conversation a propos du conflit en Israël/Palestine sans toujours être à l'aise pour donner notre perspective est un problème. Je dois l’admettre, durant le mois d’octobre et même depuis, certains jours ce malaise m’a envahie. Mais je refuse de laisser ces angoisses définir notre campus et mon expérience. Ce n’est pas en stigmatisant tout le campus que ce sera résolu. En effet, la reprise de la vraie souffrance de certains élèves à des fins politiques rend le dialogue d’autant plus difficile. La diffamation venant des médias pousse à des réactions antagonistes de certains qui empêchent la discussion modérée et honnête. Il est donc évident que la diffamation à l’encontre de notre campus affecte tout à la fois des individus, le fonctionnement d’associations et la capacité d’organiser des événements en son sein. Le manque de réponse face à ces attaques médiatiques et leurs reprises politiques nous laisse nous questionner sur l’avenir du campus.

Secularism is a valid outlook and a reality for many 21st century states; however, we often fail to consider the fact that states in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia can have a different perspective on this separation, with different traditions and political systems. This creates the question of what is and what should be the role of religion in the world of politics. < Back Religion and Politics: Always at War By Angeliki Vytogianni October 30, 2021 The topic of religion is always a hot one, fueling debates and conversations both in politics and in individuals’ behavior. For many with European and North American influences, the answer is easy: religion should be 100 percent separate, never involved in domestic politics or international relations. Secularism is a valid outlook and a reality for many 21st century states; however, we often fail to consider the fact that states in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia can have a different perspective on this separation, with different traditions and political systems. This creates the question of what is and what should be the role of religion in the world of politics. Religious extremism and fanaticism around the world have sparked many tragedies throughout the centuries. From the Crusades in the 11th to 13th century, to European wars on religion in the 16th to 18th centuries, to the Indo-Pakistani wars, to the Israeli-Pakistani conflict, to the Sudanese conflict, to Bush’s “war on terror,” religion is a common denominator in almost every conflict, the dividing factor, an urge to extremism and the development of paramilitary groups. We have seen the extent to which terrorist organizations like the Islamic State (ISIS) and Al Qaeda will go in order to fulfill their religious/political aims. We have seen the number of countries divided not because of nationalities, but because of religion, or religious branches, denominations, movements. We’ve seen the damage done by religion-related hostilities. So why are we not abolishing religion completely? Why not ban its involvement in foreign and domestic politics? Separate the Church from the State, should we not? For a historian studying these events, religion seems like the absolute worst subject to include in policy drafting, as it has made the people, the land, and the army suffer in every case it was involved. However, this view is rather ignorant for countries that have religion at the heart of their organization and their identity. Until the era of imperialism, most parts of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia organized themselves into groups according to religion. Religion was the most significant part of their identity and culture. To this day, it plays a much bigger role than the West understands. After the Second World War, the decolonization period brought several changes to most former colonies and/or occupied territories of the Great Powers. To avoid and contain uprisings or conflicts that developed, artificial borders and states were created. A prime example of the West’s treachery and imperialism, the areas were divided according to such preferences rather than the will of the people. Especially because of the Cold War and conflict occurring primarily through proxy, areas of great geopolitical importance such as the Middle East, Africa and Asia (Yemen, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Myanmar in particular) became the tennis courts for a match that never truly mattered to them. In most cases, the borders do not even come close to the pre-existing divisions between ethnic, cultural, and religious distinctions in the area. The political and humanitarian crises, civil wars, and uprisings the world faces today are results of those deep-run divisions. Many conflicts have arisen due to religion-fueled hatred that spiked when distinct groups were forced to co-exist within specific borders. Those who drew the lines between the artificially created states failed to consider the pre-existing conditions in the region and placed power interests above the locals’ right to self-determination. Many groups place religion at the core of their identity and culture, so it is inevitable that it should play a role in politics and international relations. We cannot ban or prohibit something so fundamentally important for these people, nor should we really try to. There is a way to meet in the middle and respect the traditions in every part of the world. It is the only way to hold effective negotiations and resolve the apparent issues. The first papal visit in Iraq, back in March, gives a hint of hope, pushing tolerance, understanding, and inclusion of different cultures. A historic moment for the Christian and Muslim communities, Pope Francis’ visit to the former Islamic State occupied territories should not be a symbol of Christian saviors healing the land and the people, but rather an act of co-operation, a step towards mending the conflict. 2021 also brought the re-establishment of Taliban rule in Afghanistan. An oppressive, authoritarian regime that uses its own interpretation of religious beliefs to persecute women, erase their accomplishments, and forbid their existence. How does the world deal with these violations of rights and freedoms in the name of religion? And how does one find the balance between preventing this oppression of the people but also practicing religious tolerance? Since offensive and aggressive behavior occurs both in the name of religion and in the name of secularization, it is imperative that we work on such issues collectively, and not solely through a Western point view. Only by listening to the people and the countries involved can we reach a point where politics, religion, and different forms of self-determination can peacefully coexist.

