The gap between official and unofficial inflation rates is staggering; both domestic and foreign investment has plummeted, and there are instances of people waiting in lines to receive food supplies. It is uncertain how Erdoğan plans to regain his popularity. However, one thing is certain: when people can’t afford their food and shelter, their political views change. And if this continues to be the case for Turks, the end of the road for Erdoğan is near. < Back Collapsing Lira Signals the End of the Road for Turkey’s Erdoǧan By Ata Tezel November 30, 2021 “Whoever supports higher interest can not be on the same side with me!” were the words President Erdoğan used in his party’s annual meeting in November, reaffirming his commitment to lowering interest rates at any cost. His words portrayed not only his unconventional economic beliefs but also posed a direct threat to the administration of the central bank, which had been reluctant in following his interest policies. However, with the lira falling like a rock, it is unclear whether Erdoğan will keep standing by his beliefs or concede to making a political U-turn, something his administration has been associated with for years. Among all major currencies, the Turkish lira has been the worst-performing since 2018, losing up to 80% of its value in a three-year span. Turkey has also experienced one of the highest rates of inflation among leading developing economies, with its official annual inflation rate surpassing 20% this year. It is therefore confusing to many that Mr Erdoğan strongly advocates for lowering interest rates, an unconventional and practically counterintuitive policy to combat an economy in stagflation. Erdoğan’s economic priorities are different from those set by virtually every other nation in the world. Amidst the demand recovery from the health crisis this year, Turkey is the only nation that reduced policy rates, which says a lot about the recent shift in Erdoğan’s political agenda. In his own words, Erdoğan believes that “interest rates are the culprit, inflation is the result.” In an economy that is heavily dependent on foreign financialization and one that experiences high currency volatility and interest rates, it is unclear how Erdoğan, a self-claimed economist, reached this conclusion. Nonetheless, what is clear is that pursuing this belief has resulted in a massive economic downturn which, if not changed, will certainly lead to catastrophic consequences. What is interesting about the situation is that the consequences of the president’s interest policy were not unprecedented — many in the political and financial spheres of Turkey, as well as other global players, have repeatedly raised concerns regarding the long-term sustainability of Turkey’s unconventional growth mechanics. Moreover, the Turkish people have been the direct subject of his failures, and their unrest against the government amidst witnessing their savings and income shrink is heard loud and clear. In fact, Erdoğan currently has the lowest approval rate of his 20-year-long rule, and both the presidency and parliamentary polls for the 2023 election indicate, for the first time in his political career, that he and his party are on track to get ousted from power. Therefore, Erdoğan’s fixation with his economic policies indicates that, following his massive loss in the 2019 Mayoral Elections, he has been unclear about his political intentions and insecure about his future. In fact, for the first time, Erdoğan is resistant to calls for early elections by the opposition. For a populist figure that has legitimized all his actions based on ballot results, this is unprecedented. Moreover, it is clear that the power of political Islam in Turkey has been diminishing significantly as the economic turmoil gets more severe. Many of Erdoğan’s supporters could care less about the religious rightness of the concept of economic interest over their declining living standards. His attempts to deviate attention from the crisis have been unsuccessful, on the contrary, scandals from his past and present have been piling up. For the first time, these scandals are receiving the attention of the people, who now call for early elections. Consequently, it is unknown whether Erdoğan can survive the upcoming elections in 2023. More worryingly though, it is unclear if the economy and the people can endure the crisis for two more years. Solely in the first half of December 2021, the central bank of Turkey spent more than 10 billion US dollars of foreign reserves in an attempt to stabilize the plummeting currency, just for it to fall further once the interventions ended. The gap between official and unofficial inflation rates is staggering; both domestic and foreign investment has plummeted, and there are instances of people waiting in lines to receive food supplies. It is uncertain how Erdoğan plans to regain his popularity. However, one thing is certain: when people can’t afford their food and shelter, their political views change. And if this continues to be the case for Turks, the end of the road for Erdoğan is near.

Neo-Baathism finds its roots in the thought of the Syrian intellectual Michel Aflaq, who was able to inspire generations of anti-imperialist revolutionaries and radicals. < Back Arab Intellectuals that Every Sciences Piste Should Know: Michel Aflaq By Emilia Kohlmeyer November 30, 2022 Michel Alflaq’s Baathism is difficult to recognize in contemporary Baathist ideology that still occupies Syrian and Iraqi thought. However, neo-Baathism finds its roots in the ideas of the Syrian intellectual Michel Aflaq, who inspired generations of anti-imperialist revolutionaries and radicals. Michel Aflaq was born to a middle-class Greek-Orthodox family in Damascus. He received western education during his childhood under the French Mandate and later studied on a scholarship at the Sorbonne. His politics were strongly influenced by the instability Syria experienced during the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925 and post-WWII Europe, which brought uncertainty to the Middle East. During his time in Paris, he first interacted with ideologies such as communism, Marxism, socialism and nationalism. He formed the Union of Arab students, which called for the decolonization of Arab lands. Upon his return to Syria, Aflaq and Salah al Din al Bitar, a Sunni Muslim, co-founded the Baath “renaissance” party, which would extend to many other Arab countries, most notably Iraq. Michel Aflaq’s principles are embodied in the Baathist slogan, “unity, freedom and socialism.” Aflaq’s quest for unity stems from his conception of the Arab nation. The essence of the Arab nation unveils itself through an eternal Arab revelation, which experienced its last rise when Islam unified the Arab world. The Arab nation is primarily bounded by its common language, which Aflaq regards as its primary source of social norms and perception. Restoring the glory of the Arab world, in his view, was only possible by a complete structural transformation achieved only through a revolution, “inqilab,” on the foundation of nationalism and socialism. Nationalism, as an ideology, was to be the key vehicle in unifying the lower classes against the political elites. Aflaq, a Greek Orthodox Christian, pursued a secular pan-Arab nationalist vision, which regarded religion as a force of division within the Arab nation. However, he regarded Islam by its “intense moral” nature to have inspired Arabs to “break through their entrenched reality,” as he outlined in a lecture in 1943. According to him, Islam represents an innate part of Arab culture, and he asserted that “Islam was an Arab movement. Its meaning was Arab renewal and its perfection. So the language that Islam descended with was Arabic. Its outlook and understanding were of an Arab mind. The qualities it encouraged were apparent or hidden Arab values, and the faults it addressed were faults the Arabs were to vanquish.” Furthermore, his writings were known to contain numerous Quranic references. The second pillar of his strategy of transforming the Arab world was socialism. During his studies in France, he was particularly exposed to Marxist thought, although he later declared communism to be “Western and alien to everything Arab.” Instead of relying solely on pure ideology, Aflaq drew on certain Marxist tenets, such as dialectical materialism. However, he translated the struggle of the working classes into the united Arab struggle against Western capitalists. While supporting inheritance rights and private ownership, Aflaq advocated for wealth redistribution, greater public ownership of key industries, and workers’ participation in profit-sharing and managerial matters. His socialist vision envisaged economic justice as forming the foundation of the new Arab nation-state, which should be democratic and a defender of fundamental rights such as free speech. However, despite supporting these values, he considered it necessary for the Baath party to claim the required authority to create the conditions where individual ideas could flourish after decades of imperialism and elitist ideology. Only then would the people be capable of forming their demands. His politics have been described as many things, from radically leftist to fascist, although in practice, they were rather vague and formulated to appeal to the masses. After the split of the United Arab Republic, a union between Syria and Egypt under Nasser that Aflaq had cautiously advocated for, the influence of the original Baathist generation began to decline. Successive military coups during the 1960s and a humbling defeat against Israel in 1967 culminated in a neo-Baathist coup instigated by Hafez al-Assad, whose son remains president today. Aflaq fled Assad’s Syria to Iraq under the protection of his follower Saddam Hussein and his Iraqi branch of the Baath party. Michel Aflaq died in Paris in 1986 and was buried in a mausoleum in Iraq, which, upon the American invasion, was repurposed as a gym for US soldiers and is now a shopping mall.

“If you want to eliminate values from past societies, you have to eliminate the artists.”, reflects Prince Norodom Sirivudh of Cambodia, in the 2014 documentary “Don’t Think I’ve Forgotten: Cambodia’s Lost Rock and Roll”, recounting the systematic erasure of music from Cambodian society under the brutal regime of the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s. < Back “When They Tell You to Sing, You Just Sing.”: The Khmer Rouge’s Musical Manipulation of Cambodian Society Loowit Morrison November 10, 2025 “If you want to eliminate values from past societies, you have to eliminate the artists.”, reflects Prince Norodom Sirivudh of Cambodia, in the 2014 documentary “Don’t Think I’ve Forgotten: Cambodia’s Lost Rock and Roll”, recounting the systematic erasure of music from Cambodian society under the brutal regime of the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s. “[A]rtists are influential. Artists are close to the people,” says Sirivudh. Music is inherently political, used for centuries as a mechanism of control and mobilization. Throughout history, music has shaped public opinion and regime legitimacy by both producing and limiting access to music. From 1955 until 1975, Cambodia’s music experienced what is known as its “Golden Era.” Thanks to increasing global communication, the rise of clubs, bars and nightclubs, and the United States’ Armed Forces’ radio , Cambodian music became infused with Western, Latin and Afro-Cuban pop influences, creating a distinct style of modern music. Traditional Cambodian styles were electrified; garage and surf rock took root in Cambodia’s art scene. Stars such as Sinn Sisamouth, Ros Sereysothea and Pan Ron gained massive popularity. Cambodia’s musical backbone was not only thriving — it was vital to the nation’s social life. A mere 17 years after gaining independence from France, Cambodia entered into a period of civil war. In 1970, an American-backed coup ousted Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s regime as part of their larger war against communism. Sihanouk fled to Beijing, becoming a figurehead for the rising Khmer Rouge, a group of communist insurgents. The years that followed were marked by tensions between communist guerrilla fighters and Lon Nol’s anti-communist government. 1973 saw massive devastation at the hands of U.S. bombardment. The civil war came to an end in April 1975, when Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge toppled Lon Nol’s government and seized the capital, Phnom Penh. 1975 was declared “Year Zero” by Pol Pot’s regime and the country was renamed “Democratic Kampuchea”. The regime, stretching from 1975–1979, was marked by a radical strategy of agrarian communism and strict isolation. Civil and property rights, religious practice and Western influence were completely eradicated, and urban citizens were forced into the countryside to labor in agricultural projects. Any intellectuals, artists or elites were sent to work or killed. Cambodian society was effectively “decapitated.” As part of the eradication of artists, musicians were among the first targets of the Khmer Rouge. All music, other than propaganda of the Khmer Rouge, was banned in an effort to eliminate “old” identities linked to Western culture. At the time, Cambodian musical culture was deeply influenced by the French colonial period, beginning in the 19th century. French colonizers brought Western instruments and genres to Cambodia, infusing Cambodian music with Western designs. The Khmer Rouge, in opposition to anything Western, sought to destroy this Westernized musical identity and create a “new,” yet staunchly traditional, Khmer identity. Although the majority of existing music and musicians were destroyed by Pol Pot’s regime, part of the strategy to mobilize the new Khmer identity was through music. The Khmer Rouge’s re-education program rearranged traditional hymns and melodies, such as basak and mohori , to serve their ideologies and push forth the new agrarian society. Despite the fact that most musicians were targeted in the regime’s early days, others were recruited by the Khmer Rouge to serve as regime musicians. Touch Chhatta recounts that the only “reason I survived was because I knew how to play music.” Chhatta was enlisted by the Khmer Rouge to serve in a band that played at meetings, at which music was played with only traditional instruments, including the khim , tro , and takhe . Chhatta describes that at the beginning of the regime, he purposefully memorized the propaganda music, maximizing his utility to the regime and thus his chances of survival. Children were also recruited by the Khmer Rouge as musicians. “We were like a blank piece of paper. When they tell you to sing, you just sing,” describes Chhom Charvin, who was a child singer under the regime. Easily persuaded and indoctrinated, children were the perfect candidates for the Khmer Rouge’s new musical strategy. “Don’t Think I’ve Forgotten: Cambodia's Lost Rock and Roll” presents footage of the Khmer Rouge’s child singers in a performance, reenacting farmers, chanting “the day is hot and dry / smoke is coming from the earth / but we can take it / we are resilient / we serve Angkar until results are produced.” Undying loyalty to serving the new, agricultural and communist state is conveyed curtly through lyrics, fashioning a new emblem for the nation of the laboring and nationalistic child. Music was also used as a mobilizing tool. Thida Buth, who was a child during the regime, remembers that in the work camps, the national anthem would blare over the speakers each morning, at 4am. The first lyrics are “the bright red blood spilled in the lands of kampuchea / our motherland / the blood of our good workers and farmers / of our revolutionary soldiers / of both men and women / we will make our Motherland / the most prosperous, magnificent, wonderful!”. Every day in the Democratic Kampuchea began with music -– propaganda music. Music which was manufactured specifically to promote the idea of a new nation. The musical construction of Democratic Kampuchea contains a dual nature: one of radical return to tradition yet a complete transformation of society. The Khmer Rouge attempted to erase the existing musical culture in Cambodia while simultaneously promoting a musical culture that was ‘traditional’, thus blurring the line between “new” and “old”. This phenomenon highlights the contradictory nature of the Khmer Rouge regime, which attempted to use old, traditional Khmer music to promote a new, revolutionized identity, which in and of itself reflected a traditional past. Whether restoring an “old” or creating a “new” identity, it is clear that music was a critical tool employed by the Khmer Rouge to carry out their transformation of society. Despite the supposed “eradication” of music in Democratic Kampuchea, it was frequently mobilized by the Khmer Rouge to legitimize their regime and build the foundation of a new national identity. Music, as any form of art, is fundamental to the skeleton of society. Music transmits values, histories and identities; its mobilization by elites in society has the power to structurally, radically reshape what a country is, how it functions and what it stands for. Despite the weaponization of music by Pol Pot’s regime, when the Khmer Rouge fell on January 7, 1979, music was what revived Cambodian society. Sieng Vanthy, a Cambodian singer, was one of the first to return to the capital city of Phnom Penh, which had been emptied at the start of the regime. With much of the nation hesitant to return to the city, Vanthy describes that she sang “Oh, Phnom Penh” on the radio, in an attempt to reassure the displaced that it was safe to return. “Oh, Phnom Penh” seeps with yearning, nostalgia and memories of a place once called home. The first lyrics state, “Oh, Phnom Penh / For three years / I never stopped missing you / We were separated / and my heart was broken.”, and later, the song says, “the Cambodian soul lives on / Oh, Phnom Penh / I meet you again.” While music may have been a tool of manipulation in the Khmer Rouge regime, it was also a unifying factor. Music is what brought Cambodians back together to collectively rebuild their nation physically and culturally. In spite of their efforts, the Khmer Rouge was not able to abolish the musical roots that run through Cambodia. Music continues to flourish, decades after the country was musically sanitized. Dengue Fever, a band formed in the U.S. in 2001, brought Cambodian music back to the global forefront. Lauren Yee’s 2016 play, “Cambodian Rock Band,” recounts the story of a Cambodian American woman and her father, a survivor of the genocide, exploring a history of music and memory. The revival of music in Cambodia is a testament to the nation’s ability to overcome a difficult past and to their cultural resilience. Photo Source: Emile Gsell, Picryl

