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Despite a few hiccups and more than a few drunk incidents, the ski trip was a tremendous success. Sciences Pistes faced their fears on the mountain, and they are stronger for it. Going into the second semester of the year, there is undoubtedly a tighter connection between us than ever before < Back Menton à Risoul: Sciences Pistes Spend Last Week of Break at Annual BDS Ski Trip By Hugo Lagergren February 28, 2023 We all know that sports are not what Sciences Po prides itself on, and neither is the Menton campus famed for its sporting performances at the annual intercampus Minicrit competition. However, this has not stopped the Bureau Des Sports (BDS) from outperforming itself at every opportunity this school year. They managed to collect over 2000 euros for the League Against Cancer for Pink October, nearly triple what they managed last year. Thanks to their apt negotiation skills, the bureau received sports equipment for each campus team for the first time in Sciences Po Menton history. And for their final trick… send nearly 100 students to the Alps for a five-day skiing holiday before the beginning of term — a feat that they executed perfectly. On Monday morning, Sciences Pistes woke up early, eager to board the bus. The journey from the pebbly beaches of the Côte D’Àzur to the snowy tips of the French Alps began… and continued. After a few festive hours, the “are we there yet?” calls began in earnest. For eight hours, they persisted. A little downtrodden, we finally arrived in Risoul and checked into our rooms at “Yoonly & Friends” — well, at least those of us who managed to make it down the infamous icy steps. After a complicated check-in and a well-needed night’s rest, we were finally ready to begin exploring. Being super excited to start skiing, we all woke up early to pick up our skis from the local rental shop and collect our ski passes. Many of the group had never seen snow, let alone set foot on a ski slope, so there was some understandable apprehension among a few, especially after seeing second-year Ilyes Mesbah and first-year Nael El Kihal bombing down the slopes at uncontrollable speeds. Their speed and elegance, unfortunately, inspired second-year Lilou D’Inca, who, according to her, had not set foot on a pair of skis “for over ten years” to throw herself a little too enthusiastically down her first hill. After multiple barrel rolls and a torn ligament, the medical team managed to get D’Inca down the slope in one piece. Her ski holiday was promptly over. We hope our beloved cheer captain will recover quickly and bring home the Minicrit. The rest of the group remained in good spirits as we sat down for lunch beside the slopes. It did not take long for the initial groups of flatmates and friends to dissolve. Almost immediately, 1A’s and 2A’s were becoming more comfortable skiing with one another. What was so brilliant about the ski trip was not the skiing or the parties; it was its ability to bring us all together. “The ski trip really brought us closer together,” comments co-president of Bureau Des Sports, Romain Dufournet. “Five days of holiday all together is obviously going to be packed with emotion. I think constantly being around each other and talking to each other and just living in the moment outside the context of Menton and Sciences Po allowed us to create stronger bonds.” After skiing, we were treated to some first-class DJing by DJMiketrackz at ”La Grotte du Yéti.” It might have been a ski trip, but it did not stop the Ummah from partying like it always does. The Après-Ski was a highlight. Beer in hand, the snowy outdoor party embodied the Mentonnais saying: “no stress, success.” It was a moment for everyone to relax and decompress before the work kicked in a few days later. The parties often continued well into the night, with Sciences Pistes getting to bed at times that could only make Mme. la directrice Yasmina Touaibia proud. This resulted in exceptionally slow mornings. However, the enthusiasm never waned. Despite a few hiccups and more than a few drunk incidents, the ski trip was a tremendous success. Sciences Pistes faced their fears on the mountain, and they are stronger for it. Going into the second semester of the year, we have a tighter connection than ever. As the monotony of essay writing and unanswered emails set in, I would just like to leave the reader with a notion that is important to keep in mind going into semester two, as it highlights the campus’ ability to surpass all expectations despite the adversary we face: Samy, c’est un mec du R.

Mentoniya, on behalf of the Menton Times, I thank you for your readership and a successful first year together. The trials and tribulations of just one year at Sciences Po have filled the pages of our newspaper with fresh opinions, breaking news, sparkling student features, and insightful coverage of sporting events and local arts. < Back The Menton Times: A Year in Review By Celeste Abourjeili April 30, 2022 Mentoniya, Mentoniya. Last summer, I was struck with a vision for a newspaper that would synthesize campus discourse and bring all student events together in one collective monthly recount. Though I was committed to bringing it to life, I never foresaw the scope or size that it would reach in just one year. Mentoniya, on behalf of the Menton Times, I thank you for your readership and a successful first year together. The trials and tribulations of just one year at Sciences Po have filled the pages of our newspaper with fresh opinions, breaking news, sparkling student features, and insightful coverage of sporting events and local arts. The journey of creating a newspaper from scratch was filled with the unexpected — it was a turbulent yet irreplaceable experience. I got to watch our designer and my dear friend, 2A Ada Baser, create a layout template from scratch. She pieced together over 30 articles worth of content into one digital masterpiece each and every month. “Starting the design of a paper from scratch wasn’t the easiest experience… [but] at the end of the day, it’s been a pleasure to work with the many different members of the team, because designers need to communicate with reporters, photographers, and the editorial board,” said Baser. “I hope I have been able to bring their amazing works to life.” Her clean-cut designs have been praised by Mentonese students. “I really like the mise-en-page,” said 1A Amira Zargouni, “it’s really easy to read.” Our editorial team, made up of 1A Ayse Lara Selcuker, 1A Lara-Nour Walton, 2A Morgane Abbas, and myself, has had to edit just as many articles to fulfill our three-step editing process. “Editing felt special to me because journalism has been a really formative source for me,” said Walton. “To make this newspaper a reality was genuinely so fulfilling.” My role as Editor-in-Chief, besides managing and organizing the team, consisted of a wondrous albeit time-consuming process by which I had to review each article that was ever published. I knew that I was collecting stories from the students, combining them in one collective and polished form, and sending them back to the student body for all to read, and I wanted to do them justice. I grasped the significance of my job in qualifying the words our students were entrusting to the paper to send out to the world. Our photography team, led by 1A Hugo Lagergren and composed of 1A Emilia Kohlmeyer and 2A Wang Di, has brought each and every story to life with its talent and eye for the camera. “ The staff reporters and guest reporters, without whom this paper would not exist, made the decision to share their stories with us and with you — a decision for which we are endlessly grateful. “Writing for the Menton Times has been incredible! I joined the team with little writing experience, but I saw my skills improve through the feedback and support of our editors, and my articles allowed me to further immerse myself in the topics I am most passionate about,” said 1A Magdelena Offenbeck. Over the course of one year, we have worked with a team of about 20 people and around 39 guest writers. We wrote articles in collaboration with a variety of associations, ranging from Sciences Alcoolémiques to the Stone Skipping Society to the BDS to Babel, MEDMUN, TedX, Environnementon, and the list goes on. 2A Isabella Aouad, who contributed to the newspaper as a guest reporter, noted, “It was very impressive how, in one year, the Menton Times became a real thing. It was very consistent and rigorous and featured really high quality articles.” 1A Joudi Arafa, who claimed she was proud to contribute as a guest reporter, affirmed, “The Menton Times is a big campus name.” I’m proud of our team for creating a shared vision out of what started as a small idea. The process behind the paper starts with our monthly meetings, which take on the form of a team brainstorming session, to choose article topics for that month’s issue. “I really enjoyed the flexibility of choosing my topics instead of having them assigned,” said 1A staff reporter Luca Utterwulghe. I’ve always trusted our writers with the topics they chose, and I was ecstatic that they matched my trust with passion and motivation for the job. Besides our partnerships and guest articles, we try to include everyone on the campus by including student quotes and opinions in each article. “It’s fun interviewing people to get quotes for my articles,” said Utterwulghe, “I learned a lot from this past year at the Menton Times.” I am grateful to you, Mentoniya, for electing our association to be an official student initiative this past semester, opening up doors of opportunity for us with your trust. With the exception of the godforsaken month of February, we upheld our promise to you to publish each and every month. For the first year, our 7-1 success rate makes me quite proud. I recognize that our process wasn’t perfect. This was just the start of an association that I hope will live on for years after my departure. I believe in the future leaders of the association to not only enhance our process, but establish additional projects and events to make campus life even more robust. I am proud to announce that the association will be carried on by Lara-Nour Walton as Editor-in-Chief, Magdalena Offenbeck as Managing Editor, Hugo Lagergren as Head of Photography. I originally intended for the Menton Times to be a route for students to be heard by their peers, an opportunity for one to collect their thoughts before making them public, and to bring attention to a particular experience or event. It was supposed to serve as a chance to create change in our small, cozy Mentonese ummah. My goal, above all, was to bring students closer together. In my original “Letter from the Editor” in our very first issue, I wrote that journalism is a pillar of democracy, a chance to touch the hearts and minds of those around us and change the course of history for the better. Here in Menton, I hope we’ve done that on a personal level — if nothing else, I hope we’ve helped you better understand and resonate with the going-ons of our little community. I hope we’ve informed you. Thank you for your attention, and for the last time this year, happy reading! Sincerely and with love, Celeste Abourjeili Founder & Editor-in-Chief Menton Times 2021-2022

“I just want you to be happy.” At first glance, a wishful statement, a hopeful idea. But is this a burdensome phrase, a phrase pregnant with confusion and obsession? I don’t think I understand what happiness means. < Back A Happiness Hypothesis By Rosie Betrosian April 30, 2024 “I just want you to be happy.” At first glance, a wishful statement, a hopeful idea. But is this a burdensome phrase, a phrase pregnant with confusion and obsession? I don’t think I understand what happiness means. Is happiness a simple idea? Is happiness an ultimate goal, or is happiness momentary? So much empty language surrounds happiness: "Happiness is in the little things.” “Don’t worry, be happy.” But these phrases that permeate our lives are nothing but moot, hollow ideas, confusing and irritating—at least to me. I realize that the concept of happiness occupies a lot of time and space in my mind; thoughts about how to make my decisions. I know I am not the only one. To debunk the happiness hypothesis, I asked 13 people to give me their ideas on happiness. What is happiness? Is “happiness closing your eyes and not feeling heavy” or is “happiness accepting the cards that you are dealt with”? Does one include the other? In our discussions, two contrasting ideas arose. The first one describes happiness as a state, being free of negative emotions and stress, a peaceful moment. The second designates happiness as a purpose, a goal, or “something to strive for,” and “happiness as a goal and not something that necessarily exists.” Is happiness the absence of something else? What do you feel when you feel happy? Is happiness a feeling that can be described? What is happiness in its being? Is it a feeling? In the hardest attempt to delineate happiness, we all struggle. It’s already hard to describe a feeling; that being said, it is a feeling that is heavily discussed and rings in our ears from day one. We couldn’t conclude if happiness is the absence of something else. Some argued yes, happiness is peace, a mere absence of anything negative, mostly pertaining to imminent stress or anxiety. Others objected, claiming that happiness is its own thing, a feeling most closely related to something warm, “a sunny day,” “a conversation with a friend,” or even happiness is ontologically fragile and is solely construed as a goal. Do you think some people are incapable of finding happiness? Even though happiness is complex and misunderstood, all participants agreed that its subjectivity renders it accessible to all. Everybody agrees that happiness is so personal that it can be perceived in different ways and personalized to a maximum. However, what is the relation of happiness to external stimuli? Is happiness purely based on perception? Thinking of the sun, most people feel happy. So, do we have the power of perception over external stimuli, or is it solely dependent on our perception? Given the example of the sun as a predator in Camus’s “L’etranger,” we thought of the associations of things, their value, and the ideas we ascribe to them. The sun can be seen as a happiness indicator, an etch to spend the day outside, but according to most participants, the sun can turn into a predator depending on pre-existing emotions. If stress is preoccupying one’s mind, then the sun is an annoyance. One participant even mentioned that it depends on familiarity and comfort with external stimuli. The sun is as comforting and happy as you understand it to be. Rain in a rainy place is comforting, as it is understood as normality, associated with a blanket and a hot beverage. Does happiness transcend time? When you think about happy memories, do they remain happy? “Eating ice cream with my sister under the sun” will always be a happy memory in my mind. But is this pure happiness, or is it amalgamated with sadness, worry, and other negative emotions? I understand that happiness is not pure bliss, but how can you be sad and happy at the same time? I understand that it is not the same for everyone, and a happy moment that has passed for some remains happy and only reminisced in a positive light. What about nostalgia? Nostalgia, denoted by homesickness (nostos, i.e., return to home, and algos, i.e., acute pain), is something we probably all experienced. So how can happiness transcend time if it's thinking about something that is lost and can never be relived? Some claim nostalgia is unrelated to happiness, rather its own concept, even if it can be bittersweet. One interpreted nostalgia through the lens of ‘Saudade, in Portuguese,’ described by sadness for missing but happiness for feeling, arguing that happiness transcends time and the longing for a moment, is followed by happiness for the existence of the moment in itself. Nostalgia can be both happiness and unhappiness. Happiness can be tailored; happiness is experienced differently. In the end, as arduous as it is to find happiness on your own, it's the only way. There cannot be a collective happiness hypothesis. Thank you to all participants, this article would not be possible without you! Thanks to Ecesu, Nela, Aysenaz, Marly, Saskia, Louis, Lola, Chams, Juni, Tommi, Pedro, Greg, and Mahmoud.

