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The government’s control over media is seen as a way to shape public opinion in regard to their own agendas, protect their own interests and prevent opposing views from gaining popularity. < Back Censorship Concerns in Turkish Media Nil Çelik December 31, 2024 In the past years, censorship in Turkish media has reached alarming levels. The government maintains substantial control over television networks and censors voices that they deem oppositional. The Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) has been transformed into a primary tool to suppress opposition media, often imposing fines and broadcast bans on channels that critique the government. Among broadcasting channels that have received fines and bans are Tele1 and Halk TV . Under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish government has gradually implemented laws and policies that reduce the freedom of independent journalism. The increasing influence of the government in media has resulted in the press losing its freedom as well as its impact on citizens due to not being able to produce works that show the truth of pressing issues. Consequently, this creates an environment where independent journalism is under constant threat, and journalists are forced to choose between self-censorship or risking severe consequences. Media outlets such as Tele1, Halk TV and KRT which are critical of the government are constantly under investigation, and are targeted with forms of repression. The government’s control over media is seen as a way to shape public opinion in regard to their own agendas, protect their own interests and prevent opposing views from gaining popularity. RTÜK has the authority to impose fines, suspend broadcasts, and revoke licenses of media outlets that violate its regulations. Over the years, RTÜK has more frequently silenced opposition views, eliminating views that differ from or counter the AKP regime. RTÜK was first established in 1994 to provide a regulatory authority for radio, television, and other audiovisual media in a sense of overseeing the rapidly evolving media landscape, specifically with the emergence of private television and radio channels. In 2020 , TV station Tele1 with a five-day black screen broadcast ban over statements critical of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and Ottoman Sultan Abuldhamit II. Opposition leaders have denounced RTÜK for its move, saying that this is an "attack on free press and people's freedom of information." RTÜK's move was slammed online with the hashtag #Tele1Susturulamaz (which translates as 'Tele1 cannot be silenced') is going viral on Twitter. Similarly, Halk TV was suspended for discussing allegations of corruption linked to high-ranking government officials. In 2022 , Tele1 and Halk TV were both fined in heavy amounts for covering anti-government protests and questioning the government policies on the ongoing economic crisis. In addition to the actions of RTÜK, the AKP government has passed a series of laws that facilitate censorship and target independent media. The 2020 Social Media Law has raised concerns about the government’s increasing control over online platforms. The law requires platforms like Twitter, Facebook and YouTube to appoint local representatives and comply with content removal requests from Turkish authorities. Failure to comply with these requests can result in heavy fines and bandwidth restrictions, which effectively limit access to these platforms. This law allows the government to monitor and control online content, making it easier to censor dissenting views and limit freedom of expression. On Friday, August 2, 2024, the Instagram ban in Turkey affected the entire country, leaving millions unable to access the app. The ban on Instagram in Turkey has once again disrupted the social media lives of users, highlighting ongoing censorship practices in the country. The move sparked a backlash from Turkish citizens and quickly became a global trending topic on X. It has now gained worldwide attention. X user Cem Say shared a noteworthy update, revealing that the Turkish Constitutional Court had initially deemed the ban unconstitutional, arguing that it infringed on freedom of expression and the press. This shows the frailing justice system which has increased since the 2017 Turkish Constitutional referendum where the office of Prime Minister was abolished and the existing parliamentary system of government was replaced with an executive presidency and a presidential system which reduced the existing check and balances on the government by limiting the power of the Grand National Assembly and Turkish courts and consolidating the power to the president. Additionally , a Turkish court issued an arrest warrant on Monday for a woman accused of inciting hatred and insulting the president after she criticized the ban on the Instagram social media platform, according to broadcaster Haberturk and other news outlets. The government has also passed the "Disinformation Law," which was introduced in 2022 and penalizes those found guilty of spreading so-called "false information" with up to three years in prison. This law can be said to be designed to allow the government to censor, as it gives authorities broad discretion to determine what constitutes misinformation. The law has already been used to prosecute journalists and social media users who criticize the government. It is viewed by many as a direct attempt to silence criticism and create a sanction on free speech. Several high-profile cases highlight the Turkish government’s aggressive stance on media censorship. In 2022, journalist Sedef Kabaş was arrested for allegedly insulting President Erdoğan during a live broadcast on Tele1. She was charged under Article 299 of the Turkish Penal Code, which criminalizes insults against the president and carries a prison sentence of up to four years. This case drew widespread condemnation from press freedom organizations, which argued that it was an attempt to intimidate journalists and discourage critical reporting. In 2023 journalist Barış Pehlivan was imprisoned for reporting on the alleged mistreatment of political prisoners, his arrest was justified through the “Disinformation Law”. His case garnered significant international attention and was condemned by human rights organizations, which called it a direct attack on press freedom. The extent of governmental surveillance of the media sector was evinced even more pointedly during the 2023 earthquake in Kahramanmaraş, when media outlets criticized the government’s slow response and were targeted with fines and accusations of spreading disinformation. Independent journalists covering the inadequate efforts were faced with opposition by authorities and channels like Halk TV faced significant oppression for showing the truth such as the head of Kızılay, an establishment which provides humanitarian aid and sells tents that were supposed to be donated to victims of the earthquake. RTÜK also blocked live broadcasts from the affected areas, limiting the public’s access to crucial information. The government’s response to the earthquake crisis exemplifies its tendency to suppress critical reporting, even during times of national disaster. Moreover, the AKP’s influence over media extends beyond censorship to include the consolidation of media ownership under pro-government entities. Major companies that work with the government have acquired crucial newspapers and television channels, creating a media that projects the narrative of the government. This trend leaves little room for independent or opposition media to thrive, effectively marginalizing varying perspectives. For instance, the 2018 acquisition of the Doğan Media Group by Demirören Holding, a company with close ties to the government, marked a significant shift in Turkey's media landscape. The Doğan Media Group’s assets, including influential newspapers like Hürriyet and TV channels like CNN Türk, were transformed into platforms that largely avoid government criticism. This monopolization of media ownership undermines democratic discourse by limiting the diversity of viewpoints available to the public and creating an environment where state-aligned media dominates public opinion. International organizations and advocacy groups have repeatedly expressed concern about the limitations on press freedom in Turkey. Reports from organizations such as Reporters Without Borders (RSF) and the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) highlight Turkey's alarming ranking in global press freedom indices and document numerous cases of journalist arrests, media closures, and censorship. These organizations emphasize that the Turkish government’s actions violate international standards of free expression as enshrined in treaties like the European Convention on Human Rights, to which Turkey is a signatory. Furthermore, Turkey's growing authoritarianism in media regulation has drawn criticism from the European Union , which has urged the country to respect fundamental freedoms as part of its EU accession aspirations. Despite these pressures, the Turkish government continues to defend its policies under the guise of national security and combating misinformation, further entrenching a climate of fear and self-censorship among journalists and media professionals. Looking ahead, if censorship continues to grow in Turkey, it could further limit people’s access to diverse viewpoints and independent journalism. This would weaken democracy, as citizens may no longer receive unbiased information to make informed decisions. It could also lead to the government further consolidating its control over public opinion, and journalists self-censoring out of fear of punishment. The outcome could be a society where the media is dominated by government-approved information, making it harder for people to challenge or question authority. However, there is hope for change. Global pressure from organizations fighting for press freedom, combined with local efforts to protect journalists, could help push for reforms. Legal actions against restrictive laws and greater public demand for a free press might encourage the government to ease censorship. Additionally, as digital platforms continue to grow, they could provide new ways for people to express themselves and share information, overcoming traditional media restrictions. If these efforts are supported, it could launch a freer, more open media environment in the future.

Football, once dubbed the “beautiful game,” has become the epicenter of sports washing, a newly coined term that refers to ways in which countries invest in sports to promote their reputation and deflect attention from their less favorable activities. Qatar is not alone in this. < Back Qatar Bids for Manchester United By Noor Ahmad March 31, 2023 Manchester United, the globally renowned English football club with over 140 years of history, the winner of 20 Premier League titles, 12 FA Cups, three Champions’ League titles, and the home to iconic players such as David Beckham and Cristiano Ronaldo, has become the center of takeover speculation in the last several weeks. Bought outright by the Glazer family in 2005 at an estimated price of £790 million and with an estimated debt of £660 million, the takeover elicited wide protests by fans, as much of the club’s earnings had to be diverted away from spending on the club to servicing the debt. Even a campaign known as “Love United, Hate Glazer” was started by its fans. From 2010 onwards, there was speculation of supporters groups such as the “Red Knights” coalescing to buy out the Glazer family, but the price sought by the Glazers was considered well beyond what they were prepared to pay. Instead, the Glazers listed the club’s shares on the New York Stock Exchange, valuing the club at more than two billion dollars. Since then, their popularity with the club’s fans has remained strained. They decided in November 2022 to undertake a strategic review, which may include a partial or full sale of their remaining 70% share in the club. A soft deadline of Feb. 17, 2023, was set by the Glazer family’s merchant bank advisors. Two bids for the club have materialized. One is from Sir Jim Ratcliffe, owner of INEOS Group, a British chemical company. The other, from Sheikh Jassim bin Hamad Al Thani, has elicited the most attention, as little is known about this member of the Qatari Royal Family. He is the eldest son of Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani. The Qatari politician who goes by HBJ is the former head of the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), foreign minister, and prime minister of Qatar. HBJ is reputedly worth $1.3 billion, according to Forbes Magazine. Yet, Sheikh Jassim’s bid is likely to be an all-cash offer, valuing the club at $4.5 billion. This disparity between the potential bid and the net worth of his family’s patriarch has raised concerns among many that Sheikh Jassim is not the true bidder; it is suspected that the QIA, the State of Qatar’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, may be the source of the funds and that Sheikh Jassim is merely a figurehead. In the past, Sheikh Jassim was nominated by the QIA to represent its interests at Credit Suisse, which appointed him to the Board of Directors in 2010. The separation of interests is important as the QIA already owns Paris Saint-Germain (PSG), which it acquired in 2011. UEFA rules stipulate that two clubs owned by the same owner cannot compete with one another in any of their competitions. These rules were introduced to protect competitive integrity. The risks include untoward financial benefits and distorted transfer activity among clubs with the same owners to the detriment of other clubs. Beyond this, the owners of PSG have been the target of Javier Tebas, the president of La Liga, the Spanish football league. He contends that Qatari ownership has already caused financial distortions which have allowed PSG an unfair financial advantage in bidding for and retaining players that breach UEFA’s new cost controls that place a limit on spending on player and coach wages, transfers, and agent fees to 70 percent of club revenues. These financial regulations that apply to all clubs in UEFA competitions were first introduced in 2010, with the aim of improving solvency and stability for clubs. The State of Qatar also owns Qatar Airways, its national airline, which is one of the main sponsors of PSG, providing a major source of revenue to the club in its spending. La Liga’s complaint stems from PSG’s spending, which made Kylian Mbappe reject a move to Real Madrid. Nasser Al-Khelaifi, the President of PSG, who is also a UEFA executive committee member and chairman of the European Club Association, has countered with his own criticisms of Spanish club Barcelona on raising funds and big money transfers. Football, once dubbed the “beautiful game,” has become the epicenter of sports washing, a newly coined term that refers to ways in which countries invest in sports to promote their reputation and deflect attention from their less favorable activities. Qatar is not alone in this. Abu Dhabi owns Manchester City and has also been a sponsor of Real Madrid, and countries like Russia, Saudi Arabia and China are also considered active in this field. With football as a great interest of many people, it is an efficient conduit through media that allows positive impressions to form, according to Michael Skey of the London School of Economics. The truth behind the bid for Manchester United may eventually be unveiled by new legislation, for which a discussion paper, also known as “white paper,” has been floated by the British government in the last few weeks and described as the most radical overhaul of governance since 1863. Although it is not common practice for the government to regulate football, this is a new set of regulations being discussed in light of the potential for sports washing. The white paper envisages a new regulator that will focus on stronger due diligence and the sources of wealth of club owners. However, given the opacity with which linkages between state and individuals exist in the Middle East, it is more likely that we may never know. But one thing is clear, foreign ownership of football clubs and sports sponsorship have become another frontier of political influence through sports washing.