The EU’s ongoing partnerships with authoritarian regimes, such as Tunisia, to control migration raises crucial concerns about the ethics and long-term efficacy of such agreements. While these arrangements may offer short-term containment, they fail to address the systemic drivers of migration, such as political repression, economic instability and environmental degradation, prevalent in many MENA countries. < Back EU-Tunisia Deal: Migration Control at the Cost of Human Rights? Eleni Dimitropoulou November 30, 2024 People have lost faith. International humanitarian law has lost its credibility and value, both in theory and practice. Nowhere is this erosion more evident than in Tunisia, where human rights have taken a backseat to geopolitical interests. In recent years, Tunisia has faced mounting criticism for its deteriorating human rights situation, exacerbated by an increasingly authoritarian regime. This crisis has drawn global attention, particularly due to the European Union's growing role in shaping Tunisia's migration policy. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), signed in 2023 between Tunisia and the European Union (EU), is officially titled the "Global Gateway Tunisia-EU Partnership" and involves financial support for Tunisia, in return for a commitment by the Tunisian government to curb migration to Europe. Although the deal aims to stabilize Europe's borders, it has been heavily criticized for its role in supporting a regime accused of widespread human rights abuses. Testimonies recorded by international human rights organizations are alarming. Tunisian authorities have been accused of arbitrary arrests, beatings, mass deportations and violent practices against migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, often leaving them abandoned in poor conditions at the border with Libya and Algeria. These practices expose people to extreme risks, as many are left without access to humanitarian aid or basic necessities. According to these testimonies, Tunisian security forces are applying violence against migrants at sea, using dangerous maneuvers against their boats, resulting in their frequent sinking and the deaths of dozens of people. The UN reported that in the first half of 2023 alone, at least 265 people died in these interception operations, and several others remain missing. Despite growing evidence of violent and abusive practices by the Tunisian authorities, the EU continues to financially support Tunisia as part of its strategy to outsource its border management. The memorandum of understanding includes the provision of 105 million euros to strengthen Tunisia's border control measures, as well as other investments in the digital sector, renewable energy and economic support for the country. The EU has tasked Tunisian authorities, including the National Guard and Coast Guard, with the responsibility of preventing migrant departures to Europe. However, this strategy has allowed the regime of President Kais Saied to double-down on its authoritarian practices, limiting the rights of citizens and immigrants. The international community is watching the intensifying repression of civil society in Tunisia with concern. Since 2021, core freedoms such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press and the independence of the judiciary have come under severe pressure. President of Tunisia Kais Saied has imposed severe restrictions focusing on dissent and political opposition, such as intimidating and imprisoning journalists, activists and political opponents, while humanitarian organizations are prevented from carrying out their work. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and humanitarian organizations stress that Tunisia is not a safe destination for migrants to disembark, as many of them are vulnerable to serious violations of their rights during the deportation process. Authorities are accused of using collective deportations and not carrying out individual assessments to protect migrants, thus violating the principle of non-refoulement, a fundamental tenet of international law that ensures that no one is sent back to a country where they risk persecution, torture or serious harm. Although supported by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and some European leaders, the EU deal with Tunisia raises ethical and political questions. Some MEPs express their dissatisfaction with the EU's stance, accusing it of not taking sufficient measures to protect human rights. In a letter to von der Leyen, MEPs call for tighter conditions on funding to prevent further funding being responsible for serious breaches. They also warn that the current agreement does not ensure the protection of migrants while entrenching the EU's cooperation with authoritarian regimes in the Mediterranean region. Migration flows into Europe have been steadily increasing due to a combination of global crises, including armed conflict, climate change and economic inequality. In many regions of the world, worsening conditions are forcing people to flee their homes in search of safety, opportunity and a better life. For Europe, this means migration is no longer a distant concern; it’s a challenge at the region’s doorstep—one that will only intensify in the coming decades. By 2050, experts predict that climate change alone could force millions more to leave their homes, exacerbating the pressures on already strained migration systems. At the same time, economic disparities between Europe and other regions, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, continue to fuel movement across borders. For many, Europe represents the hope of a more secure future, but the rise in migration is testing the EU’s capacity to manage arrivals without compromising its commitment to human rights and dignity. Understanding the root causes of migration—and addressing them through more sustainable, cooperative strategies—is essential if Europe is to remain a beacon of hope while ensuring fair and effective migration management. However, political dynamics within Europe complicate these efforts. Anti-immigration rhetoric, fueled by populist movements, continues to shape public opinion and policy. While the EU must address these concerns, it cannot afford to compromise its foundational values. Transparent communication, highlighting the contributions of migrants and fostering solidarity among member states, will be essential. The EU's current engagement with external partners like Tunisia reveals the complexities of balancing migration control with the principles of human rights. This approach is emblematic of a broader strategy that prioritizes agreements with neighboring countries to manage migration flows. For instance, the EU’s collaboration with Turkey under the 2016 migration deal showcased a significant investment in curbing irregular migration routes in exchange for financial aid. Some critics argue that such deals often sacrifice the EU's values in pursuit of pragmatic solutions, creating a precedent for controversial partnerships. The EU-Turkey deal is often lauded for reducing irregular crossings in the Eastern Mediterranean, but it too has faced significant debate. Human rights advocates have pointed to overcrowded refugee camps on Greek islands as evidence of the deal's failure to ensure humane treatment for migrants. This demonstrates that while such partnerships may achieve short-term goals, they often fail to address systemic issues, such as improving asylum processes or offering viable resettlement options for displaced individuals. In contrast, some EU member states have worked to set positive examples in migration management. Sweden, for instance, has emphasized the integration of refugees through extensive language and vocational training programs, enabling them to contribute to local economies. Similarly, Portugal has actively sought to attract migrants and asylum seekers to address demographic challenges, fostering policies that encourage inclusion and community-building. These examples illustrate that humane approaches to migration are both possible and beneficial when politics align with long-term planning. To uphold its stated humanitarian values, the EU must reassess its reliance on third-country agreements that lack clear human rights safeguards. Establishing transparent oversight mechanisms, ensuring accountability in the use of EU funds, and prioritizing partnerships with countries that respect international law could mitigate risks of complicity in abuses. These measures should be complemented by internal reforms to create accessible legal pathways for migration, reducing reliance on external actors. The EU’s ongoing partnerships with authoritarian regimes, such as Tunisia, to control migration raises crucial concerns about the ethics and long-term efficacy of such agreements. While these arrangements may offer short-term containment, they fail to address the systemic drivers of migration, such as political repression, economic instability and environmental degradation, prevalent in many MENA countries. Rather than outsourcing border control to regimes with questionable human rights records, the EU should focus on policies that address the root causes of migration. This involves supporting sustainable development, peacebuilding, and climate resilience in migrants’ countries of origin, particularly in regions like the MENA, where instability is exacerbated by conflict, corruption and climate change. In the case of Tunisia, the EU's ongoing funding despite proven violations demonstrates the need for a more rigorous policy assessing human rights criteria before distributing funds. Ending cooperation with regimes accused of abuses and creating accountability mechanisms would protect migrants and uphold the EU’s moral credibility. Without such actions, the EU risks eroding the principles on which it is built, undermining its international legitimacy and prestige. Ultimately, the EU must evolve its migration policies to address both immediate concerns and long-term goals. By fostering internal solidarity, building ethical partnerships, and addressing the root causes of displacement, the EU can set a global standard for humane and effective migration management, reaffirming its role as a leader in promoting human dignity.

After 19 years of nearly continuous U.S. military presence, Iraq has limited the influence of the Islamic State, but is still experiencing domestic turmoil, a Parliamentary crisis and extreme corruption in the public and private sectors. Solutions to these challenges should be led by the Iraqi people, not a foreign power with conflicting interests and little investment in the future of Iraq. < Back Reconsidering America’s Presence in Iraq after Zainab Essam Al-Khazali’s Death By Peyton Dashiell October 31, 2022 On September 21, a 15-year-old girl was shot and killed in Baghdad, Iraq while working on her father’s farm. Despite Baghdad previously being labeled as the most dangerous city on Earth for terrorist attacks, Zainab Essam Al-Khazali was not killed by an Islamic State militant or a member of another terrorist group, but by American troops conducting a routine military drill. These are the same troops which first mobilized in 2014 to protect Iraqis from the looming terrorist threat of the Islamic State. Her tragic, senseless death raises critical questions: Why has the United States government refused to acknowledge her death in any way? Why did the American military conduct an exercise in a populous area? And, most of all, why are U.S. troops still present in Iraq after the Iraqi Parliament voted them out years ago and multiple American presidents have pledged military withdrawal? The United States has maintained a continuous military presence in Iraq since a U.S.-led coalition invaded the country in 2003 to overthrow Saddam Hussein. After a brief hiatus from 2011 to 2014, the U.S. military formally reentered Iraq in 2014 on “Operation Inherent Resolve” to fight Islamic State forces upon request from the Iraqi government. Efforts began after the Islamic State launched the Northern Iraq Offensive in August 2014. In response, the U.S. began supplying Kurdish Peshmerga forces with weapons on August 5, and began direct airstrikes three days later. The operation continued for nearly seven years, and U.S. aid to the Iraq Security Forces totaled $3.5 billion throughout the conflict, with over 189,000 officers trained. The U.S.-led coalition has been criticized for committing human rights violations during “Operation Inherent Resolve” and compounding Iraq’s existing humanitarian crisis. Poorly targeted coalition airstrikes led to many civilian casualties, and Amnesty International alleged in 2014 that the coalition kidnapped Sunni civilian men to use as forced labor in the fight against the Islamic State. Finally, U.S.-backed prisoner abuses date back to the early stages of the Iraq War in prisons like Abu Ghraib – in 2004, Amnesty International uncovered photos of U.S. troops abusing prisoners of war in the same suburb of Baghdad where Zainab lost her life. Despite the United States formally withdrawing from Iraq in December 2021, nearly 3000 military personnel remain in the country in an advisory role to provide air support and military aid. However, their presence has been contentious. In January 2020, U.S. assassination of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani caused widespread outrage in Iraq. Major political figures called for the U.S. Embassy to be closed and diplomatic relations halted. The Iraqi military launched retaliatory airstrikes on U.S. forces in Iraq, and the Iraqi Parliament voted unanimously to expel all American troops from the country, later revising their statements to include all foreign troops. While several NATO countries withdrew their troops due to safety concerns, the Trump administration threatened Iraq with sanctions if any further action was taken against U.S. forces, thus, cementing their presence. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force except in “intervention by invitation,” when a country requests the military presence of another country. This rare case would apply to the 2014 American entry into Iraq because the Iraqi government requested help in the fight against the Islamic State. But after the vote by the Iraqi Parliament in 2020 asking U.S. troops to leave, their presence became illegitimate under this charter. However, despite a strong opposition wing within Iraq, anti-American sentiment is not universal, largely dependent on ethnic and religious identity. The vote to expel U.S. troops was led by Shia lawmakers, with most Sunni and Kurdish representatives abstaining from the vote. U.S. troops continue to train with the Iraqi military and recently signed a bilateral defense agreement with the Kurdistan Regional Government to bolster security and military training operations. Proponents of U.S. military presence in Iraq often cite reasons such as countering Iranian influence, preventing terrorist attacks, and protecting the security of Israel and other US partners in the region. However, natural resources, particularly oil, serve as another key factor. Iraq is home to oil reserves totaling over 140 billion barrels, the fifth largest proven oil supply globally, with a large portion located in the Kurdistan region. Upon entering the 2003 Iraq War, former U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz pledged to support Kurdistan’s energy sector, telling a Congressional panel that Iraq’s oil and gas resources “could bring between $50 billion and $100 billion over the course of the next two or three years.” But nearly two decades later, it is evident that the Iraqi people did not benefit as foreign powers descended upon their oil reserves. While the oil-rich Kurdistan region has seen more economic development than the rest of Iraq, fraud, corruption and mismanagement have led to nearly $20 billion per year in oil revenue smuggled out of the country, with little benefit to the Kurdish residents working to source the oil. Kurdistan’s Ministry of Natural Resources has been accused of working with foreign powers to send oil money to international tax havens, flipping assets, and producing massive profits for multinational companies based in North America and Europe. While the Islamic State remains a threat in Iraq, they have no consistent territorial holds, and the Iraqi government has developed effective containment policies for terror cells. Operating with the goal of completely eradicating all Islamic State adherents and ideology will result in an indefinite U.S. presence in Iraq. Furthermore, while American troops have helped foil and respond to some Islamic State attacks in Iraq, they are increasingly being targeted by Iranian drone strikes, which have killed U.S. servicemembers as well as Iraqi citizens fighting alongside the U.S. in Kurdistan. These attacks signify a larger balance of power the U.S. seeks to maintain in the region — Iraqis are paying a violent price as the U.S. aims to counter Iranian influence. If the U.S. decides to completely withdraw troops from Iraq, lessons must be learned from its 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan. The 2021 withdrawal resulted in the Taliban seizing power from the Afghan National Army within days of the U.S. military’s departure and created an unresolved humanitarian disaster. Additionally, the withdrawal broke promises made to Afghan civilians who aided American forces — many people were left behind and susceptible to persecution by the Taliban due to past U.S. ties. If American troops leave Iraq, the U.S. must prioritize the protection of Iraqis who have fought alongside them, and ensure that any stabilization money given to the Iraqi government is used for its intended purpose — during the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban seized millions of dollars in cash, gold, and weapons left behind by U.S. forces. The question of American military presence in Iraq extends far beyond a pure military partnership.Twenty-first-century Iraq has experienced immense exploitation for military, economic, and geopolitical gain, and the people and government of Iraq should decide the next steps regarding the American military. After 19 years of nearly continuous U.S. military presence, Iraq has limited the influence of the Islamic State, but is still experiencing domestic turmoil, a Parliamentary crisis and extreme corruption in the public and private sectors. Solutions to these challenges should be led by the Iraqi people, not a foreign power with conflicting interests and little investment in the future of Iraq.