< Back Setting Precedents – Greece’s LGBTQ+ Rights Triumph and France’s Landmark for Abortion Rights By Maria Eirini Liodi March 31, 2024 Cause for celebration comes in the past months, as Greece became the first Orthodox Christian-majority country to legalize same-sex marriage and France enshrined the right to abortion within its constitution. Amid tense discussions on upcoming U.S. elections, multiple ongoing conflicts, and protests of all sorts recently setting central Europe ablaze, perhaps a moment of appreciation for these two recent ‘wins’ could be uplifting. On February 15, 2024, following months of deliberation, Greece emerged as a triumphant example of LGBTQ+ representation within the Southern European region. Despite opposition from the Orthodox Church and members of the political right, the measure was passed by the parliament with 176 voting in favor and 76 against, legalizing same-sex marriage and granting same-sex couples’ adoption rights as well. Granting the right to marriage translates into recognizing LGBTQ+ couples and children's rights on an equal footing within their familial structure. For those who remained unconvinced as to why equal marriage rights are important, various studies conducted over the years support the reality. One such example published in the National Library of Medicine, indicates that same-sex marriage constitutes an issue of public health, delineating clearly that: “ Being in a legally recognized same-sex relationship, marriage in particular, appeared to diminish mental health differentials between heterosexuals and lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons (in the study). ” Greece has been one of the relatively liberal countries on LGBTQ+ rights in Southern Europe, considering homosexuality had long been decriminalized in 1951, and same-sex civil unions were legalized in 2015. However, given the persisting tragedies of hate crimes against members of the LGBTQ+ community, it is important to keep striving for equal rights and protection for all the country’s citizens. As notably stated by the country’s Prime Minister on X, this moment is “a milestone for human rights” in Greece. As the 16th European Union country to legalize same-sex unions, following Estonia earlier in January of this year, Greece can serve as a precedent for other countries in the region that beyond civil unions, remain more conservative on the matter. Across the continent, France marked its own historic milestone on March 4, 2024, shifting the global narrative toward progressive social change. France has become the first country to enshrine the right to abortion within their constitutional framework. Why is this significant, given that abortion has been legalized since 1975 in France? Ensuing the U.S. Supreme Court’s disruptive downturn in deciding to overturn Roe v. Wade, activists both within the U.S. and elsewhere around the world have responded in an uproar. As of January of this year, twenty-one states prohibit abortion or restrict the procedure to earlier in the pregnancy than the standards set by Roe v. Wade. Women with pregnancy complications or subjects of rape still have to illegally or unsafely deal with this issue. Abortion is a human rights issue, and France has made it clear that “guaranteed freedom” to abortion is vital. In celebration, the Eiffel Tower was lit up with the words “ mon corps mon choix”, my body my choice, clearly delineating the stance the country has taken and continues to take for women. There have been debates on why Macron’s government decided to enshrine this right within the constitution, considering the pre-existing laws safeguarding abortion in France. Is this merely a political stunt? An effort to win popular support? Whatever the case on this front, one thing remains steadfast – laws can change. Putting this right within its constitution, France is providing a long-term safeguard for its women today, tomorrow and for future generations. This step serves as a statement; one which can be an important example for other nations, especially during an era where certain countries are facing regressive shifts in reproductive policies. By codifying this essential freedom, France is challenging deeply ingrained patriarchal structures – after all, what does a state say to its female citizens today if it does not permit them bodily autonomy and protection? Amid grim news feeds, Greece and France shed light on a progressive path toward more equitable societies. Let’s hope these victories resonate globally, prompting policy change toward acceptance and autonomy.

< Back Turbulent Tensions: What’s Going on Over Russia? Pracheth Sanka January 31, 2025 Dec. 25, 2024: Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243, en route from Baku, Azerbaijan to Grozny, Chechnya, inexplicably crashed near Aktau, Kazakhstan, on the other side of the Caspian Sea. The intended flight path, a regularly scheduled trip, was a near-straight shot north towards Grozny, passing over parts of the Caspian Sea before entering Russian airspace over Makhachkala, Dagestan. However, the flight veered east towards Kazakhstan, severely changing altitude and losing GPS service before its fated descent. The crash killed 38 onboard, including both pilots, and left 29 survivors. Early reports by Russian and Azerbaijani aviation authorities supposed that foggy weather conditions could have been a factor in why the flight diverted toward Aktau, but this gave no explanation for why the flight crashed. Rosaviatsiya, the Russian aviation agency, proposed that a flock of birds may have been to blame for the incident. While these initial predictions indicated that the plane malfunctioned due to unfortunate natural occurrences, the suspected truth is less tame. Shortly after the incident, Azerbaijan Airlines announced that “external interference” was a factor in the flight's demise. Survivors recalled hearing multiple loud bangs as the flight approached Grozny and the flight’s GPS was jammed as it entered Russia, leading to speculation that Russian military operations were to blame for the disaster. Though nearly a thousand kilometers away from the frontline, Ukraine has conducted drone strikes as far as Chechnya as part of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war . Azerbaijani investigators believe that Russian missiles mistakenly struck down the plane as part of anti-drone operations. Rosaviastsiya also announced that Ukrainian drone strikes had been launched in Grozny before Flight 8243 took off, further providing evidence that the Russian military could have caused the crash. Azerbaijan's President, Ilham Aliyev, placed full blame on Russia, asking Russian President Vladimir Putin to admit guilt and offer compensation to the victims. Despite Aliyev’s pressure, which came with Western support , Putin refused to accept responsibility for the tragedy, only providing his condolences to the victims and those affected. This was not the first instance of a suspicious aviation disaster taking place over Russia. Russian airspace has long been plagued with cases of mysterious crashes and downed airplanes, such as Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 and the 2023 Wagner Group plane crash, which killed Russian rebel and paramilitary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin. The Kremlin’s failure to cooperate in international investigations into these incidents, and their further refusal to accept any responsibility, point to their sinister involvement in some of aviation’s worst crashes. Flight MH17, which was en route from Amsterdam, Netherlands to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, crashed over eastern Ukraine in July of 2014, killing all 298 passengers and crew on board. Russia-allied Ukrainian separatists shot down the plane during the war in Donbas, which was part of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war. An international investigation headed by the Netherlands found that the separatists used Russian-owned missiles to bring down the flight. The same investigation prosecuted four individuals related to the incident, ultimately finding three guilty of the murders of the 298 killed. However, the Kremlin refuses to hand over the three men and continues to deny any involvement in the downing of the plane. Further probing by Dutch officials found that Putin may have even approved the funding and supply of the missiles used by the separatist forces, further implicating his involvement in the crash. While Dutch officials admitted that their evidence was insufficient for a proper conclusion, there were strong indications that Putin taking action may have led to the fate of Flight MH17. Russia’s refusal to cooperate with international prosecutors and investigators permits a shadow of feigned innocence, a way for them to remain devoid of responsibility in the space of international relations, despite the implicit understanding that Putin and the Kremlin bear culpability for their actions. Take Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death in August of 2023, which took place two months after his failed mutiny against the Russian Ministry of Defense. Prigozhin, a once-close ally of Putin and leader of the private military Wagner Group, perished in a private plane crash north of Moscow, killing all passengers on board. Like the Azerbaijan Airlines crash, investigators noted that there was external interference at play and grenade fragments were found in the bodies of the victims, indicating foul play. Putin, who was open to an internal investigation, rejected outside help from the Brazilian company that manufactured the plane, while also dismissing claims that it was an assassination attempt on his behalf. A targeted attack on Prigozhin—who at the time was seen as an enemy of the state—would not be new to the Kremlin. Russian oligarchs and businessmen who oppose the regime have famously died in suspicious circumstances, like falling out of hotel room windows or suffering heart attacks; popular Russian dissident Alexei Navalny suddenly died while serving time in an arctic corrective prison colony, in what may have been a targeted poisoning . It is not below the Putin regime to have assassinated Prigozhin, or at the very least, had some suspect connection to his death. Russia’s failure, like in their other aviation ‘accidents’, to transparently investigate the incident highlights their aversion to culpability and responsibility, despite the rest of the world seeming to see past the Kremlin’s facade. Perhaps Putin truly believes that he has done no wrong, and it could be that these accidents were truly just that: accidents. Or maybe he knows that as long as these disasters take place within his borders, no one can fully know what he has or has not done. Whatever the case may be, the world has become wary of wandering in Russian air. The European Union’s aviation agency has warned all non-European airlines to avoid flying over Western Russia and to avoid being unintentionally—or intentionally—targeted by Russian defense systems. As the war wages on, and Putin’s power is checked, both externally and internally, flying into Russian airspace seems to be an increasingly dangerous venture. Airlines should heed the ominous warnings of their fated predecessors and avoid the tragedy of a downed flight. Photo credits: Wikicommons

< Back Menton Hosts the 89th Edition of the Lemon Festival By Catarina Vita March 31, 2023 From Feb. 11 to 26, our once-deserted “lemon town” became packed with tourists from all over the world to attend Menton’s renowned Fête du Citron. Composed of parades (called corsos) from the train station to Place St. Roch, endless lemon-themed souvenirs and even 30-euro NFTs on sale , Menton’s Lemon Festival brought over 250,000 people to the small town . To Menton’s economy and tourism, this annualfestivity is crucial. The 89th edition of the Fête du Citron was themed rock and opera, with the mascot being John Lemon — a pun for John Lennon, the famous member of the Beatles and rock singer. The majestic lemon structures at Jardin Biovès all resemble rock and opera singers, and every Thursday during the festival, a parade stopped the city and displayed even more lemon-made structures and rock and opera music. According to Marinella Giardina, the tourism assistant to the mayor of Menton, in an interview with France Bleu , “a rock lemon is a lemon filled with vitamins and bananas and invites you to bite into life with certainty.” With this statement, Giardina means that the 89th Fête du Citron and its symbolic lemon will not be bitter but sweet and inviting to participate in. It is no exaggeration that the weekly corsos during the Lemon Festival paralyzed Menton. Mayor Yves Juhel, speaking to France3 Provence-Alpes-Côte-D’Azur , confirmed that over 100,000 people bought tickets to watch the festival. These presentations ended at 23:15, and since the trains back to other cities in the Côte D’Azur line end not long after 21:00, the Mayor encouraged bus networks to supplement train services. In 1896, the first edition of the Fête du Citron began. Hotel workers suggested a parade to draw visitors to Menton during the wintertime. This idea attracted not only high-profile visitors, such as Queen Victoria but the citizens of Menton as well. From 1896 to 1929, the parade continued, but without the famous citron as its main character. As 1929 approached, Menton led the production of lemons in the region, and hotel workers from Hotel Riviera organized a parade of citrus flowers and fruits throughout Menton. In 1934, the Fête du Citron became an annual tradition. It is undeniable that the festival is crucial for the Mentonese economy. According to BFM Côte D’Azur , a local Italian shop and restaurant, Pasta Piemonte, which sells ravioli with Menton lemon filling, reported selling eighty kilos of their delicacy. The shop owner also said that their orders are concentrated on corso days, especially because their location is close to Jardin Biovès, and hence close to the lemon-made statues. A local hotel was also reported to have a 100% occupancy rate during the Fête du Citron. Tutti Frutti, a Michelin-starred ice cream parlor, was closed in Menton since late October, and reopened due to the Lemon Festival, which has brought in massive queues. Frank Devergranne, interviewed by France3 Provence-Alpes-Côte-D’Azur as a member of the Menton’s hôteliers union, reported an approximate 50% growth in hotel performance. He also considered the economic concern for hotel workers in Menton during quarantine and winter time and how this year’s Fête du Citron was “a big gulp of oxygen” for their revenues. Small touristic train-like cars circulate Menton during the day times of the Lemon Festival, which gives temporary driving jobs to people in need. The promotion of dance, music and art for workers in the creative field is highlighted in the Lemon Festival, which makes the event a valuable opportunity for those working in the industry. Considering the passion the Mentonese government and the Côte D’Azur has for the annual Fête du Citron, the theme for its 90th edition is already established: the Olympics from ancient history to the present. The year 2024 will also be when Paris hosts the Olympic games, which will only further bolster French tourism. Nonetheless, the surface area of Menton is a humble 14.05 kilometers squared, and harboring more than 250,000 people is challenging, especially with its infinite staircases and narrow streets. For future events to come, the city is hopeful that the Mentonese government considers this factor and develops strategies to prevent the city from overcrowding. Obvious environmental factors come with the Fête du Citron, such as tourists polluting the streets and wasting food and material. As the Festival comes to an end, lemon peels and paper confetti are found scattered in the Basilica stairs and in the Mentonese narrow streets. To make this event even more prosperous for Menton itself and its citizens’ well-being, the government can deliberate strategies for the sustainability of the Lemon Festival.