Malgré la répression du gouvernement, la voix des Iraniens et Iraniennes ne faiblit pas et se fait entendre à travers le monde dans les diasporas américaine, allemande, canadienne ou encore française. < Back La voix des artistes : un soutien essentiel aux soulèvements en Iran By Salomé Greffier October 31, 2023 À l’occasion de la commémoration d’un an de la mort de Mahsa Amini ayant succombé à ses blessures en garde à vue suite à son arrestation par la police des mœurs, les Iraniens et Iraniennes poursuivent leurs combats contre le régime des mollahs arguant fièrement le slogan « Femme, Vie, Liberté ». La mort de cette jeune femme kurde accusée d’avoir mal ajusté son voile le 16 septembre 2022, a déclenché des mouvements de foule sans précédents dans un État où le terreau de la mobilisation civile demeurait déjà riche. Plus précisément, depuis la révolution de 1979, le régime se heurte à sa population qui l’accuse de la diriger d’une main de fer, dissimulant ses exactions derrière d’innombrables mensonges. La dénégation des autorités quant à leur implication dans le décès de Mahsa Amini a poussé l’exaspération des Iraniens à son comble, trouvant dans la rue le seul moyen d’expression de leur colère. Malgré la répression du gouvernement, la voix des Iraniens et Iraniennes ne faiblit pas et se fait entendre à travers le monde dans les diasporas américaine, allemande, canadienne ou encore française. « Khodeshoun kardan ! » [Ils (le régime) l’ont fait eux-mêmes!] résonne comme un cri d’espoir et de solidarité poussé contre l’absurdité des violences commises. Une des voix qui se dresse contre la république théocratique d’Ali Khamenei, demeure celle des artistes. Ce comportement n’est pas anodin. En effet, l’histoire nationale iranienne est parsemée d’engagements d’artistes ayant influencé des choix politiques et sociaux. Leur célébrité leur confère un pouvoir de persuasion auprès de la population et leur travail éclaire une vérité cachée par les autorités. Ils font sortir des images de l’Iran pour confectionner leurs œuvres, ce qui relève de l’impossible dans un pays fermé à double clé, censuré. Malgré le danger, le travail des photographes Sajede Sharifi et Jeanne Grouet dans Le Laser Vert mêlent désobéissance civile, résistance publique et privée à l’autorité, à la censure et à la répression du gouvernement de la République islamique. Les deux femmes exposent des images d’intimité côtoyant des photographies de manifestation. Par l’image, les artistes capturent des instants de vérité et se présentent comme témoins des exactions commises par le régime. Provoquant les institutions, nombre d’artistes ont dû fuir pour éviter la répression ou ont été détenus arbitrairement dans les geôles de la prison d'Evin notamment. Nous pouvons relever les noms de Jafar Panahi réalisateur du film Taxi Téhéran (2015), de Saeed Roustaee réalisateur de Leïla et ses frères (2022) récompensé au Festival de Cannes ou encore de Mina Keshavarz réalisatrice également. Ces trois figures majeures du monde du cinéma iranien ont été emprisonnées sans que des accusations concrètes soient invoquées. La détention de Mina Keshavarz et d’une de ses homologues, Firouzeh Khosravani, ont déclenché une mobilisation spéciale avec pour slogan le hashtag #FreeWomenDirectors . Ces cas particuliers ne sont malheureusement pas isolés mais reflètent le traitement systématique de la répression des artistes en Iran sur l’année écoulée. Dans l’objectif de dénoncer cet acharnement, Nasim Vahabi, écrivaine franco-iranienne lauréate du prix littéraire de Sciences Po 2024 pour son livre intitulé Je ne suis pas un roman (2023), réalise une liste non exhaustive recensant tous les noms d’auteurs, de poètes, journalistes assassinés ou actuellement incarcérés en Iran. Parmi les 16 000 personnes interpellées lors des premières semaines de soulèvement (Rapport 2022/2023 Amnesty International), nombreux étaient artistes. Un des derniers à avoir subi les frais de la police des mœurs est le chanteur et activiste Mehdi Yarrahi. Son titre Roosarito « ton voile » se positionne contre l’obligation du port du voile et est dédié aux « courageuses femmes iraniennes ». Il écope sa peine depuis août sans doute pour « inimitié à l’égard de Dieu ». L’investissement des artistes en Iran est fondamental et s’accompagne d’un soutien de la communauté depuis l’étranger. Marjane Satrapi, dessinatrice de la fameuse bande dessinée Persepolis, a publié en septembre dernier un travail comptant près de 200 planches dessinées en soutien à la révolte. Intitulé Femme, Vie, Liberté témoigne de la volonté de la diaspora de soutenir la révolte. De même, dans le monde de la musique, des dizaines d’artistes tels que le pianiste Arshid Azarine ont donné des concerts en l’honneur des Iraniens et Iraniennes se battant pour leurs droits. Le 22 mai dernier, à la Cité de la Musique, quatre artistes ont présenté le projet Mèches de feu en référence à la mobilisation des artistes françaises ayant coupé symboliquement une mèche de leurs cheveux en soutien aux femmes iraniennes. Cet évènement mené par l’actrice Julie Gayet, mêle musique classique et poésie d’auteurs comme Garous Abdelmakian et Rambob Daghigh. Trois musiciennes Shani Diluka, pianiste ; Sonia Wieder-Atherton, violoncelliste; Anousha Nazari mezzo-soprane Iranienne participent à cette aventure artistique. L’objectif ici était de recourir à la musique comme langage universel afin de permettre aux messages de solidarité et de paix d’être diffusés aux quatre coins du monde avec la viralité qu’ils méritent. En outre, il ne faut pas négliger que la mobilisation en Iran demeure moins virulente après un an d’affrontements. Selon le Tehran Times, c’est avant tout la détermination de l’Occident, et in extenso de la diaspora Iranienne, qui maintient les braises de l’agitation et qui a exploité le premier anniversaire de la mort de Mahsa Amini pour la relancer. Les rassemblements à Londres, Berlin, Bruxelles ou encore Melbourne en témoignent. Alors qu’une adolescente de 16 ans, Armina Garavand, se trouve dans le coma depuis le 4 octobre 2023 suite à l’intervention de la police des moeurs, demeure une certitude : l’hymne Barayé entonné depuis le début des évènements dans les Etats où se trouvent des ressortissants Iraniens ne faiblira pas tant que le régime des mollahs persistera. Les mots, les images et la musique se dresseront toujours face à l’injustice intolérable et la violence arbitraire.

The gap between official and unofficial inflation rates is staggering; both domestic and foreign investment has plummeted, and there are instances of people waiting in lines to receive food supplies. It is uncertain how Erdoğan plans to regain his popularity. However, one thing is certain: when people can’t afford their food and shelter, their political views change. And if this continues to be the case for Turks, the end of the road for Erdoğan is near. < Back Collapsing Lira Signals the End of the Road for Turkey’s Erdoǧan By Ata Tezel November 30, 2021 “Whoever supports higher interest can not be on the same side with me!” were the words President Erdoğan used in his party’s annual meeting in November, reaffirming his commitment to lowering interest rates at any cost. His words portrayed not only his unconventional economic beliefs but also posed a direct threat to the administration of the central bank, which had been reluctant in following his interest policies. However, with the lira falling like a rock, it is unclear whether Erdoğan will keep standing by his beliefs or concede to making a political U-turn, something his administration has been associated with for years. Among all major currencies, the Turkish lira has been the worst-performing since 2018, losing up to 80% of its value in a three-year span. Turkey has also experienced one of the highest rates of inflation among leading developing economies, with its official annual inflation rate surpassing 20% this year. It is therefore confusing to many that Mr Erdoğan strongly advocates for lowering interest rates, an unconventional and practically counterintuitive policy to combat an economy in stagflation. Erdoğan’s economic priorities are different from those set by virtually every other nation in the world. Amidst the demand recovery from the health crisis this year, Turkey is the only nation that reduced policy rates, which says a lot about the recent shift in Erdoğan’s political agenda. In his own words, Erdoğan believes that “interest rates are the culprit, inflation is the result.” In an economy that is heavily dependent on foreign financialization and one that experiences high currency volatility and interest rates, it is unclear how Erdoğan, a self-claimed economist, reached this conclusion. Nonetheless, what is clear is that pursuing this belief has resulted in a massive economic downturn which, if not changed, will certainly lead to catastrophic consequences. What is interesting about the situation is that the consequences of the president’s interest policy were not unprecedented — many in the political and financial spheres of Turkey, as well as other global players, have repeatedly raised concerns regarding the long-term sustainability of Turkey’s unconventional growth mechanics. Moreover, the Turkish people have been the direct subject of his failures, and their unrest against the government amidst witnessing their savings and income shrink is heard loud and clear. In fact, Erdoğan currently has the lowest approval rate of his 20-year-long rule, and both the presidency and parliamentary polls for the 2023 election indicate, for the first time in his political career, that he and his party are on track to get ousted from power. Therefore, Erdoğan’s fixation with his economic policies indicates that, following his massive loss in the 2019 Mayoral Elections, he has been unclear about his political intentions and insecure about his future. In fact, for the first time, Erdoğan is resistant to calls for early elections by the opposition. For a populist figure that has legitimized all his actions based on ballot results, this is unprecedented. Moreover, it is clear that the power of political Islam in Turkey has been diminishing significantly as the economic turmoil gets more severe. Many of Erdoğan’s supporters could care less about the religious rightness of the concept of economic interest over their declining living standards. His attempts to deviate attention from the crisis have been unsuccessful, on the contrary, scandals from his past and present have been piling up. For the first time, these scandals are receiving the attention of the people, who now call for early elections. Consequently, it is unknown whether Erdoğan can survive the upcoming elections in 2023. More worryingly though, it is unclear if the economy and the people can endure the crisis for two more years. Solely in the first half of December 2021, the central bank of Turkey spent more than 10 billion US dollars of foreign reserves in an attempt to stabilize the plummeting currency, just for it to fall further once the interventions ended. The gap between official and unofficial inflation rates is staggering; both domestic and foreign investment has plummeted, and there are instances of people waiting in lines to receive food supplies. It is uncertain how Erdoğan plans to regain his popularity. However, one thing is certain: when people can’t afford their food and shelter, their political views change. And if this continues to be the case for Turks, the end of the road for Erdoğan is near.

Considered the oldest political group within the Arab world, the Muslim Brotherhood is rejected by multiple Arab countries who designate it as a terrorist organization. Can an organization which participated and led alleged plots, assassinations and government overthrows truly change and become non-violent? < Back Is the Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Organization? By Isabella Hehl Dalla Zuanna November 30, 2022 Where lies the limit between a strong ideological religious group with a history of violence and a terrorist organization? After how many violent attacks do these stop being exceptions and instead a major characteristic of the group? Can an organization that participated in and led alleged plots, assassinations and government overthrows truly change and become non-violent? These are the questions that outline the struggle of countries today when deciding whether or not the Muslim Brotherhood should be labeled a terrorist organization or a religious and political movement. Considered the oldest political group within the Arab world, the Muslim Brotherhood is rejected by multiple Arab countries who designate it as a terrorist organization, such as Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and even non-Arab country Russia. Founded in 1928 in Egypt by an Islamic teacher and scholar, Hassan al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood’s original goal was to find a universal Islamic system of rule. Embracing political activism, social responsibility, charitable works and social support programs, the Brotherhood seeks to serve its main support base of low-income populations. The organization’s current leader in Egypt is Mohamed Badie, who is currently in prison, serving numerous life and death sentences for, among other charges, murder, incitement of violence, support of Islamist President Mohamed Morsi, vandalism and incitement to terrorism. Some of the group’s international offshoots are the Islamic Constitutional Movement in Kuwait, Tunisia’s Ennahda and Hamas in Palestine, some of whose founding members were originally in the Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood has a complicated political history within Egypt, which was only exacerbated by brotherhood member Mohamed Mohamed Morsi Eissa al-Ayyat’s, stint as president between 2012 to 2013. Morsi was nominated as a backup candidate but became the official President when Kharait El-Shater was disqualified in the elections. Through a temporary constitutional declaration in November of 2012, Morsi granted himself unlimited power, described by some as an “Islamist coup.” Soon, with accusations of repressing the freedom of press and demonstrations, major protests began in 2012 and ended in June of 2013, when now-President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi removed Morsi from office in a coup-d’état, commonly referred to as the June 30 Revolution. Presently, many of the Brotherhood’s remaining members have been accused by the Egyptian government of supporting Morsi, a criminal act in the eyes of the Sisi regime. Since then, the government has labeled the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. Sisi’s administration has implemented aggressive policies which aim to eradicate Brotherhood leadership and isolate it by spreading a narrative that links it to violent Islamism. Yet, the Muslim Brotherhood miraculously still prevails today. Their resilience poses a risk to Sisi’s legitimacy and the stability of the Egyptian state. Currently, the Egyptian government holds thousands of the group’s members in prison, where they often face abuse, violating international prison standards, such as the freedom from torture outlined in the Declaration of Human Rights. Other preventative measures against the organization include confiscating its assets and media censorship. Sisi believes that the ends justify the means — it is worth suppressing a violent terrorist organization that has previously threatened political leadership for national security. However, the Brotherhood has claimed to reject violence and wishes to participate in mainstream politics. Are governments to believe that they are still a terrorist organization, or should they be treated as any other religious and political movement? The Egyptian government justifies its classification of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization by describing it as a group with “blood on its hands,” due to their connection with Morsi, the multiple terrorist attacks orchestrated by Brotherhood members and because many offshoot organizations of the Brotherhood are jihadists. They claim that the Brotherhood’s attempts to prove it has become a non-violent organization are only a manipulative tactic to regain public and media popularity. At this point, they will once more resort to violence. Terrorist attacks led by members of the organization include the bombing of a police bus in Rashid in 2015, wounding dozens of policemen and killing four, the burning of the General Court of Fayoum Governate in Fayoum, the setting of fires at the Friends of the Bible Society building in Fayoum, storming police stations in Youssef Al-Siddiq and Tamiya, and the theft of ammunitions. The Muslim Brotherhood’s perennial challenge of effectively mixing religion with politics has historically ended in violence and strife, as was the case for Egypt in 2012-2013. Gamel Abdel-Gawad, a political analyst from Al-Ahram, wrote that “Egypt began to stabilize only after Al-Sisi was elected president in May 2014, and even then, the country was still forced to fight the remnants of terrorist groups and help the state stand on its feet again. Despite its defeat on June 30, 2013, the Brotherhood resumed its war against the new regime, resorting to terrorism and assassinations and launching a media war.” Another aspect that would justify categorizing the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization would be that many offshoots of the group are known to be violent and dangerous jihadists, such as “Liwaa al-Thawra,” “Popular Resistance,” “Helwan Brigades,” “Ajnad Misr” and “Revolutionary Punishment.” According to the Egyptian government, these offshoots did not only originate from the group but were financed and led by them. However, Sisi’s claims are disputed by other states and independent journalists. The Tahir Institute for Middle East Policy stated that “understanding the Salafist influence is important for it highlights how [Ajnad Misr] and similar [groups] that may pop up are not necessarily an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood and its ideological outlook, as the government contends.” Even though the Muslim Brotherhood’s rightful characterization may be up for debate, it is indisputable that they have a history of violence, starting at their roots. The group’s founder, Hassan al-Banna, once said, “Jihad is an obligation from Allah and every Muslim and cannot be ignored nor evaded.” In his book “The Way of Jihad,” he wrote: “Jihad means the fighting of the unbelievers and involves all possible efforts that are necessary to dismantle the power of the enemies of Islam, including beating them, plundering their wealth, destroying their places of worship, and smashing their idols.” This ideology was followed not only during the Brotherhood’s terrorist attacks but also when they mourned the death of Osama bin Laden. Numerous clerics of the group have openly supported the violence against Coptic Christians in Egypt, as well as antisemitic behavior when discussing their views on the Holocaust. An Egyptian Sciences Piste, who has asked to remain anonymous, described the “atrocious” acts of terror by the Brotherhood: “words cannot describe the hate I have for them, and how they made it more complicated to get into a place of worship. Until today, before entering churches, bags are checked, you go through scanners, and they sometimes even ask for your ID (which indicates your religion).” Most violent extremist acts and quotes come from the three years following the June 30 Revolution and have not occurred more recently. However, the Brotherhood’sHamas branch still currently participates in suicide bombings, kidnappings and rocket attacks with civilian targets, all of which the Brotherhood view as a legitimate response to Israeli occupation. Its other branches, conversely, only very loosely associate themselves with the Brotherhood and arguably cannot concretely be connected. The Egyptian media and government propagate myths about the organization being affiliated with large jihadist groups such as Al Qaeda. While some Brotherhood members quit the group in frustration with the organization’s policy on non-violence and joined groups such as Al Qaeda, the Brotherhood has repeatedly denounced the infamous jihadist group. Most experts outside of Egypt have agreed that the organization cannot be classified as a terrorist group. Even when the Donald Trump presidency tried to label it as such, the Trump administration could not find enough evidence. David D. Kirkpatrick from the New York Times argued that “the main international advocates for the designation are Mr. el-Sisi of Egypt and his authoritarian allies in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Alarmed that Muslim Brotherhood parties might rise to power through elections, all three governments have cracked down on the Islamists and pressed their allies to do the same. They argue that the Brotherhood’s Islamic ideology makes it a threat to the idea of the nation-state and thus a threat to the region’s stability.” As a result, whether or not it is for Sisi’s political gain, if one only looks at the present day, there is not enough proof to label the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. However, it cannot be easy to erase its history of violence. The anonymous Sciences Piste stated, “what makes it more alarming to me is how some of the churches that were bombed were ones my parents had been to throughout their childhoods, and that’s not anything they can forgive the Muslim Brotherhood for committing. I would not trust a Muslim Brotherhood-based government.” It is logical why countries might define the Brotherhood differently based on their geographical location. Countries far from the conflict — unaffected by the group’s historical violence — would understandably be more easily ready to believe the Brotherhood has evolved. In contrast, countries with a more personal relationship with the organization who still see the psychological scars caused by the Brotherhood today would be more inclined to stay wary. Overall, the rational labeling of the group as terrorist or non-terrorist depends on how long one believes a period of non-violence must last until the group in question has definitively shifted away from terrorism. Arguably, since it has only been about half a decade in the case of the Brotherhood, it might be premature to claim that they have completely veered away from terrorism. The Brotherhood being labeled as a terrorist organization in Egypt is enforced by Article 7 of the Terrorist Entities Law. Their meetings are banned, all of its activities have been shut down, funding is prohibited, all of the group’s assets and its members are frozen, and it cannot access any social media or express itself digitally. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood, which has often wished to become a part of the mainstream political conversation, is strictly banned from all public activity. Even if some can consider these measures as unfair since the Muslim Brotherhood is characterized by most as a non-terrorist organization, it cannot be disputed that the organization stands for extreme and arguably highly dangerous and intolerant values such as a support for a totalitarian system operating under sharia law and various forms of religious discrimination. Today, the Brotherhood attempts to gradually return to the Egyptian street through its “Change Movement of the Muslim Brotherhood,” also called the “Kemalist movement,” after Muhammad Kamal, who led major terrorist operations in Egypt in 2014. Whether or not this is a prelude to violence that could once again destabilize Egyptian politics remains yet to be seen.