De la merde. Et puis de l’urine, du vomi, de la transpiration, et du sang. Voilà ce qui ponctue l’empire Babylonien bâtit par Damien Chazelle-également réalisateur des machines à succès que sont La La Land et Whiplash. < Back Babylon: Lettre d’Amour au Cinéma, Lettre de Haine à Hollywood, Mais Quelle Lettre Nous Adresses-Tu Chazelle? By Layla Hammouda February 28, 2023 De la merde. Et puis de l’urine, du vomi, de la transpiration, et du sang. Voilà ce qui ponctue l’empire Babylonien bâtit par Damien Chazelle, également réalisateur des machines à succès que sont La La Land et Whiplash. C’est alors dans la décadence et la vulgarité que Chazelle nous fait passer par les trouées de lumières d’Hollywood, afin de nous présenter l’effervescence du cinéma muet à la jonction des années 20 et 30. Dès la première scène, on voit un éléphant déverser ses excréments sur un homme, c’est la souillure originelle qui marquera la proximité du realisateur avec le spectateur, au point que la merde en impregne l’objectif de sa camera. Alors afin de pénétrer dans l’univers scatologique qu’est Hollywood, on se fait prendre la main par Manuel, jeune homme à tout faire aspirant à une grande carrière dans le cinéma. Il nous entraîne d’abord dans une fête grandiose, animée par une élite frivole, un pur concentré de chaos que même la caméra n’arrive pas à saisir — enchaînant vainement les travellings et les panoramiques. Manuel rencontre à cette même fête Nellie La Roy — incarnée par Margot Robbie — qui se dit déjà star, mais qui n’a en réalité au début que pour elle son ambition et sa hargne d'artiste torturée. Ils converseront sur leur amour pour le cinéma, nous laissant d’emblée apercevoir la lettre d’amour que réserve Damien au 7e art. Nous suivrons ainsi l'ascension de Nelly en parallèle de celle de Manny, tous deux s’offrant corps et âme à l’industrie Hollywoodienne. Alors Hollywood, à la manière d’un ogre qui dévore tout sur son passage, se nourrira des rêves de nos deux ambitieux, pour le meilleur mais surtout pour le pire. Assurément vers la fin des années 20, l’arrivée du son dans le cinéma mettra en sourdine les aspirations de nos protagonistes, et celles de bien d’autres stars établies- tel que Jack Conrad, joué par Brad Pitt. Hollywood après avoir digéré rêves et ambitions, recrache alors, expurge, que ce soit par l’urine, le vomi, la transpiration ou encore la merde. Le premier épanchement de l'éléphant dévoilait alors le cycle de cette industrie qui propulse puis abat les fantasmes au rythme de son évolution. Assurement, dans Babylon, chaque personnage finit par ressentir le besoin de s'échapper, de se libérer, en dansant frénétiquement vers l’obscurité; que ce soit par le suicide, la dependence, ou la retraite. Ainsi, Damien Chazelle reprend la frénésie de Whiplash pour aborder une fois encore cette idée de lutte permanente. A l’image de Sisyphe, Hollywood se violente et lutte, et comme on parvient à s’imaginer Sisyphe heureux, libre à nous de voir de la beauté dans l’impitoyable ephemerité cyclique hollywoodienne. Là, est la lettre que nous adresse Chazelle, une lettre dont la ponctuation finale est un point d’interrogation. Babylon fait il testament d’un cinéma qui s’embourbe dans la merde, dans la crasse qu’il a lui même etalé faisant sombrer avec lui Nellie et bien d’autres? Ou ne nous mettrait il pas plutot face à une opération digne d’un alchimiste, battant la merde en neige afin d’en extirper de l’or? Afin d’apporter réponse à ce dilemme, Chazelle invite le spectateur à inspecter la salle de cinéma dans laquelle il se trouve, à s’inspecter lui-même. Le film se finit sur Manuel devant un grand écran des années plus tard, sans voix face à ce que l'avènement du parlant a signifié pour le cinéma, mais surtout pour ceux qui le regardent. On le voit scruter la salle, examiner chaque spectateur avant qu’on ne puisse plus distinguer l’individualité dans la masse du public. Tel un aveu pour Chazelle, le réalisateur reconnaît être héritier de ces cycles d’Hollywood qui dévore puis recrache les ambitieux qui s’en approchent au profit de son évolution. Chazelle reconnaît s’inscrire dans une industrie où semer l’individualité des spectateurs afin de se tourner vers la compacité des publics était devenu presque une condition pour être profitable. La réception de Babylon au cinéma, l'échec total de ce mastodonte de 3 heures au budget astronomique, prouve que Chazelle est allé au bout de sa démarche; au point de se donner lui-même raison. Mais rappelons nous, la lettre que Damien nous adresse se termine par un point d’interrogation. Alors quand les larmes de Manuel coulent devant Singing in the rain , on ne peut s'empêcher de nous demander si toute la douleur et l’espoir de ceux qui y croyaient n’étaient pas nécessaires pour offrir ces croyances et cette beauté aux spectateurs. Toute la beauté du cinéma ne se trouverait -elle pas justement dans ces cycles qui célèbrent l'éphémère en faveur des ondes du beau qui nous comblent en tant que spectateurs? Babylon, dans toute sa décadence qui peut nous paraître au début si lointaine, s’adonne alors au recul de l’idée du spectateur. Jusqu'où la puissance cicatrisante de la beauté des grands écrans pourra-t-elle justifier la cruauté du monstre Hollywoodien? Jusqu'à quand sera-t-il légitime pour les masses des salles de cinéma de délimiter les frontières du beau? Une infinité d'autres points d’interrogations que Chazelle nous adresse comme un cri du cœur, face auquel on ne peut être insensible. Répondre dans l'immédiat à sa lettre si dense serait alors sot, mais pour le moment, on peut reconnaître que c’était une belle lecture.

To answer this question, we must remember that when politics is the subject of art, art becomes the subject of politics. In the case of Mustang, Erguvan’s socio-political expression in the film challenges the image of a fully modernized Turkey. < Back Mustang: A Deep-Dive Into the Public Response to Art in Turkey By Selin Elif Köse October 31, 2023 “Everything changed in the blink of an eye,” says Selma gently before letting you on an emotional rollercoaster that, perhaps, leaves you with a lot to think about. Mustang , a Turkish language film directed and co-written by Deniz Gamze Ergüvan, was undoubtedly one of the most talked about films during the 2015 award season. The French-Turkish co-produced drama boasted 63 impressive nominations. It secured 43 wins, topping its success with a Label Europa Cinemas award from Cannes and a nomination for Best Foreign Language Film of the Year at the 87th Academy Awards. Despite its global recognition and success, the public reaction in Turkey was quite conflicted, sparking a significant controversy around the film's portrayal of the country. As Erguvan says, “Everywhere else, people have really embraced the film. In Turkey, the reactions were extremely diverse.” The film mainly focuses on the conservative social life in rural Anatolia and the consequent oppression against women. Erguvan does nothold back from tackling the harsh realities of her homeland as she tells a compelling story of five sisters and their experiences with arranged marriages, sexual abuse, virginity tests, and more. The critique of “honor” and “purity” in the film sheds light on the traditionally patriarchal structure of Turkish society. While some critics like Atilla Dorsay labeled the film a “masterpiece,” others, such as Ali Ercivan, thought the film was “a work designed for the Western world in the most annoying, calculated way.” The argument of the latter was a common opinion. The perception among some in Turkey is that the film was created with a Western audience in mind, potentially damaging the country's reputation on the global stage. However, this criticism is not unique to Mustang – many other Turkish artists with global recognition, such as Nobel Literature Prize winner Orhan Pamuk and Women's Prize for Fiction nominee Elif Şafak, have faced similar backlash in the past. The negative public response to Turkish artists with worldwide fame almost seems like a recurring trend. So, one might ask, what is the reason behind this peculiar pattern, and why are Turks not embracing their very own artists? To answer this question, we must remember that when politics is the subject of art, art becomes the subject of politics. In the case of Mustang , Erguvan’s socio-political expression in the film challenges the image of a fully modernized Turkey. The film offers a social and political commentary on the state of Turkish women's rights and gender equality. Moreover, it implies that these issues are still significant concerns in certain parts of the country, which can be seen as a critique of the government's policies and societal norms. This gave an opportunity for extreme right-wing parties like the Justice and Development (AK) Party to polarize society by turning the artist into a public enemy. Then-Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç expressed his disappointment with the film, stating that it “didn't accurately represent Turkish society and culture,” while also claiming that the film had “an agenda.” As a result, local authorities in Turkey reportedly faced pressure not to screen the film in their theaters. Even though the government’s response to the film may align with some people’s views, it does not fully reflect the reason behind the public reaction, demonstrating why examination of cultural authenticity is necessary. The most common criticism towards Erguvan, Pamuk, and Şafak’s work is the superficiality of their products. We must note that life in rural Anatolia is completely distinct from metropolitan cities like Istanbul and Izmir. Rural Anatolia is not only socio-economically but also culturally unique with its traditional lifestyle. This puts a huge responsibility on the artist's shoulders as they need to showcase a very nuanced reality. However, when the artist is a stranger to these customs, the artwork loses its essence. The script of Mustang , for instance, lacks an extremely significant aspect: cultural authenticity. The film shows that Erguvan is clearly aware of the underlying issues in Anatolia, but, at the same time, you can also see how she fails to execute the many layers of these problems. The lack of details leaves viewers unsatisfied with a one-dimensional story. On the contrary, Yaşar Kemal, who was nominated for a Nobel Literature Prize, has always been an embraced artist in the Turkish community despite his focus on the social injustices in rural Anatolia. Having been raised in Southern Anatolia himself, Yaşar Kemal knows the Taurus Mountains and Çukurova so well that he is able to build a story around this natural tension in his most well-known novel, Memed, My Hawk . His descriptions are subtle and nuanced, and his storytelling has the perfect balance between fiction and reality, which you cannot find in either Erguvan, Pamuk’s, or Şafak’s work. Overall, Erguvan’s Mustang provides an illustrative example for examining the public reaction to art in Turkey. We can see that an intriguing plotline and strong visuals are, of course, crucial factors for a successful movie, but insufficient on their own. Among many reasons, cultural authenticity is what makes the movie stand out. Hence, we can conclude that for a society to embrace art, the artist should come from within, deeply connected to the culture and traditions they portray in their work.

The question does however prevail – do these camps therefore pose a durable long-term solution? < Back The Refugee Camps in Tindouf: Is There Another Way? By Vanja Lerch Eriksson November 30, 2023 The refugee camps in Tindouf were established by the Polisario Front, the Algerian state and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as an immediate emergency response to Sahrawis fleeing Western Sahara as the Moroccan occupation began. The camps are located in the western corner of Algeria and house between 90,000 to 165,000 Sahrawi refugees. Established in 1975, thousands of Sahrawi refugees have spent almost five decades in the camps while others have come and gone. Over the years, the camps have transformed into an established civilization with a state-like structure divided into four villages with internal municipalities and neighbourhoods, all of which are named after landmarks and places in Western Sahara, to remind the camps’ population of their homeland. The quick establishment of the camps in Tindouf was absolutely necessary to stabilise the number of Sahrawi refugees seeking to leave the occupied territories, and such an immediate solution was welcomed by many international organisations which sought to find possible long-term avenues. However, looking back, the immediate ‘success' of the camps also contributed to the conflict being portrayed as less urgent to resolve, as a large part of the Sahrawi population was now considered safe from the violence of the Moroccan state. Increasingly fewer international organisations thus put in an effort to stabilise and mediate the conflict. Even though the word about the ‘success' of the camps spread in the international community, the reality in the camps was very different. Families have suffered from extreme poverty and food insecurity for decades as international organizations changed priorities and also wrongly estimated the number of inhabitants in the camps, sometimes differing by tens of thousands. In addition, the camps face large challenges regarding access to water as knowledge about how to treat, store and distribute it is close to nonexistent. It is therefore unsurprising that an increasing number of people in the camps are distressed and seeking alternative solutions. A continuous question is: why can’t the Sahrawis simply return to the occupied territories? The answer is clear – returning would pose a huge safety risk. The few Sahrawis who have chosen to stay in the occupied territories are constantly put at risk by the Moroccan authorities, as well as the Moroccan settlers in the area, as the Sahrawis are often subject to harassment and violence. International organizations have concluded that in the occupied territories, there is no guarantee that human rights are or will be respected, as few international organisations are granted access to surveil the human rights situation. In addition, Sahrawis in the occupied territories are subjected to violations of their freedom of speech, their freedom of association and their freedom of assembly. There have also been numerous reported cases of Sahrawi activists being imprisoned on false ground after unfair trials, and many of those have also been subject to torture and harassment from Moroccan authorities. Over the years, the international community has tried to facilitate negotiations and propose peace plans. However, all such efforts have proved insufficient as both Morocco and the Polisario Front continuously violate cease-fire agreements and reject peace plans and possible solutions. The international community further questions whether the camps should even be allowed to exist, as they could prevent serious matters from being dealt with urgently. Such matters include long-term plans for reintegrating refugees and plans for rebuilding necessary infrastructure. Though the conclusion in the case of the camps in Tindouf has been clear, the camps need to remain as few other options are available. The two most recent and possibly realisable solutions proposed are: West Saharan autonomy under Morocco and “The new capital solution.” The option of West Saharan autonomy under Morocco is supported by the Moroccan regime, however, the international community opposes this as long as the situation in Moroccan politics prevails. For such a solution to be realizable in terms of human rights, the international community has concluded that the Moroccan regime would need a great democratic transition as well as a major decentralisation of the state. Thus, as expected, this option was rejected by the Polisario Front. The second proposed option is that the inhabitants of the Tindouf camps would slowly move to the liberated territories of Western Sahara, especially to the area surrounding the capital of Tirafiti. However, such a solution is estimated to be problematic as well, as Tirafiti is located only five miles from the defense front and could contribute to a renewal of the armed conflict in the area. In addition, the area is close to inhabitable; it completely lacks natural resources and is composed of only a small strip of land the size of barely a third of Western Sahara. Though there are clear complicating circumstances, this is the favoured option by the Polisario Front as it means that the Sahrawis could partly return to their land. As these are the currently most favoured options for a possible solution, the idea of a referendum for the Sahrawis is out the window. Many blame the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) as a significant subject in enabling the stalemate situation to prevail, as they have continuously failed to provide and create an environment where a referendum is safe to be held. If MINURSO had had a more sufficient mandate as well as a better structure from the beginning, a referendum could possibly have been held in the 1990s as initially planned. To hold the referendum today is considered close to impossible, not only due to the humanitarian situation but also the lack of authentic representation of Sahrawi opinions, as Sahrawis have now become a minority in their own land. Actors of the United Nations, unfortunately, complicated the conflict even further as Ban Ki-Moon publicly mentioned the occupation of Western Sahara during a visit to the Tindouf camps in 2016. Even though he was correct from the perspective of the international community, this ravished the diplomatic relations with Morocco. As a response, the Moroccan government retracted all of their financial support to MINURSO and demanded that all 84 international civil staff members leave the country. This signified that no surveillance of human rights was allowed in Morocco or the occupied territories, putting the Sahrawi population in the occupied territories even more at risk. The humanitarian situation in the camps is evidently unfavourable, as it consequently results in prolonged and extreme poverty and human rights abuses of thousands of Sahrawis. However, few other options seem realisable at the moment. The question does however prevail – do these camps therefore pose a durable long-term solution? Even though the international community continuously answers no, little effort has been put into actually changing the situation, neither in the camps nor in the occupied territories.