Najib Mikati incarne un Liban corrompu et à bout de souffle. Le passé et le présent du pays se sont fait avec lui, mais le futur qu’espèrent nombre de libanais ne pourra se réaliser que lorsque Najib Mikati et toute la classe politique qu’il représente seront relégués au musée. De nouveaux visages sur scène sont attendus pour la nouvelle pièce à écrire. < Back Najib Mikati, un milliardaire dans le marécage du Grand Sérail Lubin Parisien September 30, 2024 « Quelles seront vos priorités ? » demande le journaliste du Figaro . « Améliorer la situation économique, réduire la dette publique, défendre le pouvoir d'achat des Libanais et travailler sur les grands chantiers de réforme qui sont en souffrance », énumère le Premier ministre libanais Najib Mikati. Il pourrait faire référence aux priorités de son gouvernement depuis 2021. En réalité, ces réponses sont tirées d’un entretien accordé au Figaro en 2011, quand il est élu Premier Ministre une seconde fois. Durant une décennie, Najib Mikati est à la tête d’un gouvernement qui doit faire face aux mêmes problèmes. L’absence de progrès interroge: pourquoi rien n’a été fait? Najib Mikati, qualifié « d’éternelle roue de secours » par L’Orient - Le Jour , incarne l’immobilisme d’une classe politique versée dans les affaires et profondément inefficace, si ce n’est néfaste. Le 24 Novembre 1955, Najib Mikati voit le jour à Tripoli. Les élites de Tripoli ont pu ainsi jouer le jeu nationamiste syrien avant de rallier la politique libanaise. Dans l’ouvrage collectif Leaders et partisans au Liban , publié en 2012, Bruno Dewailly revient sur les “transformations du leadership tripolitain”. Désormais, avec le mandat français, “la dimension du négoce finit par primer et l’indépendance marque l’instauration d’un libéralisme particulier associant de nouvelles élites foncières et marchandes”. Dans ce contexte, la famille Mikati est une famille de petits notables tripolitains avec une éducation certaine, mais cela n’a rien à voir avec de grandes dynasties de Beyrouth ou de Tripoli comme les Karamé. C’est dans toute cette dynamique qu’il faut comprendre l'ascension des Mikatis. Najib Mikati est diplômé de l’université américaine de Beyrouth. Son ascension commence avec Investcom, une entreprise de télécommunication, fondée avec son frère, Taha Mikati. De 1975 à 1990, la guerre civile fait rage au Liban, les infrastructures de télécommunications tombent comme des dominos. C’est justement cela qui fait la prospérité de Investcom; l’entreprise vend en effet des téléphones satellitaires, et plus tard elle reconstruit un réseau d’infrastructures de télécommunications. Najib Mikati noue des liens privilégiés avec le régime des Assads: quelques semaines après l’accession au pouvoir de Bachar al-Assad, une filiale d’Investcom obtient des concessions pour opérer en Syrie. Mikati s’est aussi fait une place dans le capitalisme mondial, son groupe est coté dans de grandes bourses et est présent dans 10 pays, notamment en Afrique de l’Ouest. En 2006, les frères Mikatis empochent 5 milliards de dollars avec la vente d’Investcom à la compagnie sud-africaine MTN. Néanmoins, en faisant l’acquisition de 6% des actions de MTN , les Mikati ne coupent pas les ponts avec les télécoms. Leurs actifs se diversifient, que ce soit avec l'immobilier, la finance ou avec la mode (Pepe Jeans). Tout cela est regroupé dans une maison-mère, M1 Group, créée en 2007. Ils s’aventurent même dans la presse avec le lancement du site Lebanon 24 en 2011. En 2024, le magazine Forbes évalue la fortune de chacun des frères Mikati à 2,8 milliards de dollars , c’est-à-dire les plus grosses fortunes individuelles recensées par le magazine au Liban. Najib Mikati s’est fait une place dans le monde des affaires libanais et plus largement arabe; ce faisant, il acquiert une place dans un monde inextricablement lié au premier: la politique. De 1998 à 2004, il est ministre des Travaux publics et des Transports. Il officie dans les gouvernements de Rafic Hariri notamment, sans pour autant intégrer le grand parti sunnite des Hariris. La charge ministérielle l’a d’ailleurs « convaincu de la nécessité de ne pas cumuler les charges du ministère et de la députation. » Il gravit néanmoins progressivement les échelons ; il est élu député à Tripoli en 2000 tout en restant ministre. En 2005, l’ex-Premier ministre Rafic Hariri est assassiné dans des conditions troubles. Le pays est en crise, nombreux sont ceux qui dénoncent les ingérences occidentales et surtout l’occupation syrienne. Najib Mikati est alors nommé Premier ministre en avril sur fond de retrait syrien et de révolution populaire. Najib Mikati est une personnalité politique peu connue qui représente l'establishment pro-syrien mais qui a une assise financière mondiale qui le rend légitime aux yeux de la communauté internationale. Son gouvernement comporte des pro et anti-syriens, et pour l’organisation des élections, il fait appel à la communauté internationale: c’est donc un gouvernement consensuel. Il profite de son image en retrait pour apparaître comme une solution de compromis, mais le mandat que lui accorde la classe politique n’est qu’un intérim: « il accepte ce qu’il refuse aujourd’hui [en 2021]: être à la tête d’un gouvernement dont la seule mission est de superviser les élections et le retrait syrien du Liban » selon L’Orient-Le Jour dans une rétrospective de sa carrière politique. En 2011, le Liban est encore en crise . Le gouvernement de Saad Hariri chute. Le Hezbollah affirme sa supériorité militaire et reproche à M. Hariri de ne pas avoir assez fait pression sur le tribunal international sur l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri. Il est soutenu par le Hezbollah, il est parfois même présenté comme le candidat du parti chiite. Le clan Hariri, chassé du Grand Sérail, accuse M. Mikati de trahison contre sa communauté sunnite. Mikati est dès le début en position de funambule: dans un entretien avec Le Figaro en Février 2011, il déclare: « Avant de me soutenir, le Hezbollah m'a certes demandé des engagements, mais j'ai répondu que je ne pouvais pas les assurer. Je ne me suis engagé qu'à une chose envers lui: protéger la résistance. » Les trois enjeux de son gouvernement sont sa propre survie, le redressement de l’économie libanaise exsangue ainsi que d’éviter la propagation de la guerre civile syrienne au Liban. Pour s’attirer les bonnes grâces de la communauté internationale, il dégèle les fonds que le Liban devait allouer au Tribunal enquêtant sur l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri; il le présente comme une initiative personnelle pour ne pas attirer en même temps les foudres du Hezbollah qui craignait des poursuites à son encontre. Le gouvernement chute à cause des dissensions de la coalition autour de l’attitude à adopter vis-à-vis de la guerre civile syrienne : la politique d’équilibrisme de Najib Mikati n’a pas fait long feu. La question de la réforme électorale et du redécoupage des circonscriptions ont finalement raison des lambeaux de la coalition de M. Mikati. Il reste Premier ministre jusqu’en 2013, il exerce l’intérim jusqu’en 2014, jusqu’aux élections législatives repoussées par un Parlement n’ayant pas trouvé d’accord sur ses modalités. En parallèle, le Liban obtient le score peu glorieux de 30 sur l’indice de perception de la corruption en 2013: le pays occupe la 127ème place. Le Gouvernement Mikati n’a pas rétabli la confiance envers le pays et sa classe politique. Il n’a pas attiré le tonnerre sur le Liban, mais il n’a résolu aucun problème et a ainsi laissé le système politique s'encroûter. En 2021, Najib Mikati est de retour dans le Grand Sérail, siège du gouvernement libanais. Le Liban a vécu de grandes manifestations en 2019 contre l’incurie économique du pays. En 2020, l’explosion d’un silo de nitrate d’ammonium dans le port de Beyrouth fait 235 morts et défigure la capitale. Après les échecs de Saad Hariri, Hassan Diab puis Mustapha Adib, c'est Najib Mikati qui est nommé Premier ministre , avec notamment le soutien de la France. Pour rétablir la confiance des bailleurs de fonds internationaux dans le Liban, il doit trouver une solution aux problèmes d’approvisionnement en hydrocarbures et améliorer le sort des 78% de libanais sous le seuil de pauvreté. Son poste de Premier Ministre est remis en jeu début 2022, nombreux sont ceux qui considèrent son gouvernement comme démissionnaire. En juin, il reçoit le mandat du Parlement pour former un nouveau gouvernement, avec 54 voix sur 128 ; il bénéficie du soutien des partis chiites que sont le Hezbollah et Amal, mais les partis chrétiens le rejettent. Le rejet de M. Mikati par les partis chrétiens est d’autant plus vrai quand il faut élire un nouveau président. Le mandat de Michel Aoun expire le 31 octobre 2022. Les relations entre Najib Mikati et Michel Aoun sont notoirement mauvaises, ce qui pourrait être expliqué par leurs parcours opposés: M. Mikati était au gouvernement sous l’occupation syrienne alors que Michel Aoun était en exil en France après s’être opposé à l’intervention de Hafez al-Assad. Avant de quitter le palais présidentiel, Aoun envoie une lettre au Parlement où il nie toute autorité à Najib Mikati, qui avait reçu la confiance du Parlement mais qui n’avait pas encore formé son gouvernement. Il déclare dans un discours qu’en « vertu des pouvoirs que [lui] confère la Constitution, j'ai adressé ce matin une lettre à la Chambre des représentants et j'ai signé le décret de démission du gouvernement. » Néanmoins, si la Présidence n’a pas de titulaire, c’est à M. Mikati de remplir les prérogatives liées à la fonction présidentielle. Il ressort gagnant du bras de fer avec Michel Aoun. Son gouvernement est constitué, mais il est affaibli. Najib Mikati est à la tête du jeu politique libanais en cumulant les prérogatives présidentielles et primo-ministérielles, mais il ne tire pas toutes les ficelles de ce jeu politique. Il n’est que celui qui a le plus réussi à maintenir des voix autour de sa personne. Aujourd’hui, il n’y a toujours pas de Président élu. Autre souci pour M. Mikati, la révélation des bénéfices qu’il a retirés de biens mal acquis, notamment avec les Pandora Papers en 2021. Il est accusé d’avoir détourné, par l’intermédiaire de sociétés-écrans, un prêt accordé à M1 Group par la Banque du Liban— entre 2010 et 2013 alors qu’il était Premier ministre—pour acquérir un patrimoine immobilier personnel à Monaco et en Côte d’Azur. En Avril 2024, l’ONG Sherpa et le Collectif des Victimes des Pratiques Frauduleuses et Criminelles au Liban ont porté plainte en France auprès du PNF (Parquet National Financier). Ces transactions malhonnêtes se seraient faites avec la complicité de Riad Salamé, ancien directeur omnipotent de la Banque du Liban, arrêté en septembre 2024 pour corruption et détournement de fonds. Enfin, M. Mikati est aujourd’hui à la tête d’un Liban au bord de la guerre, après le 7 octobre 2023 et avec des échanges de roquettes réguliers entre le Hezbollah et l’Etat hébreu. Alors qu’Israël a frappé Beyrouth-Sud en août et que de nouvelles frappes encore plus meurtrières ont été initié le 23 septembre, le gouvernement semble dépossédé de l’exercice de la souveraineté de l’Etat libanais, État bien souvent oublié quand on parle de la possible guerre au Liban. M. Mikati est spectateur de la géopolitique régionale. Ses initiatives sont convenues et reprennent peu ou prou les mêmes idées que celles défendues par les chancelleries occidentales. Le rôle de Najib Mikati, qui a des ministres du Hezbollah dans son gouvernement, est sans doute de maintenir et de geler le jeu politique libanais pendant que le Hezbollah, l’Iran et Israël mènent un jeu autrement plus dangereux et déterminant pour l’avenir du Liban. Najib Mikati est partout et nulle part à la fois. Son évanescence lui a permis de naviguer dans toutes les ramifications du marécage politique libanais, et il a su maintenir un État libanais lors de grandes crises comme celle d’aujourd’hui. Il a surtout maintenu les iniquités décriées par la population et qui gangrènent la politique libanaise: Najib Mikati incarne un Liban corrompu et à bout de souffle. Le passé et le présent du pays se sont fait avec lui, mais le futur qu’espèrent nombre de libanais ne pourra se réaliser que lorsque Najib Mikati et toute la classe politique qu’il représente seront relégués au musée. De nouveaux visages sur scène sont attendus pour la nouvelle pièce à écrire.

Allowing citizens abroad to vote in European elections is not just a matter of convenience; it's a recognition of the evolving nature of citizenship in an interconnected world. < Back European Parliament: A Plea for Uniformity in Electoral Regulation By Selma Kaymakci for European Society November 30, 2023 As the 2024 European Parliament election, scheduled for June 6 to 9, approaches, the institution is at a crossroads, with pressing challenges of possible radicalization and ensuing need for effective functioning. Central to overcoming these challenges is fostering high voter turnout in the upcoming elections. Amidst its commitment to democracy and increasing voter participation via communication campaigns, a persistent issue casts a shadow over the electoral process in four specific member states: Czechia, Slovakia, Malta and Ireland. These four countries, by law, do not allow their citizens to vote from abroad. Despite 23 of the 27 European Union Member States allowing remote voting as a means to enhance accessibility and civic engagement, these four countries require their citizens abroad to return home to vote, with many citizens opting not to do so. While this may seem like a minor issue, in practicality, it has wider implications. Allowing citizens abroad to vote in European elections is not just a matter of convenience; it's a recognition of the evolving nature of citizenship in an interconnected world. The voting rights in the elections to the European Parliament extend beyond national borders, impacting not just the voters’ own national legislation but shaping the very mechanisms and policies of the European Union, hence indirectly impacting the laws and legislation of other member states. EU citizens living in a different member state than their origin are also highly relevant for the outcome of the elections. The first-hand experience of cross-border mobility abroad offers a tangible expression of the abstract idea of the European Union, reflecting a nuanced understanding of the benefits and challenges of European integration. Particularly amid growing radicalization in some member states , the votes of those who live abroad are likely to push for policies reflecting ideals of the current European Union, contributing to stability. Interestingly, the four countries in question present a different case on this matter. In Malta and Ireland, citizens living outside the country do not have the ability to vote in any state elections or referendums—however, both countries have different outlooks and solutions on the matter. In Malta, all elections have resulted in subsidizing airplane tickets for eligible voters, which was also done in the 2019 European elections. While this is admirable, it calls into question the need for such barriers in the first place. The idea of citizens having to board an airplane to exercise their fundamental right to vote appears to be rather obsolete, at least, in the 21st century. In Ireland, no solution is proposed to this issue, and at the heart of the matter is a lack of political will to address this problem. However, by limiting voting rights to those within the country's borders, Ireland inadvertently sustains a system that excludes a segment of its population in both European and local elections. Czechia is a different case, where citizens can vote in parliamentary and presidential elections from abroad, but are excluded from participating in European elections, senate and local elections. Slovakia also presents a similar policy, where nationals abroad have the option of voting by mail in parliamentary elections but not in presidential and European elections. While the absence of vote from abroad in local elections can be justified via constituency fragmentation, the countries stand as one electoral district in the case of European Parliament elections. Hence, they have no reason not to facilitate elections from embassies or consulates. This exclusion of voting rights, coming from a time when interest in voting for MEPs (i.e., Member of the European Parliament) was low, presents a democratic blind spot that requires immediate attention. Solution? An alternative choice for individuals living abroad in these states is to vote for their country of residence rather than their country of origin. This, however, comes with obstacles—and the more obstacles presented to voters, the greater the chance of non-participation. It requires citizens to be aware that they can vote in their country of residence, register, map out the political arena and cast their ballots. Even when a person is willing to run through these hurdles, the conditions vary across member states as to who can vote in European elections, not ensuring that one can vote at all if they cannot travel to their country of citizenship. One thing is certain—the European Electoral Act requires revision for a set of united election rules to occur, ensuring full accessibility, equity and legitimacy of representation. The European Electoral Act currently only outlines very broad common principles and lacks a uniform electoral system across EU Member States for European elections. While changes were introduced to this act, most recently in 2022, that sought to harmonize the electoral procedure in many aspects, for these changes to come into effect a long process including a unanimous vote from the Council and majority consent from the Parliament is needed. Most recently, a debate on this act was held in June of 2023, so for the 2024 elections, the train to pass the revised version of the act has long passed. At a time when political turmoil is present and every vote can influence the outcome of the election, this can prove to be a dangerous aspect of European legislation that has not been given sufficient attention. Examining and addressing these seemingly insignificant legislative issues is crucial as the European Union navigates the complexities of modern governance to combat extremism in the European Parliament and ensure that the democratic process remains reflective of the dispersed European population, guaranteeing voting rights to every citizen.