The government reopened the borders on February 7, 2022 following a series of protests from tourism industry workers. As the world enters a new phase of the pandemic, with increasingly more governments viewing COVID-19 as an endemic disease, there still remains some uncertainty. < Back As Morocco Opens its Borders, a Delicate Return to Normal By Colin Lim March 29, 2022 Toward the end of November 2021, news of the mysterious Omicron variant swept the world. It was another episode in the seemingly never-ending saga of COVID-19, a routine to which the world had become accustomed by that point. Governments around the world predictably imposed new restrictions in an attempt to curb the spread of the more contagious yet less deadly variant, and some, including Morocco, closed their borders entirely. This had a grave impact on its tourism sector, which comprised 7.1% of its GDP in 2019 and has been facing a severe decline since the start of the pandemic, as well as general international commerce and economic activity. Royal Air Maroc had planned to launch direct flights from Casablanca to Tel Aviv on December 12, 2021, following the normalization of relations between Morocco and Israel (coincidentally the only two MENA countries to have closed their borders in response to Omicron), and they finally reached this important milestone in intra-MENA relations on March 13, 2022. On a human level, Moroccan citizens and diaspora members overseas who wanted to visit relatives in the kingdom could no longer do so. This is not just an abstract concept; in fact, many members of the Sciences Po campus of Menton community are from Morocco or have strong family ties to the country. Maryam Khattari, a 2A from Casablanca, was very upset over the border closure, and she expressed frustration over not being able to go home or have her family members leave the country to visit in Europe. She emphasized the lack of sufficient advance communication from airline authorities regarding the suspension of flights, as well as the great deal of uncertainty that resulted from the lack of a clear end date for the restrictions. Anis Karrakchou, a 2A from Rabat, also did not visit Morocco during the break; rather, he enjoyed time in Tunisia with the Babel Initiative. He acknowledged his minority position, but was somewhat apathetic regarding the border closure. He did express sympathy toward those who had missed the opportunity to visit relatives during the month-long break in between the autumn and spring semesters. He has now recently returned from Morocco and recounted how “enjoyable [and] comfortable” it was “to see my family and to eat Moroccan food — the food I grew up with.” The government reopened the borders on February 7, 2022 following a series of protests from tourism industry workers. As the world enters a new phase of the pandemic, with increasingly more governments viewing COVID-19 as an endemic disease, there still remains some uncertainty. One can only hope that the dark days of travel bans will soon be behind us.

Until now, Kurdish voters have gritted their teeth and arguably voted against their best interest for the sake of democracy, and it seems that we must now imagine a world where they do not. < Back In The Lead-Up to Local Elections, Istanbul’s Kurdish Voters in Spotlight By Yasmin Abbasoy March 30, 2024 The 2019 elections were an undisputed success for a weary Turkish opposition. On a late-night political talk show of the sort that is omnipresent in a pre-election Turkey, then-leader of the main opposition Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu received nothing but laughter from the moderator when stating his party’s goals for the campaign. Listing the names of coveted provinces including the capital, Ankara, and the city that is arguably the heart of Turkey, Istanbul, he went on to state that the opposition would “be taking all of these places.” Despite the laughter and the ridicule he later received online, he was proven right by a prodigious result in the elections; the opposition alliance emerged having wrested away from the governing Justice and Development Party, and its People’s Alliance, the metropolitan municipalities of five additional provinces, among which were Ankara and, crucially, Istanbul. In Ankara, main opposition Republican People’s Party candidate Mansur Yavaş prevailed over longtime member of the President’s inner circle and current minister Mehmet Özhaseki relatively uncontroversially. His past as a member of the ultranationalist alliance partner of the government, the Nationalist Movement Party, was much-discussed but seemed to have little bearing on final vote totals. In Istanbul, whose mayorship carries unparalleled pragmatic and symbolic value, the race was much more fraught. As the largest city in Turkey in terms of population and industry, Istanbul is valuable for its rent-generating properties. Its status as the cultural capital and beating heart of the country has however transformed it into the nucleus of Turkish politics. President Erdoğan started his political career as the mayor of Istanbul in 2001, and engraved this path into the collective public consciousness with his often quoted phrase: “Whoever takes Istanbul takes Turkey.” The opposition candidate, Ekrem Imamoğlu, was at the time the mayor of a small western district of Istanbul. He emerged as the underdog, supported solely by Kılıçdaroğlu over other candidates which were more prominent in the public eye. He emerged mostly unscathed despite a state-supported campaign which saw him accused of everything from being a “crypto-Greek',”a fifth columnist opposed to Turkish national interests, to a supporter of the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party. This was a true trial by fire for a candidate who constructed his persona on tolerance and pacifism as encapsulated by his slogan, “Everything will be alright.” Imamoğlu won the first round of the election with a margin of 14,000 votes, though the results were contested by the governing coalition and later annulled by the supposedly-impartial Supreme Election Council. This proved to be a strategic mistake on the part of President Erdoğan, as Imamoğlu increased his margin of victory to over 800,000 votes to lead the opposition to its most significant victory in decades. On the heels of this triumph, widely interpreted as the first blow to Erdoğan’s two-decade regime, the opposition coalition was optimistic heading into general elections in 2023. Hopes were dashed, however, when alliance parties were unable to decide on a unity candidate. The nationalist Good Party pushed for Imamoğlu, but was opposed by the main opposition, who cited a pending criminal case filed against him by the government, which would render him unelectable if he lost. Party chairman Kılıçdaroğlu was ultimately chosen as the candidate, upon which the Good Party announced a withdrawal from the alliance, setting off a cascade of meetings and backroom talks which saw crisis averted but the deep fractures in the alliance laid bare. A campaign that had already been launched on the back foot failed to sway nationalist and islamist voters and further failed to retain the Kurdish vote. A disappointing finish in the first round saw the alliance pivot sharply to the right and campaign on the lowest common denominator in Turkish politics: sending Syrian refugees back to Syria. There was a hasty attempt to establish ties with the far-right ultranationalist Victory Party, whose chairman Ümit Özdağ has been credited with mainstreaming the idea of sending refugees ‘home’ in buses involuntarily. Local media reported that Özdağ, who was courted by both the opposition and the government, had been offered a significant ministerial position from the opposition–a red line for the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party — who was not officially a part of the alliance but had been promised support on key issues. Shockingly, after this large-scale compromise of principles, Özdağ elected to support the government party instead. In the aftermath, Erdoğan won the second round with a comfortable margin of around 2 million votes. In a way, it has always been Kurdish voters who have decided the fate of the opposition. In 2019, the People’s Democratic Party broke with tradition and did not field a candidate in Istanbul, despite not being party to a formal alliance. During the campaigning stage for the second round of elections, Abdullah Öcalan, the former leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party who has been jailed since 1999, released a letter urging Kurdish voters not to unite under the banner of the opposition alliance. The coverage this letter received on pro-government news channels and discussion panels was no coincidence. When Kurdish voters coalesced around Imamoğlu, it was what won him the election. In 2023, pro-Kurdish parties again chose not to field candidates and to support the opposition alliance for informal guarantees. In return, however, they found an opposition that was perfectly willing to take their votes for granted all while attempting to form alliances with violent racists. This was yet another datapoint in an ongoing pattern for an opposition which sees Kurds as ‘vote depositories,’ according to senior party officials. Most direfully, the main opposition has consistently displayed a chilling disregard for what was and continues to be potentially the most salient issue in the Kurdish political space: the appointment of ‘trustees’ in the place of elected officials to 48 People’s Democratic Party municipalities since 2019. This practice, which has been referred to as a ‘coup on local democracy’ by party officials and the Council of Europe, has failed to draw overt condemnation from the main opposition. The opposition alliance broke apart almost immediately after the general elections. The main opposition replaced its chairman for the young(er) and allegedly more charismatic Özgür Özel, who inherited a party that had alienated most of its allies. The People’s Democratic Party, on the other hand, faced pressure from their base to drop the quasi-alliance strategy, especially in the light of an ongoing criminal case over tenuous links to terrorist organizations that could lead to the closure of the party. Party leaders admitted their strategy had not worked, and expressed their intention to run candidates in all big cities in the 2024 elections. The 2024 local elections will see Imamoğlu defend his position against Murat Kurum, an unremarkable man most notable for his role in rebuilding efforts after the devastating earthquakes of 2023 as the Minister for Forestry, Urbanism, and Climate Change. For Imamoğlu, a victory is essential to establish himself as a viable future presidential candidate, an opportunity for which he has already been passed over once. The field of candidates is a wide one — almost every single political party has at least one candidate in the running. The People’s Democratic Party, for their part, have put forward their co-leaders under the banner of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party, a joint venture with the left-leaning Green Left Party. Polling figures show that the overwhelming majority of People’s Democratic Party voters who voted for Imamoğlu in the previous election would vote for their own candidate in 2024. In this scenario, the margin of difference between Imamoğlu and Kurum would be a mere two percent. It is these dynamics which will determine the result that comes out of the Istanbul elections. Like so many other elections in Turkey, what really matters here is not promises or ideological notions. This election is being played out in the past, as a response to two decades of betrayal from the main opposition. Until now, Kurdish voters have gritted their teeth and arguably voted against their best interest for the sake of democracy, and it seems that we must now imagine a world where they do not.