A whirlwind of whimsical musical comedy and delectable love triangles (quadrangles?), with a splash of poignant moments, “Crazy Ex-Girlfriend” is a god amongst television productions, an exceptional set of four seasons that supersedes the comparatively mundane Netflix, Amazon Prime, or Hulu material.  < Back Crazy in Love? My (Unrequited) Romance with Rachel Bloom’s Comedy By Maia Zasler April 30, 2024 Have you ever been utterly desperate for a new show to watch? Have you ever yearned for a series that’s just long enough to hold your attention while you let the episodes run in the background of your daily life? After completing “Gossip Girl,” “Gilmore Girls,” “Big Mouth,” “The Marvelous Mrs. Maisel,” “Human Resources,” “Community,” “Inside Job,” “Young Sheldon,” “The Office,” “Outlander,” “The Great,” “The Great British Baking Show,” “Bridgerton,” etc. (yes, I watch a lot of TV), I thought I exhausted my arsenal of quality shows. It’s only then that, by a stroke of pure destiny, I discovered the gem that is “Crazy Ex-Girlfriend.” A whirlwind of whimsical musical comedy and delectable love triangles (quadrangles?), with a splash of poignant moments, “Crazy Ex-Girlfriend” is a god amongst television productions, an exceptional set of four seasons that supersedes the comparatively mundane Netflix, Amazon Prime, or Hulu material. Rachel Bloom stars as Rebecca Bunch, a quirky, high-strung New York lawyer who quits her job at a fancy firm in favor of moving out to West Covina, California. She makes this impulsive decision immediately after a brief run-in with her summer camp boyfriend from a decade prior, Josh Chan (but Josh just happens to live there!). Bunch is cunning and smart; the first season follows her and her bestie/enabler, Paula, as they hatch plots to wiggle into Josh’s life. Bunch will stop at nothing… unless her great love is actually with another guy, Greg, a bartender at the local sports joint with a smidge of an alcohol consumption problem. Or maybe it's with Nathaniel, the new, jaded boss at her firm in West Covina. To be determined. In each progressive episode, Bunch becomes a bit more deranged. At first, her “unraveling” is endearing; she’s just a tad overzealous, love’s #1 fan…but the audience learns that this passion, the immediateness that washes over her at seemingly random times, is part of a more pressing, pertinent mental health problem. Her struggles and missteps— occasionally crossing the line into illegal territory—are depicted realistically and respectfully. In any instance of intense love where one craves the attention and validation of another and is willing to drop everything for that person, there are often underlying issues e.g., anxiety and/or depression. The audience slowly uncovers more about Bunch’s past and how her behavior toward Josh Chan was not a one-off; she was hurt and traumatized by a previous relationship with a much older male professor during her time at undergrad. Bunch needs affirmation, someone, anyone, to tell her that she's “ okay .” She constantly pushes the limits to what the audience considers “crazy.” It’s what allows the show to masterfully balance cheekiness and an amusing self-awareness with a seriousness that accompanies a storyline of a woman who’s “falling off the side of a mountain and sort of grabbing at roots and trees and brambles,” plummeting (Bloom 2017). But Bunch is able to get the help she needs. She even gets “ a diagnosis ”! Throughout its final season, “Crazy Ex-Girlfriend” contributes to the de-stigmatization dialogue that surrounds addressing mental health problems because “ anti-depressants are so not a big deal .” Bunch views her life as a musical. She makes sense of her thoughts, her feelings, and her relationships with others through melodies and performance. Her internal monologue is always on display, and so when she grows, the audience grows with her. While watching, I found myself rejoicing in her triumphs and mourning her losses. I cheered her on when she supported her friends and when she gathered the courage to follow her true calling. Perhaps most frequently, I laughed and cringed at the handful of exaggerated characters and clever, wacky songs. I can’t help but feel a sentimental compulsion to the show; maybe because I see myself in Bloom’s character, or maybe because I think that we can all relate to Rebecca Bunch; Bunch reacts to life’s trials and tribulations in an uninhibited way, reactions stripped of regulated temperament. Her intensity, palpable through a television screen, is a product of feeling intensely. We all face similar fears, anticipating rejection or feeling the sting of criticism, lacking validation. We stifle ourselves, denying ourselves the opportunity for change before we’re even told “no.” We place our happiness at some undefined point in the future, almost always with asterisks; if we’re able to complete this deadline, get a date with this person, and fit into those pants, then “ we’ll never have problems again .” Bunch and her path towards getting better is a testament to a journey we all, in some way or another, are on. On a different note, any musical or show-tune lover will be thrilled with the variety of themes and genres incorporated into “Crazy Ex-Girlfriend”’s incredible score. Some of my favorites included “Let’s Generalize About Men” (a colorful, catchy 80s inspired bop), “Remember That We Suffered” (a dizzying, addicting song set at a quintessential New York bar mitzvah celebration), “Santa Ana Winds pt. 1-5” (I can’t describe… you just have to watch), and “The Sexy Getting Ready Song” (a potential feminist commentary?). Despite receiving two Emmys (and my glowing endorsement), “Crazy Ex-Girlfriend” maintained relatively low ratings throughout its run between 2015 and 2019. But it seems to be having a revival now on Netflix. And a revival is what it deserves, if not to have been lauded during its initial release. To watch “Crazy Ex-Girlfriend” is to watch a labor of love. Bloom, as a lead writer and creator of the show—alongside the late Adam Schlesinger—puts so much of herself into each episode’s immersive dialogue, catchy theme songs, and bonus tunes. Giving audiences Rebecca Bunch simultaneously gives them something for which to strive: authenticity and, as corny as it may sound, self-love. Connecting with ourselves and that which makes us truly happy, rejecting (as difficult as it may be) that which we think should please ourselves or others, is the best service we can give ourselves. That and binge-watching “Crazy Ex-Girlfriend.”

Behind the curtain of seemingly increasing stability in Syria, out of the eye of Western press and politics, a deplorable crime is being committed against Syrian nationals: the expropriation of their heritage. < Back Turkey Is Waging War on Syrian Heritage By Emilia K September 29, 2022 Behind the curtain of seemingly increasing stability in Syria, out of the eye of Western press and politics, a deplorable crime is being committed against Syrian nationals: the expropriation of their heritage. Syrian heritage is one of the oldest and richest, providing invaluable insight into our past, with some of the best-preserved sites in the Middle East dating back thousands of years. Syria was the birthplace of sedentarization and agriculture; the first complex societies, writing systems and sciences emerged there. However, for several years, Syrian heritage has suffered immeasurable damages under various factions of the Syrian National Army (formerly known as the ‘Free Syrian Army’). Funded, trained and supplied by Turkey, which has established de-facto control over areas in Northern Syria, these armed opposition groups have looted and bulldozed numerous essential heritage sites. The theft of integral parts of Syrian history is happening against the backdrop of increasing Turkification of the self-proclaimed “safe zones.” This Turkification includes renaming geography and landmarks (the Saraya square in Afrin is now the Erdoğan Square), the introduction of Turkish in the school curriculums and the ethnic cleansing of a sizable Kurdish population. Heritage represents an indispensable component of the construction of group identity, and the loss thereof has a grave impact on the ability of Syrians to reconstruct their national identity after a traumatic war that has sown great divisions in the nation. By 2020, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights had reported activity at more than 25 archaeological sites, a number which has been continually increasing over the last two years. ‘Ayn Dāra represents the most prominent victim of the numerous attacks on Syrian heritage. This temple was a unique monument with rich sculptural decoration, dating to the 14th/13th century BCE, and — ironically — built by the Anatolian Hittites who had, at that time, conquered large parts of northern Syria. Lying roughly 40km northwest of Aleppo, the archaeological site dates back over 3000 years and bears importance on ancient trade routes between Egypt, Palestine and Anatolia. An airstrike by the Turkish air forces in 2018 eradicated half of the temple structure. However, more recently, Turkish-backed forces have looted both the site and the storage of the archaeological mission, despite repeated warnings by United Nations organizations. The temple of ‘Ayn Dāra is only one of many decimated sites. There have been reports of excavations near the Nabi Huri fortress, an important site on the ancient trade route from Antioch to the Euphrates, containing a 100-meter diameter Roman theater. Furthermore, the Sheikh Hamid shrine and the archaeological shrine of Abdulrahman, both holy sites for Yazidi Kurds, have been desecrated by excavations. Turkey’s role in this is significant: Stolen artifacts have been reported smuggled and sold in Turkey, and Ankara funds the heavy machinery and advanced equipment available to the armed groups. However, beyond the material damage, the loss of Syrian heritage in the Turkish-occupied regions presents an even greater danger to the Syrian identity, particularly to its Kurdish inhabitants. The United Nations reported the displacement of over 150,000 Kurdish residents of Afrin by the Turkish invasion and subsequent prohibition to return, instead promoting Arabic settlements. The remaining Kurdish population has been subject to the expropriation of property, harassment and arbitrary arrests by Syrian National Army factions. Other reports describe the widespread hewing of olive groves, which often represent a source of firewood in cold winters and the sole source of income for the families to whom they belong. While some of the olive trees were burned systematically, others were uprooted and smuggled to sell in Turkish markets. Few conflicts have grown as protracted as the Syrian one. The war has displaced 13 million Syrians since its 2011 outbreak, of which 3.6 million have fled to neighboring Turkey. In 2016, Turkey launched its first military intervention to counteract the Islamic State and the organization of Kurdish groups in Northern Syria. Since then, it has established effective control over an area of almost 9000 square kilometers, referred to as safe zones. These areas are under Turkish military rule and connected to the Turkish infrastructure. In a 2019 policy brief analysis, Engin Yüksel and Erwin van Veen identified that “Turkey has been setting up institutions that mirror Turkish structures and practices, creating favorable conditions for private (Turkish) investment and encouraging refugee return. These institutions also reflect Turkey’s own brand of national Islamism. Nationalism manifests itself in the introduction of the Turkish language in the primary school curricula in the area. State Islamism reveals itself in the 1,472 clerics and 5,686 religious teachers that Diyanet — the government’s directorate of religious affairs — has hired among Syrians to spread Turkey’s political interpretation of Islam among the local population, including anti-Kurdish and anti-Gülenist sentiments.” While establishing these safe zones is primarily interpreted as serving the relocation of the large refugee population in Turkey, the broader context of the occupation offers a different perspective. President Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman sentiments towards a regional Turkish hegemony are no secret. Before Turkish incursions, the “conquest” Surah of the Quran rang from mosques, and in 2012 he proclaimed, “Inshallah, we will go to Damascus soon to hug our brothers. That day is close. Inshallah, we will read el-Fatiha at the tomb of Salahuddin and pray at the Emevi mosque...” The more control Turkey gains over educational and religious institutions, the stronger its ability to shift the narrative in favor of Turkish expansionism. The destruction of heritage represents the loss of tangible reminders of the nation’s history and heightens the difficulties of returning to unity, a prerequisite to sustained peace. While Western powers continue to support peace-restoration efforts in Syria, their closest ally is diminishing the prospects of their project. How can the North Atlantic Treaty Organization continue its pledges of support to Ukrainian sovereignty while one of its members exhibits such blatant disrespect to the very notion of such?

Truth be told, when life (or the mayor in this case) gives you a fair, you make magic out of it. < Back Bastion Fair Brings Magic to Menton By Angeliki Vytogianni March 30, 2022 Just around a month ago, most Sciences Po students in Menton started coming back from their Christmas holidays only to find a noticeable change — a surprise in Bastion. Bright, loud, and food-scented, it offered fluffy teddy bears, wild rides, and any other fair games one could imagine in this crazy small town. If you are currently a Sciences Po student in Menton, chances are you did not miss the fair that took place throughout the month of January, even spilling into the beginning of February. Disclaimer: this is not an investigative article to uncover the truth hiding behind fairy lights and annoying fair music. I did not get the scam behind the teddy bear games. Nor did I manage to figure out how to win an iMac, a PS5, or whatever it is they offer. I also don’t know how they make some of the best crepes I’ve had in Menton, or how the burgers, fries, sandwiches, churros, and other fair foods tasted so good. But while writing this during the last few days of the fair, I have realized one thing: it’s the magic that does the trick — the ambiance of celebrations, parties, and liveliness that we all so desperately needed. As the campus suffered a brutal Omicron attack, classes for the spring semester officially started, and the post-holiday blues hit, the fair was there to help keep the Mentonese ummah’s spirit high. So, I am simply transmitting the magic of the Menton fair in some personal and not-so-personal highlights of the past weeks. This way we can relate not only to the ups and downs we experienced in this fair, but also observe how crazy this town is. Let’s start with the first visit: it’s around 5 p.m., already getting dark and chilly (January weather). The fair, however, is at its peak; the crepes are coming out one after the other, hot chocolate is being made in bulk, and the lights are shining bright and colorful. Now, it is your first night in Menton, so you naturally gravitate towards the flashiest diversion in town to see your friends and spend time with them, as they all get back after the Christmas break. Scene 2: It’s a nice, sunny morning on the Riviera, and, following your New Year’s resolution, you put your trainers on and decide to go on a run. The only difference is that the Bastion area is now occupied by the flashing, noisy fair. So, on your trail by the beach, you have to shuffle through cantinas of food, multiple different stands of games, shooting challenges, and rides. Scene 3: The January 2022 COVID cluster has been tearing the campus apart and sending a good majority of students into isolation. As you have been getting restless inside your apartment, you decide to put on your KN95 mask and go on a short walk to get some fresh air. Of course, you avoid the fair so as not to transmit the virus to all the locals or visitors that are having fun there. What you realize as you are walking far away from any other people, is that the fair, with the lights and the setup, still beautifully decorates this part of the Cote d’Azur. Scene 4: The season has started and house parties are being thrown every weekend, so naturally, you get ready, you pre-game, and before you go to the party, you take a stroll around the fair area. Maybe a churro stand is still open, maybe the rides are more fun after a couple of tequila shots. Maybe the lights are just more mesmerizing, creating the club atmosphere that we need since COVID measures are still in effect. The scene continues later as well, before going home and calling it a night, a walk through the – dead at this time – fair of Menton is almost mandatory to get the feels of a summertime festival town. Scene 5: It’s a regular Wednesday evening, you have finished your fifth or sixth hour of class, but instead of going straight home and under your covers, you and your friends decide to go to the fair, have a crepe, a burger, a beer, some churros, or a slice of pizza, chatting away with your friends. This leaves you feeling like you suddenly escaped your university student reality to go to simpler times. The next few scenes, however, include some not-so-positive reactions and experiences in the fair. First of all, the scam of the challenges! I interviewed many students, and no one could say that they won a brand-new PlayStation, Macbook, or iPhone. I am fairly certain that the only “wins” we can count are some small furry animals. We should also mention the noise and annoying playlist of four pop songs ON REPEAT for the entirety of the month. Naturally, students that live close to the area were not amused to be waking up to the noise of the fair, hearing people scream through microphones, and getting the same songs stuck in their heads. Lastly, the pirate boat ride going back and forth high into the sky was responsible for some sparse injuries here and there. I know someone that decided to do the ride and ended up flying for most of it, while also falling on their knees and bumping their arms around. But we should look at the glass as half-full: when life gives you lemons, you make lemonade. The magic of the fair, at least for the Sciences Po students of this town, was that you could visit at any time of the day or night, guaranteed to have a fun time, with some bizarre moments sprinkled in there. Even though it operated in “Menton time,” opening around noon and shutting down around 8 p.m., it was still an experience to walk through at 3 or 8 a.m. It also signaled a second part of the festivities in Menton, beginning just after the Christmas market and right before the Lemon Festival, adding a very warm atmosphere to this town. If you ask most students of this campus whether or not they miss the festival, you are guaranteed to get a positive answer. Because truth be told, when life (or the mayor in this case) gives you a fair, you make magic out of it.