We’ll find ourselves scrolling through 2.7 million posts ranging from references to the album, people talking about and embracing themselves using the brat aesthetic and lyrics from the album, photos of vice-president Kamala Haris, and tutorials on brat green hair and makeup. Nevertheless, there remains the question: How did being ‘brat’ come into the mainstream in an era dominated by the highest grossing tour in history, Taylor Swift’s Eras tour? < Back BECOMING BRAT Ema Nevrelova September 30, 2024 Contrary to many trends circulating on social media, the “brat summer” trend emerged from an album title. In the era of short videos and short extracts for songs, it sometimes seems impossible to appreciate more 'time-consuming' forms of art and music, but Charli XCX proved us wrong. Songwriter and artist Charli XCX released her sixth studio album, Brat, on June 7, 2024. It is worth mentioning that Charli has maintained her relevance for over 15 years, and has accomplished exactly what she had imagined for herself back in 2009 when she stated in an interview for the magazine Dazed Digital: “I want to prove to people that you don’t have to become this big, commercial pop writing machine to be successful, you can just do whatever you want, and it will be fine.” However, the recent resurgence of her popularity led some people to believe that she made an overhyped album with sloppy covers. Yet, her true fans know that coloured background and blurry title has been the aesthetics of her past four albums (including Brat). Fittingly, “you can just do whatever you want, and it will be fine” could also be a good basis to establish the definition of term brat, even though the commonly cited description of “brat essentials” by Charli XCX as having a “pack of cigs, a Bic lighter and a strappy white top with no bra.” There definitely has been room for interpretation illustrated by the #brat on Instagram. We’ll find ourselves scrolling through 2.7 million posts ranging from references to the album, people talking about and embracing themselves using the brat aesthetic and lyrics from the album, photos of vice-president Kamala Haris, and tutorials on brat green hair and makeup. Nevertheless, there remains the question: How did being ‘brat’ come into the mainstream in an era dominated by the highest grossing tour in history, Taylor Swift’s Eras tour? As Charli XCX alluded to in her interview for podcast Sidetrack, there is a cultural shift and “ the niche is being rewarded.’’ Her statement might be confusing to most people as they probably connect Charli with her second and arguably most mainstream studio album Sucker (which included hits like Break The Rules or Boom Clap ) released in 2014. What is perhaps lesser known is that she has been active in the Underground scene since her teenage years—attending raves or DJing in clubs. Charli has also collaborated with a producer named SOPHIE who, I would argue, helped shape her work towards hyperpop , a microgenre of electronic and pop music originating in the UK (mostly spread through SoundCloud). There are other reasons apart from a higher appreciation for the niche that made this album relevant this summer. An important factor for the promotion of the album was that Charli is the embodiment of brat—from the way she dresses to her confident yet vulnerable presence. Eye-catching colour, her strong personality and Tik Tok opened the door for her album into the mainstream. Another good marketing strategy and demonstration of various meanings of brat was the reconciliation of Lorde and Charli over the song “ The girl, so confusing” – even though they never really had a falling out. The 3.9 million views on YouTube prove that communication, female solidarity and friendship are brat. When discussing friendship that should have happened sooner, let’s look at the song “ Guess” featuring Billie Eilish. The song “ Guess” doesn’t appear on the original album Brat, but on its extended version called “Brat and it’s the same but there’s three more songs so it’s not” released on June 10. This queer hit pushed the brat obsession even further, with some of us longing for “lower back tattoo”. Possibly, the biggest ‘brat move’ surrounding the song was Charli and Billie donating around 10 000 of undergarments, from the Guess videoclip, to the I Support The Girls nonprofit organization providing ‘‘distribution of undergarments and menstrual products to folx experiencing homelessness and to victims of domestic violence.’’ Charli doesn’t just address important topics in real life but also in her songs. “ I think about it all the time” touches on the thought process and expectations around having children. Lines that resonate are “Should I stop my birth control? ‘Cause my career feels so small in the existential scheme of it all.’’ A second song with heartbreaking potential (not in a romantic way) is Apple . Unveiling Charli’s complicated relationship with parents allows for a reflection on our own childhood traumas and for a realisation that “the apple doesn't fall far from the tree.’ ’ Notably, the most emotional and vulnerable song is “ So I” – tribute to Charli’s long time music mentor, DJ and producer SOPHIE, who passed away in 2021. Slower tempo and reference to SOPHIE’ song It’s okay to cry should make us all cry. Clearly, brat isn’t solely about being a shallow bad girl, rather, it deals with the intricacy of womanhood from a messy feminine perspective. That is not to say that there is not a party element to the album, as Charli XCX revealed in the Therapuss podcast: “It [the album] is very personal but there are songs about just like getting f*cked up.’’ The party songs include 360 , 365 , Rewind or Club classics and that is where Charli utilized her skills from DJing. The tempo is fast, almost to a point where you feel dizzy but in a soothing tipsy way, at the same time the lyrics serve as reassurance that we don’t have a perfect routine, body or personality. We can “just rewind’’ and “say something stupid.’’ The popularity of this trend got so widespread that it even found its way into U.S. politics. After vice-president of the U.S. Kamala Harris announced running for presidency; Charli XCX endorsed her by writing on X: “kamala IS brat.’’ Harris’s campaign adopted the brat aesthetic and produced memes, making many people quickly forget about the attempted assassination of Donald Trump—a success, from a marketing point of view. Despite Harris’s quick rise to internet fame, it wasn't coincidental. As many politicians before her she likely aimed at younger voters in hopes of securing their votes. It remains to be seen if this tactic will prove to be successful, as Democrat voters among Generation Z and Millennials tend to sympathize with Palestine and criticize President Joe Biden’s policy in the current Israeli-Palestinian war. Harris will likely follow in his footsteps if she becomes president. Regardless of the outcome of the U.S. presidential elections, it is safe to say that “kamala IS brat’’ will not be forgotten. To conclude, this summer we witnessed a cultural shift during which, paradoxically, niche became part of mainstream culture and politics. But has the Brat album made a societal impact? As with any trend or album we will probably forget brat summer ever happened. Nevertheless, it will be one more summer which 2.7 million of us spent being less self-conscious and less bothered by other people’s expectations. Charli XCX reminded us, in her blunt and unhinged way, that we can be confident and vulnerable and there is in fact nothing wrong with our imperfect, complicated personalities. After all, if the potential U.S. president can be brat, can’t we all?

Our beloved SciencesPistes became more comfortable both on and off the slopes — daring to dive into challenging skiing and dynamic conversations. < Back Menton à SuperDévoluy: Sciences Pistes Spend Last Week of Break at BDS Ski Trip By Gigi Hodes January 30, 2022 When 2A Samanéa Rousseau, president of the Bureau des Sports (BDS) on campus, sent a flyer advertising a ski trip for students, I was apprehensive to sign up. The task of organizing a trip to the Alps for 50 SciencesPistes seemed Herculean and I was unsure whether it would work out. Now, after returning from the trip, I am so glad I went. The five-day experience was a great way to spend some time outdoors, connect with nature, and bond with other students. The adventure began with a schlep to the stadium. There, we boarded the bus that took us to SuperDévoluy, a ski resort a few hours north of Menton in the French Alps. The excitement was palpable — for the first few hours, everyone was chattering away. Our journey lasted around six hours, but in this distance, we managed to go from sunny Menton to snow-capped mountains. After disembarking with our luggage, it was time to check into our rooms at the Hameau du Puy residence and get settled in. A few sighs of frustration later, (doing an état des lieux in a mountain hotel is no more fun than in a seaside apartment, especially with a 200 euro deposit on the line), we were ready to explore. I was most excited to play in the snow; it had been years since I had seen it piled up like that. We all immediately donned our snow pants and went outside. Suddenly, I felt a cold thud against my right shoulder. I turned around to see a gloating 2A Isabella Aouad, proud of her aim. After that, it was on. We spent a good hour tumbling across the landscape, hitting each other with snowballs until we were all exhausted and ready for some beauty sleep. Though the sound of my alarm the next morning was not exactly welcome, I was excited to hit the slopes — skiing was a childhood favorite for me. I felt butterflies at the thought of returning to it now, at least a meter taller and 10 years older. Thankfully, the BDS took care of the equipment rental package, including the (objectively uncomfortable) ski boots and bright helmets. For beginners like 2A Paris Sistilli, it was a bit daunting to head out to experience the sport for the first time. However, there was an instructor waiting on the bunny hill to teach the 15-person group the basics. The rest of us split up to tackle what SuperDévoluy had to offer. At first, people were more comfortable sticking to their friend groups from home or their flatmates. However, as the trip progressed, it became more practical to organize according to skill level and confidence, which meant spending quality time with people you may never have gotten to know. 1A Sienna Bertamini was pushed outside of her comfort zone and forced to make new relationships with 2As since not many people in her cohort decided to come. She explained that it was nice to build connections with people outside of her closer core. According to her, this bonding was especially fostered during group dinners and other collective activities. She said, “it was like Integration Week all over again … it definitely helped with bonding.” Another 1A agreed, saying that interactions became more fluid by the second or third day. People bridged the gaps that usually split the Ummah. There was an overwhelming sense of solidarity and collaboration when it came to the sport, with advanced skiers often offering to help the beginners and pushing them to feel more confident. This led to a group of novices tackling a blue slope (easy-intermediate level) together for the first time! Though the trip had some serious hiccups (a torn ligament here, sliced finger there), it was a really fun experience overall. We had amazing weather; all blue skies after fresh snow — nearly perfect powder conditions. Our beloved SciencesPistes became more comfortable both on and off the slopes — daring to dive into challenging skiing and dynamic conversations. As a 2A who is nearing the end of her time on campus, I thought this was an exciting way to kick off the semester, as it fostered bonding across the Ummah and helped me start the year on the right foot.

The pervasive use of historical analogy has not always had quite the same stranglehold over public discourse as it does today. These analogies have not always been used as a central axis in massively polarizing issues e.g., Israel-Palestine and U.S. domestic politics. In light of the growing use and misuse of historical comparisons, when should they be used or avoided? < Back The Use and Misuse of Historical Analogy in Contemporary Discourse Niccolo Gentile You’ve probably heard historical analogies deployed to describe contentious events: the Russo-Ukrainian War compared to World War II or Vietnam; the Jan. 6th, 2021 Capitol Building riots in the United States paralleled the burning of the Reichstag; Vladimir Putin likened to Adolf Hitler or the War in Gaza to the Holocaust. These links have become a typical element of political discourse for millions and a rhetorical tool levied to argue opposing cases in these conflicts. However, the pervasive use of historical analogy has not always had quite the same stranglehold over public discourse as it does today. These analogies have not always been used as a central axis in massively polarizing issues e.g., Israel-Palestine and U.S. domestic politics. In light of the growing use and misuse of historical comparisons, when should they be used or avoided? Linguists have long examined the use of analogy as a whole and how it can enhance the popular understanding of the present. In everyday communication, the use of rhetorical tricks like simile, metaphor and analogy all enhance one’s ability to understand and relate to the experiences of others. It is no surprise then that the comprehension of contemporary political matters, especially those taking place half a world away, often attracts comparisons with well-known past events. It is an innate element of the human condition that we confound the unknown with the knowable. The specific use of analogy in regard to history complicates matters. In relation to the history of these analogies, Professor Denis Charbit, specialist of the history of ideas at Sciences Po, argues that these comparisons emerged from the “crisis of modernity, of time” that occurred around the '60s and ‘70s. Hitherto, under the sway of modernism, humanity’s point of reference was placed firmly in the future, whether that be a proletarian revolution or a homogenous ethnostate. This is not to say that historical analogy emerged, contextless from a virgin birth, in the middle of the 20th century. Doubtlessly, it was employed far before this to relate like event to like event. The inundation of this method, however, in the popular imagination seems to be a phenomenon which can be roughly dated, traced and followed in its swell of use over the past few decades. From the historian’s perspective, analogy is a dangerously sweeping tool only to be used in the most damning of circumstances. As Dr. Augusto Petter, lecturer at Sciences Po Menton and expert in the philosophy of history, explained to me, the use of analogy in academic work is generally frowned upon today. Of course, a core element of the historian’s work is to compare events in the past. But drawing an actual link in the form of an analogy or metaphor necessitates an overwhelming, impossible burden of proof so as to make even rhetorical tricks practically absent from the field. Additionally, these analogies have the ability to imbue arguments with immense ethos, pathos and logos, often through cheap or inaccurate means. To quote Kenneth Minogue on the discourse analysis of Quentin Skinner, ‘historical’ analogies “are historical in the popular sense of referring to the past, but not historical in the sense of being contributions to the academic problem of attempting to understand some passage of events in a properly historical manner.” The historian’s highly restrictive and critical view cannot be expected of the wider public, nor should it be sought. To apply the same rigor to popular discourse would cripple any chance such discussion has of producing productive understanding and inspiring the action needed to keep democratic institutions functioning, which discourse should inculcate. To further illuminate the point of criticism here, take one prime example of this discourse and its accuracy in some of the issues from the past few years. What I’ve chosen to examine is not the most current events but one with relevance, some temporal removal and well-established facts from which to base this analysis. Today, commentators and politicians compare Western policy towards Russia with the policy of appeasement that much of Europe took towards Nazi Germany in the years preceding WWII. At a glance, this would seem like a cogent topic to bring into the discourse. Benoît Bréville takes a different position, stating that harkening back to events like the Munich Conference and the invasion of Poland only serves to aggravate tensions that should be soothed to bring an end to the bloodshed. Moreover, these connections simply do not stand up to deeper inquiry. For example, the war in Ukraine is isolated to one country and has dragged on for years whereas Munich and Poland were but brief glimpses of the global conflict to come—one which modern-day Russia is clearly not able to persecute given its performance in Ukraine. This is not to take away from the often rightful case made by these arguments but to encourage a greater level of discernment when choosing one’s evidence so that it holds up beyond our ephemeral present. A couple of caveats should be mentioned. One key difference that Professor Charbit argued for is the difference between using historical analogy and collective memory. This might take the form of an Israeli comparing something to the Holocaust or a Palestinian drawing a connection to the Nakba. However, heed care even here, for as Ada Yurman formulates , such terminology can be used “by those who do not grasp the dimensions of the catastrophe.” Another is to keep in mind the difference between drawing a sweeping analogy and a specific, evidence-based comparison. Though it is ridiculous to compare contemporary French government coordination with private industry to Italian fascism’s corporatism, particular elements can indeed be likened to one another to argue a broader point. The world is a fraught place where meaning seems increasingly intangible, even as the bonds linking our societies to the past are frayed or twisted. We are watching a large-scale military engagement take place around Kursk and Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad) while far-right parties are sweeping European elections in Germany, Italy and Hungary, and multipolarity is pushing most countries into two great blocs or into a position of non-alignment. It is nigh impossible to refute the importance of recalling the past and comparing its causes and outcomes to the present. Alongside this, though, a more critical examination of how and why we use these terms to describe the present and whether they are unjustly coloring our view of current events is due to better engage with both the past and the present.