The sheer joy that usually accompanies the World Cup approach has been tainted this year. Qatar, the next World Cup site, continues to raise human rights concerns. < Back The 2022 Qatar World Cup Has a Dark Side By Arian Akrami September 30, 2022 The sheer joy that usually accompanies the World Cup approach has been tainted this year. Qatar, the next World Cup site, continues to raise human rights concerns. Evidence of labor exploitation and poor working conditions in unbearable heat has led to accusations of modern slavery. These tensions have been ever-present since the controversial decision by the International Federation of Football Associations (FIFA) in 2010 to award Russia and Qatar the 2018 and 2022 World Cups, among corruption allegations. According to Amnesty International, around 2 million migrant workers (mainly from Africa and Asia) have been employed to construct roads, metros and eight remarkable stadiums. More will be hired for the security, hospitality and transport industries during the event itself. Labor importation is understandable given Qatar’s meager population of 2.8 million and the world’s 5th highest GDP per capita ($84,510 according to the International Monetary Fund). The lack of pre-existing stadiums and infrastructure in a nation that has almost no significant sporting history or need for public transport further justifies the necessity for foreign workers. However, the issue comes with the “Kafala” or “sponsorship” system, which binds foreign workers to a local sponsor, or “Kafeel,” which is often their employer. A similar system is employed by all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as well as by Jordan and Lebanon. At face value, this does not appear to pose any particular problems, and it is essential to note that some of the issues within the Kafala system in Qatar have seen improvements during the last two years, the efficacy of which will be later examined. But these organizations cleverly fall into the category of interior ministries as opposed to labor ministries, meaning that labor laws cease to apply to migrant workers. Consequently, laborers lack the right to join unions or freely enter the labor dispute process. While these sponsors provide “housing,” it is more akin to overcrowded dormitories, posing a particular risk during the pandemic. Furthermore, workers require the explicit permission of their sponsor to leave their job, or even the country, since the “Kafeel” reserves the right to invalidate residency status without reason. Not adhering to these terms spells potential imprisonment or deportation. Employers regularly confiscate passports, visas and phones to enforce this. Such terms are often stipulated in contracts written in languages the migrants do not speak. Qatari employment is also rife with “debt traps.” This means that recruitment fees, which host countries require from sponsors, are handed down to workers who, before recruitment, cannot afford the fees. As a result, they are obliged to take out loans which indebt them to their Kafeel. According to the Guardian , there have been 6,750 migrant deaths in the 12 years since Qatar was awarded the right to host the World Cup. Many of those deaths are traced to subjecting workers to continual labor for up to ten hours a day in summer temperatures of 113 degrees Fahrenheit (45 degrees Celsius) or more. Could the World Cup be perceived as a force for good in the Middle East, a region that has never hosted the tournament? U.S. Soccer spokesman Neil Buethe argues that “Qatar has made more progress with respect to human rights in the last four years than it has in the last four decades because it is hosting the World Cup.” While, to some extent, this is true, the lives of so many innocent workers are not a justifiable means to the ends of fundamental labor rights. Kuwait and Qatar have gone as far as imprisoning female workers under “Zina” laws (an Islamic legal term referring to unlawful sexual intercourse) concerned with extra-marital sex, even in the case of rape. Why do migrant workers accept this work? Simply put, the pay is higher than in their country of origin. According to the World Bank, remittance payments help combat poverty in lower-income nations. While some countries like Kenya and Indonesia have prevented workers from emigrating to GCC nations. This can often have an adverse effect since workers with no alternatives will seek human smuggling gangs as a means of achieving what they perceive to be superior employment opportunities in the Middle East. Qatar has managed to implement some reform following global condemnation. Last spring, new regulations were adopted that banned work outdoors between 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. from June to mid-September. In August 2020, Qatar revoked the rule requiring employers’ consent to switch jobs and implemented a monthly minimum wage of 1000 Qatari riyals ($274). However, many workers still experience delays, harassment, threats, imprisonment and even deportation during the job-switching process. A Qatari government spokesperson claimed that the reforms had “transformed” the labor market, contributing to over 78,000 successful job transfers in the final quarter of 2020. The delays were supposedly due to the sudden high volume of transfer requests. More recently, the BBC reported that on Aug. 14, 2022, 60 workers protested, reportedly having not been paid for seven months. An unconfirmed number of protestors were instantaneously detained and deported. The Qatari government confirmed this event, which insists that they had been detained for “breaching public security laws.” Concerns about discrimination are not limited to the workers. Homosexuality remains illegal in Qatar, incurring up to three years in prison, and a possibility of the death penalty for Muslims under Sharia law, although there are no known cases of the application of the latter. The Qatari government does not recognize same-sex marriage nor permit campaigning for LGBTQ+ rights. On Dec. 8, 2020, Qatar announced that rainbow flags would be allowed in stadiums at the 2022 World Cup in line with FIFA regulations. The World Cup Chief Executive Nasser Al-Khater stated, “when it comes to the rainbow flags in the stadiums, FIFA have their own guidelines, they have their rules and regulations, whatever they may be, we will respect them.” Nevertheless, in May 2022, some hotels on FIFA’s official list of recommended accommodations forbade room reservations for homosexual couples. Others agreed to host homosexual couples if they agreed to hide their relationship publicly. FIFA has since pledged to remind Qatar of its obligations to ensure a tolerant welcome to all fans. In an interview in Germany on May 20, 2022, the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, stated that the LGBTQ+ visitors would be welcomed to the 2022 World Cup but that they need to respect the nation’s culture. Foreseeable issues such as these put into perspective the ignorance of FIFA to award the 2018 and 2022 World Cups to Russia and Qatar, respectively. Perhaps it is time for the Middle East to finally host the World Cup; however, this would have been better suited to a nation with at least some of the infrastructure necessary for an event of such scale. FIFA also missed a golden opportunity to transform the region for the better by holding Qatar to stringent human rights standards. Spectators should not carry guilt for this iteration of the World Cup. They have a right to enjoy the world’s greatest sporting spectacle. However, FIFA bears a responsibility to have sufficient foresight in matters of ethical conduct when awarding such a monumental event.

Ultras, celebrations, anthems, hatred and violence are often associated with football. Coming from a country where the derby between Olympiakos and Panathinaikos brings out some of the best ultras in the world, I came to discover what happens in my new country of residence, France. < Back Eternal Enemies: PSG vs Olympique de Marseille Eleni Dimitropoulou October 31, 2024 Ultras, celebrations, anthems, hatred and violence are often associated with football. Coming from a country where the derby between Olympiakos and Panathinaikos brings out some of the best ultras in the world, I came to discover what happens in my new country of residence, France. These often involve clubs that consistently contend for titles, as well as neighboring teams—a key aspect of what defines a derby. It’s more likely that Steaua Bucharest will reclaim the European championship, Morecambe will win the Premier League, or Nafplio will become the capital of Greece again than the likelihood ofParis Saint-Germain (PSG) and Marseille ever reconciling. Their rivalry is deeply rooted in historical, cultural, social and class differences—opposing ways of life and entrenched perceptions. From a purely sporting perspective, Paris and Marseille don't share much history before 1970, when PSG was founded. Until then, Marseille primarily competed with teams like St. Etienne and Bordeaux for the French title, boasting dominance in Ligue 1. However, over the decades, the dynamics changed. Olympique de Marseille (OM), founded in 1899, is one of the few clubs that played in Ligue 1 when it was formed in 1932 and continues to compete there today. After a tumultuous period in the 1960s, marked by stints in Ligue 2, the arrival of Bernard Tapie revitalized the club, leading to back-to-back championships. Since then, OM’s performances have fluctuated, and despite frequently being at the top, the club has faced challenges maintaining its position. Notably, OM is the only French club to have won the UEFA Champions League, in 1993. Additionally, it has won the Coupe de France ten times and claimed the Ligue 1 title nine times. PSG, meanwhile, burst onto the scene in 1986, shaking up French football by winning Ligue 1 for the first time. Until that point, Marseille had been the pride of the Mediterranean, outshining the Parisians in the football world. PSG’s rise dealt a significant blow to Marseille's pride and triggered the beginnings of an intense rivalry. While the rivalry only officially dates back to 1991, it is more about what the clubs represent . Marseille is a Mediterranean city, open and full of sun, famous for its working-class origins, vibrant emigrant communities and a rich history of art and literature that carries its multiculturalism. On the contrary, Paris lies on a generally rainy plain, striving to be an enclave of power and elegance, home for the upper classes with highly emphasized high culture, luxury and congenital elitism. Whereas the culture of Marseille is steeped in genuineness and pride for the locale, Paris exudes eloquence and elegance, often with a hint of supremacy over the rest of the country. This tension between Paris and Marseille was born in 1660 when the forces of Louis XIV invaded Marseille, subduing the rebellious city and subordinating it to direct royal control. That ended a long-standing tradition of Marseille's independence and fostered great resentment, thus starting an embittered rivalry between the northern pole of power in Paris and the proudly independent southern port). This regional rivalry was eventually transferred to football in 1991. At the time, Marseille was not only France’s strongest team but also a serious contender in the Champions League. As pay TV was emerging in France, Canal+ made a move to buy PSG, which Bernard Tapie, OM’s president, found scandalous. Tapie launched a campaign around the idea that “France is not just Paris” and “The South cannot be subjugated by the North.” Media outlets fueled this fire, and a true derby was born. The match on May 29, 1993, solidified this rivalry as France’s most important. At that time, the political establishment was pursuing legal action against Tapie, and tensions were high. Marseille triumphed 3-1, with goals from Rudi Völler, Basile Boli, and Alen Bokšić after PSG had initially taken the lead through Vincent Guérin. This victory, which eventually secured Marseille’s title, sparked wild celebrations in the city. Since then, the rivalry, known as Le Classique , has endured for over 30 years. PSG won the league again in 1994 and, backed by Qatari ownership, has since built a team that competes on the global stage. Meanwhile, Marseille has struggled to keep pace, often fighting for a top-three finish. Despite these differences, Le Classique remains one of the most anticipated fixtures in French football. To better understand this theoretical concept in the sports world, we had the chance to delve into this topic more by interviewing a true fan, a classmate of ours, Aymen Madani from the 2As. Q: How did you become a fan of Marseille, and how has your connection to the club evolved over time? Aymen: "I’ve been fond of Marseille since the day I was born because, well, I was born and raised there. I’ve spent my entire life in the city. I’ve been a Marseille fan from the very beginning, even as a kid. I wasn’t deeply into football back then—I never joined a football club or association—but I followed Marseille as much as I could. When I entered middle school, around 11 or 12, I started watching their games more closely and got more involved as a fan. The matches against Paris made me prouder to support OM. As I grew older, I realized how intense the rivalry is, especially when Paris comes to Marseille. The reception Paris players get when they come to Marseille is just wild—it's chaotic. That’s when I thought, ‘Wow, we really do hate Paris.’" Q: Are there episodes of violence between fans? Aymen: "The atmosphere outside the stadium can get chaotic hours before a match. But PSG fans in Marseille and OM fans in Paris have been banned since 2010-2011. So, it’s been nearly 15 years that we’re not allowed to travel to these away games. The spots reserved for away fans are closed during these matches." Q: What is football to you? Aymen: "A family tradition—that's how I would characterize it. So with my mother and three elder sisters, we would watch often but actually, my sisters and especially my mother, despite their ignorance when Marseille plays, become quite interested and they would actually make efforts. They would cheer like their life depends on it and they would defend the équipe even though they do not understand the rules." Q: What’s the difference between ultras and hooligans? Aymen: "People often confuse ultras with hooligans, but they’re different. Hooligans use football as an excuse for violence. Ultras, on the other hand, are deeply dedicated to the club and consider themselves a key part of it. They’re like an extension of the club—when you think of the team, you think of the players, coach, president, and the ultras. Unfortunately, some ultra groups become violent, especially during away games, as they’re fiercely protective of their club. It’s their identity—they are the club, and the club is them." Q: What do you think about Mbappé leaving Paris? Aymen: "I’ve grown up watching PSG beat Marseille most of the time, and Mbappé has been our worst nightmare since 2018. We call him 'the turtle' or 'the nut' because he always haunts us. He’s the second-highest scorer in Le Classique and enjoys mocking us when he scores. However, I appreciate his talent with the French national team, especially since he carried them to victory in 2018. This season, our team is doing well, sitting in third place, tied with Monaco. If we can beat Paris this month, we could overtake them in the standings. We’ll see, but I don’t think our chances are much better, even if Mbappé leaves." Q: When was the last time your team beat PSG, and what were the circumstances? Aymen: "We last beat them in October 2020, right after the COVID-19 lockdowns, in their stadium. That was our first win against PSG in eight years, as we hadn’t beaten them since 2012. More recently, we won in February 2023 in the Coupe de France, beating them 2-1 at home. That victory turned into a massive street party, with people honking, singing and celebrating all night. The stadium atmosphere was incredible, but sadly, I wasn’t there in person. Watching it on TV was still unforgettable, though." Q: How does football impact a fan, especially a man's mood? Aymen: "My mood depends on their performance. So, I can come on a Monday with a depressed look because they lost the game. But if they won the day before and let's say we won against Paris the day before I'll be too cheerful and delighted. I am hosting a party."