The truth is this: Egypt has never ruled merely by sword or throne. Its empire was always one of imagination, where a pen could be sharper than steel, a song louder than artillery, and a camera brighter than any spotlight. The world may forget armies, but it remembers stories. And Egypt has always known how to tell them. < Back The Pen, the Camera, and the Microphone: The Egyptian Kit of Soft Power Amena Elkayal September 27, 2025 Whether it is “ Huna al-Qahira ’ (Here is Cairo) echoing from radios in the beginning of every radio program, “ Cairo writes, the world reads ” proclaiming the Egyptian pen’s might, or Om Kulthum – known as Kawkab al-Sharq (the Star of the East) – mesmerizing hearts with her voice, Egypt has always spoken to the world through culture. Its soft power has always been a timeless symphony of word, image, and sound. In order to grasp the true reach of this subtle weapon of soft power, we must journey backward in time. Not to the recent golden age of cinema or the era of Nasser’s radio, but much farther into the fertile soil of the Nile and the texture of the papyrus, to Ancient Egypt—seven millennia ago. From tender love songs in hieroglyphs in temples in the Egyptian city of Aswan to tales like the Eloquent Peasant , Egypt's stories reached the farthest points of the earth and gave the scribe’s pen the power of a sword: they gave the nation its own legitimacy, unique persona, and influential cultural heritage. Centuries later, in Alexandria, the greatest library of the ancient world was the headquarters of literature, poetry, arts, and sciences, giving birth to some of the world’s greatest poems, epics, and scientific discoveries. What united these eras was not the might of armies but the sway of ideas–the ability to move nations through fascination and respect for its heritage and legacy rather than fear. It is this very idea that Joseph Nye would much later name soft power , defined as “the ability to affect other’s behavior by coercion, inducement or attraction.” The main sources of soft power are diplomacy but also culture, including music, media, literature, science, and cinema; thus, states achieve desired outcomes through attraction rather than coercion. As Janice Bially Martin later observed , this attraction Nye referred to in his definition of soft power is " constructed through communicative exchange" which emphasizes that soft power lives and dies in the art of storytelling: whether it's through the pages of a book, the melodies of a song, the flash of a camera, or the strength of the spoken word. By this measure, Egypt has long been a maestro of attraction. In 2025, Business Insider Africa announced Egypt 1st in leading soft power in Africa and 38th globally. Its score, 47.8 points out of 100, rested on pillars varying from trade, international relations, culture and heritage, media and communication to people and values. Under Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian call for justice and unity through its media thundered across the Arab world. Nasser believed that his revolution should not be carried only by soldiers but by soundwaves. The radio broadcasting station Sawt al-Arab (The Voice of the Arabs) was launched in 1953 as Egypt’s revolutionary radio station. It played a huge role in spreading Nasser’s ideas of Pan-Arabism, nationalism, socialism, and anti-colonialism across the region. Through radio waves, Cairo became the capital of Arab and African unity broadcasting the spirit of independence to Algeria, Kenya, and beyond. When Algerian revolutionaries spoke from Cairo in both Arabic and French: “The Voice of the National Liberation Front Speaks to You from Cairo”, this was proof that Egypt’s microphone was as mighty as any arsenal. On the other hand, while the radio spread words, music touched souls. Om Kulthum’s voice was an ocean of tarab (as the Guardian described : “ a state of rapturous enchantment, where time and self dissolve in the music”) in which millions willingly drowned. Her reach extended far beyond the region, as Western artists like Bob Dylan and Maria Callas confessed that Kawkab al-Sharq is like no other. Before Om Kulthum, Sayed Darwish had already proven that music could shake empires, rallying Egyptians during the 1919 Revolution until even the British felt threatened by his melodies. The pen, too, carved Egypt’s name into the cultural map. From Abbas Mahmoud Al-Aakkad’s pioneering contributions to the world of play-writing and philosophical essays to Naguib Mahfouz’ labyrinthine novels introducing the Arab world to the art of novel-writing; Cairo strongly embodied the saying “Cairo writes, Beirut publishes, Baghdad reads” . Mahfouz, the Arab world’s only Nobel laureate in literature, actually introduced the modern novel to the Arab world, turning Cairo’s alleyways into characters in their own right, therefore vividly capturing and conveying the essence of the Egyptian spirit to the world. And then came the camera. Egypt, producing 75% of Arab films in the 20th century was called the Hollywood of the East . This did not only shape stories, but a wide range of Arab identities; dialects, fashions, ideals, jokes, morals, and general taste. Stars like Omar Sharif who conquered Hollywood with Lawrence of Arabia and Faten Hamama who bewitched Arab audiences with her grace, made Cairo both stage and spotlight. To this day, Ramadan dramas and Eid films keep Egyptian screens flickering in living rooms from Baghdad to Rabat. Yet, brilliance is never eternal. In recent decades, Egypt’s cultural production has drifted into shallow waters; its once-vast sea of creativity and influence now narrowed by profit-driven media chasing sensation over substance. Increasing censorship and the tightening grip of centralized control have been among the major currents dragging this deterioration. Before the revolutions of 2011 and 2013, there was more freedom given to Egyptian drama to weave political references and to mirror, however imperfectly, the pulse of the nation and its people. However, when such reflections began to rattle the system, more state control over media led to the retreat into safer terrain of content leaning more towards ‘social’ dramas. In an article by The Arab Weekly, Nader Khalifa, a critic and scriptwriter, lamented “the age of Egyptian drama is over”. That is, according to him, resulting from the trend of mediocre serial dramas that absolutely lack representation of the Egyptian people, their pulse, their truth. Instead of what was once a means of cultural influence, representation, and genuine portrayal has taken a turn now into being a commodity measured only by financial return rather than its artistic and cultural worth. The trend is unmistakable. Today’s Egyptian drama leans almost entirely toward depoliticized social stories, detached from the nation’s lived realities. Despite the rise of inflation and the economic crisis, no discussion or portrayal of these realities seems to ever be present in current shows. An essay published by Mohamed El Aswany, Egyptian journalist and critic specialized in Arab arts and entertainment industry and its relationship to society, discussed the reality of the class stratification currently present in Egyptian Ramadan shows and how producers split the content into 3 class categories: Class A, B, and C. Class A shows are completely detached from the harsh reality the Egyptians are living in, while the so called “shaabi drama”, popular drama of Class C, is by far the most produced, however unfortunately misrepresenting Egypt's lower social classes rather than being a voice for the voiceless. Violence, drug dealing, mistreatment of women, gangs, and vulgarity: caricatures that misrepresent the very people they intended to capture, gradually erasing a hundreds-of-years legacy. But not all is lost. Even though Egyptians themselves might blame the government’s shift to private sector and building new cities and festivals, yet it is undeniable that this is one of the things keeping the country’s splendour alive: El Gouna Film Festival , the cultural vibrancy of Alamein , Cultural and historical Events like Pharaoh's golden parade , and the Sahel (Egypt's North coast) scene keep Egypt in conversation with the world. The truth is this: Egypt has never ruled merely by sword or throne. Its empire was always one of imagination, where a pen could be sharper than steel, a song louder than artillery, and a camera brighter than any spotlight. The world may forget armies, but it remembers stories. And Egypt has always known how to tell them. So for all Egyptians out there, keep in your bag a pen, a camera, and a mini microphone and… rise to power! Photo Source: Aldas Kirvaitis, Flickr

Turkish prisons still do not allow open visitation for their inmates, despite the vaccination rate across prisons being higher than the general population. They are denied visits from their family and lawyers, with their phone time being increased by only 10 minutes since the beginning of the pandemic. < Back Turkey: Visitation Still Not Allowed in 82% Fully Vaccinated Prisons By Ayşe Lara Selçuker November 29, 2021 While this article was written before the government announced the return to “open visitation” on December 1, its analysis of pandemic prison policies are still valid; prisoners have been neglected across the globe. Turkish prison inmates have not been permitted “open visitation” for one year and eight months, despite the fact that the prison vaccination rate (82 percent) has surpassed that of the general population (78 percent), according to an article published by T24. For almost two years, according to DW Turkish, inmates have only had access to 20 minutes of phone calls per week, increased from 10 minutes pre-pandemic. Prisons have recently begun to allow “closed visitation,” but the Justice Department suggests that this will not change for a while, “due to pandemic reasons.” The Turkish prison system distinguishes between “open visitation” and “closed visitation” as contact visitation (where the inmate may sit in a room with their relatives or lawyer and sit at a table for a period of time) and non-contact glass-partition visitation (where the inmate and the lawyer/relative are separated by a glass partition and have to talk through a telephone.) Not only is “open visitation” banned for inmates, but also any cross-prison transfers are currently at a halt. Transferring from high security prisons (which often use solitary confinement) to lower security prisons for good behavior, once motivation for inmate reformi is no longer possible. This might even mean that some have been in solitary confinement or similarly psychologically abusive situations for as long as these pandemic rules have been instated. The contrast between the strict rules in prisons and travel for the general public is particularly striking. While Turkey has been in the process of returning to normal since about June, with lockdowns ending and restaurants, schools and hotels reopening, the fact that prisoners cannot even sit in a room with their relatives, and perhaps more importantly, their lawyers, is astonishing. A similar critique can even be made about pre-June Turkey, when its restrictions (or lack thereof) on tourists seemed incomparable to those on its citizens. While Turkey’s citizens faced a lockdown on Sundays, and earlier in the pandemic before vaccinations, for consecutive weeks, tourists were exempted from any lockdown restrictions. Prisoners have therefore been a victim of Turkey’s inconsistent COVID-19 response ever since the beginning. Many point to the fact that prisons are congregate housing facilities, with higher risks for COVID transmission at a much higher rate. Yet, the Anadolu Agency reports that Turkish nursing homes have had the right to allow visitations since around June, when the reopening period started. The Turkish government left this decision to the discretion of the nursing homes, many of which have decided to allow visitations with proof of visitors’ vaccinations and negative PCR test results. Further, there is really little reason to justify the continued isolation of inmates despite a developed vaccination scheme such as the one observed in Turkey at the moment. While Turkish citizens can now travel internationally (and foreigners can travel to Turkey) as they wish with vaccinations and test results, inmates suffer, despite prisons’ higher vaccination and lower case rates. Yet, is this a Turkey-specific issue as some would make it to be? How has the rest of the world dealt with congregate housing facilities and, particularly, prisons? The response varies, but it can be determined overall that many have unsurprisingly not prioritized prisoners in their pandemic response. With many which have had problems with prison visits, a shocking number of nations have little to no information available about their prison-visit protocols. According to Buzzfeed, prisons in California only opened their doors to in-person visits around July, following months of telephone and video visits through a platform that faced frequent and significant crashes. According to its official website, the United Kingdom government has set up a “National Framework for Prisons” by which prisons have been classified as open or closed to visits based on their current vaccination and case rights, allowing for there to be a dynamic, updated, and rational system for prisons to receive visitors. The EuroPris website, which has stated that it will be “updated every day,” posted its most recent “Prison Visits” update on its COVID-19 information page in May 2020. Concurrent with many questions surrounding the ethics of prisons in debate around the world, the pandemic has made it especially evident that prisoners are too often neglected by the government in times of crisis. The humanity of inmates are too often forgotten in policies about people who have been portrayed as criminals with no remorse. No person deserves no visits or no contact for a year and eight months, and governments across the world need to develop their schemes on including all of the nation’s public when specifying pandemic responses.

While restaurant food and your roommates' ready-to-eat options all seem like acceptable means to satiate your hunger, an array of more efficient, cheap and satisfying options will save you from unnecessary tensions with your roommates and a possibly drained credit card. I hope to help you prepare balanced meals that will fuel you for your long study sessions while simultaneously not exhausting the limited amount of time on your hands. < Back Eats with Angela: Speedy October By Angela Saab Saade October 31, 2022 October is a transitional month for most of us; the weather is as unstable as Katy Perry's ex, the tourists of Menton are departing, freeing up our lonely town's streets, and mid-semester stress factors, such as midterm exams, vacations plans, third-year abroad decisions and parcours civique preparations are constantly lurking in the back of our minds. Overwhelmed with these important matters, we may find ourselves betraying our kitchens by avoiding the hectic task of food preparation. While restaurant food and your roommates' ready-to-eat options all seem like acceptable means to satiate your hunger, an array of more efficient, cheap and satisfying options will save you from unnecessary tensions with your roommates and a possibly drained credit card. Research shows a strong relationship between stress and nutrition. Mindful balanced eating “provides the extra energy needed to cope with stressful events.” Other findings posit that short-term stress actually reduces appetite. The disparity in the literature indicates that there is no single truth that generalizes the effect of stress on individuals. What is certain however, is that comfort food — as its name implies — is meant to yield comfort in anxious times, for example, eating a pack of chocolate for breakfast (guilty as charged). Nonetheless, I hope to help you prepare balanced meals that will fuel you for your long study sessions while simultaneously not exhausting the limited amount of time on your hands. The Veggie Roast The veggie roast includes three simple tasks: Place the vegetables of your choice onto a baking sheet (cut if necessary or preferred). Some usable vegetables include zucchini, tomato, broccoli, brussels sprouts, carrot, pepper, beetroot, potato, sweet potato, onion, butternut squash, corn, and cauliflower. You can use fresh vegetables, frozen or canned; whatever suits you! Place the vegetables into a preheated oven and set the oven temperature and your timer based on your vegetables of choice. Drizzle some olive oil, sprinkle lots of sea salt and enjoy! For a more flavorful and fulfilling serving, I recommend preparing eggs, tofu or your choice of meat to go with your mix, and, for a wiser use of your time, do so while your veggie mix is cooking. My recipe involves fresh tomatoes (not cut or peeled) and fresh cut-in-half zucchinis and carrots, alongside some frozen bell peppers and broccoli. I grease the baking tray, throw in my veggies, and add frozen filet fish on that same tray, since the vegetables and protein source I have chosen conveniently require a similar cooking time. Speedy Bowls Aside from being time-efficient, as its name implies, making this delicious dish only requires two components: a bowl and a microwave. Microwaves have repeatedly come to my rescue for quick breakfasts prior to eight am classes and effortless late-night snacks. However, for those of you without a microwave, do not fret! The oven is just as efficient as an appliance; the main difference is that ovens need to be preheated. Find below three basic items with which you may craft delicious, quick and balanced meals! Oatmeal Vitamin-rich and mineral-dense, oats are a great source of fiber which may be cooked by different means and with various ingredients to fulfill savory or sweet cravings. Plus, they are incredibly cheap! Simply throw some oats in a bowl and pour in water or your choice of milk. If desired, add chopped fruit, honey, peanut butter, seeds, nuts, coconut flakes, candy (I would recommend crushing Oreos, M&M's or sweet biscuits) or whatever else may sound appealing to you. Place the bowl into a microwave and determine the heating time as per the appropriate consistency. I enjoy adding yogurt for a cold twist to my warm oatmeal. Oatmeal serves as a great snack too! Sweet potato Sweet potatoes are rich in vitamins, minerals and fiber. Poke holes in your sweet potato and place it in your microwave for a few minutes, et voilá! You can melt cheese on the potato, add cold or cooked vegetables and chickpeas into the equation.Top with spices and a dressing of your choice for a delightful and filling meal. My sophisticated roommate expertly embellishes her sweet potatoes with marinated tofu, chopped tomatoes and a fried egg. Unfortunately, I am far too lazy for this haute-cuisine and opt to put minimal effort into my sweet potato creations. But, if your ambitions surpass mine, I support you in your gastronomical escapades. Corn Corn is a canned gem — it may be consumed with olive oil and salt, cream and sugar, or cinnamon and lemon juice. It may also enrich your meals with more flavor and color. It is perfect for tasty corn soup too. Some items I bet you do not know exist that are advantageous in autumn Packaged Soup As repulsive as that may sound, packaged soup is cheap, quick and quite flavorful in comparison to what its name may signal. You just pour the soup in a bowl and cook in the microwave or on a stove for a few minutes and enjoy! Purée I do not know how you feel about mashed potatoes, but I adore them. Warm and savory, mashed potatoes will work wonders if you give them the chance. Unfortunately, however, cutting, peeling and mashing the potatoes is not a good use of your time. For that reason, I often head to the store and purchase eight packs of powdered mashed purée (each pack makes one to two servings) for approximately three euros. Whenever I have no time on my hands, I empty a pack into a bowl, add milk or water, microwave the bowl for a few minutes, drizzle some oil and sprinkle some salt. Complemented by boiled eggs, beans or vegetables, this platter tastes heavenly. Last tip While creating quick meals is ideal for stressful days, it is also worth considering cooking one “proper” meal and storing it for the longer term. This could be as simple as making a pot of pasta or rice and storing it for future consumption. In fact, if you are seeking shortcuts, you can find portioned bags of rice or couscous that simply need to be dropped into boiling water for consumption. For example, a meal that takes under ten minutes to prepare is the combination of couscous, lentils, and a side salad. I apologize in advance for my North African counterparts, however I prepare couscous by just placing the couscous in boiling water and covering them for five minutes. Meanwhile, rinse some canned lentils, chop up an apple and parsley. Add all ingredients on the plate and add the dressing of your choice. I added olive oil and salt on the couscous and lentils and opted for balsamic vinegar for the side salad. If speedy and cost-effective recipes are your jam, stay tuned for next month’s edition of Eats with Angela. Traditional Lebanese recipes that require under 10 minutes preparation await you.