L’absence de mémoire collective divise; chaque communauté se retrouve attachée à sa propre version du passé. Alors, quelle histoire raconter? Comment peut-on espérer construire un futur partagé lorsque les fractures du passé nous maintiennent encore captifs? < Back Repenser l’histoire de la guerre civile libanaise Christy Ghosn January 31, 2025 « Il n’y a pas de mémoire de la guerre au Liban, mais une guerre des mémoires, » souligne Marwan Chahine , journaliste franco-libanais. L’absence d’un véritable travail officiel de mémoire sur la guerre civile a conduit à une multiplicité de récits, où chaque communauté s’emploie à revendiquer sa propre version des événements. Dans cet espace fragmenté, l’histoire et la mémoire devraient, en théorie, se rencontrer, se fondre l’une dans l’autre. Pourtant, paradoxalement, raconter l’histoire, loin d’apaiser les mémoires, ravive les blessures enfouies et des tensions que le temps n’a su apaiser. Ainsi, l’histoire et la mémoire se confrontent, s’opposent, empêchant toute véritable union. L’absence de mémoire collective divise; chaque communauté se retrouve attachée à sa propre version du passé. Alors, quelle histoire raconter? Comment peut-on espérer construire un futur partagé lorsque les fractures du passé nous maintiennent encore captifs? Loi d’amnistie de 1991, une institutionnalisation de l’oubli En 1991, le Liban, émergeant des cendres de sa guerre civile, adopte une loi d'amnistie générale couvrant les crimes politiques commis avant le 28 mars de la même année. L’initiative visait à panser les plaies nationales en effaçant les offenses passées, espérant favoriser une réconciliation collective. Cependant, elle fut rapidement perçue comme une institutionnalisation de l'oubli, instaurant une culture d'impunité où les auteurs de violations graves des droits humains échappent à la justice. Les victimes, quant à elles, se virent marginalisées, leur quête de vérité et de reconnaissance entravée, retardant ainsi le processus de guérison collective. Les responsables de crimes de guerre furent de ce fait graciés sans avoir à rendre de comptes, sapant la confiance du peuple dans les institutions étatiques et judiciaires. Toutefois, cette amnistie, bien que générale, comportait des exceptions notables: elle ne s'appliquait pas aux assassinats ou tentatives d'assassinat de personnalités religieuses, politiques, ou de diplomates arabes ou étrangers. L'amnistie libanaise se présentait alors comme conditionnelle, conférant une immunité à certaines personnalités, notamment les chefs de milices de guerre, désormais reconnus institutionnellement. Cette stratégie, établie par et pour les responsables politiques, visait à sécuriser leur position, au détriment d'une véritable réconciliation nationale et d'une justice équitable. Une absence d’enseignement de la guerre L’enseignement ne facilite pas les choses non plus: les programmes scolaires ne couvrent pas la période de la guerre civile libanaise, mais s'arrêtent notoirement à la veille de la guerre. Bassel Akar , spécialisé en éducation citoyenne, dresse le tableau d’un système scolaire dépassé: « Ce que les jeunes connaissent de l’histoire récente du pays est le fruit d’une transmission familiale qu’ils ne retrouvent pas dans le programme scolaire. C’est comme si le gouvernement leur disait “ce que tu crois savoir est faux.’’ En effet, le problème des livres scolaires au Liban remonte aux accords de Taëf, signés en 1989 pour mettre fin à quinze ans de guerre civile et amorcer un processus de réconciliation nationale. Ces accords prévoyaient notamment la révision et le développement des programmes éducatifs afin de renforcer l'appartenance et l'intégration nationales, ainsi que l'unification du livre scolaire dans les matières d'histoire et d'éducation civique. Cependant, depuis trente ans, les ministères de l'Éducation successifs peinent à élaborer un manuel unifié, confrontés à la complexité de concilier les multiples points de vue issus de cette période conflictuelle. L'héritage politique La politique au Liban reste profondément influencée par des divisions confessionnelles et politiques héritées du conflit. Selon l’historien Jean-Pierre Filiu , « le Moyen-Orient est régulièrement présenté comme fatalement englué dans des problématiques religieuses . » La notion de laïcité, qui implique une séparation entre la sphère politique et la sphère religieuse, semble difficilement applicable dans ce contexte. Depuis les accords de Taëf de 1989, mettant fin à la guerre civile, les sièges de la chambre des députés doivent être répartis de manière équitable entre les représentants chrétiens et musulmans. De même, les postes de président de la République, de Premier ministre et de président de la Chambre des députés sont attribués selon des critères confessionnels, le président étant maronite, le Premier ministre sunnite et le président de la Chambre chiite. La coexistence d’un système juridique national avec plusieurs juridictions communautaires, qui régissent des affaires telles que les mariages, divorces ou successions, témoigne également de cette influence confessionnelle persistante. Ce modèle a été adopté comme solution pour apaiser les tensions intercommunautaires après les quinze années de guerre civile. Croyants ou non, les Libanais ne peuvent échapper à leur appartenance confessionnelle, chaque institution publique étant régie par ce prisme. La nouvelle génération revendicatrice De cette manière, la guerre civile libanaise ne figure pas suffisamment dans les livres d’histoire, et les échanges avec les parents sur ce sujet sont rares. Les jeunes générations souhaitent croire en un avenir meilleur et redonner de la valeur à leur pays et à leur drapeau. Ces jeunes revendiquent la nécessité de réécrire l’histoire pour mieux appréhender leur identité et construire un futur sans répétition des erreurs passées. Le mouvement de 2019 a marqué un tournant significatif en réclamant la démission du gouvernement, la convocation de nouvelles élections parlementaires et l’instauration d’un système politique et juridique laïc. Cette vague de contestation, qui a rassemblé plus d’une centaine de milliers de manifestants, se distingue par un consensus sur la nécessité de changer radicalement le modèle politique. Les manifestants rejettent toute réforme dans le cadre du confessionnalisme, estimant que cette sortie est essentielle pour éviter la corruption. Ce mouvement, porté notamment par la jeunesse, incarne une rupture profonde avec le lien entre le politique et le religieux. Les jeunes, majoritairement âgés de 18 à 25 ans, ne connaissant pas directement la guerre civile, rejettent les clivages communautaires hérités de cette époque. Des artistes se sont de plus largement engagés dans la réflexion sur cette période. Des pièces de Wajdi Mouawad par exemple, dramaturge libanais insistent sur la connaissance de l’histoire et la lutte contre l'amnésie mémorielle. Par ailleurs, des films tels que West Beirut, Memory Box, ou encore 1982 ont aussi joué un rôle important dans la documentation et la réflexion sur ce conflit. Par ailleurs, des expositions, comme la Maison Jaune, symbolisent cette mémoire. Situé sur l'ancienne ligne de démarcation, ce lieu, ancien poste de contrôle et repaire de francs-tireurs, est devenu un espace de réflexion collective, essentiel pour perpétuer la mémoire des événements tragiques qui ont marqué le Liban. D’une guerre à l'autre Contrairement à la guerre civile libanaise, où la mémoire collective a été marquée par des silences et des oublis, le conflit de 2024 a favorisé une documentation immédiate et une diffusion rapide des témoignages notamment grâce aux réseaux sociaux. Cette digitalisation de la mémoire pourrait indiquer une prise de conscience accrue chez la nouvelle génération de l'importance de la mémoire collective et de la reconnaissance des traumatismes. Cette évolution pourrait alors jouer un rôle clé dans le processus de réconciliation et de reconstruction du pays, tout en favorisant une meilleure compréhension des événements passés et en encourageant un dialogue ouvert sur les blessures du passé. Simone Veil affirmait « Que nous le voulions ou non, que nous le sachions ou non, nous sommes responsables de ce qui nous unira demain, collectivement. Nous sommes faits de ce qui nous a précédé et pour partie, nous engageons l’avenir. » Aujourd’hui, plus que jamais, cette responsabilité prend tout son sens, notamment avec l’élection du nouveau président Joseph Aoun, qui se distingue par son indépendance vis-à-vis des partis politiques. Cette nomination marque ainsi le début d’une ère nouvelle pour le pays, où les Libanais, jusqu’ici condamnés à l’espoir, pourraient enfin aspirer à de réels changements et à une véritable transformation collective. Photo credits: Steven Damron on Flickr .