Concrete, tall and monotonous, these “famous postwar apartment blocks” have for better or for worse forged Athens’ contemporary architectural identity, usually conveying a feeling of indifference or discontent to most of its residents. With their appearance dating back to the early twentieth century, their preponderance and widespread development in the following decades is intrinsically tied to the city’s historic path and the occurrence of various major events such as growing demographic pressures and the end of the military junta in 1974. < Back Athenian Architecture and Urban Policy: Diffuse (Dis)Organization Or A New Sense of Cohesion? Margarita Kopsia November 30, 2024 Debates on the issues of historic preservation, the rise and fall of architectural neoclassicism in European cities and contemporary methods for rapidly housing masses of population in developing urban areas all form crucial matters in the field of architecture and urban policy. One can find pieces of all these questions and perhaps even some bits of answers just by taking a stroll around their closest urban setting. It is not rare to be able to notice subtleties such as the concrete blending with other or with more aged materials, bearing witness to all the charming contradictions that cities are characterized by. Athens is no exception to this, as the Greek capital teaches whoever is attentive to its fusion of architectural styles and diffuse spatial planning the value of finding beauty where it is traditionally attributed, be it, for example, in the indisputable worth of the ancient monuments that the city is well-known for, but also where fewer are willing to inquire into. By this last point, I am more specifically referring to what has been the ambiguous result of Athens’ exponential growth in the second half of the twentieth century and the crisis that it was hit by earlier in that period, which tangibly influenced its unique and seemingly unattractive landscape. The latter is dominated by the polykatoikies (plural of polykatoikia ) , or “multi-residence” buildings, appearing to serve the sole purpose of housing as many people as possible at affordable costs. Often overlooking aesthetics by having had to keep up with the rapid urbanization trends they emerged from, they are commonly criticized for being too dull and soulless. Concrete, tall and monotonous, these “ famous postwar apartment blocks” have for better or for worse forged Athens’ contemporary architectural identity, usually conveying a feeling of indifference or discontent to most of its residents. With their appearance dating back to the early twentieth century, their preponderance and widespread development in the following decades is intrinsically tied to the city’s historic path and the occurrence of various major events such as growing demographic pressures and the end of the military junta in 1974. Given the specificities and fragilities of the process through which these apartment complexes proliferated, it can be very enlightening to ask ourselves what lessons can Athens teach us, from its “successes” as well as its “mistakes.” Can we rethink how we should tackle issues related to the interaction between architectural influences, challenging historic contexts and, in some cases, the neglected importance of valuing the past all while turning to the future? The roots of a perceived bitterness What constitutes today a major source of frustration and discontent among Athenian residents is in fact the striking disposal of nineteenth century neoclassical architecture in favor of these modern “condominiums.” Linked to the search for more state-of-the-art amenities, these were presented as means to maximize each building’s capacities. The neoclassical style of architecture, which signaled a “ revival of Classical architecture” by showcasing the development of a “new taste for antique simplicity” among Western powers, had in fact been exported to Greece in the 1830s at the time of the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece. King Otto of Bavaria had been chosen as Greece’s King by the great powers and strived to put into practice various aspects of his romanticized vision of the country. This had led to the involvement of European architects such as Theophil and Christian Hansen, Ernst Ziller and Eduard Schaubert, who pursued their works in the city alongside other Greek architects. Traces of their designs can still be found around the capital, as some of their leading works include, for instance, the Zappeion Megaron , the Presidential Mansion and the emblematic buildings that are part of the Athenian neoclassical trilogy in the center of Athens. The latter are comprised of the National Library of Greece, the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens and the Academy of Athens, which, no matter how significant and imposing they are, amount to only a small minority of the neoclassical constructions that were once scattered in various corners of the capital, as most did not survive in the face of the new pressures that governments and individuals were eventually faced with. There are multiple factors that represented major political and social challenges, inducing various demographic evolutions in the direction of dramatic increases through massive settlements or civil divides. For instance, one can cite the 1923 Greek-Turkish Population Exchange “that saw 1.5 million Greek refugees leave Turkey and settle in Greece,” the “Axis Occupation of Greece (1941-45)” and the “Greek Civil War (1946-49).” As such, the neoclassical architectural wave shortly found its end and the remains of that period are rather found in simple exterior building decorations and ornamentations that are adjacent to the “simplified classical” style of architecture. Paired at times with various Art Déco elements from the 1930s, such architectural interactions often add figures of stability and resilience to the elegant and timeless neoclassical character. It is interesting to note, however, that the fading of the neoclassical boom in Athens did not necessarily signal the end of all external architectural influences in Greece, as it is essential to note the prevalence of the famous French architect Le Corbusier’s principles in the design and construction of various other projects during the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s. More precisely, it is important to discuss the substantial aftermath of the fourth International Congress of Modern Architecture held in Athens in 1933, which was illustratively titled The Functional City . Le Corbusier was remarkably a firm believer in functionalism in matters of architecture and urban planning; accordingly, he promoted “ such characteristics as clean geometric forms and open efficient spaces,” intrinsic to the values of the Modern Movement and the ensuing International style of architecture . Such principles undoubtedly paved the way for the development of modern architecture in Athens. Public schools, for instance, appear to have been heavily influenced by the modern ideals of open and efficient space, as one of their fundamental characteristics is their large horizontal windows providing “ even light and panoramic views.” The consequent prevalence of modern polykatoikia is therefore deeply tied to the development of the modern architectural and urban ideal. Last but not least, when it comes to understanding how such an extensive presence of polykatoikies was made possible, perhaps we should also take a closer look at the adoption of new laws that facilitated the purchase of buildings. This is the case of the “ governmental housing policy known as antiparochi ,” which favored the construction of buildings even by “non-professionals” in “informal” ways, without necessarily relying on too much capital. Consequently, contemporary Athenian architecture and urban planning resemble in essence a blending of various internal and external influences whose predominance was profoundly altered under the effect of major events of historic, political, economic, legal and social value contributing to the formation of its authentic landscape. Towards new symbols of cohesion and stability As mentioned previously, the generalized preference for polykatoikies over neoclassical constructions partly relates to the emergence of new needs for modern comforts, as “ the carefully decorated and carved façades, although beautiful and somewhat reminiscent of the (glorious) ancient Greek past, did not satisfy the needs of the 20th century Athenian.” However, the unintentional social implications of such a predominance also form part of one of these buildings’ strongest characteristics. It is not uncommon for polykatoikies to be attributed the merit of having laid the foundations for a new social organization which appears to be in favor of closer contact between people, often by bridging the gaps between social classes. Polykatoikies have in fact managed to become, more accidentally than not, home to different fragments of the Greek population, as “ in a typical polykatoikia, the ground floor would most likely be a shop, a café, a restaurant or a bar, then the first couple of floors would be occupied by the lower social classes while the upper floors would house wealthier families.” Consequently, polykatoikies could very well have turned into contemporary urban symbols of social unity, even resulting in relationships of greater trust and solidarity between groups. Thus, this urban model and the mechanisms it has put in place appear to have managed to curb the “ socio-spatial segregation” that can be often observed in contemporary European urban settings, by supporting systems of social diversity and the development of more networks among individuals. Still, the lack of proper urban policy and planning are increasingly forming part of Athens’ major sufferings, as its diffuse and unorganized nature fails to answer to the city’s contemporary concerns. Over the last decades, the city has been facing multiple environmental issues and various other contemporary challenges that can be traced back to these irregularities, like important traffic jams. As such, what can one conclude about the reality of the contemporary Athenian urban landscape? The modern polykatoikies oftentimes come out as the neoclassical architecture’s “unworthy” successor, with the neoclassical buildings’ short-lived and scarce presence potentially showcasing a decline of Greece’s own ancient architectural principles. That being said, the amenities and perspectives offered by polykatoikies —despite their mundane appearance—have also participated in Athens’ transformation into the modern metropolis it is as of today and have showcased patterns of social bonding. Their anarchical positioning and nature can however be quite frustrating, to the extent of having even been considered as one of the city’s greater flaws; they have served as evidence of Athens’ severe lack of urban planning in the aftermath of the city’s hasty reconstruction. All these elements are nevertheless shaping the hardships and struggles the country has had to face, alongside the evolutions these phenomena have accompanied. What is demonstrated at the end of the day by the Athenian case is the extent a city’s appearance is inherent to its historic roots and tumultuous times. In light of this, one could even argue that this is precisely where real cultural value lies: in the narrow space between our ideals and the material representation of all the unavoidable fluctuations and drawbacks that are increasingly forming part of the human experience. Perspectives for a better development of the Greek capital do exist, and carry with them the hope that urban policy in Athens will be able to better meet its residents’ wants and needs in the following decades.

Sanctions failed to make Saddam Hussein withdraw from Kuwait, unseat Fidel Castro, convince Haiti’s junta to honor democratic election results, or prevent India and Pakistan from testing nuclear weapons. Despite mounting sanctions against Iran, the violent suppression of protests has not abated — Iranian courts have begun to issue death sentences for those with links to the protests. < Back Are Iran Sanctions an Ethical Alternative to War? By Peyton Dashiell December 31, 2022 Since the rise of recent Iran protests after the killing of Mahsa Amini and subsequent violent crackdowns at the hands of Iranian officials, the international community has employed a range of responses. The United States stalled highly-anticipated nuclear negotiations, the United Nations Human Rights Council held a special session on the situation in Iran and new economic sanctions, travel bans, and asset freezes were applied to many individuals and companies with ties to the Iranian government. These actions are not new developments — since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the international community has applied various economic, trade and military sanctions against Iran with efforts spearheaded mainly by the United States. Reasons cited for sanctions include Iran’s nuclear program, the backing of the Houthis in the Yemeni Civil War and support for designated terrorist groups like Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. As a result of sanctions, Iran has experienced a drastic reduction in oil revenue, billions of dollars of frozen foreign assets and almost complete exclusion from the global financial system due to sanctions on banks. Economic sanctions against Iran from the United States can be divided into two categories: primary sanctions, which prevent U.S. citizens and entities from engaging in economic activity with Iran, and secondary sanctions, which bar non-American entities from engaging in business with Iran if they want a presence in the United States. Due to secondary sanctions, multinational corporations do not operate in Iran due to the risk of being banned from the American market. The European Union and International Atomic Energy Agency have imposed their own sanctions on the Iranian regime due to unauthorized nuclear activity. In 2007, the European Union froze all assets of individuals with ties to Iran’s nuclear program, and in 2010, they joined the U.S. policy of banning all transactions with Iranian financial institutions. However, the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action lifted some sanctions against Iran in exchange for limits on its nuclear program. Initially a party to the deal, the United States withdrew in 2018, citing national security concerns. These sanctions have resulted in broad economic and humanitarian consequences. Since 2018, the Iranian currency has lost 50 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar, prompting inflation and higher living costs for citizens. And while American sanctions theoretically exempt humanitarian imports, many medical companies over-comply with these sanctions out of fear of retaliation and penalties from the U.S. government, resulting in severe shortages of medications and raw materials for medical production. According to Idriss Jazairy, United Nations Special Rapporteur on Effects of Sanctions on Human Rights, under economic sanctions, “people die but from lack of food and medicine, rather than from explosive devices.” Unfortunately, this has been true in practice. After the United Nations Security Council imposed economic sanctions and a complete trade embargo on Iraq in 1990 due to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, an estimated 1.2 million Iraqis were killed due to malnutrition and disease — 500,000 of whom were children. Jazairy also argued that sanctions deserve the same recognition and concern in the international community as any act of war. These negative humanitarian effects are not an unprecedented consequence. After new U.S. sanctions were imposed in 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo admitted that “things are much worse for the Iranian people, and we are convinced that will lead the Iranian people to rise up and change the behavior of the regime.” This lends credence to the idea that economic sanctions are a form of collective punishment — punishments imposed on a group for the actions of individuals. This practice is regarded as a violation of international human rights law and illegal under the Fourth Geneva Convention. Secondary sanctions imposed by the United States have been exceptionally controversial in international law due to their extraterritorial jurisdiction, and other major global powers have tried to mitigate their economic effects. After the 2018 JCPOA withdrawal, the European Commission issued a Blocking Statute, declaring U.S. Iran sanctions illegal. Businesses based in Europe became explicitly prohibited from complying with the U.S. sanctions and could recover damages from U.S. restrictions on legitimate business with Iran. Finally, sanctions as a foreign policy tool evoke broader questions regarding the morality of international intervention. Since the end of World War II and the advent of a new, post-Westphalian world order, the international community has taken on the responsibility of monitoring and upholding human rights through military intervention, sanctions and prosecution in international courts. But to what degree should this responsibility be applied — and are sanctions that worsen civilian conditions in the name of human rights hypocritical? Despite their prominent role in modern foreign policy, there are few examples of sanctions eliciting their desired political response. Sanctions failed to make Saddam Hussein withdraw from Kuwait, unseat Fidel Castro, convince Haiti’s junta to honor democratic election results or prevent India and Pakistan from testing nuclear weapons. Despite mounting sanctions against Iran, the violent suppression of protests has not abated — Iranian courts have begun to issue death sentences for those with links to the protests. As history has demonstrated, economic sanctions are an ineffective political measure that comes at an extreme civilian cost. While carefully calculated sanctions against specific industries or government officials may be a useful foreign policy tool, utilizing sanctions in the fashion of the United States — as an economic blockade spanning decades and forcing civilians to bear the effects — is an undeniable human rights infringement. Sanctions are not a flippant, inconsequential measure to respond to issues seen as not important enough to justify military operations — in some cases, they are more impactful than any act of war.

The recent increase in the number of races held in the Arabian Peninsula comes from the rise in investment from the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, which is currently advocating for the addition of a second race in Qiddiya. < Back Formula 1: Are the Gulf Countries “Sportswashing”? By Selin Elif Köse March 30, 2024 It’s lights out and away we go : Formula 1 2024 season is officially off to a start with the much anticipated Bahrain Grand Prix. As the silly season comes to an end, the whole Formula 1 community is still in shock with seven-time world champion Lewis Hamilton's announcement of transferring to Ferrari in 2025. The soon-to-be-empty Mercedes seat, on the other hand, has been associated with many names, from two-time world champion Fernando Alonso to Williams driver Alex Albon, but the most jaw-dropping one without question is Red Bull’s very own Max Verstappen. While there has been plenty of news going on off the grid, there hasn’t been a significant change in the team’s performances on the grid compared to last year, except for Alpine, as the formerly midfield team has fallen way back. Red Bull is still comfortably leading with Verstappen winning and Sergio Perez becoming runner-up in both the Bahrain and Saudi Arabian Grand Prix. The third place on the podium went to Ferrari drivers, Carlos Sainz and Charles Leclerc respectively, in the first two races of the season. Aston Martin and McLaren have also shown solid performance finishing in points while Mercedes has been facing obstacles with both the qualifying and race pace which left Hamilton ve Russell frustrated. However, this is not unexpected, as Mercedes started the last season on the wrong foot. Nonetheless, with the upgrades brought midseason, Mercedes quickly moved to the front of the grid again. With the end of the two-header in the Arabian Peninsula, the teams are now headed to Australia, returning to the Gulf for the last two races of the year. The recent increase in the number of races held in the Arabian Peninsula comes from the rise in investment from the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, which is currently advocating for the addition of a second race in Qiddiya. With their increasing stakes in Formula 1, Gulf countries have been accused of sportwashing. The Guardian journalist David Conn defines sportwashing as “the exploitation of sporting events to cleanse tarnished reputations." But why are the Gulf countries suddenly more interested in investing in Formula 1 and are they actually “sportwashing”? The term gained significant traction after Qatar hosted the 2022 World Cup, but “sportwashing” has been long used for other Gulf countries as well with their huge investments in football and Formula 1 in recent years to cover up their political wrongdoings. Evidently, Abu Dhabi's investments in sports, such as ownership of English Premier League club Manchester City and hosting the final race in the Formula 1 calendar, serve as a diversionary tactic to deflect attention from its violation of human rights, which include unfair trials, limited freedom of expression, failure to investigate torture allegations, gender discrimination, and mistreatment of migrant workers, as condemned by Amnesty International. Perceptions surrounding Saudi Arabia and sportswashing are similar. The country is commonly known as an authoritarian state responsible for the execution of almost 200 people in the last year , fueling the humanitarian crisis in Yemen with a military intervention, linked to the murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi, as well as the persecution of women's rights protestors. Yet, Saudi investors succeeded in securing a spot in the F1 calendar for Jeddah in 2021. This was received poorly, as Formula 1 had just launched their “We Race as One” campaign a year prior in 2020 to condemn inequality & racism and promote inclusivity for everyone regardless of their gender, race, and sexuality. Even though some argue that the Gulf states’ investment in sports is a means to improve their reputations on the international stage, it is also arguably fueled by desires for rapid economic growth. In 2016, Saudi Arabia’s Prince Mohammed bin Salman introduced Vision 2030, a long-term development plan to diversify the Saudi economy and reduce its dependency on oil revenue by developing other sectors such as tourism, entertainment, and technology while promoting private sector growth. Parallel to these efforts, Saudi Arabia invested heavily in Formula 1 by building a circuit in Jeddah and signing a 10-year contract with Liberty Media, owners of F1, to host at least one race each season in the country. Additionally, they advocated for a second race in Qiddiya by signing multi-million dollar marketing deals with drivers, including Fernando Alonso. This paved the way for other Gulf countries to develop their own economic plans to transform their oil-dependent economies into more sustainable and diversified ones. Qatar implemented the National Vision 2030 and constructed state-of-the-art stadiums for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. The United Arab Emirates launched the "UAE Vision 2021" and "UAE Vision 2071" initiatives, investing heavily in sports by hosting events such as the Dubai World Cup (with horse racing), Dubai Tennis Championships, and Dubai Rugby Sevens, among others. They also backed the Emirati former rally driver Mohammed Ben Sulayem in the FIA Presidential elections for choosing the successor of Jean Todt. The eventual election of Ben Sulayem also naturally increased the Gulf influence in F1. While this growing Gulf influence benefits the countries’ reputation, economy, and globalization, the administrative change has led to various political debates. Drivers such as Lewis Hamilton and former F1 driver and world champion Sebastian Vettel are actively engaged in activism for human rights and social justice. They often use their platform to speak out on global issues — Hamilton has worn a special design rainbow helmet supporting LGBTQ rights and a Black Lives Matter shirt before races. Hence, a major controversy emerged when The FIA (Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile) changed its International Sporting Code and endorsed drivers to receive written permission from the FIA to make any "political, religious and personal statements." FIA president Mohammed Ben Sulayem further said he would prefer the drivers to leave their "private personal agendas at home.” It was later clarified that the drivers were actually free to say whatever they wanted in the press conferences and this ban was only for formal events like podiums and grid ceremonies. This was just one of the multiple political debates going around in the F1 paddock. Even though there aren’t absolute restrictions on the rights of expression and political speech, the drivers and the teams have to be more careful with their words and actions in Middle Eastern countries. In conclusion, sportswashing and economic goals lie at the heart of the rise in Gulf investment in sports and Formula 1. While it sometimes leads to political controversies, it benefits both the states and the sport. In a way, it also gives the drivers the platform to be vocal on the social injustices and inequalities in the countries they are racing at and draw attention to these issues on the global stage. It shouldn’t be forgotten that Formula 1 is a platform that reaches an immense global audience and it can be instrumental in shaping public opinion. Hopefully, F1 not only provides breathtaking races in the Gulf but also carries the “We Race as One” spirit to these countries.