Prenant tous ces éléments en compte, il est possible de voir l'extrême droite non pas comme le mal mais simplement un des symptômes d’une Europe fragmentée et dont une grande part des populations doutent aussi. < Back L’Union Européenne confrontée à elle même By Anna Halpern December 31, 2023 Qu’est-ce que l’Union Européenne? Cette question devient de plus en plus cruciale avec la montée au pouvoir de partis d'extrême droite qui ne soutiennent pas forcément l’UE et qui divisent l’Union de plus en plus. Le Brexit était un premier signal très flagrant et un “wake up call” pour l’Union Européenne, mais la question de sa viabilité et de son futur est de plus en plus pressante. Entre ceux qui prônent une centralisation et un fédéralisme Européen et ceux qui veulent sa dissolution, où va t-on? Cette question de la structure européenne est apparue après la chute de l’Union Sovietique et l'expansion sans précédent de l'Union Européenne vers l’Est avec notamment l’élargissement de 2004 à 10 pays, passant de 15 à 25 membres. Cet élargissement est un moment charnière pour l’opposition à l'Europe, car il a permis de développer la notion que l’Europe avait perdu son but/raison d’être d'après-guerre et s'était élargie à des pays ayant une histoire politique et une économie très différente. A cela s'ajoutent les crises migratoires et économiques auxquelles toute l’Europe fait face, surlignant des divisions de fond. Ces divisions sont les fondements des tiraillements que l’on peut observer aujourd’hui. Je me dois de souligner que je ne peux pas répondre à cette question, mais il faut les garder en tête en regardant la montée historique de l’extrême droite en Europe. En effet, l’année 2022 seule a vu Giorgia Meloni monter au pouvoir en Italie, le grand succès du bloc d'extrême droite en Suède ainsi qu’un score historique pour le Rassemblement National en France. Les finlandais et les néerlandais ont eux aussi témoigné une montée de l'extrême droite en 2023. Ceci a des impacts non seulement sur la politique de ces pays, notamment en Italie où le débat fait rage sur les propositions de changement de la constitution amenées par le gouvernement Meloni, mais aussi sur l’Union Européenne. En effet, l’UE apparaît de plus en plus divisée. Face à la guerre en Ukraine et à la problématique migratoire, les pays européens se divisent entre les pays gouvernés par l'extrême droite et le reste de l'Europe. Cette divergence fait aussi et surtout rage sur les sujets de la démocratie et la protection des libertés fondamentales avec l’affrontement entre l’Union Européenne et la Hongrie et la Pologne au sujet de tendances autoritaires que ces pays ont progressivement adoptées (notamment la libertée de la presse et la séparation des pouvoirs sont sous pression), culminant en une confrontation juridique. En de tels temps, des questions se posent sur la viabilité de l’UE telle qu’on la connaît. Néanmoins, il serait trop facile de blâmer l'extrême droite pour tous les maux de l'Europe. En effet, les ressentiments se sont fait sentir de toutes parts, notamment après 2008 dans les pays d’Europe de l’ouest tels que la Grande Bretagne dont la population avait le sentiment de trop cotiser et de ne pas en bénéficier autant, créant la base de l’argument pro-Brexit. D’autant plus que la tendance vers la droite n’est pas universelle dans les pays membres avec l’exemple de l’élection de Donald Tusk, du parti pro-UE, comme premier ministre en Pologne, un changement radical par rapport à la dernière administration. Prenant tous ces éléments en compte, il est possible de voir l'extrême droite non pas comme le mal mais simplement un des symptômes d’une Europe fragmentée et dont une grande part des populations doutent aussi. Ces doutes vont très certainement influencer les résultats des élections européennes de juin.

In the second half of September, thousands of people were living in a temporary and improvised camp situated under a bridge that connects Del Rio, Texas, and Ciudad Acuña, Mexico. Now, the encampment has been completely cleared. Out of 15,000 of the displaced, the majority were Haitian migrants. < Back The Never-Ending Haitian Migrant Crisis By Margherita Cordellini October 30, 2021 In the second half of September, thousands of people were living in a temporary and improvised camp situated under a bridge that connects Del Rio, Texas, and Ciudad Acuña, Mexico. Now, the encampment has been completely cleared. Out of 15,000 of the displaced, the majority were Haitian migrants. This disproportionate number is not an accident: the surge of Haitians in the United States was derived from intertwining historical, political and morphological factors. According to the 2020 Human Development Index (HDI), Haiti ranks 170 out of 189 countries, making it the poorest country of the Latin America/Caribbean region. The main historical cause is traced back to the country’s colonial past. From 1492 until the beginning of the XIX century, Haiti was a French colony whose soil has been intensively exploited to cultivate coffee and sugar. As a result, today, large parts of the soil are completely infertile. Moreover, the island’s independence, declared in 1804, entailed significantly high monetary costs, which corresponded to the amount of money requested by France to grant the diplomatic status of a newborn independent country. Since then, the state has been characterized by permanent political instability and, consequently, military foreign intervention. The last major intervention occurred from 2004 to 2017 and was a UN peacekeeping mission, called the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti. The consequence of the 13 years long occupation was devastating: a cholera epidemic caused by the poisoning of the Artibonite river ascribed to an American base killed almost 10,000 inhabitants. The country’s morphological conformation also contributed to worsening living standards. For instance, Haiti was subject to two ruinous earthquakes in January 2010 and in August 2021, and to Hurricane Matthew in 2016. Lastly, the July 2021 murder of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse plunged the country into political turmoil. Political instability fosters its social equivalent, which, already characterized by the widespread presence of criminal gangs, is now dominated by a dichotomy of popular opinions concerning political succession. Natural disasters, political uncertainty and a population mostly under the national poverty line of USD 2.41 per day are the main factors that piled up to generate huge migration waves. Furthermore, the United States’ influence on the country has been ubiquitous in the last century, such that Haiti is often defined as an American protectorate. Therefore, the migratory phenomenon is not ascribed to the events of 2021 alone: according to the US Census of 2019, Florida was inhabited by 356,358 Haitians, 1.66 percent of its population. Hence, Haitian migrants are not a novelty for the US government, which in May 2021 had, in fact, announced a new Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation for 150,000 Haitians living temporarily in the United States. Nonetheless, Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro N. Mayorkas stated at the end of September that this pronouncement has been misinterpreted. For instance, its immediate consequence was a massive wave of Haitians spilling over into the United States, confident that the Biden administration would have welcomed them. This was not the case. In September, nearly 30,000migrants undertook a perilous and strenuous journey, starting from disparate departure points. More than half of them shared a common ground: being Haitian nationals. However, a meaningful number had been living in various Latin American countries, such as Panama, Chile, and Brazil, and some of them were not even familiar with their motherland. They all eventually amassed in Del Rio, building a temporary encampment under a bridge. After some days of hesitation, US authorities took the drastic decision to clear the encampment, by first apprehending and then repatriating its inhabitants. On the 19th of September, the first three flights landed in Port-au Prince, the Haitian capital, and the rhythm of repatriates have progressively intensified. Unlike what was promised, these operations did not run smoothly. For instance, once deported to the island, Haitian migrants denounced, along with the excessive use of violence, the indecent and inadequate conditions of the detainee centers, and, above all, the widespread abuse of deception. Various directly involved witnesses reported having been told that they would have been relocated in less crowded detention camps in Florida. Instead, the next thing they saw was Port-au Prince’s airport. Moreover, none of the returnees underwent interviews or formal identifications. As a result, Nicodeme Vyles, a 45-year-old man who had been living in Panama since 2003 found himself in Haiti, a country in which he had no home, no bank account, and no family. The events of this September must be placed into a broader framework. Thanks to empirical data, it has emerged that every presidential administration since the 1970s has treated Haitians differently than other migrant groups, holding them longer in detention and rejecting their asylum claims. A not negligible precedent is the Guantanamo case of the 1990s, which saw 12,000 Haitian migrants detained indefinitely in the famous prison. In the last month, images of the US Border Patrol on horseback, using the reins as whips while chasing migrants in Del Rio, shocked the global West. However, the main reason was often not compassion, but genuine surprise: the popular expectations towards the Biden administration concerning immigration policies were different. For instance, the president’s promise of discontinuity with the Trumpian past seems to be jeopardized by the incorrect and unfair procedures of repatriation, and by the lack of altruism towards a heavily burdened country that is not able to welcome 15,000 migrants.