En ces temps de mutation profonde du monde du travail, la controverse portant sur la forme que doit prendre une bonne workweek anime les gouvernements et les sociétés. Décriées ou célébrées, les tentatives actuelles pour réformer la semaine de travail traditionnelle se multiplient à travers le monde et nous incitent à repenser notre rapport à la production et à l’emploi. < Back Les ‘Five-Day Workweeks’ en Débat: Revisiter Notre Rapport à la Production et au Travail Margarita Kopsia October 31, 2024 Les sondages réalisés par CNN Business révèlent que « 77% des travailleurs aux États-Unis » seraient en faveur de la semaine de quatre jours, convaincus que cela aurait un effet positif sur leur bien-être. Les expérimentations sur la four-day workweek se multiplient alors à travers le monde, portant avec elles l’espoir d’un meilleur équilibre entre vie privée et vie professionnelle et promettant de meilleures performances économiques. Traversant les pays, les secteurs économiques, les entreprises et les employés. Elles réunissent également tous ces acteurs autour d’une même préoccupation: celle de trouver des solutions plus efficaces pour atteindre un meilleur équilibre entre productivité et épanouissement personnel. Ce renouvellement dans notre manière de penser et d’organiser le travail pousse alors des acteurs de plus en plus nombreux à donner une chance à la semaine de quatre jours. Ce mouvement ne fait pas pourtant l’unanimité et au mécontentement de nombreux, la Grèce a récemment tendu en faveur de la semaine de six jours dans le cadre de sa politique économique, afin de stimuler la croissance dans certains secteurs. Ainsi, le débat sur la durée et la fréquence qui sont censés caractériser la workweek « idéale » est bien là. Mais qu’est-ce que le terme workweek est-il censé refléter et pourquoi parle-t-on de plus en plus ces dernières années de ses différentes variétés? La notion de workweek— signifiant littéralement “semaine de travail”—se réfère généralement au nombre d’heures ou de jours que l’individu moyen passe à travailler au cours d’une semaine. Ainsi, si la représentation que chacun peut avoir de la semaine « parfaite » varie fortement—entre temps consacré à travailler ou à s’épanouir individuellement—celle qui s’est historiquement, traditionnellement et culturellement imposée l’est beaucoup moins. En effet, la semaine de cinq jours, qui dure entre 30 et 39 heures environ dans l’Union européenne, constitue une réalité depuis de nombreuses générations déjà et semble avoir bien pris place dans nos habitudes à travers l’écrasante majorité des populations et des secteurs de travail. Mais suscitant curiosité, espoir ou incompréhension, la Belgique fut dès 2022 « le premier pays dans l’Union européenne—et le troisième seulement dans le monde, après l’Islande et la Nouvelle Zélande—à introduire formellement la four-day workweek comme une option pour ses travailleurs, » en augmentant le volume horaire de travail requis pour les quatre jours restants, qui passe alors de huit heures par jour à neuf heures et demi: « rendre les gens et les entreprises plus forts » est l'objectif affiché par le Premier ministre belge Alexander de Croo. Le Royaume-Uni figure parmi les pionniers en expérimentation de la four-day workweek, dont le succès à même ouvert la voie à la rédaction du « Flexible Working Bill » censé entrer en vigueur en Juillet 2025 . Ce projet de loi prévoit de laisser aux employés plus de liberté concernant leurs horaires et milieux de travail privilégiés, suite aux constats du CIPD dont les recherches ont montré que « 6% des employés ont changé d’emploi [en 2022] précisément par manque d’options de travail flexibles et que 12% parmi ces derniers ont quitté leur profession entièrement faute de flexibilité au sein du secteur. Cela représente 2 et 4 millions de travailleurs respectivement. » L’argument qui revient est comparable à celui des autres pays qui donnent une chance à la semaine de quatre jours, le ministre des Affaires et du Commerce Kevin Hollinrake affirmant qu’ « une force de travail plus heureuse signifie plus de productivité, et c’est pour cela que nous soutenons des mesures qui donnent aux travailleurs à travers le Royaume-Uni davantage de flexibilité quant à “où” et “quand” ils travaillent. » Face au nombre grandissant d’entreprises, d’administrations publiques voire d’États qui semblent récemment remettre en question cette vision généralisée de ce qu’est une bonne workweek , conciliant efficacité, productivité et équilibre, le Japon prend position. Espérant « rendre les postes plus attractifs en passant de cinq à quatre jours hebdomadaires, » faire face au coût économique du vieillissement de la population ou même pour « lutter contre le burnout, » le Japon a récemment commencé à opter lui aussi en faveur de la semaine de quatre jours. Soucieux de préserver le bien-être de ses travailleurs, doper leur productivité mais aussi dans le but d’attirer plus de talents, c’est dans le cadre de sa « work style reform campaign » que le gouvernement japonais incite les entreprises à adopter une plus grande « flexibilité » quant aux horaires et jours travail qu’ils imposent à leurs employés. Depuis l’année 2021 que le concept acquiert une certaine popularité parmi les rangs des grandes entreprises japonaises telles que Panasonic ou Hitachi, mais il peine étonnamment à s’imposer parmi les travailleurs eux-mêmes pour cause de la « workaholic culture » qui caractérise la société japonaise. Car en effet, travailler « moins »—même si cela peut se traduire à travailler « mieux »—peut être mal vu parmi des employés qui sont de plus en plus prêts à sacrifier du temps de leur vie privée pour leur vie de travail. Martin Schulz, économiste en chef chez Fujitsu, confie alors à CNBC que « faire partie d’une compagnie c’est presque comme faire partie d’une communauté, et cela résulte souvent en des heures de travail plus longues, qui ne sont pas forcément plus efficaces. » Ainsi, selon ce même article, seulement 150 parmi les 63 000 travailleurs éligibles chez Panasonic pour une telle flexibilité du travail ont finalement opté pour cela. Nous sommes donc témoins aujourd'hui d’un mouvement international, mais divisé, en faveur de la semaine de quatre jours, à la lumière du nombre grandissant de pays qui multiplient les expérimentations et réglementations suivant cette nouvelle direction. Espérant concilier productivité et bien-être, l’équilibre entre vie professionnelle et vie personnelle semble de plus en plus difficile à trouver au fur et à mesure qu’il est remis en question par ces différents pays, dont les semaines de travail deviennent plus courtes et plus denses. S’écarter de la semaine de quatre jours: le cas de la Grèce avec la nouvelle loi 5053/23 Le chemin qui est emprunté par la Grèce à ce niveau est différent et la solution qui se présente depuis Juillet 2024 pour « stimuler l’emploi » implique contrairement une hausse du temps de travail hebdomadaire: la semaine de 48 heures pourrait devenir une réalité pour de nombreux employés. Cette nouvelle législation concerne les entreprises qui « fournissent des services [de type] 24/7 ou celles qui font face à une charge de travail extraordinaire, » qui auront la possibilité « d’imposer une semaine de travail de six jours à leurs employés. » Le secteur touristique, caractérisé par des rythmes intenses et par des journées longues pour les salariés, n’est donc généralement pas concerné par la législation selon le journal Ekathimerini . Le compromis pour ceux qui le sont? Une « hausse de leur salaire de 40% » pour ce jour supplémentaire, voire de 115% s’il s’agit d’un dimanche. Décalage par rapport à d'autres pays européens , ou plutôt outil de rattrapage privilégié ? De tels questionnements traversent la société grecque et alimentent la controverse, sachant que la Grèce figure déjà selon Eurostat parmi les pays de l’Union européenne avec la semaine de travail la plus longue, affichant une moyenne de 39,9 heures de travail hebdomadaires en 2023. L’explication qui est mise en avant par les économistes est que « le plus grand problème de l’économie grecque est la productivité des heures de travail, » le pays affichant une efficacité moins importante par rapport à la moyenne européenne. D’autres facteurs tels que la « baisse de la population » ou la « la pénurie de travailleurs qualifiés » —tous deux liés à « l'exode » de millions de jeunes qualifiés depuis la crise économique de 2009—accentuent également les enjeux qui ont abouti à cet élargissement de la semaine de travail pour les secteurs en question. Ces facteurs feraient-ils de cette nouvelle législation une mesure impopulaire mais nécessaire? Espérant soulager ces maux mais aussi affronter les problèmes liés au versement des salaires des employés et ceux de l'exercice de travail « non déclaré , » la mesure excède une dimension purement économique pour le gouvernement qui souhaite d’en faire également une mesure qui soit « worker-friendly . » Les modalités de l'exercice de ce jour de travail supplémentaire sont ainsi régies par différentes réglementations et la limite de travail journalier pour ce sixième jour est fixée à 8 heures, les employeurs étant dans l’obligation de respecter ce seuil et ne pouvant imposer à leurs salariés des tâches ou des horaires qui nécessiteraient de s’en écarter. Malgré ce souci affiché pour le respect des droits des employés concernés par ces changements, la nouvelle loi fait face à une impopularité accrue, étant même qualifiée comme « barbare » par les syndicats dans le cadre de manifestations pendant le mois de Juillet qui y dénoncent une approche contre-productive, ne faisant qu’accentuer des problèmes existants. Aussi éclaircissant que cela puisse être de continuer de s’interroger sur ce qui fait la force ou la faiblesse de ces différentes workweeks , entre semaines de quatre jours ou semaines de six jours, demandons-nous également comment en est-on arrivés là. Pourquoi la semaine de cinq jours a-t-elle fini par s’imposer comme le modèle dominant d’organisation du travail? Visions, pensées et représentations de la semaine travail à travers le temps et l’espace Mis à part toutes ces différentes controverses et mouvements opposés, le débat sur les workweeks s’opère généralement sur un même fond commun, qui est celui de la semaine de cinq jours. Cette dernière est largement partagée par la grande majorité des pays du monde et traverse les sociétés et les époques. Ainsi, le concept aurait même constitué une réalité sous une autre forme durant la dynastie Han en Chine, durant laquelle les « fonctionnaires avaient le droit de prendre un jour de repos tous les 5 jours » selon Lien-sheng Yang dans S chedules of Work and Rest in Imperial China . Il est ainsi possible de retracer plusieurs origines à la notion de la semaine de cinq jours. Parmi les moments de l’histoire qui ont participé à son façonnement, nous relevons par exemple la contribution fondamentale de Henry Ford qui aurait « dit à ses employés qu’il mettait en place une semaine de 5 jours et de 40 heures [...]. » Les « revendications syndicales » auraient également joué un rôle essentiel dans la mise en place des principes constitutifs de la semaine de 5 jours dans le cadre des « nombreuses luttes sociales dès les années 1830 »—époque où « on travaille quinze à dix-sept heures par jour » et où on s’engage déjà à réduire les journées à 12 heures par jour. Ce seuil diminue progressivement au fil du temps et c’est en 1982 que « la durée légale du travail passe à 39 heures par semaine, sans perte de salaire » en France. Aujourd’hui, « la durée légale du temps de travail est fixé à 35 heures par semaine à temps complet » en France, et le site web officiel de l’Union européen écrit qu’ « en tant qu'employeur , vous devez veiller à ce que votre personnel ne travaille pas plus de 48 heures par semaine en moyenne (heures supplémentaires comprises). » En ces temps de mutation profonde du monde du travail, la controverse portant sur la forme que doit prendre une bonne workweek anime les gouvernements et les sociétés. Décriées ou célébrées, les tentatives actuelles pour réformer la semaine de travail traditionnelle se multiplient à travers le monde et nous incitent à repenser notre rapport à la production et à l’emploi. Voir clair dans ce débat est un exercice subtil, à la lumière duquel il n’existe finalement pas de réponse unique et universelle. Mais plus important encore que de s’attarder au cas par cas et de critiquer ces différents modèles, il ne faut perdre de vue l’objectif ultime vers lequel on espère se rapprocher: celui d’un monde professionnel conciliant efficacité, équilibre et respect. Dévier du modèle traditionnel de la semaine des cinq jours ne pourrait correspondre en fin de compte que d’une nouvelle occasion pour nous à revisiter nos pratiques et les interroger pour les améliorer.