In Palestine, memory has always been a form of resistance. Today, it lives not only in embroidery and heritage, but on digital screens across the world. Across Gaza, the West Bank, and the Palestinian towns inside Israel, a new generation is documenting life, loss, and love in "real- time" — transforming social media into a living archive of survival. < Back Digital Resistance: How Young Palestinians Use Social Media to Preserve Memory Mariam Mahamid November 6, 2025 In Palestine, memory has always been a form of resistance. Today, it lives not only in embroidery and heritage, but on digital screens across the world. Across Gaza, the West Bank, and the Palestinian towns inside Israel, a new generation is documenting life, loss, and love in "real- time" — transforming social media into a living archive of survival. When mainstream media misrepresents or erases Palestinians voices, young creators step in to fill the silence. Through platforms like Instagram, TikTok, and YouTube, they reclaim the narrative — one post at a time. From Bisan Owda 's heartfelt stories and Plestia Alaqad 's field reports in Gaza", to Muna El-Kurd documenting displacement in Sheikh Jarrah, and artists like Tamer Nafar and Nadeen Khoury using performance to challenge silence — each of them adds a fragment to Palestine’s digital memory. Even creators such as Marwan Halabi keep the Palestinian dialect and humor alive online, showing that even humor can be a form of resistance. Together, these voices form a patchwork of truth — connected by hashtags instead of threads (traditional Palestinian embroidery). For many in Gaza, sharing the truth is an act of immense risk. Saleh Al-Ja’frawi , a young content creator, used to post brief videos capturing daily life between airstrikes — snippets of hope amid chaos. His camera became his way of coping and communicating with the world. When he was killed while filming, his final posts turned into memorials: fragments of a story that will not fade. Even after his death , his account remains — a reminder that in Palestine, to document is to resist. According to Access Now’s 2024 report "Gaza, Genocide & Big Tech ", major social media companies have repeatedly removed Palestinian content, shadow-banned accounts, and labeled eyewitness reports as "sensitive"or "misinformation." The stated reason for many of these removals is that the posts contain explicit or graphic imagery — footage of bombings, the wounded, or scenes of destruction. Yet these images are often the only proof of what is happening on the ground. As a result, Palestinians documenting the war face a constant dilemma: how to show the reality without violating platform policies. Many creators blur images, crop videos, or use symbols and coded language to avoid deletion. In doing so, they expose the paradox of the digital age — that the same platforms built for visibility can also enforce invisibility. This digital erasure mirrors the physical destruction on the ground: while bombs silence cities, algorithms silence witnesses. Yet, Palestinians continue to post, rebuild, and remember — proving that resistance survives in every upload. Palestinian heritage has always depended on acts of remembrance. Where previous generations preserved identity through tatreez , such as traditional Palestinian embroidery, today’s youth are doing so through images, captions, and live streams. Today’s youth are doing so through images, captions, and live streams. The method has changed, but the purpose remains the same. According to "Digital Activism in Perspective: Palestinian Resistance via Social Media ", social platforms have become “virtual spaces of protest” where storytelling and collective memory merge. Projects like "Visualizing Palestine " and the "Palestinian Museum Digital Archive " extend this tradition into cyberspace, transforming data and memory into visual testaments of truth. Palestine’s digital activism carries the same spirit of remembrance that once lived in thread and fabric. In colonized societies, memory itself often becomes a way to survive — a quiet act of resistance passed from one generation to the next. As historian Pierre Nora wrote in 1989, these "sites of memory" are spaces where people preserve identity when physical places or traditions are lost. For Palestinians, the internet itself has become one of these sites — a shared space where loss and belonging coexist in every post. Each photo, voice note, or caption becomes a modern heirloom passed from one timeline to another. Yet telling these stories online comes with its own battles. Palestinian content is often restricted or deleted by platforms that claim neutrality. Reports from Amnesty International and the Meta Oversight Board reveal how algorithms systematically suppress Palestinian voices, echoing what researchers call "systematic digital repression." As scholar Miriyam Aouragh wrote in 2008, this represents a new kind of "everyday resistance on the internet," where activism becomes embedded in daily digital life. Yet the community finds ways around it — mirroring posts, translating captions, saving content before it disappears. Every repost becomes an act of defiance, every share a heartbeat of persistence. As noted in "Social Media’s Key Role in Palestinian Activism for Gaza ", the online sphere now serves as both a newsroom and a memorial wall. This convergence between memory and technology mirrors the old forms of preservation — when tatreez carried stories across generations, and now when data carries voices across screens. Digital resistance doesn’t end when the Wi-Fi is cut off. It lives in conversations, in art, and in the quiet insistence to remember. These young Palestinians aren’t just documenting conflict — they’re preserving humanity. Their feeds may scroll endlessly, but their stories root deeply. Beyond the posts and the algorithms lies something more enduring: a collective determination to exist. Each act of sharing, archiving, or even mourning online becomes a declaration of identity. For Palestinians, visibility itself is survival — an assertion that their stories cannot be deleted, even when their accounts can. This persistence transforms technology into testimony, and testimony into truth. Just as every stitch of a tatreez once carried a story, every pixel now carries a memory — a thread of continuity between past and present. Through both fabric and fiber optics, Palestinians continue to prove that resistance is not only about struggle, but about the refusal to be forgotten. Photo Source: Raw Pixel, Creative Commons

Lorsque la question des nations sans états indépendants est abordée, on pense souvent aux Palestiniens, aux Tibétains, aux Berbères. À cette liste des “opprimés des opprimés” , il faudrait rajouter les Kurdes. < Back Vous Voulez Savoir Plus Sur les Kurdes? C'est Par Ici By Amalia Heide March 31, 2023 Lorsque la question des nations sans états indépendants est abordée, on pense souvent aux Palestiniens, aux Tibétains, aux Berbères. À cette liste des “opprimés des opprimés” , il faudrait rajouter les Kurdes , considérés comme étant, parmi les peuples sans État, le plus démographiquement nombreux dans la région du Moyen Orient. La distribution du peuple kurde dans différents États, et donc sous différents régimes politiques, nous amène à nous questionner sur l’évolution régionale du nationalisme kurde depuis sa naissance au début du XXe siècle. Faisons un récapitulatif historique. Historiquement, les mouvements nationalistes kurdes ont tous revendiqué un État kurde indépendant, que ce soit pour le PKK en Turquie, le PYD en Syrie, ou les kurdes irakiens (GRK) et iraniens. Le sujet de la création d’un État Kurde indépendant avait été envisagé dans le traité de Sèvres en 1920 après la chute de l’empire ottoman mais n’avait pas connu suite du fait du refus du fraichement constitué Etat turc nationaliste à perdre des territoires ainsi que du besoin du Royaume-Uni de contrôler rapidement la région, où l’on avait récemment découvert du pétrole. Se signa ainsi le traité de Lausanne en 1923 pour remplacer le traité de Sèvres. Celui-ci prévoit la création de l’État syrien sous le contrôle de la France et du Royaume de l’Irak sous contrôle du Royaume-Uni. Pas un mot sur le statut des Kurdes ne figure sur le traité. Les kurdes se trouvent ainsi dispersés entre la Turquie, la Syrie, la Perse et l’Irak. Leur lutte pour la revendication qui s’ensuit s’est souvent traduite en mouvements politiques qui ont connu des répressions très violentes notamment de l'État Irakien avec le massacre de Halabja en 1988 avec des armes chimiques. En Turquie, les répressions contre le PKK ont même poussé ce dernier à évoluer sur sa position à la fin des années 90 et début 2000 pour passer d’une revendication indépendantiste à une revendication autonomiste, et à un changement de méthode qui implique en principe moins de violence. Néanmoins, cette évolution est à nuancer puisque le PKK est encore reconnu comme étant une organisation terroriste par beaucoup de pays tels que les Etats-Unis et l’Union Européenne. Les violences et les attentats ne sont pas disparus. Le susdit massacre de Halabja en Irak a suscité un important émoi de la communauté internationale. Cette agitation a permis aux États Unis d’instrumentaliser la question des nationalismes kurdes dans le cadre de la première guerre du golfe en incitant ces derniers à la révolte afin de déstabiliser l’Irak. À la suite de cette guerre, les Kurdes en Irak ont pu établir une zone autonome qui a ensuite reconnu la pleine reconnaissance de l'État irakien dans la constitution de 2005 après la chute de Saddam Hussein. Le Kurdistan irakien est toujours là et constitue la forme la plus institutionnalisée et stable d’un État kurde après l’existence éphémère de la République kurde de Marhaba en Iran en 1946. En 2017, un référendum a été organisé dans cette région de l’Irak sur la question de l’indépendance qui a obtenu 92.73% de votes en faveur. Contrairement aux attentes, ce référendum a été une source importante de divisions. En effet, les mouvements kurdes ne sont pas unis et de nombreuses divisions persistent encore aujourd'hui. Étonnamment, la question de l’autonomie ou l’indépendance est une source de désaccord important entre les mouvements nationalistes kurdes car certains ont changé leur position et leur angle de lutte. C’est le cas notamment en Turquie , où le parti politique kurde (PYD) fut créé en 2015 ayant pour objectif un Etat autonome démocratique, égalitaire, pacifique et écologiste dans le respect des frontières turques. Il s’agit d’un parti ayant des relations proches avec le PKK mais qui ne soutient pas publiquement leurs actions violentes. Cette nouvelle idéologie fut exportée au mouvement en Syrie. L’évolution dans ces revendications du mouvement kurde va totalement à l’encontre du nationalisme kurde en Irak, où le discours indépendantiste « pankurdiste » est certes en voie de disparition , mais où l’on cherche activement la mise en place d’un État-nation « kurdistanais irakien ». Cet affaiblissement d’un sentiment d’appartenance commune kurde et donc les divergences de revendications expliquent pourquoi à présent nous devons parler des nationalisme s et non d’ un nationalisme kurde. En outre, les soutiens de puissances étrangères à certains mouvements kurdes ont participé à augmenter les tensions entre les différents mouvements qui ont parfois évolué jusque vers des luttes armées. C’est le cas de l’Irak soutenant les kurdes iraniens et inversement l’Iran soutenant les kurdes irakien pendant la guerre de 1980-1988, ce qui fait que les deux groupes kurdes s’affrontent à plusieurs reprises. Pour mettre un exemple plus récent, le jeu d’alliance dans la région fit que, lors des révoltes contre Bachar-Al Assad en Syrie, le GRK (les kurdes d’Irak) étaient soutenus par la Turquie tandis que la Turquie était du côté de l’opposition syrienne. Au contraire , le PYD (groupe kurde de Syrie) soutenait (au moins au début) le régime syrien. Comme le PYD et le PKK sont proches idéologiquement et que le régime turc et les Kurdes de Turquie ne s’entendent pas très bien, à la fin, nous voyons que le PYD et le PKK s’opposent dans ce jeu d’alliances. C’est hallucinant de voir l’impact que les intérêts des puissances extérieures peuvent avoir sur des mouvements qui étaient à l’origine extrêmement proches. Mais cette discordance et tensions entre mouvements kurdes est à nuancer. Même s'il existe des divergences et même des conflits d'intérêts, il existe encore une certaine solidarité kurde transfrontalière qui fait preuve de l'existence encore latente d'une identification commune. Un exemple est la prise en charge de réfugiés lorsque se produisent des persécutions de la part des Etats. Celui-ci est le cas à présent avec les jeunes kurdes iraniens, victimes des répressions actuelles de la part de l'Etat Iranien suite au mouvement social, qui fuient et sont accueillis par le Kurdistan irakien.