The chilliing news about Ukraine, struck me – I felt that I wanted to discuss the situation with others from our campus, and inform those who were less up to date with the events leading up to the invasion. Half an hour after I woke up, the group chat was born. < Back How Students Are Keeping Up With Ukraine By Markus Vaher March 30, 2022 A Student Perspective on the Russo-Ukrainian War Estonian second year student, Markus Vaher, created a group chat following the Ukrainian invasion, in which students share information and updates. In five responses, he sums up his experience. 1. Why did you create the Ukraine group chat? What is the purpose? The day that the war broke out was very cloudy and depressing here in Menton. I remember waking up in the early morning, way before my alarm. The war had started a mere two hours earlier, but my parents and close friends had already texted me. Just a few minutes later, I found myself plunging into the news, making coffee and breakfast on the side. What I was seeing really struck me differently. I felt that I wanted to discuss the situation with others from our campus, and perhaps inform those who were less up to date with the events that have taken place in Ukraine in the last decade. Half an hour after I waken up, the group chat was born. 2. How have you been following the invasion so closely? Are there any apps or sources you would recommend? Following a live war from a distance is always quite exhausting, it is very emotionally draining. It takes up a lot of your time, and distracts you from whatever else you might be doing. But if it matters to you, then you will keep following the events. My sources vary quite a bit. In a large part, especially for information about battles and bombings, I follow Ukrainian Telegram channels like the Kyiv Independent, Политика страны, Украина сейчас, and Киев сейчас. For information about Russian and Belarussian internal opposition, NEXTA Live and Осторожно новости are quite good. A lot of information also comes through Estonian media and the Estonian Council of Foreign Relations, of which I am a member. And Twitter, of course, but as a source it is not very reliable. 3. As an Estonian, how do you feel about the safety and security of your country and family? How does being Estonian impact your perception of the invasion? 24 February, the day that the war started, was also Estonia’s 104th independence day. The speeches and celebrations that day took on a very different, darker tone. Our people remember history. We remember the battles, the killings, the deportations and carpet-bombings of World War II. We remember - my parents from first-hand experience - the silent terror of the [Russian] occupation [of Estonia]. So, of course, the symbolic meaning of this conflict is very deep for us. We remember how our people, language, and culture were being erased, and we are now seeing a revived attempt at that. I have never stepped foot in Ukraine, but we have a lot of common historical experiences with the Ukrainian people. Today, I do not see a direct threat to the safety of my friends and family. Our country is a highly committed member of NATO and the EU, our society is heavily opposed to any form of Russian domination and influence. Compared to an attack on Ukraine, an attack on Estonia would be even more costly for Putin’s regime. We have already proved this with the level of military support we are offering to Ukraine: proportionally to population size, Estonia has provided the largest amount of military aid of any country, and in absolute terms, we are in third place after the United States and the United Kingdom. 4. What do you think has motivated Putin? Do you think he has an upper hand? For a long time I was skeptical about the narrative that Putin just wants to rebuild a Russian empire in the former territory of the Soviet Union, perhaps because I expected him to be more rational. Since the war started, however, I have begun to give more credit to this view of him as an imperialist. After all - attacking Ukraine was a very high risk, but low reward endeavour. And he still went for it. I do not think he has an upper hand, however. As of my writing this article [March 28, 2022], the war on the ground has come to a stalemate, whilst Putin is losing on the information and economic fronts. He has won very little so far, and even if he can drag the conflict out, there is little for him to gain. On a more personal level, he seems to have lost a large part of the legacy he sought to make for himself. Even the judo belt was taken away. There is an important historical comparison. When Poland was attacked by Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939, it took the invading forces 36 days to occupy the country. It seems highly likely that Ukraine will pass that mark, albeit at a great cost to human lives. Yet it is nowhere close to losing the war. The question is whether Ukrainians can win back their land. 5. What have been the biggest outcomes and challenges of the war thus far? Do you see these persisting? How do you feel about the international response? The biggest positive outcome is that Ukrainian society has been reoriented toward the West. If Ukrainians and Russians might have gotten along well a decade ago, the animosity between them, between normal, everyday people, has grown very large. And so Ukrainian unity and commitment to Western values have never been as large as today. After all, Ukrainians are the only people who have died fighting under the European flag. The biggest negative outcome is, obviously, the cost in human lives and livelihoods. This war has already resulted in more than a thousand civilian deaths, including the confirmed bombings of three hospitals and nine schools. There are up to four million people that have left the country, just as many have been displaced within. It is very hard to tell today how the health and well-being of these people can be ensured, or how they could safely return to their homes in a relatively short time-frame. A lot has been done, but nonetheless the international response should be stronger, especially regarding a lot of low-risk measures, such as humanitarian aid, military intelligence sharing, limiting Russian disinformation, and working on ending the European dependence on Russian fossil fuels. The slow response in many of these areas is perhaps behind technical challenges that the public is not aware of. But in other cases it might be a lack of political will or real commitment. The proposal of a NATO-backed no-fly zone, however, is a technical question. Too often, it is seen as a symbolic or diplomatic question rather than a purely military one, but at the end of the day, it is the military calculus that matters. As of now, it is unlikely it will ever be established.