« Mal nécessaire, » il s’avère que la Grèce entretient un rapport étroit au tourisme, d’autant plus au surtourisme. Pays autant dépendant que victime de ses effets, il s’inscrit pourtant dans des logiques qui tentent de dépasser ces limitations initiales, pour tirer pleinement parti de sa situation. Le tourisme, en tant que phénomène, subit des transformations, des mutations, qui—nous l’espérons—vont dans le sens d’une meilleure adaptation aux priorités contemporaines. < Back Le « Surtourisme » En Grèce : Un Mal Nécessaire ? Margarita Kopsia April 30, 2025 À l’heure où le soleil réapparaît à travers les nuages mentonnaises et où l’on songe à nos escapades estivales, la saison touristique en Grèce est sur le point de débuter. Mais tandis que le pays s’apprête à recevoir l’immense majorité des quelques 30 millions de touristes qu’il accueille chaque année, le moment serait aussi venu de questionner les enjeux qui vont de pair avec de tels records exceptionnels, faisant des paysages grecs les véritables victimes de leur succès. Le tourisme en Grèce: moteur de croissance, mais à quel prix ? La Grèce a accueilli en 2024 près de 35,9 millions de touristes étrangers, un « cap historique » dont les effets sont devenus trop apparents pour ne pas être examinés. Car en réalité, le tourisme, bien que générant 18% du PIB national et permettant l’emploi de « 900 000 personnes, » est la même force que celle derrière l’importante dégradation environnementale et l’augmentation des prix qui caractérisent les destinations les plus célèbres du pays. Qu’il s’agisse des îles dans la mer Égée, de la capitale grecque, Athènes, ou les îles des Cyclades et du Dodécanèse, les ravages d’un tourisme de masse sans précédent ont des conséquences considérables. Entre les difficultés liées à la gestion des déchets, les pénuries d’eau sur les îles et les embouteillages dans les sites urbains, ces « défis de saison » rendent les discussions autour des limites du tourisme plus que pertinentes. Peut-être faudrait-il alors aussi s’interroger sur le réel impact de cette « overdose » touristique, afin de mettre en évidence une face moins ensoleillée de la Grèce, mais qui mérite à son tour d’être étudiée. À titre illustratif, la situation dans laquelle se trouve l’île de Santorin est caractéristique de ces dynamiques contradictoires, qui font du tourisme en Grèce une force à double tranchant. Les enjeux de Santorin dévoilent à quel point le tourisme est vecteur de défis mais aussi de développements, qui sont d’ailleurs aussi ceux des autres îles des Cyclades comme Mykonos, Paros ou Naxos, et d’autres destinations populaires dans la mer Égée et au-delà. Selon les propos tenus par le maire de Santorin en 2024, les problèmes dûs à la « saturation » de l’île rendent sa situation incontrôlable, à l’image des obstacles courants en « approvisionnement en eau et en électricité » pendant l’été. Car au-delà de la « défiguration » du paysage engendrée par l’omniprésence des hôtels et des complexes de luxe, et la menace que cela représente pour la préservation et la mise en valeur de son patrimoine naturel et culturel, il faut aussi noter que la densité de cette masse touristique rend l’île « inaccessible » pour la grande majorité de la population. En effet, dans le courant des mois de juin à septembre, Santorin n’échappe pas à la « flambée des prix » qui touche la plupart des endroits les plus visités de la Grèce, ni à « l’indisponibilité des logements » pour les populations locales. Parallèlement, les débats relatifs aux limites du tourisme acquièrent une dimension sociale et politique, lorsqu’il s’agit pour les locaux de juger que leurs droits sont menacés par ces affluences, mais aussi—et surtout—par la non-application des lois relatives à l’aménagement urbain sur les littoraux. Ainsi, le « mouvement des serviettes , » « né [...] sur l'île de Paros » en été 2023, fut un « mouvement de protestation inédit » en réaction à « l'occupation illégale des plages par des restaurateurs et des beach bars, » contraire à la Constitution grecque. Ainsi, comme l’explique la Présidente de la Chambre de l'environnement en Grèce en 2024, « les lois sur la construction sont très faibles et très flexibles en Grèce. Il y a un cruel manque de plan d'aménagement du territoire, et lorsqu'il existe, il n'est pas respecté. » Plus que le tourisme de masse, le « surtourisme » Malgré ces problématiques, le secteur tertiaire représente toujours trois quarts du PIB grec, et est lui-même largement constitué des activités touristiques. Ainsi, s’il ne s’agit pas pour la Grèce de renoncer au tourisme, comment pouvons-nous nommer l’impasse dans laquelle le pays se trouve, en faisant allusion aux problèmes associés à sa branche économique dominante? Se livrer à un telle entreprise de conceptualisation est important, parce que mieux nommer ces problèmes, c’est aussi mieux les comprendre. Saisir toute l’ampleur du surtourisme en Grèce et ses complexités intrinsèques est nécessaire pour affronter plus efficacement les enjeux qui le constituent. Face à cet engagement, la notion de surtourisme s’impose, soit overtourism en anglais. Selon le Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), ce néologisme « se caractérise par une mobilité accrue où l’afflux de visiteurs dépasse la capacité d’accueil d’une destination. » Cependant, à la différence du simple concept de « surcharge » touristique, le surtourisme permet d’attirer l’attention sur les « paradoxes intrinsèques au tourisme international, » entre « logiques de rentabilité et exigences de durabilité. » Car, en réalité, le cas de la Grèce est loin d’être unique. Et le surtourisme, toujours fidèle aux dynamiques de mouvement qui le caractérisent, ne se limite pas aux frontières nationales, mais dépasse les pays et les nations. Qu’ils s’agisse de l’Italie, de l’Espagne et des capitales européennes, des îles et des pays en Asie du Sud-Est tels que Bali ou la Thaïlande, ou des pays en Amérique latine comme le Mexique et le Pérou, les dangers du surtourisme deviennent de plus en plus visibles. Ils suscitent parfois de vives réactions de la part des habitants et des gouvernements. Ainsi, si la Grèce a prévu d' « imposer aux croisiéristes une taxe de 20 euros, » Florence met en place « l’interdiction d’Airbnb et des locations saisonnières [...] dans le centre historique » et « au Machu Picchu au Pérou, la billetterie est devenue plus stricte avec créneaux horaires imposés. » Le développement d’un tourisme durable en Grèce: une perspective réaliste sur le long terme? Loin de se laisser désespérer par cette situation, certains préfèrent interroger—de manière compréhensive et réaliste—la perspective du développement d’un « tourisme durable » en Grèce. Ce dernier permettrait au pays de réconcilier ses activités économiques dominantes avec le bien-être de ses habitants et la préservation de son patrimoine naturel et culturel, conformément à la définition du tourisme durable proposée par l’Organisation mondiale du tourisme. En tant que « tourisme qui tient pleinement compte de ses impacts économiques, sociaux et environnementaux, actuels et futurs » et « répondant aux besoins des visiteurs, des professionnels de l’environnement et des communautés d’accueil. » Le tourisme durable peut raviver l’espoir, mais aussi susciter de nouvelles séries de questions, notamment par rapport à sa réelle efficacité et moyens d’action. En Europe ces dernières années, « durable » sonne de plus en plus avec « train, » en vertu de l’ accessibilité de la plupart des villes européennes telles que Londres, Amsterdam, Barcelone ou Milan à travers les réseaux de TGV ou autres trains de nuit. D’autre part, un nombre croissant de touristes privilégient des formes de tourisme alternatif, favorisant une meilleure proximité avec la nature et les moyens de transport moins polluants. L’offre devant suivre la demande grandissante, force est de constater que ce projet est aussi en train de gagner en popularité et de prendre forme en Grèce. Ainsi, « de nombreux hôtels et complexes hôteliers ont installé des systèmes photovoltaïques afin de réduire les diffusions de gaz carbonique, » tandis que l’agenda de la Grèce en matière de tourisme durable se concentre également sur l’élaboration de nouveaux plans d’investissement. La nouvelle « Loi sur les incitations aux investissements », ainsi que son « nouveau schéma PPP (partenariat public / privé), » incarnent ces engagements. Par conséquent, serait-il davantage intéressant de se demander si le tourisme durable en Grèce est un projet qui portera ses fruits, une promesse qui mérit e d’être tenue? « Mal nécessaire, » il s’avère que la Grèce entretient un rapport étroit au tourisme, d’autant plus au surt ourisme. Pays autant dépendant que victime de ses effets, il s’inscrit pourtant dans des logiques qui tentent de dépasser ces limitations initiales, pour tirer pleinement parti de sa situation. Le tourisme, en tant que phénomène, subit des transformations, des mutations, qui—nous l’espérons—vont dans le sens d’une meilleure adaptation aux priorités contemporaines. Il faut réponder au mieux aux préoccupations de ses contextes locaux. Photo source: Mstyslav Chernov on Wikimedia

Behind the curtain of seemingly increasing stability in Syria, out of the eye of Western press and politics, a deplorable crime is being committed against Syrian nationals: the expropriation of their heritage. < Back Turkey Is Waging War on Syrian Heritage By Emilia K September 29, 2022 Behind the curtain of seemingly increasing stability in Syria, out of the eye of Western press and politics, a deplorable crime is being committed against Syrian nationals: the expropriation of their heritage. Syrian heritage is one of the oldest and richest, providing invaluable insight into our past, with some of the best-preserved sites in the Middle East dating back thousands of years. Syria was the birthplace of sedentarization and agriculture; the first complex societies, writing systems and sciences emerged there. However, for several years, Syrian heritage has suffered immeasurable damages under various factions of the Syrian National Army (formerly known as the ‘Free Syrian Army’). Funded, trained and supplied by Turkey, which has established de-facto control over areas in Northern Syria, these armed opposition groups have looted and bulldozed numerous essential heritage sites. The theft of integral parts of Syrian history is happening against the backdrop of increasing Turkification of the self-proclaimed “safe zones.” This Turkification includes renaming geography and landmarks (the Saraya square in Afrin is now the Erdoğan Square), the introduction of Turkish in the school curriculums and the ethnic cleansing of a sizable Kurdish population. Heritage represents an indispensable component of the construction of group identity, and the loss thereof has a grave impact on the ability of Syrians to reconstruct their national identity after a traumatic war that has sown great divisions in the nation. By 2020, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights had reported activity at more than 25 archaeological sites, a number which has been continually increasing over the last two years. ‘Ayn Dāra represents the most prominent victim of the numerous attacks on Syrian heritage. This temple was a unique monument with rich sculptural decoration, dating to the 14th/13th century BCE, and — ironically — built by the Anatolian Hittites who had, at that time, conquered large parts of northern Syria. Lying roughly 40km northwest of Aleppo, the archaeological site dates back over 3000 years and bears importance on ancient trade routes between Egypt, Palestine and Anatolia. An airstrike by the Turkish air forces in 2018 eradicated half of the temple structure. However, more recently, Turkish-backed forces have looted both the site and the storage of the archaeological mission, despite repeated warnings by United Nations organizations. The temple of ‘Ayn Dāra is only one of many decimated sites. There have been reports of excavations near the Nabi Huri fortress, an important site on the ancient trade route from Antioch to the Euphrates, containing a 100-meter diameter Roman theater. Furthermore, the Sheikh Hamid shrine and the archaeological shrine of Abdulrahman, both holy sites for Yazidi Kurds, have been desecrated by excavations. Turkey’s role in this is significant: Stolen artifacts have been reported smuggled and sold in Turkey, and Ankara funds the heavy machinery and advanced equipment available to the armed groups. However, beyond the material damage, the loss of Syrian heritage in the Turkish-occupied regions presents an even greater danger to the Syrian identity, particularly to its Kurdish inhabitants. The United Nations reported the displacement of over 150,000 Kurdish residents of Afrin by the Turkish invasion and subsequent prohibition to return, instead promoting Arabic settlements. The remaining Kurdish population has been subject to the expropriation of property, harassment and arbitrary arrests by Syrian National Army factions. Other reports describe the widespread hewing of olive groves, which often represent a source of firewood in cold winters and the sole source of income for the families to whom they belong. While some of the olive trees were burned systematically, others were uprooted and smuggled to sell in Turkish markets. Few conflicts have grown as protracted as the Syrian one. The war has displaced 13 million Syrians since its 2011 outbreak, of which 3.6 million have fled to neighboring Turkey. In 2016, Turkey launched its first military intervention to counteract the Islamic State and the organization of Kurdish groups in Northern Syria. Since then, it has established effective control over an area of almost 9000 square kilometers, referred to as safe zones. These areas are under Turkish military rule and connected to the Turkish infrastructure. In a 2019 policy brief analysis, Engin Yüksel and Erwin van Veen identified that “Turkey has been setting up institutions that mirror Turkish structures and practices, creating favorable conditions for private (Turkish) investment and encouraging refugee return. These institutions also reflect Turkey’s own brand of national Islamism. Nationalism manifests itself in the introduction of the Turkish language in the primary school curricula in the area. State Islamism reveals itself in the 1,472 clerics and 5,686 religious teachers that Diyanet — the government’s directorate of religious affairs — has hired among Syrians to spread Turkey’s political interpretation of Islam among the local population, including anti-Kurdish and anti-Gülenist sentiments.” While establishing these safe zones is primarily interpreted as serving the relocation of the large refugee population in Turkey, the broader context of the occupation offers a different perspective. President Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman sentiments towards a regional Turkish hegemony are no secret. Before Turkish incursions, the “conquest” Surah of the Quran rang from mosques, and in 2012 he proclaimed, “Inshallah, we will go to Damascus soon to hug our brothers. That day is close. Inshallah, we will read el-Fatiha at the tomb of Salahuddin and pray at the Emevi mosque...” The more control Turkey gains over educational and religious institutions, the stronger its ability to shift the narrative in favor of Turkish expansionism. The destruction of heritage represents the loss of tangible reminders of the nation’s history and heightens the difficulties of returning to unity, a prerequisite to sustained peace. While Western powers continue to support peace-restoration efforts in Syria, their closest ally is diminishing the prospects of their project. How can the North Atlantic Treaty Organization continue its pledges of support to Ukrainian sovereignty while one of its members exhibits such blatant disrespect to the very notion of such?

< Back Last Call for Legality: International Law's Scrutiny of Israel Niccolo Gentile October 31, 2024 Since Oct. 7, 2023, the war in Gaza has attracted all-consuming international attention, far exceeding the sporadic focus previously given to the conflict in recent memory. The critical gaze of the international community has been accompanied—just as in previous flare-ups in the conflict—with mounting legal pressure. This time around, that pressure has materialized in the form of a series of remarkable court rulings and attempted prosecutions which advise that Israel should pull out of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), which constitutes the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem, or face international prosecution. While these steps are not completely unprecedented, they do mark a notable shift in the position of international legal institutions regarding Israel and Palestine. While the decisions remain based on impartial evidence, this sets the international justice system on a course of clashing with Israel and its Western backers, namely the United States. There are two major international courts handling cases related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: In the International Court of Justice—the principle judicial body of the United Nations meant to resolve disputes between its member countries—has presided over two cases during the war in Gaza. The former, an inquiry based on a 2022 Resolution of the General Council, ruled in an advisory decision in July that Israeli settlers must immediately withdraw from the OPT, further adding to the international jurisprudence that declares Israeli settlements in the West Bank to be a violation of international law. The latter, an ongoing court case alleging that Israel is committing genocide against Palestinians, continues to pit South Africa and a growing number of supporting states against Israel and its Western allies. Meanwhile, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, concerned with the prosecution of individuals in matters of international crime, has decided to bring charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes against both Israeli and Hamas leaders. In response, Israel denied the ICC’s right to investigate such matters, essentially refuting the international court’s jurisdiction over Israeli citizens. The UN and other international institutions are not known for their efficacy in fulfilling their mandate without significant Western backers. Thus, it is doubtful whether these filings will or would ever be meaningfully implemented if Israel is found guilty. That being said, the recent backlash to Israel’s war on Gaza trumps any previous litigation of Israel’s actions, spurring European states to recognize the State of Palestine and Turkey to cut trade with Israel. Viewing Israel-Palestine as a flashpoint in the growing fears of a New Cold War, it is worth pointing out that the battlelines weave a complex tale of who might take which side. Take the supporters of either side in South Africa’s genocide case at the ICJ. While the core Western powers of the US, France, Germany and the UK have all rallied around Israel, countries like Spain, Ireland and Belgium have decided to endorse South Africa’s accusation. Additionally, strong support for South Africa’s case comes not just from the some Arab states, but also from Latin America and China, as well as the Non-Aligned Movement. Russia remains absent as a continued black sheep in the conflict due to its ties with both sides. This speaks to a far more complex world of international issues than the Cold War of yore. The highly awaited rulings of the ICC and ICJ will likely spark further responses on the global stage. International organizations , American policymakers and humanitarian experts all have certain expectations of what will emerge from these debates. When they inevitably leave some of these unmet, faith in the already-tenuous “rules-based” world order will be confronted with the dashed hopes of the idealistic generations who instituted it. Whatever the case, there is little hope these contested pressures will restrain actions in the Gaza Strip and beyond. On the ground in Israel and Palestine, international legal matters hold little sway. Israel has now been invading Gaza for over a year in retaliation for the October 7 attacks, in turn, a response to Israeli violence at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. A cycle of violence continues to devastate the region with no foreseeable end in sight. Try as it might, the international community lacks the will, drive, or direction to impose lasting measures on the conflict. Whether such a move would have a positive or negative impact is debatable, but the current standstill in relation to the two main actors in this conflict seems to be coming to some sort of head. The situation that emerges in response to the international judicial decisions remains critical for the future outcome of this issue, even if it has little material effect for those immediately harmed.