Long ago, Palestine was at the heart of the intoxicating idea of Arab solidarity. Now, it struggles to retain its legitimacy in an increasingly splintered SWANA region. In light of warming relations with Israel across the Arab world, it seems as though Palestine’s last true allies are deserting. < Back The Fairytale of Arab Unity: Israeli-Arab Ties Strengthen By Lara-Nour Walton November 29, 2021 Once upon a time, an anticolonial fervor bound the Arabic-speaking countries together. Once upon a time, the Arab Enlightenment, Al-Nahda, prompted the espousement of Nasser’s and Gadaffi’s quixotic, pan-Arab ideals. Once upon a time, the Palestinian plight was something other Arabs, a people all too familiar with the consequences of colonial pursuit, could relate to; still fresh in my great-grandmother’s mind 50 years later was the sound of bagpipes from the British occupation in Egypt. But, the SWANA region has become fragmented over the years. The memory of occupation is far more distant among the newer generations, and solidarity with Palestine has only diminished as a result. This dwindling support is evident in regional pro-Israel policy shifts. Until recently, there had been bad blood between the Gulf States and Israel. Saudi Arabia, especially, had remained a staunch supporter of the Palestinians — in 1973, it even enforced an oil embargo against the U.S. for backing Israel during the Yom Kippur War. This demonstration of Saudi’s past willingness to jeopardize its valuable American alliance proved its loyalty to the Palestinian cause. That is why the world was stunned when late last year, Saudi Arabia appeared to be open to normalization with Israel. This paradigm shift followed the signing of the Abraham Accords, which afforded fellow GCC members, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, normal diplomatic relations with Israel. During his rule, Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud refused any normalization until Israel restored the 1967 borders. But his son, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, who has taken over from the King almost entirely, is not as attached to the Palestinian cause as his father. His desire to appease the West and safeguard his Kingdom’s regional hegemony against Iran undoubtedly informed his choice to normalize ties with Israel. The potency of U.S. influence cannot be understated when analyzing the diplomatic reordering of the SWANA region. In September 2020, Sudan joined the Abraham accords with the promise that the U.S. remove it from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism and lift sanctions. Similarly, Morocco’s December 2020 move to join the agreement was largely predicated on Washington’s conditional pledge to affirm Morocco’s claim over the disputed Western Sahara. In effect, Palestinians, according to Ahmad Majdalani , member of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s Executive Committee, feel abandoned “by the Arab nation(s) leaving them to remain locked in an untenable status quo.” As a result of U.S. sway in the region, SWANA diplomatic decisions are almost always made at the expense of Palestine. Consequently, Israel is rewarded for conceding nothing. This trend has continued, this time in Jordan. Despite a 1994 Peace Treaty , the Hashemite Kindom’s relationship with Israel has been tenuous over the past two decades, largely due to King Abdullah’s sympathy for Jordan's sizeable and ever-growing Palestinian population. At the core of Jordanian foreign policy has been the demand for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders with an East Jerusalem capital. Under former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Jordan-Israel bilateral relations grew icy. However, one of the top priorities of the new premier, Naftali Bennet, is to thaw those relations. In his bid to do this, he and Jordan engaged in what Gidon Bromberg, Israel’s director of the regional environmental group EcoPeace Middle East, said is the “largest water sale in the history of the two countries.” This water deal stipulates that the H2O-deficient Kingdom is set to receive double the amount of fresh water from Israel than it had before. But, to Jordanian English Track 1A, Sami Omaish, this deal is far from magnanimous. “Israel diverts water from the Jordan River. It is hypocritical that they steal Jordanian water and then sell it back for Jordanian money.” However, Jordan’s top envoy does not seem to be phased by this apparent injustice. He reported that he and Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid intend for this to be the first in a series of deals towards “a just and comprehensive peace” between Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom. On the same day as the water deal, Jordan accused Israel of committing war crimes for the forced eviction of Palestinians from the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah. But despite Amman’s frequent condemnations of Israeli human rights abuses, there is little to no firm action to match its threatening rhetoric. Perhaps it is simply advantageous for a country in drought to be chummy with one of the world’s leaders in desalination. Or maybe King Abdullah seeks diplomatic realignment with Israel to maintain the $1.5 billion in annual aid from pro-Israel lawmakers in Washington. Regardless of the reasoning, Jordan’s support as one of Palestine’s most devoted advocates is waning. Palestine found a home in what senior associate member of Oxford’s St. Antony’s College, Hussein Agha, calls the “Third World Movement,” a period during the mid-20th century characterized by pushes for liberationism and anti-colonialism. However, according to Agha , “many of the Palestinians’ former Third World allies (like India and Vietnam) have chosen economic self-interest in place of ideological commitment.” Long ago, Palestine was at the heart of the intoxicating idea of Arab solidarity. Now, it struggles to retain its legitimacy in an increasingly splintered SWANA region. In light of warming relations with Israel across the Arab world, it seems as though Palestine’s last true allies are deserting.

Dans le contexte du conflit de Gaza entre Israël et le Hamas, le Yémen, déjà en proie à ses propres troubles internes, se trouve de plus en plus impliqué dans des complexités régionales, principalement orchestrées par le mouvement houthis montant. < Back L'implication du Yémen dans la guerre de Gaza : l'essor des houthis et la dynamique régionale By Elian Jorand April 30, 2024 Dans le contexte du conflit de Gaza entre Israël et le Hamas, le Yémen, déjà en proie à ses propres troubles internes, se trouve de plus en plus impliqué dans des complexités régionales, principalement orchestrées par le mouvement houthis montant. Alors que le pays navigue sur ce terrain dangereux, la grave crise humanitaire qui sévit dans le pays est un rappel saisissant du coût humain des conflits et des manœuvres géopolitiques. Le Yémen, souvent qualifié de pays le plus pauvre du monde arabe, lutte depuis longtemps contre la pauvreté systémique et la souffrance généralisée. Avec environ trois quarts de sa population plongée dans la pauvreté et la maladie faisant rage, dont une épidémie de choléra suspectée dépassant deux cent mille cas en 2020, le pays est au bord de l'effondrement. La pandémie de COVID-19 n'a fait qu'exacerber la crise, les analystes de la santé suggérant que les cas signalés sous-représentent largement l'ampleur réelle de l'impact du virus. Le blocus imposé par les forces de la coalition dirigée par l’Arabie Saoudite a infligé d'indicibles souffrances à la population yéménite, obstruant le flux de fournitures vitales et faisant grimper les prix des biens essentiels. Bien que le cessez-le-feu de 2022 ait offert un bref répit, les craintes d'une résurgence des coûts élevés sont grandes après son expiration. Le bilan de la guerre, aggravé par des causes indirectes telles que le manque de nourriture, d'eau et de services de santé, a entraîné la mort d'environ 370 000 personnes, selon le Programme des Nations unies pour le développement. Dans ce contexte de désespoir, les forces houthies et de la coalition sont accusées de commettre des crimes de guerre flagrants, notamment des attaques contre des cibles civiles en violation directe du droit international. La destruction d'un hôpital dirigé par Médecins Sans Frontières en 2015 témoigne de la nature indiscriminée de la violence qui sévit au pays. Malgré ces nombreux défis, des lueurs d'espoir ont émergé à l'horizon. Les négociations de paix soutenues par l'ONU, bien que difficiles, ont progressé de manière incrémentielle, notamment avec l' Accord de Stockholm de 2018 qui a évité une bataille catastrophique dans la ville portuaire de Hodeïda. Cependant, la mise en œuvre des dispositions de l'accord a été lente, entravée par les frictions persistantes entre les acteurs régionaux, dont l'Iran, l'Arabie saoudite et les Émirats arabes unis. Des développements récents ont insufflé un optimisme prudent dans les efforts de paix, avec des relations améliorées entre l'Arabie saoudite et l'Iran et des discussions en cours entre Riyad et les houthis offrant une lueur d'espoir. La coordination d'un cessez-le-feu national en avril 2022, facilitée par le nouveau conseil gouvernemental du Yémen, a marqué une étape significative vers la désescalade. Toutefois , l'échec à renouveler le cessez-le-feu a soulevé des questions sur les perspectives de paix durable, d'autant plus que des acteurs clés, tels que le conseil gouvernemental et le Conseil de transition du Sud (STC), restent exclus des négociations. Malheureusement, le récent conflit à Gaza a anéanti les espoirs de paix, avec l'implication des houthis, soutenus par l'Iran, exacerbant la situation précaire. Leurs actions irrationnelles ciblant le commerce maritime civil ont suscité de fortes réponses de la communauté internationale, y compris des raids aériens conjoints des États-Unis et de la Grande-Bretagne. Ces frappes, touchant 36 cibles houthies dans 13 endroits au Yémen, ont été menées en réponse aux attaques continues des houthis contre le commerce maritime international et commercial en mer Rouge. Les frappes de précision visaient à perturber et à dégrader les capacités utilisées par les houthis pour menacer le commerce mondial et la vie des marins innocents, ciblant les installations de stockage d'armes profondément enfouies, les systèmes de missiles, les lanceurs, les systèmes de défense aérienne et les radars. Les houthis, quant à eux, ont justifié leurs attaques contre le commerce maritime en mer Rouge en tant que soutien aux Palestiniens de Gaza au milieu de la campagne dévastatrice d'Israël, déclenchant des frappes de représailles et exacerbant la violence régionale impliquant des groupes soutenus par l'Iran. La situation a atteint un état critique, avec peu d'optimisme à l'horizon. Alors que le Yémen se débat avec son implication dans les conflits régionaux, l'urgence de trouver une solution durable à sa propre crise n'a jamais été aussi pressante. Ce n'est qu'avec des efforts internationaux concertés, soutenus par un dialogue diplomatique et une aide humanitaire robuste, que le Yémen pourrait espérer sortir de l'ombre de la guerre et tracer un chemin vers un avenir défini par la paix, la stabilité et la prospérité pour sa population longtemps éprouvée.

Najib Mikati incarne un Liban corrompu et à bout de souffle. Le passé et le présent du pays se sont fait avec lui, mais le futur qu’espèrent nombre de libanais ne pourra se réaliser que lorsque Najib Mikati et toute la classe politique qu’il représente seront relégués au musée. De nouveaux visages sur scène sont attendus pour la nouvelle pièce à écrire. < Back Najib Mikati, un milliardaire dans le marécage du Grand Sérail Lubin Parisien September 30, 2024 « Quelles seront vos priorités ? » demande le journaliste du Figaro . « Améliorer la situation économique, réduire la dette publique, défendre le pouvoir d'achat des Libanais et travailler sur les grands chantiers de réforme qui sont en souffrance », énumère le Premier ministre libanais Najib Mikati. Il pourrait faire référence aux priorités de son gouvernement depuis 2021. En réalité, ces réponses sont tirées d’un entretien accordé au Figaro en 2011, quand il est élu Premier Ministre une seconde fois. Durant une décennie, Najib Mikati est à la tête d’un gouvernement qui doit faire face aux mêmes problèmes. L’absence de progrès interroge: pourquoi rien n’a été fait? Najib Mikati, qualifié « d’éternelle roue de secours » par L’Orient - Le Jour , incarne l’immobilisme d’une classe politique versée dans les affaires et profondément inefficace, si ce n’est néfaste. Le 24 Novembre 1955, Najib Mikati voit le jour à Tripoli. Les élites de Tripoli ont pu ainsi jouer le jeu nationamiste syrien avant de rallier la politique libanaise. Dans l’ouvrage collectif Leaders et partisans au Liban , publié en 2012, Bruno Dewailly revient sur les “transformations du leadership tripolitain”. Désormais, avec le mandat français, “la dimension du négoce finit par primer et l’indépendance marque l’instauration d’un libéralisme particulier associant de nouvelles élites foncières et marchandes”. Dans ce contexte, la famille Mikati est une famille de petits notables tripolitains avec une éducation certaine, mais cela n’a rien à voir avec de grandes dynasties de Beyrouth ou de Tripoli comme les Karamé. C’est dans toute cette dynamique qu’il faut comprendre l'ascension des Mikatis. Najib Mikati est diplômé de l’université américaine de Beyrouth. Son ascension commence avec Investcom, une entreprise de télécommunication, fondée avec son frère, Taha Mikati. De 1975 à 1990, la guerre civile fait rage au Liban, les infrastructures de télécommunications tombent comme des dominos. C’est justement cela qui fait la prospérité de Investcom; l’entreprise vend en effet des téléphones satellitaires, et plus tard elle reconstruit un réseau d’infrastructures de télécommunications. Najib Mikati noue des liens privilégiés avec le régime des Assads: quelques semaines après l’accession au pouvoir de Bachar al-Assad, une filiale d’Investcom obtient des concessions pour opérer en Syrie. Mikati s’est aussi fait une place dans le capitalisme mondial, son groupe est coté dans de grandes bourses et est présent dans 10 pays, notamment en Afrique de l’Ouest. En 2006, les frères Mikatis empochent 5 milliards de dollars avec la vente d’Investcom à la compagnie sud-africaine MTN. Néanmoins, en faisant l’acquisition de 6% des actions de MTN , les Mikati ne coupent pas les ponts avec les télécoms. Leurs actifs se diversifient, que ce soit avec l'immobilier, la finance ou avec la mode (Pepe Jeans). Tout cela est regroupé dans une maison-mère, M1 Group, créée en 2007. Ils s’aventurent même dans la presse avec le lancement du site Lebanon 24 en 2011. En 2024, le magazine Forbes évalue la fortune de chacun des frères Mikati à 2,8 milliards de dollars , c’est-à-dire les plus grosses fortunes individuelles recensées par le magazine au Liban. Najib Mikati s’est fait une place dans le monde des affaires libanais et plus largement arabe; ce faisant, il acquiert une place dans un monde inextricablement lié au premier: la politique. De 1998 à 2004, il est ministre des Travaux publics et des Transports. Il officie dans les gouvernements de Rafic Hariri notamment, sans pour autant intégrer le grand parti sunnite des Hariris. La charge ministérielle l’a d’ailleurs « convaincu de la nécessité de ne pas cumuler les charges du ministère et de la députation. » Il gravit néanmoins progressivement les échelons ; il est élu député à Tripoli en 2000 tout en restant ministre. En 2005, l’ex-Premier ministre Rafic Hariri est assassiné dans des conditions troubles. Le pays est en crise, nombreux sont ceux qui dénoncent les ingérences occidentales et surtout l’occupation syrienne. Najib Mikati est alors nommé Premier ministre en avril sur fond de retrait syrien et de révolution populaire. Najib Mikati est une personnalité politique peu connue qui représente l'establishment pro-syrien mais qui a une assise financière mondiale qui le rend légitime aux yeux de la communauté internationale. Son gouvernement comporte des pro et anti-syriens, et pour l’organisation des élections, il fait appel à la communauté internationale: c’est donc un gouvernement consensuel. Il profite de son image en retrait pour apparaître comme une solution de compromis, mais le mandat que lui accorde la classe politique n’est qu’un intérim: « il accepte ce qu’il refuse aujourd’hui [en 2021]: être à la tête d’un gouvernement dont la seule mission est de superviser les élections et le retrait syrien du Liban » selon L’Orient-Le Jour dans une rétrospective de sa carrière politique. En 2011, le Liban est encore en crise . Le gouvernement de Saad Hariri chute. Le Hezbollah affirme sa supériorité militaire et reproche à M. Hariri de ne pas avoir assez fait pression sur le tribunal international sur l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri. Il est soutenu par le Hezbollah, il est parfois même présenté comme le candidat du parti chiite. Le clan Hariri, chassé du Grand Sérail, accuse M. Mikati de trahison contre sa communauté sunnite. Mikati est dès le début en position de funambule: dans un entretien avec Le Figaro en Février 2011, il déclare: « Avant de me soutenir, le Hezbollah m'a certes demandé des engagements, mais j'ai répondu que je ne pouvais pas les assurer. Je ne me suis engagé qu'à une chose envers lui: protéger la résistance. » Les trois enjeux de son gouvernement sont sa propre survie, le redressement de l’économie libanaise exsangue ainsi que d’éviter la propagation de la guerre civile syrienne au Liban. Pour s’attirer les bonnes grâces de la communauté internationale, il dégèle les fonds que le Liban devait allouer au Tribunal enquêtant sur l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri; il le présente comme une initiative personnelle pour ne pas attirer en même temps les foudres du Hezbollah qui craignait des poursuites à son encontre. Le gouvernement chute à cause des dissensions de la coalition autour de l’attitude à adopter vis-à-vis de la guerre civile syrienne : la politique d’équilibrisme de Najib Mikati n’a pas fait long feu. La question de la réforme électorale et du redécoupage des circonscriptions ont finalement raison des lambeaux de la coalition de M. Mikati. Il reste Premier ministre jusqu’en 2013, il exerce l’intérim jusqu’en 2014, jusqu’aux élections législatives repoussées par un Parlement n’ayant pas trouvé d’accord sur ses modalités. En parallèle, le Liban obtient le score peu glorieux de 30 sur l’indice de perception de la corruption en 2013: le pays occupe la 127ème place. Le Gouvernement Mikati n’a pas rétabli la confiance envers le pays et sa classe politique. Il n’a pas attiré le tonnerre sur le Liban, mais il n’a résolu aucun problème et a ainsi laissé le système politique s'encroûter. En 2021, Najib Mikati est de retour dans le Grand Sérail, siège du gouvernement libanais. Le Liban a vécu de grandes manifestations en 2019 contre l’incurie économique du pays. En 2020, l’explosion d’un silo de nitrate d’ammonium dans le port de Beyrouth fait 235 morts et défigure la capitale. Après les échecs de Saad Hariri, Hassan Diab puis Mustapha Adib, c'est Najib Mikati qui est nommé Premier ministre , avec notamment le soutien de la France. Pour rétablir la confiance des bailleurs de fonds internationaux dans le Liban, il doit trouver une solution aux problèmes d’approvisionnement en hydrocarbures et améliorer le sort des 78% de libanais sous le seuil de pauvreté. Son poste de Premier Ministre est remis en jeu début 2022, nombreux sont ceux qui considèrent son gouvernement comme démissionnaire. En juin, il reçoit le mandat du Parlement pour former un nouveau gouvernement, avec 54 voix sur 128 ; il bénéficie du soutien des partis chiites que sont le Hezbollah et Amal, mais les partis chrétiens le rejettent. Le rejet de M. Mikati par les partis chrétiens est d’autant plus vrai quand il faut élire un nouveau président. Le mandat de Michel Aoun expire le 31 octobre 2022. Les relations entre Najib Mikati et Michel Aoun sont notoirement mauvaises, ce qui pourrait être expliqué par leurs parcours opposés: M. Mikati était au gouvernement sous l’occupation syrienne alors que Michel Aoun était en exil en France après s’être opposé à l’intervention de Hafez al-Assad. Avant de quitter le palais présidentiel, Aoun envoie une lettre au Parlement où il nie toute autorité à Najib Mikati, qui avait reçu la confiance du Parlement mais qui n’avait pas encore formé son gouvernement. Il déclare dans un discours qu’en « vertu des pouvoirs que [lui] confère la Constitution, j'ai adressé ce matin une lettre à la Chambre des représentants et j'ai signé le décret de démission du gouvernement. » Néanmoins, si la Présidence n’a pas de titulaire, c’est à M. Mikati de remplir les prérogatives liées à la fonction présidentielle. Il ressort gagnant du bras de fer avec Michel Aoun. Son gouvernement est constitué, mais il est affaibli. Najib Mikati est à la tête du jeu politique libanais en cumulant les prérogatives présidentielles et primo-ministérielles, mais il ne tire pas toutes les ficelles de ce jeu politique. Il n’est que celui qui a le plus réussi à maintenir des voix autour de sa personne. Aujourd’hui, il n’y a toujours pas de Président élu. Autre souci pour M. Mikati, la révélation des bénéfices qu’il a retirés de biens mal acquis, notamment avec les Pandora Papers en 2021. Il est accusé d’avoir détourné, par l’intermédiaire de sociétés-écrans, un prêt accordé à M1 Group par la Banque du Liban— entre 2010 et 2013 alors qu’il était Premier ministre—pour acquérir un patrimoine immobilier personnel à Monaco et en Côte d’Azur. En Avril 2024, l’ONG Sherpa et le Collectif des Victimes des Pratiques Frauduleuses et Criminelles au Liban ont porté plainte en France auprès du PNF (Parquet National Financier). Ces transactions malhonnêtes se seraient faites avec la complicité de Riad Salamé, ancien directeur omnipotent de la Banque du Liban, arrêté en septembre 2024 pour corruption et détournement de fonds. Enfin, M. Mikati est aujourd’hui à la tête d’un Liban au bord de la guerre, après le 7 octobre 2023 et avec des échanges de roquettes réguliers entre le Hezbollah et l’Etat hébreu. Alors qu’Israël a frappé Beyrouth-Sud en août et que de nouvelles frappes encore plus meurtrières ont été initié le 23 septembre, le gouvernement semble dépossédé de l’exercice de la souveraineté de l’Etat libanais, État bien souvent oublié quand on parle de la possible guerre au Liban. M. Mikati est spectateur de la géopolitique régionale. Ses initiatives sont convenues et reprennent peu ou prou les mêmes idées que celles défendues par les chancelleries occidentales. Le rôle de Najib Mikati, qui a des ministres du Hezbollah dans son gouvernement, est sans doute de maintenir et de geler le jeu politique libanais pendant que le Hezbollah, l’Iran et Israël mènent un jeu autrement plus dangereux et déterminant pour l’avenir du Liban. Najib Mikati est partout et nulle part à la fois. Son évanescence lui a permis de naviguer dans toutes les ramifications du marécage politique libanais, et il a su maintenir un État libanais lors de grandes crises comme celle d’aujourd’hui. Il a surtout maintenu les iniquités décriées par la population et qui gangrènent la politique libanaise: Najib Mikati incarne un Liban corrompu et à bout de souffle. Le passé et le présent du pays se sont fait avec lui, mais le futur qu’espèrent nombre de libanais ne pourra se réaliser que lorsque Najib Mikati et toute la classe politique qu’il représente seront relégués au musée. De nouveaux visages sur scène sont attendus pour la nouvelle pièce à écrire.