To be Algerian-French means learning about your history through the voice of the colonizer. And it is more often than not immensely glorified. < Back The Celebration of Oppression Ibtissem Remdane May 15, 2026 To be Algerian-French means learning about your history through the voice of the colonizer. And it is more often than not immensely glorified. This is a realization I had when I dug a bit deeper than merely just French history books, specifically on the figure of Marcel Bigeard. A man whose statue has stood proudly in Toul, a city in the North-East of France, ever since it was inaugurated on the 24th October 2024. Marcel Bigeard, who died in 2010, was a French army officer who rose from a modest background to become one of France’s most infamous paratrooper commanders. Most of Bigeard’s adulation within the French army comes from his part in the French Resistance in 1944. After that, he actively took part in two major colonial wars: the First Indochina War and later the Algerian War. During the latter, he became one of the central military figures in France’s attempt to suppress the independence movement. His role consisted of dismantling the Algerian nationalist resistance network in Algiers, placing him at the heart of a counterinsurgency strategy built on coercion, brutal surveillance and fear. During these operations, he became a symbol of systemic torture, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances and the execution of prisoners without trial. Though “trial” itself was a hollow concept under the French colonial rule in Algeria. Indeed, for instance, registered ground forces files count 1 415 convicted et 198 executions, from the 1st January 1955 to the 15th of September 1961, SHAT, 1H 1097/6. (Professor Thénault). This adds to 198 official executions in only 6 years. Whereas in France, as a matter of comparison, 61 convicted were sentenced to death from 1950 to 1977. Still, one of the most inhumane and plainly cruel practices linked to Bigeard during this period was what came to be known as “death flights.”. This form of extrajudicial killing was used during the Battle of Algiers by the occupying French army to effectively get rid of troublesome dissidents. Whatever one may think of when thinking of the term “death flights”, the reality of what it actually was is probably worse. From a helicopter off the coast of Algiers, with their feet encased in a basin of cement, untrialed independentist detainees were thrown into the void to crash in the Mediterranean. Then, the bodies, most of the time poorly weighted due to insufficient cementation of the feet, would not sink properly and end up washing up on the beaches of the bay surrounding the capital. The many victims of these operations would later be called by the French les crevettes Bigeard , the shrimps of Bigeard. Until the end, Bigeard refuted the reports ordering torture or executions, often stating he opposed such methods, while qualifying them of a “necessary evil.” The military man seemingly disliked the term “torture” and prefferd using words like “rough interrogations”, a statement he made in a interview not long before his death. Yet, numerous testimonies from victims as well as former soldiers describe the torture as routine and organized, not accidental. Some French historians agree that these practices were structural, embedded in the system, rather than the result of a few “bad actors.”: “In conclusion, if there is one area in which the armed forces in general – and Marcel Bigeard in particular – have no lessons to learn from politicians and their cronies, it is certainly that of morality.” said Colonel (h) Christian Châtillon in an open letter to Bigeard. Indeed, as a commanding officer Bigeard operated within, and most importantly managed a machinery where brutality was the norm, and even the rule. And yet, despite all this, his legacy remains deeply divided. In parts of France like Toul, he is still celebrated as a war hero for his “bravery” and “brilliance” in his missions in Indochina and Algeria, remembered as a symbol of discipline and resilience. Everything he profited from after that, from the 25 military commendations like the Legion of Honor Great Cross to serving as Secretary of State for Defense under President Giscard d’Estaing, is a direct reward for his “exploits” abroad. Then in 2011, after Bigeard’s death, previous president Sarkozy’s government advocated for his ashes to be placed at “Les Invalides”. Today, many streets bear his name and political figures continue to praise his military career. To some politicians , survivors, descendants, he represents something entirely different. Not resilience but impunity. His name is tied not to glory but to trauma, abuse and a violence that has never truly been acknowledged, let alone repaired. The cleaving discourse that resurfaces every time he is publicly honored is not accidental. It is the result of a history that remains unresolved. France has long struggled to fully confront the reality of the Algerian War, and most of its victims have never received justice or even recognition. In that context, celebrating figures like Bigeard is not neutral, it is an assumed continuation of denial.Because to call him simply a “hero” is not just incomplete, it is an absolute distortion. It turns violence into valor and the oppression he proudly perpetuated into legacy. About 3000 dead, and 1000 missing, what a dignified way to be remembered by. Denouncing Bigeard is denouncing one of the several forms of political instrumentalization of history orchestrated by the French government. Figures like him serve in furthering its aim of reconstructing a nationalist mythology and greatly appeals to those who are nostalgic for French Algeria, a group whose presence and ideology seems to remain significant today. No statue, no speech, no selective memory can separate him from that reality. His “legacy” is not just a matter of history, it is a matter of truth. And for the children of those who suffered at the hands of men like him, that truth remains a battle yet to be won. Photo source: wikimedia commons edited with use of public domain vector

With personal testimonies, voice recordings, interviews, personal letters, and diaries, oral history detaches historical events from purely governmental accounts. < Back The Concept of Oral History is Changing the Way We Study the Past and Shaping the Future of Humanities By Angeliki Vytogianni January 30, 2022 I have always been very interested in history. As soon as I realized how easily history could be used as a means of propaganda, I recognized the importance of oral history. This movement requires historians to alter the way they study the past. The value of oral history lies in personal testimonies from people that have witnessed or been involved in historical events. Studying these events in this grassroots way and paying more attention to the individual instead of government records ensures that history is shaped by the people, not by political, economic, military ideologies, or by the interests of those with power. This allows for a more humane way of looking at history, to get an accurate reflection on some of humanity’s greatest question marks and historiographical debates. One example of this could be the post-World War I power struggle in the Ottoman Empire territories. Turks, Greeks, Armenians, and ethnic minorities all tried to claim their heritage in Asia Minor, in, more or less, hostile ways, after centuries of peaceful co-existence of this mix of nationalities up until the beginning of the 20th century. Moreover, in the Balkans, the Serbs, Bulgarians, Macedonians, Greeks, and Turks also tried to claim grounds. Historians that have studied this part of European-Middle Eastern history have mostly relied on reports, numbers and statistics provided by the governments and national organizations in the region. Novels written by Penelope Delta and other distinguished authors, intellectuals, and politicians of the time proved to be strong sources of information. However, one can easily understand that due to the complexity of this geopolitical issue, a variety of conflicting interests arose, with drastically different historiographical approaches. Thus, none of these sources can be guaranteed to accurately reflect the essence of the struggles of the time, which is when oral history comes in. With personal testimonies, voice recordings, interviews, personal letters, and diaries, oral history detaches historical events from purely governmental accounts. According to the Oral History Association, the term oral history refers to "a method of recording and preserving oral testimony" which results in a verbal document that is “made available in different forms to other users, researchers, and the public.” This organization also stresses the complexities of oral history in regard to legal concerns. Testimonies, interviews, and personal stories need delicate policies to protect privacy and copyrights, all analyzed in A Guide to Oral History and the Law . The author examines the most relevant court cases and cites examples of policies and procedures that oral history programs have used to avoid legal difficulties. But oral history is not limited to researchers in history associations. Here in Menton, we have so many interesting stories and personal testimonies from important events in history to share. I was really intrigued by the prospect of being able to learn from this diverse student body, but I encourage Sciences Po to include more testimonies, and oral history into the curriculum itself. This would add to our social sciences and anthropological studies, by giving a first-hand picture of historical events and situations. Studying social and political sciences in such a prestigious university, we use history a lot, thus oral history could very well fit in our curriculum. It would be an improved way of looking at things, considering different points of view, getting different experiences, which is actually crucial to the work of a thorough historian. Instead of basing the bulk of research on governmental state archives, we can study and create different archives by interviewing people from different backgrounds to get their experiences of a particular historical period. Oral history is a very powerful tool that can make all diverse voices heard loud and clear. It gives power and space to historically oppressed and marginalized groups, and we get the option to understand the same event in greater depth, and under different lenses, depending on each person’s experiences. Indigenous populations, for example, are often not included in reports by authorities, however, by using oral history and interviewing them, we get a better sense of their reality. In the refugee crisis, for example, listening provides more context than numbers, and head counts in the camps of Lesvos, we need to listen. Let the people talk and we listen. Lilinaz Hakimi, 2A at Sciences Po, volunteered in one of the camps in Lesvos this past summer. She stressed the importance of this human-to-human connection in building empathy that cannot be replaced by statistics. In her own words, having heard the stories from the people themselves, “it is really important to hear someone’s story and connect, visualize, to understand what they are going through, understand how any historical event has so many different layers underneath.” In the end, what it really comes down to is making history more a part of humanities like it was always intended to be. Let us not get carried away by the tendencies of our times to measure and file everything, which can be demeaning to the actual events. Let us keep being humans, keep connecting to other people and listening to them. Experiences are more valuable than any other means of sourcing, and we have so much of that.