Charlotte Well's work is undoubtedly one of the best releases of the last few years. It is an ode to memory, aging, and above all, an expression of grief. < Back Missing Figure: An Exploration of Aftersun (2022) By Pedro Meerbaum for Cinémentongraphe November 30, 2023 "I think it's nice that we share the same sky." On a 9-hour flight from Rio de Janeiro to Lisbon, my mom unexpectedly decided to watch the newly-released movie, Aftersun . The critically acclaimed A24 picture was one of my favorite movies of the year, which I had rewatched and analyzed thoroughly since its release. I sat in anticipation for her verdict, questioning if she would enjoy the movie's atypical format, or minimum-plot storytelling, let alone if she would cry as I had at the movie theater. She didn't. She only had one thing to say: "If they had made a movie about me and my dad it would have been just as, if not more, desolating." Her comment, albeit simple and short, lingered in my mind for the following 6 hours of the flight. Had my mom understood the picture better than I, seeing as me and my dad have always been close? Did she see herself in the figure of Sophie, a small girl looking back at the time spent with her absent father? Moreover, what was it about Charlotte Well's Oscar-nominated work that made it so relatable? The answer to those questions became clear as I leafed through old family albums: It lies within the universal attempt to reconstruct the puzzle of what, and why, something from our past is now missing in our lives. It lies within the missing figure. Aftersun follows Calum, played by Normal People actor Paul Mescal, and Sophie, played by the child actress Frankie Corio, as they spend a week of summer vacation in Turkey. Calum is a young single father, not older than 35, of Sophie, an 11-year-old who lives with her mom in Scotland. Set in the late 1990s, the week of vacation is often interrupted by short takes of the present, with a 30-year-old Sophie looking back at her vacation in the Mediterranean through tapes. She centers her reflections on Calum, who is often mistaken to be Sophie's brother and is struggling to embody the role of a father. In between swims and trips to tourist spots, Sophie films her dad with a little camera, the same one she would look back on 20 years later. Wells showcases the week of vacation in Turkey without utilising a traditional plot style, playing with mundane dialogues and a realistic story progression. The director herself said in a Vanity Fair interview that the movie "is not easy to describe, but powerful to behold." Through a format where nothing is revealed explicitly, the audience grasps from the get-go that this specific vacation was, the last time Sophie saw her dad. The movie begins with the sound of a camera whirring and beeping. An adjustment of zooms and focus that soon is complemented by a 90s style video recording of Calum folding clothes in the hotel room. The tape is filmed by Sophie, who comments on her recent birthday, and proceeds to ask her dad: "When you were 11 what did you think you would be doing now?" Sophie's camera whirs again and Calum, answerless, fades. The scene cuts and the movie properly begins. It is exposed, from the first scene, that there is a distance between the dad and the daughter, a feeling of nostalgia that is embedded in the faint background song and camera quality. The audience understands, then, that the movie is merely Sophie's memory. As she rewatches the tapes, and those are revealed to the viewer, the frustration of the daughter becomes clear: she desperately wants to peel the emotional layers of their last week together, looking through its content at the same age her father was when he left her. She is realizing things that her younger self would have never placed: she looks for signs of her dad's depression, indications that his well-being was in jeopardy; any warning that he would eventually fade from her life. It is hard to pinpoint within the narrative precisely what is a flashback, a dream, or simply an imagined piece that the narrator has tried to locate in the puzzle of her memory. Sophie sees a hurt father, a figure that spends half of the movie with an arm cast, and the other half with mysterious scars. When she asks him how he hurt his wrist, he replies "I didn't think it was broken." Co-Director Barry Jerkins (known for his work on Oscar-Winning Moonlight) comments that Wells, in Aftersun , is "wading through wells of quiet anguish." Calum's pain is not simply physical; he cries while taking off his plaster, but he does so with a wall dividing him and Sophie; he shows no perspective for the future, in fact, he claims to be surprised he made it to 30; he condemns smokers in front of his daughter, but quietly lights a cigarette in the room balcony as she sleeps. The nuance of his suffering, one that he so strongly tried to conceal from Sophie, becomes clear to her as time passes, and as she reaches the age of 30. There is no explanation for Calum's whereabouts – one could infer that he took his own life, or that he simply left Sophie's life without any explanation. All that is clear is that the girl tries to fill in the blanks not shown by the tapes. When her dad is not found in the room at night and appears in the morning with a huge scar, she imagines him going for a nocturnal swim. When she looks back at his lack of emotion during birthday celebrations on the trip, she pictures him sobbing alone in the hotel room. She produces a film of their vacation with tapes from her actual camera and tapes of what young Sophie jokingly calls "her little mind camera." The film reaches its climax not in any particular point of conflict, nor in any enthralling revelation. Rather it happens as Calum invites Sophie to dance to "Under Pressure" by David Bowie and Queen. As he awkwardly exhibits his dance moves, white lights flash to the sound of Bowie singing " this is our last dance ." Young Sophie dances with her dad, and as the flashes occur we see older Sophie screaming. It is not clear if she is screaming at her dad out of frustration, or at her younger self, who did not realize that was their last dance, their last moment of intimacy. In the last scene of the movie, Calum films Sophie as she enters the boarding area of the airport. He closes the camera and walks into an unknown door. The recording comes to an end. Charlotte Well's work is undoubtedly one of the best releases of the last few years. It is an ode to memory, aging, and above all, an expression of grief. It is through her mundane, but nonetheless anguished and nostalgic portrayal of the relationship between a father and a child that makes my mom, myself, and millions of other viewers consider this movie relatable. Her search for her dad through her memories is a natural reaction, a universal attempt to bring pieces together and seek solace in the unfathomable. As Sophie herself puts it, it is comforting to know "that even if we aren’t in the same place, we kind of are, you know? We’re, like, under the same sky."

Plagued by famine, economic collapse, and natural disasters, the increasingly destabilized Yemen has everything to lose through involvement in the war in Gaza. Yet, Yemeni resistance groups have emerged as some of the strongest oppositions to Israel. < Back Houthi Attacks Unaffected By US-led Counterstrikes: Houthi Role In Gaza By Colette Yamashita Holcomb January 31, 2024 Plagued by famine, economic collapse, and natural disasters, the increasingly destabilized Yemen has everything to lose through involvement in the war in Gaza. Yet, Yemeni resistance groups have emerged as some of the strongest oppositions to Israel. In particular, Houthi fighters have attacked ships in the Red Sea, forcing some of the world’s most prominent shipping and oil companies to suspend transit through the crucial maritime trade routes. The United States and other allies, including Britain, have been the primary responders to the attacks, carrying out missile strikes on Houthi targets inside Yemen. So far, the U.S. and Britain have bombed more than 60 targets in 28 locations. This precarious situation raises several questions regarding the Houthi role in the Israel-Gaza war, the global response, and what it may mean for the future of Yemen. This article tells you the key answers to these questions. Who are the Houthis? The Houthis — who also refer to themselves as Ansarullah, or “Party of God” — are an Islamist political and military organization based in the Zaydi form of Shiism. They emerged from Yemen in 1990 and have expanded beyond their Zaydi roots to a broader movement against the central government, aiming to govern Yemen in its entirety. U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken stated on Jan 17. 2024, that, beginning in mid-February, the U.S. will consider the Houthis a “specially designated global terrorist” group if they fail to halt their attacks. This shift signifies that they will be blocking its access to the global financial system, among other penalties. In 2014, Houthi fighters swept into the capital of Sana'a to further pressure the already weakened government until Yemen’s president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, resigned in January 2015. The Houthis declared themselves in control of the government and would seize power over much of north Yemen by 2016. Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia after his resignation but maintained he was still in office. Upon the deposed president’s request, Saudi Arabia launched a war against the Houthis in March 2015. A ceasefire was finally signed in 2022, lapsing after only six months, but there has still not been a return to full-scale conflict. Since the ceasefire, the Houthis have consolidated their control over most of northern Yemen and even sought a deal with Saudi Arabia to end the war and cement their role as the country’s rulers. Notably, Hadi also transferred his powers to a newly formed Presidential Leadership Council led by Rashad al-Alimi. Sources in both Saudi and Yemeni governments alleged that Saudis forced this decision. Houthi Interests in Gaza Since the escalation of the Gaza war in October, Houthis have fired weapons on commercial ships heading to and from the Suez Canal. Initially threatening to attack any vessel departing to or returning from Israel, their targets have escalated to any vessel. According to Houthi officials, their attacks on commercial and military ships intend to pressure Israel and its allies to end the war in Gaza. Yahya Sarea, a spokesperson for the group, referenced this goal in a statement made on a military operation that targeted an American ship. The Houthis had acted “in defense of the Palestinian people in Gaza, who are being exposed, until this moment, to the most horrific type of massacres by the Zionist entity,” Sarea said. The U.S. and its allies issued a joint statement condemning the attacks, which included “attacks on vessels, including commercial vessels, using unmanned aerial vehicles, small boats, and missiles, including the first use of anti-ship ballistic missiles against such vessels.” In mid-November, the Houthis seized a cargo ship and its crew — the British-owned, Japanese-operated Galaxy Leader — and are still holding them. While damaging to the ships, the attacks have not sunk vessels or resulted in any casualties. As a result of these attacks, many shipping companies have stopped using the Red Sea-Suez route and opted to send ships around the southern tip of Africa, a voyage that adds ten days in each direction, slowing trade and raising prices globally. The Houthis say they will only relent when Israel allows the entry of food and medicine into Gaza. By targeting the global supply chain in its attacks, they could be aiming to economically pressure Israel’s allies to cease its bombardment of Gaza. Primarily backed by Iran, the Houthis have received weapons and technology from the nation as part of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” — the informal anti-Israeli and anti-Western political and military coalition led by the Iranian government. Iran’s involvement in the conflict has only furthered concerns that the Israel-Gaza war will escalate into a devastating broader regional conflict. Allied Response & Future of Yemen The U.S. is leading the counter-initiative, with partners including the United Kingdom, Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Seychelles and Spain. So far, strikes from U.S. and British attack planes and warships have killed five and wounded six Houthi fighters and attacked airfields, command hubs, and weapon storage facilities. Although airstrikes have not deterred the group’s attacks on Red Sea shipping, President Biden affirmed that the U.S. will continue to carry out strikes. “Are they stopping the Houthis? No,” Biden said. “Are they going to continue? Yes.” Critics of this response have stated that allied actions against Houthi fighters are disproportionate and will harm access to humanitarian aid — crucial given that over three-quarters of Yemen’s population was considered in need of critical aid last year as it faces one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. Human rights organizations and other regional experts have warned that Biden’s redesignation of the Houthis as a specially designated global terrorist organization will complicate the work of humanitarian organizations working in Houthi-controlled Northern Yemen. This rationale prompted the Biden administration to remove the organization from Washington’s list of foreign terrorist organizations in 2021 to enable more humanitarian aid. Moreover, there is also criticism that the retaliatory strikes are too extreme and will do more harm to the people of Yemen while failing to curb further Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Without humanitarian aid — even with restricted aid — the future of Yemen looks grim. As the country struggles with extreme starvation, displacement and economic crisis, any deviation of aid has a massive human cost. A Houthi spokesperson affirmed that the group’s redesignation will not affect group operations, especially in the Red Sea, pledging unequivocal support for the Palestinian people. Afrah Nasser, a researcher from the Arab Center Washington DC, stated that the U.S. designation could “contribute to radicalizing some parts of the population and strengthen the Houthi recruitment system,” which would mean further destabilization for the population. The U.S.’s reclassification could also subject Iran to more sanctions — adding to already heavy sanctions — as it opens the opportunity for sanctions for any countries or groups that support the Houthis. Still, it is unclear if further sanctions against Iran will be a U.S. strategy and if it would be an effective path to negotiating broader regional peace.