Ever since the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia has understood that it is surrounded by dangerous neighbors. < Back Armenia: The EU As a Destination? By Jad Toufic Toutinji April 30, 2024 Ever since the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia has understood that it is surrounded by dangerous neighbors. Notably, Armenia’s unreliable ally, Russia, does not even consider Armenia’s interests as a secondary priority. Since the defeat and the rise of a new geopolitical opportunity through the Russia-Ukraine war, Armenia has seriously taken into consideration to join the European Union (EU), and the EU has cleared their way to apply. Thus, the Western bloc, especially after Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced the freezing of its Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) membership. In March, the Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said that applying for an EU membership is “being discussed.” Later, the European Parliament passed a resolution confirming that Armenia can apply for membership as it meets the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty Article 49. What are the motives for both sides? What about Russia? Armenia’s motives to join the EU are mostly defensive. Located in the Caucuses and surrounded by threats from all its neighbors (apart from Georgia), it makes absolute sense that it seeks to ensure its security. With Russia occupying Ukraine and having proven untrustworthy and unreliable in the war against Azerbaijan, France, arguably the leader of the EU, has strongly been a resort for arms sales and strengthening the military. For example, in October 2023, Paris declared it would sell an air defense system to Armenia and provide other military and humanitarian aid. Thus, in a time when Armenia feels dangerously besieged, the EU appears as an inevitable option. On the other side of the story, the EU would benefit strategically from swaying Armenia to its side. First and foremost, a foothold in Armenia presents an opportunity for military pressure on Türkiye but also, obviously, Russia. Moreover, in the long run, leverage in Armenia can, should any geopolitical shifts take place, provide access to energy resources through Azerbaijan and potentially avoid Turkish and Russian hegemony over it. Not only so, but seeing the widespread Armenian diaspora, especially in the Middle East, the EU would also gain several political influences in the region, for instance, in Türkiye and Lebanon. Nevertheless, a shortcoming that the EU might discover later is that expanding into Armenia could translate into a consistent risk of immigrant influx from Central Asia, the Caucasus, Russia and the Middle East region. Inevitably, too, the geopolitical benefits will translate into further tensions with Iran, Türkiye and Russia as these countries begin to feel surrounded. The EU may have to interfere politically and potentially militarily on several occasions if the aforementioned countries decide to act upon or create political traps for the EU countries. As to Russia, apart from the political and security messages, Armenia joining the EU will be seen as an intrusion in a region historically dominated by it, which puts Putin’s narrative of an alternative to the West under doubt. But, Armenia is not in continental Europe. The precedent for a non-European geographic country being in the EU exists if we consider Cyprus as being part of Asia or looking at the non-European territories of France and other European countries too. Not to forget, joining the EU is more reliant on upholding the values assigned in the Maastricht Treaty and the Copenhagen Criteria, which do not give reference to geographic location. Moreso, Armenia has already politically engaged with Europe through participation in bodies like the Council of Europe. Is it as easy as it sounds? It would be naïve to assume that Armenia joining will take place in a matter of months. Firstly, EU accessions are known to take years, often decades, to be fully completed. By the time a full accession takes place, if it ever does, the geopolitics of the region and the role of Russia might have shifted significantly. Apart from the natural time constraints, there are still over 10,000 Russian troops in Armenia. In April, however, Yerevan sent an official request to Moscow to remove its troops from Zvartnots International Airport, as Armen Grigorian, Armenian Security Council Secretary has said. The Kremlin (at the time of writing) denies receiving an official request, explaining why it has not started any withdrawals. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that Moscow would commit to withdrawal as it would lead to Russian loss of influence. In the past, Russia has pressured the continuity of Russian troops on ex-USSR territory, whether forcible or willingly, such as in Georgia and Crimea; hence, it would not be surprising if Russia decides to infringe upon Armenian sovereignty to protect its regional hegemony. In the future, it would be expected to see that this infringement will keep on increasing the closer Yerevan becomes to Brussels. The real question would be to see whether Russia might be further pressured by Armenian rapprochement to the EU that it intervenes militarily or leads a coup d’état. Another difficulty is geography: are small European states willing to deal with the threats surrounding Armenia, especially at a time of the rise of the European right? In light of the recent rapprochement between Hungary’s Orban and Türkiye’s Erdogan, will a hampering of the process of accession also take place by Türkiye via Orban? Lastly, Armenia is geographically isolated from most trade with the EU, so it remains to be seen whether or not further economic integration plans will be proposed and are feasible even; in another sense, will the driver for accession remain only for security purposes for Armenia? In a decade’s time, if no economic integration proposals take place, the incentive to join the West might change, thus slowing or even ending the attempt.

Sports Recap – April 2022 < Back Sports Recap: April By Hugo Lagergren April 29, 2022 Football As the season reaches its climax, the battle between Liverpool and Manchester City for domestic and European glory is showing no sign of letting up. In their second meeting of the Premier League season, the two teams played out an exhilarating 2-2 draw, in what was described by many as the game of the season. One week later, however, Liverpool overcame Pep Guardiola’s side with a dominant first half display to reach their first FA Cup final under Jurgen Klopp. This keeps its hopes of completing a historic quadruple alive. The Champions League quarter-finals saw some serious upsets, as Villareal managed to eliminate favorite Bayern Munich with a late goal from Samuel Chukwueze, setting up a semi-final against Liverpool. Karim Benzema maintained his brilliant form by eliminating the defending champions, Chelsea, with a devastating hat-trick, sending Real Madrid through. Real Madrid will play Man City, as Pep tries to win the only trophy that has eluded him during his time at City. The Europa League, UEFA’s second tier competition, also produced a number of shock results. The biggest was Eintracht Frankfurt’s defeat of Barcelona at the Camp Nou. West Ham United and Red Bull Leipzig also won their respective quarter-finals. Possibly the biggest surprise of the competition was Glasgow’s Rangers reaching the semi-finals of a European tournament. This is the first time a Scottish side has reached the last four since 2008. In the inaugural season of the Europa Conference League, Europe’s tertiary club football competition, Olympique de Marseille, has managed to reach the semi-finals, where it will play Dutch side Feyenoord. Leicester City defeated PSV to set up a semi-final against Mourinho’s struggling AS Roma. With 29 out of the 32 teams having already qualified for the 2022 Qatar World Cup, FIFA completed the draw of the group stages, classifying the 32 possible contenders into 8 groups. This decides the paths each team must take if they are to reach the World Cup final. Following a poor display of form, OGC Nice dropped out of contention for the Champions League, despite reaching the final of the French Cup. This has undoubtedly dampened the mood on the Côte D’Azur, as Nice look likely to miss out on the top-tier of European football, once again. With six games left in the season, none of which are against teams currently in the top five, Nice are looking to reverse its poor form by taking the maximum number of points possible whilst also hoping that the teams above them drop points. With only four games remaining, and just one point separating Chelsea and Arsenal, the tension is rising in the Women’s Super League, as Arsenal attempts to steal the title off Chelsea. Defending champions Chelsea, who have held the title for two years running now, will be without star striker Fran Kirby for the rest of the season. Her absence, according to Chelsea manager Emma Hayes, can be attributed to a case of “fatigue.” In the Women’s FA Cup, Chelsea beat rivals Arsenal comfortably to reach the final, where they will play Man City at Wembley. On March 22, FC Barcelona announced a four-year partnership with UNHCR. Audiences will see the UN Refugee Agency’s logo appear on the back of the Barcelona kit. Moreover, the Barcelona Foundation pledged to supply UNHCR with an annual €400,000 cash contribution and an additional annual €100,000 worth of sports equipment and technical expertise. Barcelona has a history of philanthropic partnerships with the UN – collaborating with the intergovernmental organization for unconventional kit sponsorships. Many will remember the iconic Barcelona kits with the UNICEF logo displayed on the front, which the team used from 2006 to 2010. Formula 1 Ferrari continued its dominant form by clinching a double podium at the Saudi Arabian Grand Prix behind Max Verstappen (Leclerc 2nd, Sainz 3rd). They earned their second win of the season at the Australian Grand Prix in Melbourne, where Leclerc stormed to his fourth career win. Max Verstappen retired with engine issues in Melbourne for the second time this season, exacerbating worries surrounding Red Bull’s reliability. Red Bull’s team principal, Christian Horner, labelled the issue “desperately frustrating,” as Red Bull struggles to keep up with the pace of the Ferraris. However, Red Bull managed to reestablish themselves at Imola, where they achieved their first one two finish since Malaysia 2016, with Max Verstappen taking the victory. Tennis Stephan Tsitsipas beat Davidovich Fokina to win his second Monte Carlo title in a row. The Greek tennis player took victory in straight sets, 6-3, 7-6, despite looking slightly tense during the tie breaker of the second set. The world number five described himself “very proud” as he won his first trophy of the season, a feat he hopes will kickstart his 2022 campaign. Golf On April 10, American golfer, Scottie Scheffler won his first green jacket by championing the 86th PGA Masters tournament, holding off late pushes from Cameron Smith and Rory McIlroy. Last year, Scheffler finished 18th and his highest finish at any previous major was fourth place. However, much of the golfing world’s attention was on Tiger Woods. Woods made a surprising return following a serious car crash in February 2021, during which he sustained several serious leg injuries. American Sports The NBA playoffs are now underway, with the Phoenix Suns as the favorite to win this year. Last year’s champions, the Milwaukee Bucks will be looking to defend their title. However, the Suns have put up a dominant display during the regular season by setting a franchise record for the most wins in a single season. The NHL approaches the Stanley Cup playoffs with many teams filling playoff spots, including the New York Rangers who have qualified for a place in the playoffs for the first time in five years. Last year’s finalist, the Montreal Canadians, have struggled and are currently bottom of the Atlantic Division, with qualification for the playoffs far out of reach.

Entre des réformes politiques en faveur du droit des femmes tels que le droit de conduire et le droit à l'obtention d’un passeport et au voyage à l'international sans autorisation d’un parent masculin et les réformes culturelles tel que l'accès au cinéma et la production de films, le pays semble changer radicalement. < Back L’industrie cinématographique en Arabie saoudite By Anna Halpern March 30, 2024 L’Arabie saoudite, sous la direction du prince héritier Mohammed ben Salmane (communément surnommé MBS), a fait beaucoup de bruit sur la scène internationale grâce à des réformes qui poussent le royaume vers une modernization soudaine. Entre des réformes politiques en faveur du droit des femmes tels que le droit de conduire et le droit à l'obtention d’un passeport et au voyage à l'international sans autorisation d’un parent masculin et les réformes culturelles tel que l'accès au cinéma et la production de films, le pays semble changer radicalement. Mais est-ce vraiment possible de convaincre le monde, en commençant par la population saoudite elle-même, de ce changement si souvent critiqué comme étant plus d'insuffisant? Pour ce qui est de convaincre la population saoudite, l’importance du changement culturel ne doit pas être sous-estimée. En effet, dans un pays qui subit encore de fortes répressions, il devient essentiel de garder la jeunesse du côté du gouvernement. Ceci est fait principalement grâce à des réformes destinées à ‘occidentaliser’ et ouvrir le pays, et ceci passe en grande partie par une nouvelle ouverture à l'audiovisuel international. Qui plus est, ce changement n’est pas sans motivation économique ; dans le cadre de sa “vision 2030” MBS a comme objectif de diversifier l’économie du royaume, et ceci semble passer par un pari sur le potentiel du pays dans l’industrie cinématographique. Ce développement semble centré sur Neom, où ils espèrent établir un hub technologique ainsi qu’un centre de l’industrie cinématographique en commençant par d'immenses studios. Ces studios ont déjà commencé à attirer des productions telles que « Desert Warrior » du réalisateur britannique Rupert Wyatt, avec des stars telles que Anthony Mackie et Ben Kingsley. D’ici 2030, le royaume espère avoir 2000 salles de cinéma et un box-office de 1 milliard de dollars, faisant de l’Arabie saoudite un lieux idéal pour investir. Cette ouverture nouvelle vient aussi de façon formelle par la création du festival « Red Sea Film Festival » . Ce festival a ouvert son édition 2023 par le film Britannique « What’s Love Got to Do With It? » , une comédie romantique multiculturelle représentant des LGBTQ+, des mariages arrangés ainsi que des couples bi-culturels; en bref ce film montre une diversité que peu auraient pensé voir sur un écran en Arabie saoudite il y a à peine 10 ans. Ces nouvelles normes se trouvent tout de même face à certains obstacles. En effet, la communauté religieuse à eu du mal à accepter cette modernisation. En 2017, le grand Mufti à déclaré juger le cinéma et les concerts « sources de dépravation » . Les critiques rejettent tout de même l’imposition de valeurs 'hollywoodiennes’ dans un pays qui reste tout de même très conservateur et où le droit est basé sur le respect de la sharia. D’autre part, l’ouverture du pays à des productions internationales risque d'être limitée par leur capacité à attirer des stars dont les positions publiques à propos du droit des femmes et des LGBTQ+ les met en opposition au régime saoudien. De plus, la communauté internationale n’a pas oublié la mort du journaliste Jamal Khashoggi, assassiné dans le consulat Saoudien à Istanbul. Son meurtre est largement imputé au prince héritier, causant une vague d’outrage. Plus largement, le traitement de l’opposition semble en dissuader plus d’un de participer à un projet en Arabie saoudite. La question se pose donc, ce changement en Arabie saoudite n’est il qu’une façon de faire passer l'autoritarisme de MBS sous une couverture de modernization et d'occidentalisation, ou souligne t-il un véritable pas en avant vers un pays plus ouvert et libre - même si ceci est encore loin d'être le cas.