The Beirut attack has reproduced immensely this social division on the political stage as Lebanese dreadfully await to see if Hezbollah’s ‘silent strategy of response’ unravels into an unwanted war. < Back Beirut Bombing: A Social Take By Jad Toufic Toutinji Photo of the bombed apartment where Saleh Al Arouri and six other members were assassinated. It was captured on Dec. 3, 2024 by Al Jazeera cameraman Jawad Shukr. On Dec. 2, 2024, the population of Beirut was shaken by an Israeli attack on a supposedly residential building in the Hezbollah controlled southern suburbs, killing Saleh Al Arouri, a prominent Hamas political leader, and six other members during a secret Hamas meeting. It is the first Israeli attack on Beirut since the July War of 2006. The Situation Since Oct. 8, Hezbollah and Israel have been incessantly attacking each other within a ‘limited conflict’ under ‘rules of engagement.’ On the Lebanese side, this ‘conflict’ has taken the lives of more than 160 people (at the moment of writing), some of whom were innocent citizens, children and journalists like Reuter’s Issam Abdallah. It has also caused great infrastructural damages across the southern and central western regions of Lebanon, displacing approximately 80,000 people . On the Israeli side, the death toll is 15 with minor infrastructural damages, but with thousands evacuated under the government’s organization and request. A Brief Political Analysis The attack on Beirut came as a shock to many, even to those who may have anticipated it. It marks the first potential spark of an official all out war between both parties, being that it is Israel’s biggest breach of the ‘rules of engagement.’ This latter phrase in the conflict’s context refers to an equivalent right of response by both sides, which is what all Lebanese are dreading. If Hezbollah were to respond equally to the attack, then Lebanon will be pulled into a dreadful war. Many concerned believe Israel is testing the waters and ploying to drag Hezbollah to war. Israel’s unofficial defence for the attack is to get rid of all those involved in the Oct. 7 operation as clearly expressed by the Israeli Mossad Chief’s vow to “settle the score” a day after the Beirut bombing. Yet, there is more to see on the wider scope: Washington has recently refused the inclusion of Lebanon in the regional conflict, which Israel appears to disagree with. As a result, Israel took this discrete, precise attack instead of its usual bombardments like in the southern regions of Lebanon. Even though Israeli government officials are claiming that the attack was on Hamas, not Hezbollah and Lebanon, the violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty is undeniable. Furthermore, on Dec. 3 Israel bombed the Lebanese village of Naqoura, killing a prominent Hezbollah leader Hussein Yazbeck. Clearly, the attacks are not limited to Hamas. Thus,we could argue that Israel was testing Hezbollah’s waters by attacking its central neighbourhood, but also verifying the US’ commitment to de-escalation in Lebanon. The latter’s officials denied any prior knowledge of the planned drone bombing. Moreover, it is also Netanyahu trying to postpone his inevitable electoral defeat by prolonging the war and expanding into Lebanon. In response, Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrullah warned during his speech on Dec. 3 that Arouri’s death will not go “without response and punishment,” claiming that it will be “very, very, very costly.” Consequently, observers are anticipating potential attacks; however, some interpret it as Hezbollah maintaining a ‘dormant’ right of response, so no immediate reciprocation. In fact, since Oct. 8, Hezbollah has been relatively showing a tactful response in an attempt to balance between supporting Hamas and controlling the internal Lebanese turmoil. Immediate Social Responses Instances after the bombing, there was a moment of panic that spread all over Lebanon. People in my neighbourhood, which is ten minutes away from the site of bombing, said that they had heard “three consecutive loud explosion sounds.” Two friends of mine, who live within metres from the site said that “they did not hear an explosion” – often a normal situation when the person is within close proximity to the bombing – and that “they heard a drone movement but lower than the usual Israeli warplanes viciously hovering over Lebanon.” One of them, living on the same street, said out of fear, “whatever it was they bombed us with, I felt it pass just above my house.” No one really knew who was assassinated, yet because of Lebanon’s consistent experiences with assassinations since 2005, it was almost immediately and unequivocally accepted that an assassination had taken place. The fear spread through all telecommunication ways possible. I was driving with my friends when it all happened and, within a matter of seconds, all the phones in the car were ringing. It was the typical Lebanese response to check on everyone after an attack, especially considering almost everyone in Lebanon would know someone who lives near the site of the bombing. My brother, who was in a shopping center when the explosion happened, saw many “immediately hold their kids and rush blindly to their homes.” Indeed, soon after it was made known that Israel bombed Beirut, its streets were emptied up as everyone took shelter in their homes in fear of further bombing. Even if, by far, this surely was not the biggest, most traumatic bombing to occur nor was it the most dangerous Israeli attack within the past five years, the consistent post-Beirut 2020 explosion trauma and the current Gaza and southern Lebanon massacres were enough to trigger a wave of fear all over the country. Within an hour, most Beirut boulangeries had run out of Lebanese pita bread as people bought essentials preparing for a potential war. Unlike prior to the 2006 July War, consciousness and fear of the repercussions of war is strongly present among the Lebanese. In comparison, in 2006, when Hezbollah announced the success of its kidnapping mission in the south, most Lebanese celebrated the success as many hoped to see the Lebanese hostages being exchanged for the kidnapped soldiers. Few were the ones that rushed out of fear to markets and boulangeries. However, it is evident that the trauma scarred in most Lebanese from that disastrous war created an unseen dreadfulness. As a result, most Lebanese, including to some extent Hezbollah, do not wish to go to war with Israel at the moment of writing. The Reproduction of Social Divisions The Dec. 2 Israeli attack on Beirut reproduced the never-ending Lebanese social divisions, some of which were essential factors to the 1975-1990 Civil War: the Palestinian refugees and the war against Israel. For a long time, Palestinian resistance groups, like Hamas, and also Lebanese ones, like Hezbollah, have existed out of the Lebanese military control. It has sparked on multiple occasions disputes with Lebanese civilians who feel endangered by the existence of armed groups. Today, many, if not a majority, stand against these armed groups. Most Lebanese stand with the Palestinian cause, whether on a humanitarian or identity basis. However, the division, which nowadays is not across religious sects as during the pre-civil war, stands on thin lines: ways of resistance and national priorities. Some Lebanese do not believe it is their duty to liberate Palestine militarily, seeing that the Lebanese cause – reclaiming Lebanese Israeli-occupied territories only – is of priority and that it should take place diplomatically or via the Lebanese military. This faction of the population perceives Hezbollah as an Iranian terrorist group endangering Lebanese sovereignty as much as Israel. On the other hand, another faction of the population perceives Hezbollah as their guardian angel against Israel because of a weakened Lebanese state. Interestingly, the latter faction is recently divided on the ‘Hezbollah’s balanced Palestinian-Lebanese strategy.’ A part of this latter faction sees the military support to Palestine from the Lebanese southern borders as morally necessary, yet should be kept limited to avoid an unwanted all-out war. Meanwhile, the opposing group, of which many are impoverished business owners and employees, still support Hezbollah yet believe that Lebanon is already in an economic crisis and that it is not the right time for liberation. As is the case that very few want a full war, even fewer from the anti-Hezbollah faction do not morally support the Palestinian cause and identify as Zionists. The political identification is never binary as extremists claim it to be. The Beirut attack has reproduced immensely this social division on the political stage as Lebanese dreadfully await to see if Hezbollah’s ‘silent strategy of response’ unravels into an unwanted war.