The government’s control over media is seen as a way to shape public opinion in regard to their own agendas, protect their own interests and prevent opposing views from gaining popularity. < Back Censorship Concerns in Turkish Media Nil Çelik December 31, 2024 In the past years, censorship in Turkish media has reached alarming levels. The government maintains substantial control over television networks and censors voices that they deem oppositional. The Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) has been transformed into a primary tool to suppress opposition media, often imposing fines and broadcast bans on channels that critique the government. Among broadcasting channels that have received fines and bans are Tele1 and Halk TV . Under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish government has gradually implemented laws and policies that reduce the freedom of independent journalism. The increasing influence of the government in media has resulted in the press losing its freedom as well as its impact on citizens due to not being able to produce works that show the truth of pressing issues. Consequently, this creates an environment where independent journalism is under constant threat, and journalists are forced to choose between self-censorship or risking severe consequences. Media outlets such as Tele1, Halk TV and KRT which are critical of the government are constantly under investigation, and are targeted with forms of repression. The government’s control over media is seen as a way to shape public opinion in regard to their own agendas, protect their own interests and prevent opposing views from gaining popularity. RTÜK has the authority to impose fines, suspend broadcasts, and revoke licenses of media outlets that violate its regulations. Over the years, RTÜK has more frequently silenced opposition views, eliminating views that differ from or counter the AKP regime. RTÜK was first established in 1994 to provide a regulatory authority for radio, television, and other audiovisual media in a sense of overseeing the rapidly evolving media landscape, specifically with the emergence of private television and radio channels. In 2020 , TV station Tele1 with a five-day black screen broadcast ban over statements critical of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and Ottoman Sultan Abuldhamit II. Opposition leaders have denounced RTÜK for its move, saying that this is an "attack on free press and people's freedom of information." RTÜK's move was slammed online with the hashtag #Tele1Susturulamaz (which translates as 'Tele1 cannot be silenced') is going viral on Twitter. Similarly, Halk TV was suspended for discussing allegations of corruption linked to high-ranking government officials. In 2022 , Tele1 and Halk TV were both fined in heavy amounts for covering anti-government protests and questioning the government policies on the ongoing economic crisis. In addition to the actions of RTÜK, the AKP government has passed a series of laws that facilitate censorship and target independent media. The 2020 Social Media Law has raised concerns about the government’s increasing control over online platforms. The law requires platforms like Twitter, Facebook and YouTube to appoint local representatives and comply with content removal requests from Turkish authorities. Failure to comply with these requests can result in heavy fines and bandwidth restrictions, which effectively limit access to these platforms. This law allows the government to monitor and control online content, making it easier to censor dissenting views and limit freedom of expression. On Friday, August 2, 2024, the Instagram ban in Turkey affected the entire country, leaving millions unable to access the app. The ban on Instagram in Turkey has once again disrupted the social media lives of users, highlighting ongoing censorship practices in the country. The move sparked a backlash from Turkish citizens and quickly became a global trending topic on X. It has now gained worldwide attention. X user Cem Say shared a noteworthy update, revealing that the Turkish Constitutional Court had initially deemed the ban unconstitutional, arguing that it infringed on freedom of expression and the press. This shows the frailing justice system which has increased since the 2017 Turkish Constitutional referendum where the office of Prime Minister was abolished and the existing parliamentary system of government was replaced with an executive presidency and a presidential system which reduced the existing check and balances on the government by limiting the power of the Grand National Assembly and Turkish courts and consolidating the power to the president. Additionally , a Turkish court issued an arrest warrant on Monday for a woman accused of inciting hatred and insulting the president after she criticized the ban on the Instagram social media platform, according to broadcaster Haberturk and other news outlets. The government has also passed the "Disinformation Law," which was introduced in 2022 and penalizes those found guilty of spreading so-called "false information" with up to three years in prison. This law can be said to be designed to allow the government to censor, as it gives authorities broad discretion to determine what constitutes misinformation. The law has already been used to prosecute journalists and social media users who criticize the government. It is viewed by many as a direct attempt to silence criticism and create a sanction on free speech. Several high-profile cases highlight the Turkish government’s aggressive stance on media censorship. In 2022, journalist Sedef Kabaş was arrested for allegedly insulting President Erdoğan during a live broadcast on Tele1. She was charged under Article 299 of the Turkish Penal Code, which criminalizes insults against the president and carries a prison sentence of up to four years. This case drew widespread condemnation from press freedom organizations, which argued that it was an attempt to intimidate journalists and discourage critical reporting. In 2023 journalist Barış Pehlivan was imprisoned for reporting on the alleged mistreatment of political prisoners, his arrest was justified through the “Disinformation Law”. His case garnered significant international attention and was condemned by human rights organizations, which called it a direct attack on press freedom. The extent of governmental surveillance of the media sector was evinced even more pointedly during the 2023 earthquake in Kahramanmaraş, when media outlets criticized the government’s slow response and were targeted with fines and accusations of spreading disinformation. Independent journalists covering the inadequate efforts were faced with opposition by authorities and channels like Halk TV faced significant oppression for showing the truth such as the head of Kızılay, an establishment which provides humanitarian aid and sells tents that were supposed to be donated to victims of the earthquake. RTÜK also blocked live broadcasts from the affected areas, limiting the public’s access to crucial information. The government’s response to the earthquake crisis exemplifies its tendency to suppress critical reporting, even during times of national disaster. Moreover, the AKP’s influence over media extends beyond censorship to include the consolidation of media ownership under pro-government entities. Major companies that work with the government have acquired crucial newspapers and television channels, creating a media that projects the narrative of the government. This trend leaves little room for independent or opposition media to thrive, effectively marginalizing varying perspectives. For instance, the 2018 acquisition of the Doğan Media Group by Demirören Holding, a company with close ties to the government, marked a significant shift in Turkey's media landscape. The Doğan Media Group’s assets, including influential newspapers like Hürriyet and TV channels like CNN Türk, were transformed into platforms that largely avoid government criticism. This monopolization of media ownership undermines democratic discourse by limiting the diversity of viewpoints available to the public and creating an environment where state-aligned media dominates public opinion. International organizations and advocacy groups have repeatedly expressed concern about the limitations on press freedom in Turkey. Reports from organizations such as Reporters Without Borders (RSF) and the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) highlight Turkey's alarming ranking in global press freedom indices and document numerous cases of journalist arrests, media closures, and censorship. These organizations emphasize that the Turkish government’s actions violate international standards of free expression as enshrined in treaties like the European Convention on Human Rights, to which Turkey is a signatory. Furthermore, Turkey's growing authoritarianism in media regulation has drawn criticism from the European Union , which has urged the country to respect fundamental freedoms as part of its EU accession aspirations. Despite these pressures, the Turkish government continues to defend its policies under the guise of national security and combating misinformation, further entrenching a climate of fear and self-censorship among journalists and media professionals. Looking ahead, if censorship continues to grow in Turkey, it could further limit people’s access to diverse viewpoints and independent journalism. This would weaken democracy, as citizens may no longer receive unbiased information to make informed decisions. It could also lead to the government further consolidating its control over public opinion, and journalists self-censoring out of fear of punishment. The outcome could be a society where the media is dominated by government-approved information, making it harder for people to challenge or question authority. However, there is hope for change. Global pressure from organizations fighting for press freedom, combined with local efforts to protect journalists, could help push for reforms. Legal actions against restrictive laws and greater public demand for a free press might encourage the government to ease censorship. Additionally, as digital platforms continue to grow, they could provide new ways for people to express themselves and share information, overcoming traditional media restrictions. If these efforts are supported, it could launch a freer, more open media environment in the future.

Si l’on peut dire que le cinéma est l’art d’enregistrer des vues tirées de la réalité, c’est aussi et surtout celui d’exacerber ces images en leur donnant un sens plus saisissable par le public. < Back « It Must Be Heaven » ou quand l’absurde démonte les préjugés de l’altérité By Zohra Riahi for Cinémentongraphe October 31, 2023 Si l’on peut dire que le cinéma est l’art d’enregistrer des vues tirées de la réalité, c’est aussi et surtout celui d’exacerber ces images en leur donnant un sens plus saisissable par le public. Explosions, violence, suspense ou simplement paysages époustouflants : autant de moyens qui tentent de séduire un public en faisant valoir l’émotion, au détriment parfois d’un travail rigoureux d’authenticité. Dans cette continuité de pensée, je souhaite aborder le sujet de la représentation de l’Autre. Un sujet qui fait sensation, autant dans le cinéma dédié au « bourgeois Gaze » en France, comme vu dans « Le Brio » (2017), ou ce cinéma fait à l’étranger qui souhaite « exotiser » les salles françaises. Nous nous interrogerons alors sur la production de films « réalistes » commandés aux cinéastes provenant de l’étranger, et en particulier à ceux du Monde Arabe. J’ai rencontré la notion de Néo-Orientalisme au cinéma pour la première fois au travers de l’article de Wissam Mouawad : « Petite réflexion sur le néo-orientalisme, Le cas Nadine Labaki » dans Les Cahiers De l’Orient. Sa thèse est la suivante : « Le néo-orientalisme est beaucoup plus dangereux, beaucoup plus sournois que l’orientalisme car de par sa structure même il tente de bloquer tout discours critiquant l’authenticité de l’œuvre en question. Il est commode de faire porter par un « artiste » autochtone (consentant) un discours exotique. Par là, tout le monde trouve son compte : l’Institution, qui réussit ainsi à insuffler un peu d’authenticité à l’objet de culture qu’elle veut promouvoir comme œuvre d’art ; le producteur, qui est certain d’amortir ses coûts en donnant à la fois l’impression de financer des auteurs ; le fabricant-réalisateur, promu au rang d’artiste (au sens fort) ; le grand public qui a l’impression d’avoir accès à des films d’arts à moindre frais (et à moindre effort intellectuel) ; le public des cinémas d’art et essai, toujours à la recherche de l’authentique, et qui confond souvent authenticité et exotisme… » Ici il décrit la logique de l’offre et de la demande, qui selon lui aboutit forcément au commerce des clichés. Il questionne la façon dont les cinéastes adaptent leur histoire au public. Ainsi, financés par un acteur extérieur, les cinéastes doivent adapter leur histoire aux goûts du public occidental, qui auront la confirmation illusoire que cette œuvre est authentiquement orientale. Si Wissam Mouawad analyse « Et Maintenant On Va Où? » (2017) de Nadine Labaki dans son article, j’ai choisi d’illustrer cette théorie avec le film de Elia Suleiman : « It Must Be Heaven » (2019) . Lors d’une rencontre avec une boite de production française, lorsqu’il est à Paris, Elia Suleiman se voit refuser une offre pour un film, car celui-ci est considéré comme « pas assez Palestinien ». Lui même palestinien voulant représenter la Palestine, comment un film peut ne pas être assez Palestinien? Ma déduction personnelle est que ce sont les clichés habituels : la guerre, l’oppression, la souffrance, l’islamisme; un parti-pris qui servirait à essentialiser son pays. Un film du Moyen-Orient montré en France doit dénoncer. Elia Suleiman, refuse ce parti-pris facile, ou plutôt tente de représenter l’absurdité de ce concept en analysant la France et les Etat-Unis sous le même prisme. Son film montre ses voyages et impressions dans ces sociétés dans un triptyque de la Palestine, de Paris et finalement de New York. Non loin d’un film muet, qui laisse beaucoup de place à la contemplation, on observe avec la même ironie que celle que possède le personnage principal (joué par le réalisateur lui-même) qu’il n’y a pas forcément de lieu où il fait meilleur vivre. Si la Palestine connait son propre désordre absurde, avec ses tumultes quotidiennes comme le voisin du narrateur, voleur de citrons ; elle est aussi représentée comme un théâtre aux récits mystiques, dévoilés par une iconographie typique du pays que sont les cactus, les oliviers ou encore l’apparition énigmatique d’une femme dans la nature sauvage. Plus tard, à Paris, le protagoniste ne s’attend pas à voir que la ville est vide de ses habitants pendant le 14 juillet. Au lieu d’être un moment de fête et de vie pour la nation, ce n’est que le vain défilé de la majestuosité et de l’armement du pays. Dans les belles rues de la métropole, la seule présence est celle des tanks et des avions de chasse. Et lorsque le SAMU apporte un plateau repas gastronomique à une personne sans domicile fixe, on ne retient que l’irrationalité et l’idéalisme de la société. Après tout, que pourrait un SDF vouloir de plus? Finalement, à New York, les mères déambulent avec une poussette pendant qu’elles pratiquent la gymnastique synchronisée dans Central Park, car selon la logique capitaliste tout doit être rentabilisé et exploité. De même, tout le monde fait ses courses avec une mitraillette accrochée sous le bras, dans la totale normalisation de cette atmosphère d’anxiété omniprésente. Pourtant, malgré le dépaysement, où qu’il aille le narrateur rencontre la même présence de la police et des points de contrôle, comme chez lui. Ce film ne tente pas de donner des réponses, il fait surtout émerger de nouvelles questions au spectateur. Selon moi, il souhaite montrer que l ’exotisme renvoie au spectateur. La différence que l’on tente de projeter, contraste-t-elle nécessairement avec soi? Qu’y a-t-il de si étrange dans l’Autre?

Le refus de Netanyahu de démissionner laisserait son gouvernement extrémiste au pouvoir, prolongeant la guerre et limitant la possibilité d’une pacification post-guerre. < Back Après la guerre, quel futur pour l’Israël? By Anna Halpern January 31, 2024 La guerre entre l’Israël et le Hamas, nous en entendons tous parler. Que se soit pour le procès de l’Afrique du Sud contre l’Israël, accusé de génocide à la CIJ (Cour Internationale de Justice), pour des questions humanitaires ou sécuritaires, le gouvernement Israélien est critiqué très fortement non seulement par la communauté internationale, mais aussi par les Israéliens eux-mêmes. En effet, le pire manquement sécuritaire de l'État Hébreux depuis une génération et même depuis sa création a secoué la scène politique Israélienne. Du gouvernement dont les positions violentes se sont trouvées confortées dans leur haine de l’autre, aux pacifistes pointant du doigt les problème liés à un conflit de plus de 75 ans, aux opposants du gouvernement attaquant Netanyahu pour ses problèmes judiciaires et son incapacité à prévenir les événements du 7 octobre, cette guerre est perçue comme un tournant. La question reste la suivante à ce carrefour de l’histoire Israélienne: quelle voie va-t-elle emprunter quand la guerre sera finie? Tout d’abord, pour comprendre la situation politique Israélienne il est important de revenir sur les événements du 6 octobre 1973 et leurs impacts. En effet, on ne peut manquer de faire le parallèle avec la guerre de Kippour déclenchée exactement 50 ans et un jour avant. Les forces armées Israéliennes s’étaient retrouvées prises au dépourvu quand une coalition de pays Arabes menés par l’Egypte et la Syrie ont attaqué l'Israël le jour de Yom Kippour, le jour le plus sacré pour les juifs. Ce grave manquement sécuritaire avait à l’époque été reçu comme un choc. L'Israël, malgré sa victoire militaire, y avait perdu de son image de puissance militaire sans faille et le gouvernement avait failli en ignorant des informations qui leur avaient été transmises et en manquant cruellement de préparation face à cette attaque. L’impact de cette guerre sur la politique Israélienne ne peut être ignoré. En effet, l'Israël ayant perdu de sa confiance en son système défensif s’est engagé dans une voie de pacification avec les accords de Camp David avec l’Egypte. De plus, le désastre sécuritaire subi par l'Israël mène Golda Meir (la première ministre Israélienne) à démissionner le 11 avril 1974 et à la création de la commission Agranat créée pour enquêter sur ces manquements de la part des forces de défenses Israéliennes et de la Première Ministre. Dans le cadre de la guerre Israël-Hamas et de l’attaque du 7 octobre, il est plus que probable que l’on voit un processus similaire se produire, étant donné que non seulement l’opposition politique, mais la grande majorité de la population Israélienne exige la démission de Netanyahu (Selon un sondage mené par l'Institut démocratique israélien paru début janvier, seulement 15% des Israéliens se disent favorables au maintien du Premier Ministre au pouvoir après la guerre). Il semble donc que dans un futur post-guerre les Israéliens soient très motivés à rejeter le gouvernement Likoud en faveur probablement de Yair Lapid, le leader de l’opposition, ou de Benny Gantz. Selon la proposition de Lapid, le futur de Gaza pourrait être une administration par une coalition d’États Arabes tels que l’Arabie Saoudite et les Emirats Arabes Unis, mais incluant l’Autorité Palestinienne (AP). Néanmoins, la paix ne serait pas facile, surtout avec le maintien de sa position sur une déradicalisation nécessaire de l’AP avant sa participation. En outre, le futur reste encore très flou. Le refus de Netanyahu de démissionner laisserait son gouvernement extrémiste au pouvoir, prolongeant la guerre et limitant la possibilité d’une pacification post-guerre. D’autre part, chaque instant que la guerre se prolonge, l'Israël perd du soutien international, et il est impossible de nier que cela impactera forcément le déroulement du processus de paix.