La jeune femme iranienne, Bahar, semble alarmée face à l'idée qu'un mouvement qui la touche de si près puisse tout simplement s'évaporer, comme c'est souvent le cas de la plupart des mouvements à vocation humanitaire qui deviennent viraux à l'échelle internationale sur les réseaux sociaux. < Back Le Mouvement en Iran: Un Phénomène à la Mode Pour la Communauté Internationale By Amalia Heide November 30, 2022 « Le mouvement tend vers une tendance » . Ce terme, chargé de méfiance, a été employé par Bahar (pseudonyme) pour décrire ses craintes quant à l'avenir du mouvement d'émancipation des femmes en Iran. Cette jeune femme iranienne semble alarmée face à l'idée qu'un mouvement qui la touche de si près puisse tout simplement s'évaporer, comme c'est souvent le cas de la plupart des mouvements à vocation humanitaire qui deviennent viraux à l'échelle internationale sur les réseaux sociaux. Les utilisateurs passent d'une obsession fiévreuse et passionnée pour une cause à l'indifférence et à l'oubli. Et tout cela en un clin d'œil. La viralisation excessive d'une cause génère donc une saturation et un ennui chez les utilisateurs qui ne sont pas directement concernés. C'est pourquoi, au cours d'une semaine, on assiste à un défilé sans fin de posts sur les réseaux sociaux sur un sujet précis, partagés automatiquement et sans réelle réflexion. La semaine suivante, les mêmes utilisateurs, qui semblaient si engagés, se lassent de voir le même message encore et encore et deviennent obsédés par une autre campagne. Mais qu'implique également cette viralisation démesurée ? Elle réduit une réalité très concrète à quelque chose d'abstrait ou de « symbolique » , en détournant l'attention des personnes réellement concernées par le problème. C'est pourquoi Bahar a l'impression que les utilisateurs des médias sociaux actuels accordent plus d'attention aux paroles et aux actions des influenceurs occidentaux qu'aux femmes iraniennes, dont la liberté est limitée à son expression minimale par le régime. Même lorsque les actions de ces influenceurs sont plus importantes que le simple partage d'un post, la signification de cette action ne sera pas la même ni aura le même poids que si elle était réalisée par une femme iranienne. Prenez, par exemple, les femmes qui ont rasé leurs cheveux en signe de soutien aux femmes iraniennes. Les implications d'un tel acte ne sont pas les mêmes pour une femme occidentale vivant dans un État de droit que pour une femme iranienne qui met sa vie en danger. Il est vrai, cependant, qu'il s'agit d'une forme de sensibilisation et de faire prendre conscience au plus grand nombre, ce dont Bahar est très reconnaissante. Il est indéniable que l'effet positif est très fort. Cependant, il faut toujours être conscient des limites de ces campagnes de sensibilisation. Surtout quand, une fois les cheveux coupés par exemple, les influenceurs occidentaux estiment que leur rôle a été fait et passent à un autre sujet pour divertir leurs followers. Ont-elles coupé leurs cheveux pour soutenir une cause noble ou pour créer du sensationnel et des visuels sur leur page ? Mais alors, comment pouvons-nous, en tant que membres de la communauté internationale, contribuer à changer cette réalité concrète dans laquelle vivent des millions d'iraniennes ? Selon Bahar, l'essentiel est de s'informer avant de partager sur le sujet et non de publier aléatoirement afin suivre une tendance, surtout pour ne pas laisser une vision occidentale et anti-islamique du problème s'imposer à l'opinion publique. Ce n'est pas la religion musulmane qui génère le problème actuel en Iran, ni le port du voile lui-même, mais la répression autoritaire, violente et systématique d'un régime qui ne permet pas aux femmes de décider du cours de leur vie ni du rapport qu'elles souhaitent entretenir avec la religion. Dans le même temps, les membres de la communauté internationale peuvent aider les femmes iraniennes en faisant pression sur les autorités de l'État afin qu'à leur tour, elles fassent pression sur l'ONU pour que le régime iranien actuel commence à respecter les droits fondamentaux de ses femmes. “The movement tends into a trend ” . Este terme, cargado de recelo, fue utilizado por Bahar (seudónimo) para describir sus miedos con respecto al futuro del movimiento de emancipación de las mujeres en Irán. Esta joven irani parece alarmada frente a la posibilidad de que un movimiento que la toca tan de cerca se evapore en el aire, como suele pasar con todos los movimientos de reivindicación social que se viralizan a nivel internacional en las redes sociales. Los usuarios pasan de sentir una obsesión febril y pasional por una causa a la indiferencia y el olvido de la misma. Y todo en un abrir y cerrar de ojos. La viralización excesiva de una causa genera por lo tanto saturación y hastío en los usuarios que no se ven afectados de manera directa. Es por eso que a lo largo de una semana, hay un desfile interminable de publicaciones en las redes sociales sobre un tema específico, compartidas de manera automática y sin una reflexión real. La semana siguiente, los mismos usuarios, que tan comprometidos parecían, se aburren de ver la misma publicación una y otra vez y pasan a obsesionarse con otra causa, volviendo a producirse el mismo proceso. Pero que implica además esta viralización excesiva? Se reduce a algo abstracto o “simbólico” una realidad sumamente concreta, quitando el foco de las personas que están verdaderamente implicadas en la problematica. Es por ello que Bahar tiene la impresión de que actualmente los usuarios de las redes sociales le prestan más atención a las palabras y acciones de influencers occidentales que a las mujeres iranies que ven su libertad limitada a su minima expresion por el regimen. Inclusive cuando las acciones de dichos influencers es mas significativa que el simple partage de una publicacion, el significado de dicha accion no va a ser el mismo ni va a tener el mismo peso que si lo hiciera una mujer irani. Tomemos como ejemplo raparse el pelo como muestra de apoyo hacia las mujeres iranies. Las implicaciones de dicha accion no son las mismas para una mujer occidental viviendo en un Estado de derecho que para una mujer irani que pone su vida en peligro al hacer lo mismo. Es verdad de todas maneras de que es una forma de spread awarness, algo que agradece Bahar, pero hay que ser conscientes de sus limites. Sobretodo cuando, una vez la mecha de pelo cortada, las influencers occidentales sienten que su parte ya fue hecha y pasan a otro tema para mantener entretenidos a sus seguidores. En el fondo se cortaron el pelo por apoyar una causa justa o para crear sensacionalismo y vizualicaciones en su pagina? Pero entonces, como podemos en tanto que miembros de la comunidad internacional contribuir a que esta realidad concreta en la que viven millones de mujeres iranies cambie? Segun Bahar, lo principal es Informarse y luego compartir sobre el tema y no unicamente publicar por seguir una moda. Informarse es esencial, sobretodo para no dejar que una vision occidental y anti-islamica sobre la problematica se imponga en la opinion publica. No es la religion musulmana la que genera problema, ni el port du voile en si, sino la represion autoritaria, violenta y sistematica de un regimen que no da lugar a que las mujeres decidan sobre el curso de sus vidas ni sobre la relacion que desean tener con la religion. A su vez, es importante hacer presion sobre las autoridades estatales para que, a leur tour, estas hagan presion en la ONU para que el regimen irani vigente comience a respetar los derechos fundamentales de sus mujeres.

On that evening, when I was casually texting my relative as we discussed Lebanon’s situation, he sent me a photo that my Tweet was shared on TV < Back Never Give Up on Your Voice: My Tweet Went Viral in Lebanon By Riwa Hassan November 30, 2021 Expressing my voice in Lebanon, a country that has been collapsing Nothing uncommon, just some videos of militias terrorizing the country with their legal and illegal arms. Over the years, this has become a norm for me and for everyone who lives in Lebanon, one of the most politically complex and divided countries in the MENA region. For decades now, our citizens have stood by political warlords and religious extremist figures, which has weakened Lebanese unity and allowed for corruption to infiltrate almost all governmental and non-governmental organizations. Today, with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the economic crisis, the Beirut explosion, and the overall socio-political situation compounded, people can no longer afford their basic necessities. On October 14, 2021, although the scene was not very different from today, the backstory was in fact more threatening, as it seemed that the country was on the verge of a civil war. Hezbollah and Amal Movement, known as the duo-Shiite, protested against the judge for the Beirut explosion investigation, Tarek Al Bitar, and accused him of being biassed after he involved some of their leaders in the investigation. As the protestors approached Ain El Remmaneh, where the residing majority are Christians who follow the Lebanese Forces Party, the clash, which soon became a bloodshed, began. This Tayouneh-Ain El Remmeneh bloodshed was called a “mini-civil war” as it also started in the same area where the Lebanese Civil War began in 1975. During that same time, I was in French class, trying to process all the news and the videos while texting my loved ones to make sure they were safe. The whole clash was not as disappointing to me as the youth supporters of these political parties, whose dreams and daily lives have been destroyed over the past two years. The protest, which was clearly not peaceful, was defended by Hezbollah and Amal supporters, as they backed it up with their right to protest and express themselves freely. They only recognize such human rights when it is in their interest. This sentiment was expressed in a Tweet I shared, which compared Hezbollah and Amal’s reactions in protests against a judge doing his job to the protests which demanded justice, equality and basic life necessities. In the former, they clearly supported the protests, but in the latter, their reaction was opposing and full of violence. As I normally do, I wrote a Tweet, “Remember when they called us ‘ate3een tor2at’ and ‘ze3ran’ and accused us of threatening civil peace when we were protesting for our basic rights #العدالة أقوى_من_ترهيبكم #الطيونه .” ‘Ate3een tor2at’ and ‘ze3ran’ can be translated to bandits or crooks. The hashtag under which I shared my Tweet is translated to “justice is stronger than your terrorism.” Suddenly, my Tweet was trending, and while some were threatening and cursing me, others showed their full support. On that evening, when I was casually texting my relative as we discussed the whole situation, he sent me a photo that my Tweet was shared on TV, on Lebanon Broadcasting Corporation International (LBCI). I received a lot of messages that encouraged me to continue voicing my opinion. At the same time, I got messages to be careful, and warnings that being bold about my stance is not safe. Later this year, on November 22, Lebanese Independence Day, while I was supposed to be studying for my finals, I could not help but think of how our lives have flipped upside down during the past two years, and reflect on what independence I was supposed to celebrate. I poured the words from my heart onto a post on Instagram. In almost an hour, my post was shared on numerous Instagram stories, especially within the Sciences Po community. For that, I cannot explain how safe it felt to be living in such a supportive community. I cannot thank you enough but I am forever grateful for your effort to help share my voice. I am writing this article on the plane on my way back to Lebanon and I have never felt this afraid yet excited at the same time. I know that I have only been away for around three months, but the situation in the country is changing very fast and, sadly, for the worse. On the bright side, this is the first time I have seen this amount of people going back to Lebanon, which explains how much love all the Lebanese diaspora hold for this country despite all the traumas and losses it has caused them. Sharing my stance and explaining the situation in Lebanon means a lot to me, and I will always express my opinion regardless of the consequences. Freedom of expression might only be found in our constitution, on paper, but we have the duty to share our concerns and turn it to action. The latter is one step forward towards change which Lebanon is in dire need for.

Sport is key for every individual. It constitutes an integral part of human life. Essentially, it keeps us fit and sane while reinforcing mental and physical strength. Biologically, it keeps our prominent organs alert and in turn the heart becomes stronger when it is met by regular exercise. Serving as a tool to help build the character and personality of a person. Sports have gained priority in all aspects of life while uniting the people. < Back Sports as a Way of Life By Joudi Arafa November 29, 2021 Sport is key for every individual. It constitutes an integral part of human life. Essentially, it keeps us fit and sane while reinforcing mental and physical strength. Biologically, it keeps our prominent organs alert and in turn the heart becomes stronger when it is met by regular exercise. Serving as a tool to help build the character and personality of a person. Sports have gained priority in all aspects of life while uniting the people. What can be learned from Sports? Sports bring utility. Notably, they establish discipline in life as they teach the fundamentals of communication, mobility, hard work, fairness etc. Psychologically, sport advances a human's thinking ability and decreases the stress of mind. It teaches control of emotions; the essence of staying focused in attaining discipline. Consequently, how does one attain their desired levels of discipline to reach a desired goal? First and foremost, it is essential to highlight the value of discipline in shaping determination and mindset. Discipline is a crucial foundation for any sport, and also a major aspect to succeed and dominate in other areas of life, especially in one’s career. As mentioned, it assists in achieving a certain mindset towards realizing great things. Another angle that can be taken when stating the lessons learned from sports is leadership skills. Even without being the captain of the football team, all teammates gain leadership skills. Sports always encourage people to strive to be the best that they can be, acting as a role model in their surroundings. Undoubtedly, physical activity is a core mental skill because it impacts other parts of our lives, like school and relationships with family and friends. It acts as an opportunity to build self-confidence, by embracing getting along with all kinds of people. Being a part of a group is motivating by itself; there is a group energy that occurs when people come together to take part in the same fun event. To sum up, discipline and focus are just two of the life skills that sports can illustrate; responsibility, goal-setting and working within a group are all equally beneficial and vital when recognizing sports and physical activity as pillars of leading a happy healthy life. Technology in sports The world of sport is perpetually changing over the years, and the use of technology is just one area that has made an impact on many sports in the modern day. Nowadays, technology plays a significant role in sports, and its use is indeed growing significantly. Advanced technology has become more resilient and less burdensome over this last decade, paving the way for new opportunities. Athletes currently wear sensors that portray real-time information to a trainer’s tablet, a GPS that precisely pinpoints motion, and wearable tech that prevents injuries. Compared to whiteboards and post-practice reviews, technology has substantially increased athletic potential. Take, for instance, swimmers and divers who participate in an extremely technical sport and have adapted the use of sensors into their usual practices. When swimming or diving, sensors measure more than the usual time and effort metrics. They map movements like rotational speed, dive angle, leg movement and hydrodynamics. Observing movements like those listed is groundbreaking, and allows trainers to help athletes further perfect their movements. Remarkably, they may only shave milliseconds off a performance, but a millisecond in a race can make all the difference needed to secure that desired gold medal! Importance of sports for students life As mentioned, sports have a massive positive impact on both the mind and body. It is therefore imperative to assess the various benefits that a student will gain from engaging in sports activities while also attending class. One can not deny how much sports aid in the overall development and growth of a student when effectively balanced with academia. While engaging in sports activities may seem to deduct time from studying, research has shown that more active students have better cognitive abilities. Sports along with other physical activities are beneficial to the brain, which allows students to remember or understand consistently what they read. In turn, it also increases competence when planning, creating strategies, and building team work, all of which are vital skills to have when being part of society. Development from sport goes beyond learning new physical skills. Sport helps students develop better ways to cope with the highs and lows of life. Constructive use of time and discipline is a major characteristic of any sportsperson. If a student plays sports, they need to demonstrate commitment of time, to be in a particular place at a particular time every day as a part of their routine. Simply put, participating in sports encourages a mindset towards practice, growth, and improvement: principles that encourage students to also hold academically. Becoming better at a sport results in self satisfaction, and sports are an excellent way to experience tangible improvement. From improving social skills to teaching self-esteem and personal resilience, sports can instill lifelong values for students that reach far past the classroom. With that being said, let’s hear what students from our Sciences Po campus had to say when asked about staying active: Carolina MOHR, 18yrs What sport do you play? “Soccer” Why is physical activity important for you? “Mental health, specifically for focus and I also just generally feel better because of endorphins.” Samanéa Rousseau, 18yrs What sport do you play? “I did competitive swimming for 12 years and eventing in horse-riding for 10.” Why is physical activity important for you? “I liked the idea of pushing myself to see where it takes me. I liked the outcome of mixing sports and people- it brought me amazing teammates, made me travel, encounter people and places I would not have otherwise. It taught me how important connections between people are. Those people picked me up when I was at my lowest and also pushed me to do my best. Go try new things, meet people; those things will teach you a bundle of values about life that you don't even know you need. I wish it to everyone, don't be scared to make the leap because you have nothing to lose.” Lena Westlund, 18yrs What sport do you play? “Boxing” Why is physical activity important for you? “Beneficial for physical and mental health.” David Ederberg, 21yrs What sport do you play? “For most of my life I’ve been doing Krav Maga, here in Menton I mostly play Volley- and Basketball. But I also like going running and doing different workouts to stay fit.” Why is physical activity important for you? “For me, being physically active is the perfect way to clear my mind, gain new energy and to be able to better focus and concentrate on school work. I love it when after a workout you know that you really challenged yourself and accomplished something - it's the best feeling ever.”