Tout le monde connaît les phrases toutes faites. On les répète comme si elles allaient de soi : « Civilisation contre barbarie », « Les Kurdes sont les pions des Occidentaux », « Les Arabes n’ont jamais accepté la modernité »… À force d’être répétées, ces formules finissent par s’imposer comme des évidences. On ne les vérifie plus, on les suppose. La question israélo-palestinienne n’échappe pas à ce mécanisme. < Back Les Palestiniens l’ont-ils bien cherché ? La nécessaire chasse aux mensonges sur le conflit israélo-palestinien par Sandrine Mansour-Mérien Selma Boufaroua April 1, 2026 Tout le monde connaît les phrases toutes faites. On les répète comme si elles allaient de soi : « Civilisation contre barbarie », « Les Kurdes sont les pions des Occidentaux », « Les Arabes n’ont jamais accepté la modernité »… À force d’être répétées, ces formules finissent par s’imposer comme des évidences. On ne les vérifie plus, on les suppose. La question israélo-palestinienne n’échappe pas à ce mécanisme. En fait, elle en est même le terrain privilégié. Dans L’histoire occultée des Palestiniens , Sandrine Mansour-Mérien s’inscrit précisément dans cette démarche de remise en question. Publié dans un contexte d’assez fortes tensions autour du conflit, l’ouvrage propose un retour aux archives, et ce qu’il révèle fissure plusieurs idées largement admises sur la naissance d’Israël et la Nakba. Ainsi, son travail s’apparente à une véritable entreprise de vérification, tant ces idées reçues se sont imposées de manière durable dans les discours médiatiques et politiques. Les régimes arabes ont tout fait pour défendre les Palestiniens Si les populations arabes manifestent massivement leur solidarité avec les Palestiniens, b oycottent les produits israéliens et soutiennent les grèves, les gouvernements, eux, restent en retrait. L’historien et j ournaliste palestinien Aref al-Aref est catégorique : ils ont beaucoup parlé, mais peu agi. États nouvellement indépendants, ils privilégient les promesses occidentales d’avantages économiques. Le mufti de Syrie refuse d’armer les villageois palestiniens. La plupart s’engagent à ne pas intervenir tant que le mandat britannique n’est pas officiellement caduc, ce qui laisse aux sionistes le temps de conquérir du terrain. Plus grave encore : l’armée transjordanienne, officiellement envoyée défendre les Palestiniens, est dirigée par des officiers britanniques dans le cadre d’un accord secret avec les sionistes. Cet accord prévoit que la Jordanie se contente de défendre la frontière du partage onusien, ce qui revient à l’accepter, puis annexe la partie arabe de la Palestine. L’Égypte, de son côté, adopte des lois interdisant l’emploi de réfugiés palestiniens, les cantonne dans des camps à Gaza et leur interdit tout retour après un départ. Le Liban refuse de conserver une population majoritairement musulmane qui déséquilibrerait son système confessionnel. La France, dans ses notes diplomatiques, constate qu’il ne reste guère que la Transjordanie et la Syrie pour accueillir les réfugiés. Ainsi, le mythe des pays arabes comme défenseurs ultimes de la Palestine manque cruellement de nuance et omet que la solidarité populaire ne s’est pas toujours traduite en action étatique efficace. Source: flickr , Protester carrying Palestine flag, Tahrir Square (Egypt, Cairo), 6 May 2011 La violence a commencé du côté arabe Une idée largement dominante est que la violence a commencé du côté arabe, que les milices juives n’ont fait que se défendre. Plus radical encore, certains clament que le terrorisme est un phénomène exclusivement arabe dans ce conflit. Sandrine Mansour-Mérien explique que ces positions manichéennes ne sont ni vraies ni utiles dans l’analyse d’un conflit qui dure plus de 80 ans aujourd’hui. En effet, la Haganah, créée en 1920 comme bras armé de l’Agence juive, voit émerger des scissions plus radicales. L’Irgoun, issu d’une rupture en 1936, mène des attaques terroristes dans des marchés arabes bondés, notamment à Haïfa en 1947. Deux de ses membres, Begin et Shamir, deviendront respectivement Premier ministre en 1977 et ministre des Affaires étrangères en 1980. Le Lehi (Groupe Stern) va jusqu’à proposer une collaboration à l’Allemagne nazie, qui la refuse. Le 28 décembre 1947, le Lehi et la Haganah tirent sur un café à Lifta, village de 2 500 habitants près de Jérusalem : 6 morts, 7 blessés. Ils attaquent également les voyageurs d’un bus et le village de Beit Safafa. Ces actions ne peuvent être qualifiées de défensives : aucun de ces habitants n’avait été hostile. Le massacre de Deir Yassin du 9 avril 1948, perpétré malgré un accord de non-agression avec les colonies juives voisines, reste le plus tristement célèbre. L’enquêteur britannique Richard Catling, mandaté par son gouvernement, confirme que des violences sexuelles ont été commises contre les femmes palestiniennes. L es milices ne sont officiellement dissoutes que progressivement, après la proclamation de l'État d’Israël le 14 mai 1948. Leurs combattants sont intégrés dans Tsahal, la police, la diplomatie, pratique que l’on peut qualifier d’amnistie par l’intégration , effaçant les crimes en réintégrant leurs auteurs dans le système. Le départ des Palestiniens : seulement une conséquence involontaire de la guerre ? La Nakba n’est qu’un simple effet collatéral du conflit de 1947-1949 : la population, prise dans le chaos, a fui les combats et la guerre. Voilà le discours martelé à de multiples reprises pour expliquer les catastrophes de 1948 et la suite des événements. Certains historiens eux-mêmes reconnaissent l’existence d’expulsions tout en les présentant comme inévitables. Dans une interview accordée en 2004 au journal Haaretz, l’historien israélien Benny Morris affirme ainsi que, dans le contexte de 1948, il n’y avait parfois « pas d’autre choix » que de déplacer des populations. Folke Bernadotte, diplomate suédois respecté pour avoir sauvé des détenus des camps nazis, est nommé médiateur de l’ONU au printemps 1948. Sur place, il est bouleversé par la condition des réfugiés palestiniens, qui sont en majorité des enfants, et demande l’aide internationale. Il constate le pillage systématique des biens palestiniens par les forces juives et estime qu’Israël est juridiquement responsable. Il obtient une trêve de trois mois, réclame le retour des réfugiés. Les groupes sionistes rompent la trêve par de nouvelles attaques tout en se réarmant massivement : France, États-Unis, Tchécoslovaquie continuent leurs livraisons malgré l’interdiction. La « campagne des murmures » terrorise les villages : des soldats déguisés en Arabes, parlant parfaitement l’arabe, propagent des rumeurs de massacre imminent pour provoquer l’exode. À Acre, la Croix-Rouge soupçonne la Haganah d’avoir injecté des bactéries de la typhoïde. Bernadotte est assassiné en septembre 1948 par des membres du Lehi, alors qu’il rentre de Syrie où il a présenté ses propositions. Ben Gourion arrête une cinquantaine de personnes, puis les gracie quelques mois plus tard. Plusieurs sont nommés à son gouvernement dès 1949. L’assassin présumé meurt en Israël en 2009 sans jamais avoir été jugé. La plupart des travaux historiques citent le nom de Yehoshua Cohen, bien qu'il n'ait jamais