Welcome back, fellow eaters! Last month, I promised you exciting traditional recipes that are quick, easy to make and delicious. Today, I shall fulfill my pledge. Let us celebrate Lebanese independence, acquired on Nov. 22, 1943, with two meals prepared straight from my grandma's kitchen, who, like her fellow Arab grandmothers, does not joke when it comes to food! < Back Whipping Up Lebanese Dishes Has Never Been Easier By Angela Saab Saade November 30, 2022 Welcome back, fellow eaters! Last month, I promised you exciting traditional recipes that are quick, easy to make and delicious. Today, I shall fulfill my pledge. Let us celebrate Lebanese independence, acquired on Nov. 22, 1943, with two meals prepared straight from my grandma’s kitchen, who, like her fellow Arab grandmothers, does not joke when it comes to food! Essential kitchen appliances: One medium or large pot Strainer Knife Wooden spoon Cup (for measuring purposes) Ladle (for serving purposes) “Mdardara” مدردرا Also known as mujaddara in other colloquial Arabic dialects, such as Syrian Arabic, “mdardara” has been one of my favorite meals, especially after transferring to a more vegetarian diet. “Mdardara” is a protein-dense plant-based meal that is convenient to prepare, and it involves lots of lentils, one of my favorite ingredients to cook with (after corn, obviously). Ingredients: One cup of lentils Half a cup of rice Two cups of water One big (or two medium-sized) yellow onion Two tablespoons of olive oil Salt Pepper and curcuma (optional) Recipe: Soak the rice and lentils together in water for 10-20 minutes. Meanwhile, chop your onion into cubes. Add a tablespoon of olive oil in the pot and place it on the stove over low-medium heat. Add the chopped onion cubes and occasionally stir for five to ten minutes. The goal is for the low heat to facilitate an onion-sweating process which should render them slightly translucent. Once your onion is ready, strain the rice and lentils and add them to the pot. Put another tablespoon of olive oil in the pot with the onion, rice and lentils and sprinkle some salt, pepper and cumin to taste. Stir all ingredients together, add two cups of water and bring to a boil. Once the water reaches boiling point, reduce the heat to low, and allow everything to cook slowly. Do not cover the pot or stir the ingredients! Check up on your “mdardara” every few minutes. Once the water is absorbed, give it a taste test and either add some water if the lentils and rice are not fully cooked or turn the heat off. “Mdardara” may be consumed on its own — cold or warm, and it may also be served with your choice of salad or “laban,” a fermented dairy product that I am obsessed with. Sadly, it is unavailable in the stores of Menton. For a “laban” alternative, you can use plain kefir or greek yogurt with a dash of olive oil and salt. “Rishta” رشتا Aside from meaning marriage proposals in Urdu and Hindi, “rishta” also refers to my grandma’s favorite childhood meal, which makes it very dear to my heart. I only learned about it recently over the autumn break, which was the perfect timing for me to be able to share it with you! Is that not truly heartwarming? I can certainly feel our beautiful friendship blossoming with every passing Menton Times Issue. A fellow Sciences Piste brought to my attention that “rishta” is similar to a traditional Italian dish — Pasta e lenticchie. Like its antecedent, “rishta” includes a healthy dose of lentils. Ingredients: One cup of lentils One-two cups of spaghetti (I use tagliatelle, but any kind of pasta works) Six cups of water One large (or two medium-sized) yellow onion One large (or two medium-sized) red onion Two cloves of garlic (or more or less, based on preference) Half a lemon or two to three tablespoons of lemon juice Olive oil Salt Pepper and cumin (optional) One bunch of cilantro leaves (optional) Vegetable broth (optional) Recipe Soak the lentils in water for 10-20 minutes Meanwhile, chop your onions into slices and press two cloves of garlic. Add a tablespoon of olive oil to the pot and place it on the stove over low-medium heat. Add the chopped onion cubes and occasionally stir for five to 10 minutes. Allow them to sweat and transform into slices of translucent joy. Once your onion cubes are ready, strain the lentils and add them to the pot. Add another tablespoon of olive oil, and sprinkle some salt, pepper and cumin to taste. Stir all ingredients together, add six cups of water, and keep the temperature high. You may add less water, depending on the end-result texture you want. The less water, the less soup-like the “rishta” will be. You may also add vegetable broth and cilantro leaves for additional flavor. Once the water begins to boil, bring the heat to a low so that everything slowly cooks. Once the lentils are fairly cooked, in about ten-fifteen minutes, break up about a cup or two of spaghetti and put them into the pot. Depending on personal preference and the desired lentil-pasta ratio, more or less spaghetti may be added. You might also have to add more water to cook the pasta if the lentils have already absorbed too much of it. Once the pasta is cooked, turn the heat off. Estimated Price Calculations: Aldi sells five hundred grams of raw lentils for under one and a half euros. This means that a cup of lentils, equivalent to roughly two hundred and fifty grams, costs between half and two-thirds of a euro. Slightly cheaper calculations apply to rice purchased from any of the three big stores, making our rice costs equivalent to about a quarter to half a euro. As for the pasta, the relative quantity used prices under half a euro. The onion(s), olive oil and salt should not amount to more than one and a half to two euros, making each of the aforementioned meals cost under three euros for quantities yielding two to three servings! Fellow eaters, whether my favorite meal or my grandma’s seems more tasteful to you, I hope you give at least one of them a try. It is not common to find traditional Lebanese recipes that do not require long hours of preparation, so I encourage you to seize the opportunity. If any questions or comments should arise in your Lebanese cooking journeys, do not hesitate to contact me or the Google search engine, preferably). Next month, we shall draw inspiration from holiday joy and prepare sweet treats adequate for our seasonal celebrations. Until then, eat up and sahtein !

Tunisian President Kais Saeid released a new constitution. How is it different from the 2014 Constitution and what are the political consequences? < Back The Tunisian Constitution, or Kais Saeid’s Constitution? By Luca Utterwulghe October 31, 2022 Tunisia’s 2014 constitution has been hailed as one of the Middle East and North Africa region’s most progressive. A product of the multi-stakeholder process led by the Quartet du Dialogue National during the post-uprising period, the Constitution exhibits, aside from its praised commitments to “liberal” values, a strong system of checks on power between the three branches of government. However, recent political developments are challenging the foundational principles — compromise, pluralism and multi-polarity — of this (literally) revolutionary document. Tunisian President Kais Saied’s momentous consolidation of power, beginning with his move to terminate Parliament on July 26, 2021, and subsequent decision to fire Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi, was situated in the broader context of Tunisian political dysfunctionality and economic crisis. Kousai Ghrimil, a Tunisian 1A student, expresses his support for this measure: “One of the things it does… is weakening Ennahda , which is the leading Islamist party … that party has caused a lot of destruction and a lot of issues in the country ever since the revolution.” As a manifestation of his endeavor to restructure Tunisia’s political system, Saied released a draft constitution — crafted by a small group of ‘handpicked’ architects — in late June 2021. The Saeid administration released an online consultation survey which, in theory, offered citizens a platform to share their thoughts on the document’s fundamental elements, although only 10 percent of citizens were eligible to respond. Ghrimil suggests that the constitutional formation process was legitimate because President Kais Saeid “does have the right to call for a new constitution.” A referendum on the proposed constitution was held on July 25, 2022; the state’s Independent High Authority for Elections reported that 95 percent of voters ( only 30.5 percent of the eligible population) voted “yes” for Saied’s proposed document. These numbers bring into question the extent to which the new Tunisian Constitution of 2022 was formed through a legitimate, genuine “constituent power” or whether the nation is transitioning into a “façade democracy.” How is the 2022 Constitution different from the post-revolution 2014 one? Article 101 of the 2022 Constitution gives the President the power to appoint the “Chef du Gouvernement” (Prime Minister) and “les autres membres du gouvernement” (cabinet ministers); the 2014 Constitution reserved this power for the Parliament. Moreover, Article 102 authorizes the President to dissolve the Parliament at his wish, further demonstrating the constitutional shift to a more powerful executive. In a direct effort to undermine parliamentary primacy in lawmaking, Article 68 of the 2022 Constitution grants the President the ability to propose statutes to Parliament which are granted “la priorité” (priority) over Parliamentary proposals. Additionally, Article 110 explicitly states that the President “bénéficie de l’immunité durant son mandat présidentiel” (benefits from immunity during his presidential mandate), fundamentally limiting criticism and formal checks on the executive’s power. Ghrimil has mixed sentiments on the 2022 Constitution: he supports adjustments that will place more importance on the national popular vote. Still, he struggles with the Constitution’s commitment to advance Islamic principles, for Tunisia is “a secular country and this takes us a step backward.” On the contrary, he “wish[es] that the constitution would have mentioned the Jewish minority, the Christian minority,” as this is a symbol of Tunisia’s diversity. Evidently, President Kais Saeid is spearheading a significant constitutional and political restructuring of the Tunisian system. In light of an economic crisis and growing disillusionment towards the political system, how will these changes shift the relations between the Tunisian people and the government? It will be essential to keep a close eye on the parliamentary elections in December of 2022 as they may reflect the developing political sentiment in the country.