reconnu officiellement l'assassinat de Bernadotte dans un cadre juridique. Source: wikimedia commons , Palestinian refugees during Nakba Le nationalisme palestinien était exclusivement musulman Contrairement aux tentatives de présenter le conflit comme interreligieux, les communautés chrétiennes palestiniennes se sont constamment solidarisées avec leurs concitoyens musulmans. En mars 1948, les représentants de toutes les Églises chrétiennes de Palestine (arménienne catholique, orthodoxe…) adressent une lettre aux consulats européens. Ils « dénoncent en termes non équivoques le projet de partage » et affirment que « la communauté arabe chrétienne de Palestine de toutes les dénominations est en complet accord tant en principe qu’en fait avec ses frères musulmans pour résister à toutes violations de leurs droits ». Et ce n’est pas un épisode isolé. Après les armistices, l’archevêque grec catholique d’Amman lance un appel aux pays européens : « Devant de pareilles atrocités, devant des actes si inhumains qui se commettent au milieu du XXe siècle, prétendu siècle de la civilisation, et en temps prétendu de trêve, nous ne pouvons qu’élever hautement la voix. Il est nécessaire que la conscience humaine mette fin à de pareilles atrocités en Palestine . » Ainsi, le conflit ne peut être réduit à une rivalité religieuse, et on ne peut en aucun cas affirmer que les chrétiens auraient été plus proches des puissances européennes et donc moins solidaires des musulmans palestiniens. Plus encore, une idée existe selon laquelle les chrétiens auraient vu dans le partage une forme de garantie contre une domination musulmane. En citant ces évènements, Sandrine Mansour-Mérien prouve le contraire : les chrétiens palestiniens ont justement pris position publiquement à de multiples reprises pour s’opposer au projet sioniste. Source: Flickr , Greek Orthodox Christian Church of Saint Porphyrius in Gaza « Les Palestiniens ont soutenu Hitler » Un récit persistant accuse les Palestiniens d’avoir soutenu Hitler. L’histoire nous montre très rapidement que cette affirmation est à la fois fausse et malhonnête. Les ruraux palestiniens, qui représentent alors 80 % de la population, sont farouchement opposés à une politique qui est la cause indirecte de l’immigration juive, de l’achat des terres et de leur propre dépossession. Quant aux nationalistes arabes des villes, politisés et minoritaires, qui ont pu approcher l’Allemagne nazie, l’ont fait par opportunisme politique, selon la logique « les ennemis de mon ennemi sont mes amis ». Réduire la position du peuple palestinien à celle de son leader religieux relève du même sophisme que celui qui consisterait à faire du peuple français un soutien d’Hitler parce que Pétain a collaboré. La France, pour sa part, s’engage activement contre les Arabes palestiniens en raison du soutien de ces derniers aux mouvements indépendantistes nord-africains. Elle forme des militaires israéliens sur son sol et leur fournit des armes. Source: wikimedia commons , Amin al-Husseini and Adolf Hitler Source: wikimedia commons , Henri Philippe Pétain and Adolf Hitler En relisant l’histoire et en se confrontant aux archives, on se rend compte que beaucoup de récits répétés depuis des décennies simplifient énormément la réalité. Ces simplifications s'inscrivent en réalité dans un rapport de force politique et international. Un diplomate français constate en 1949 un sentiment partagé dans les sphères influentes israéliennes : « les puissances n’oseront pas, dans les circonstances actuelles, prendre des mesures véritablement efficaces pour ramener Israël au sens réel des forces ». Cette conviction, hélas, s’est révélée juste. Les archives et les témoignages existent bel et bien et sont conservés notamment à l’Institut d’études palestiniennes de Beyrouth. Soixante-quinze ans après la Nakba, le travail d’occultation que Sari Hanafi nomme « spaciocide », c’est-à-dire la volonté de détruire un peuple non seulement sur le plan physique mais aussi symbolique, n’a pas seulement concerné la terre palestinienne, mais aussi sa mémoire . Le travail de Sandrine Mansour-Mérien est précieux pour déconstruire un certain nombre de contrevérités. Mais il met aussi en lumière les limites du fact-checking dans un contexte aussi politisé. Corriger, ça ne veut pas forcément dire convaincre. Dès lors, le livre ne peut pas, à lui seul, défaire des représentations répétées depuis des décennies. Photo Source: Wikimedia Commons

If we understand that proper wording can strongly impact policy and recognition of the suffering of persecuted peoples, then it becomes all the clearer why so many are arguing on whether the war in Gaza constitutes a genocide, and whether the treatment of Uyghurs is a crime against humanity. < Back Terminology and War Crime Denial Anna Halpern February 28, 2025 We have often heard of South Africa’s much-mediatized Genocide case against Israel in front of the ICJ , and many of us have also seen Amnesty International’s reports which call the mass deaths in Gaza a genocide . The controversy surrounding the appropriate term and the clear political game behind any position adopted on the matter really seem to have reopened the question of politics behind the terminology. While we may have heard this debate before, the end of how we name events so that they match the reality of the context of the war in Gaza is part of a far larger issue that has deep historical roots. Indeed, the use of terminology to manipulate public opinion and deny war crimes and genocides is a very powerful tool that has been employed throughout the 20th and even 21st century. Before entering the specifics of the cases that we will compare, it seems impossible not to define the terms that are so critically argued upon. Genocides, war crimes and crimes against humanity are all international crimes committed by individuals or governments that “ affect the core dignity of human beings.” In order to understand the conflict of namings and narratives, one must know the terms’ definitions and history. War crimes refer to “serious breaches of international humanitarian law committed against civilians or enemy combatants during an international or domestic armed conflict, for which the perpetrators may be held criminally liable on an individual basis.” This definition is derived from the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva Convention of 1949 and its additional protocols and Article 8 of the 1998 Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC). The definition of a crime against humanity “ encompasses crimes such as murder, extermination, rape, persecution and all other inhumane acts of a similar character (wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health), committed ‘as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.’” It is codified in Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. Finally, the term genocide was originally coined by Raphael Lemkin and first appeared in his 1944 work “ Axis Rule in Occupied Europe .” It is defined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. “It is the specific intention to destroy an identified group either ‘in whole or in part’ that distinguishes the crime of genocide from a crime against humanity.” These definitions also highlight the critical fact that the term Genocide, for example, simply did not exist during some of the events that now are argued to fit within this definition. Such questions add to the terminological dispute the question of the possibility of judging such an event through the lens of a crime that did not exist at the time. Keeping this background in mind, we can now consider how the application of these definitions has been used and disagreed upon. An extremely famous case of genocide denial and terminology debate is the case of the Armenian genocide of 1915 which Turkey, and much of the international community, still officially do not recognize despite vast scholarly support. However, the debate over naming and recognizing this event is not unique. While we cannot explore all cases that have sadly occurred, it appears relevant to look at a few more historical cases that have yet to be fully recognized. We will consider the Japanese massacres and war crimes during the invasion of China namely in Nanjing (December 1927 to February 1938) as well as the Bosnian genocide denial (1995). These cases can be linked to a far more recent lack of recognition by China of its persecution of the Uyghur minority. Through both historical examples and the current cases in Gaza and China the critical importance of terminology is underlined, and its broad political implications clearly seep through. The case of the Armenian genocide is a blatant example of the difficulty of earning official recognition of war crimes, especially genocide, and the tricky word game played by Ankara is critical in this terminological warfare. The Armenian genocide is well recognized by historians and institutions —the creator of the term himself thought to apply it to the context of Ottoman crimes against Armenians in WWI. However, the international scene is not always ruled by expert opinions—as we know all too well—but often is far more politically guided. Thus, the reality is that only 33 countries currently recognize the genocide, and this list notably does not include Turkey. Indeed, Turkey has always maintained a policy of denying “ a deliberate policy of genocide.” The official website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs portrays the Armenian view as an “embellishe[d]” version that it “selects” in order to vilify Turkey. Moreover, the website follows the phrasing “The events of 1915,” commonly used in official Turkish statements on the matter. Thus, this decision not to call it a ‘genocide’ is intrinsically linked to the maintenance of a very different narrative regarding the events themselves and is a tool aiming to prevent the acknowledgment of the extent of the devastation recorded by most non-Turkish historians. But national narratives differing regarding war crimes is not something that is exclusively reserved to the rather well-known case of Armenia and Turkey. Indeed, Sino-Japanese relations are still strained to this day by very controversial Japanese positions concerning the “Nanjing Massacre” or the “Rape of Nanjing” which in Japan is sometimes referred to as the “ Nanjing incident .” This case is not quite as clear as the case of the Armenia-Turkey disagreements. Indeed, Japan has been largely criticized for its unclear position, with varying positions from an acknowledgment of the Tokyo Trials and remorse for the suffering caused during WWII to an outright denial of the “Nanjing Massacre.” This public debate and division is all the more relevant to Japan’s international relations, within which it has maintained an unclear discourse. While it has apologized in general terms for Imperial Japan’s policies and actions, “many Japanese apologies have looked like “one step forward, one step backward.” Moreover, the lack of a unified messaging has led to questionable word choices such as referring to the “so-called Nanjing massacre” and has even seen the denial of certain Japanese war crimes. Thus, the lack of clear terminology and strategic uncertainty of positioning has led to the possibility of denials and belittling of war crime s which have affected Sino-Japanese relations. In a more recent and still very open wound, we can also consider the case of the Bosnian genocide. This refers to the massacre of Srebrenica in July 1995 which was ruled by the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia a Genocide. It occurred during the Bosnian War, where Bosnian Serb forces committed grave human rights violations and war crimes. Despite such international recognition, Bosnian Serb Politicians have largely denied such crimes, and have recently adopted a report denying the genocidal nature of the massacre. This comes in a context of great disagreement with a UN resolution to commemorate the Srebrenica Genocide by Serbian and Bosnian Serbs. This only serves to highlight that terminology arguments are crucial tools in the hands of genocide deniers and ultimately still have massive repercussions on Bosnian society thirty years after the events. This case is a prime example of the critical importance such terms hold and the real impact they can have. While all of these historical cases are immensely important and still have repercussions to this day, they also serve as a warning sign of the dangers of unclear terminology or intentionally untrue naming of grave events. It seems only fitting to look from such events to current war crimes, human rights violations and potential crimes against humanity whose terms are still under discussion such as the case of Uyghurs in China and the war in Gaza. If we understand that proper wording can strongly impact policy and recognition of the suffering of persecuted peoples, then it becomes all the clearer why so many are arguing on whether the war in Gaza constitutes a genocide, and whether the treatment of Uyghurs is a crime against humanity. Though in these two cases the final rulings are not given, both the ICJ’s indications of measures to be taken to prevent a potential genocide and the UN’s report accusing China of potential crimes against humanity indicate a high chance of such crimes having been committed and have led to no acknowledgment on the part of Israel or China. Such lack of impact of international warnings and refusal to acknowledge the terms used by both parties highlights a consistency in patterns of denial of crimes and seems all the easier to read through given such historical context. As a post scriptum, I feel that I must explain the lack of inclusion of a very well-known denial, and that is Holocaust denial. This is indeed a critical issue that merits being addressed. However, as I mentioned at the beginning, I did not have extensive space to delve into all cases of denial, and I found it to be far more interesting to focus on less well-known issues that have less media attention and deserve to be recognized. This does not in any way take away from the importance of Holocaust denial and of course we should consider a far wider range of events than the selected cases of this article when considering the real impact of terminology disagreements and denial. Photo credits: Diane_Krauthamer on Flickr